KR100859236B1 - Digital Engineered Safety Feature - Component Control System And Method For Testing The System - Google Patents

Abstract

The present invention relates to a digital engineering safety equipment-device control system and a test method for controlling the operation of an engineering safety equipment that is a facility for mitigating an accident at a nuclear power plant, and exist in the integrated digital engineering safety equipment-device control system. Input comparison test of the engineering safety equipment (ESF) start signal and manual signal input to the triple group controller, input comparison test and triple group controller for the ESF operation signal transmitted from the triple group controller to the loop controller, and Automatically test the logic of the loop controller online.

Engineering safety equipment, test, test and link processor, group controller, loop controller

Description

Digital Engineered Safety Feature-Component Control System And Method For Testing The System}

1 is a view showing the integrated digital engineering safety equipment according to an embodiment of the present invention.

2 is a diagram illustrating a test conceptual diagram of an integrated digital engineering safety equipment-device control system according to an embodiment of the present invention.

3 is a diagram illustrating a test conceptual diagram of a test and associated processor according to an embodiment of the present invention.

4 is a view showing a test method of the engineering safety equipment-device control system according to an embodiment of the present invention.

5 is a diagram illustrating a test logic diagram of an engineering safety equipment-device control system according to an embodiment of the present invention.

6 is a diagram illustrating a test scenario of a group controller according to an embodiment of the present invention.

7 is a diagram illustrating a test scenario of a loop controller according to an embodiment of the present invention.

<Explanation of symbols for the main parts of the drawings>

100: engineering safety equipment-device control system

101: group controller (GC)

102: loop controller (LC)

103: Test and Link Processor (ETIP)

104: cabinet operator module (COM)

105: control channel gateway (CCG)

The present invention relates to a digital engineering safety equipment-equipment control system and a test method thereof for a nuclear power plant. The present invention relates to an ESF start signal and a passive signal input to a triple group controller existing in an integrated digital engineering safety equipment-device control system. The comparison test, an input comparison test for the ESF operation signal transmitted from each of the triple group controllers, and the logic of the triple group controller and the loop controller are automatically performed online.

Nuclear power plant is one of the safety-oriented systems, and one of the most important roles for the safety of nuclear power plants is the engineering safety equipment-device control system. Engineering safety equipment-The equipment control system is an important system that prevents the progress of accidents by safely operating various engineering safety equipments in the event of a design standard accident of a nuclear power plant. And a decisive effect on improving safety.

Currently, the engineering safety equipment operation and control system of pressurized water reactor type nuclear power plant, which is most used in Korea, is mostly based on analog circuits, and digital engineering safety equipment-device control system has been applied since 2000s.

Analog-based engineering safety equipment operation and control systems have some drawbacks in terms of testing and maintenance.

Periodic inspection of the measurement control system is essential for the efficient and safe operation of nuclear power plants.In analog-based systems, relying on manual tests and inspections by plant operation personnel, prolonging inspection time and increasing the possibility of human error. It has the disadvantage of being difficult to improve.

In the case of digital engineering safety equipment operation and control system, which is recently developed and started to be applied, a power plant which is an engineering safety equipment operation system-auxiliary cabinet (DESFAS-AC), a logic control system for engineering safety equipment operation, and a loop control system for field equipment control It has been developed separately as a control system. In the case of DESFAS-AC, periodic and monitoring tests are conducted through the maintenance test group (MTP) and the link test group (ITP) without using the online test method, and each channel has independent ITP and MTP. The MTP provides the operator with information and enables the system test. The ITP generates the test injection input signal at the operator's request and provides the test result to the MTP.

Although the characteristics of this test satisfy the periodic inspection and test requirements of nuclear power plants, it adopts the manual initiated automatic test method rather than the online automatic periodic test method. In addition, during the system cycle test period, the controller under test is configured to bypass the actual system function.

The plant control system performs the function equivalent to the loop control system of the integrated digital engineering safety equipment-equipment control system. It is characterized by a single loop control, that is, one processor controlling one device, which incorporates a multi-loop control system in which one processor controls several devices. different. Each single loop control processor performs a manual test by the operator, which has the drawback that the processor cannot perform any given actual device control functions.

The present invention has been made to solve the problems of the prior art as described above, during the test and inspection of the integrated digital engineering safety equipment-equipment control system, the automatic periodic test and inspection online while maintaining the original function performance of the controller To provide a digital engineering safety equipment-equipment control system and its test method, which provides on-line test methods applied to the entire system area from operation logic system (group controller) to individual device control system (loop controller). The purpose.

In order to achieve the above object and to solve the above-mentioned problems of the prior art, the engineering safety equipment-equipment control system composed of m group controllers (GC) and a test and associated processor (ETIP) according to an embodiment of the present invention. (ESF-CCS) test method, the m group controllers (GC), receiving each ESF start signal generated from the plant protection system (PPS) and radiation monitoring system (RMS), the m group controllers At (GC), transmitting each ESF initiation signal state for each received ESF initiation signal to the test and association processor (ETIP), and at the test and association processor (ETIP), each of the ESF initiation signal states Testing for equality.

In addition, the engineering safety equipment-equipment control system (ESF-CCS) consisting of m group controllers (GC), n loop controllers (LC) forming a redundant structure, and a test and link processor (ETIP) according to another embodiment of the present invention. ), The m group controllers (GC), performing the operation logic for each ESF start signal generated from the plant protection system (PPS) and radiation monitoring system (RMS), the m group controllers (GC), transmitting an ESF operation signal to each of the n loop controllers (LC) based on the operation logic performed, and receiving the ESF operation signals by the n loop controllers (LC). And transmitting to an associated processor (ETIP), and testing the identity of the ESF enable signal at the test and associated processor (ETIP).

In addition, the engineering safety equipment-equipment control system (ESF-CCS) according to an embodiment of the present invention is m group controllers (GC) that operate independently, n loop controllers (LC) forming a redundant structure that operates independently And a test and associated processor (ETIP) for determining whether the corresponding channel can be tested, and each of the m group controllers (GCs) includes a plurality of channels that operate independently. Receiving the ESF start signal generated from the PPS) and the radiation monitoring system (RMS), performing a corresponding logic according to the ESF start signal, and outputting an ESF operation signal, and each of the n loop controllers LC The control logic for the ESF operation signal is performed to control each engineering safety equipment device. The test and associated processor (ETIP) is configured to perform tests and associated processors (ETIP) of other channels at regular intervals. It is characterized by transmitting and receiving a test state, and analyzing the transmitted and received test state to determine whether the corresponding channel can be tested.

Hereinafter, exemplary embodiments of the present invention will be described in detail with reference to the accompanying drawings and the contents described in the accompanying drawings, but the present invention is not limited or limited to the embodiments.

1 is a view showing the integrated digital engineering safety equipment according to an embodiment of the present invention.

As shown, the engineering safety equipment-equipment control system 100 includes four channels, each channel having m group controllers (GC, 101) operating independently, and a redundant loop controller (LC) operating independently. 102, test and associated processor (ETIP, 103), cabinet operator module (COM, 104) and control channel gateway (CCG, 105). In the present invention, the engineering safety equipment-device control system 400 of one channel will be described.

The group controller 101 is composed of m triplex group controllers having m as 3, in which an input / output device and a processor are completely separated from each other and operated independently. Each group controller (GC, 101) is connected to a processor module, digital input module, a test and link processor (ETIP, 104) or a cabinet operator module (COM, 105), a communication module, a loop controller (LC, 102). It consists of communication module.

The group controller GC 101 receives an ESF start signal generated from a plant protection system (PPS) and a radiation monitoring system (RMS). More specifically, the group controller (GC) 101 receives the corresponding ESF start signal from each of the four channels of the plant protection system (PPS) to perform 2/4 logic for the operation of the NSSS-related engineering safety equipment. In addition, the group controller (GC) 101 receives the ESF start signal from each of the two channels of the radiation monitoring system (RMS) to perform 1/2 logic for the operation of the BOP-related engineering safety equipment. In addition, the group controller GC 101 outputs an ESF operation signal for whether the primary system (NSSS) engineering safety facility and the secondary system engineering safety facility are operated according to the above-described logic.

At this time, the group controller (GC, 101) is for the operation of the engineering safety equipment 2/4 logic and the operation of the BOP-related engineering safety equipment, in order to prevent the operation by the instantaneous error of the input or operation logic. Only when the 1/2 logic is valid for more than a certain number of times, the ESF operation signal is output. For example, the ESF operation signal is output to the loop controller LC 102 only when the 2/4 logic and the 1/2 logic are operated three or more times in succession.

The group controller (GC, 101) checks the integrity of all logic by manual and automatic tests, prevents the testing of two or more group controllers (GC, 101) at the same time, and automatically starts signals for the operation of engineering safety equipment. If occurs, override all test signals. The group controller (GC) 101 transmits all logic, operating states, and test results to the test and associated processor (ETIP, 103) and the cabinet operator module (COM, 104), and transmits the start signal input state to the power plant protection system (PPS). And to the Radiation Monitoring System (RMS).

The loop controller 102 is composed of 12 loop controllers having a hot-backup processor structure in one channel by forming a redundant structure that operates independently, controlling up to 20 devices, and linking a loop control network. It has a communication module and CIM. The loop controller LC 102 receives the output ESF operation signal or an individual device control signal by an operator and performs control logic to control each engineering safety equipment device. The loop controller LC 102 performs 2/3 logic on the ESF operation signal to control each engineering safety equipment device.

In this case, the loop controller LC 102 receives m ESF operation signals independently from each of the triplex group controllers, and when the m 'or more ESF operation signals are generated among the m ESF operation signals, the corresponding engineering safety equipment device. Can be controlled. For example, the loop controller LC 102 may control the engineering safety equipment when two or more ESF operation signals are generated among the three ESF operation signals.

All logic of the loop controller (LC, 102) is checked for soundness by manual and automatic tests and prevents unnecessary engineering safety equipment from the test.

The ESF-CCS Test and Interface Processor (103) monitors the operating status of the engineering safety equipment-device control system (100). To this end, the test and associated processor (ETIP, 103) transmits and receives a test status with the test and associated processors (ETIP) of other channels at regular intervals, and analyzes the transmitted and received test status to determine whether the corresponding channel can be tested. . That is, the test and the associated processor (ETIP, 103) is not tested in the test state in two other channels in order not to test in two or more of the four channels of the engineering safety equipment-device control system 100, In the case of a test under one other channel, the test may be made.

In addition, the test and association processor (ETIP) 103 assigns IDs to each of the m group controllers GC 101 and n loop controllers LC 102, and the group controller GC and the loop controller ( The ID of the LC) is checked, and it is determined whether m 'group controllers GC and n' loop controllers LC are tested in one channel. Here, m 'is 2, n' is 2, and the test and associated processor (ETIP) 103 has two or more group controllers GC 101 and two or more loop controllers LC, within one channel. 102) shall not be tested. That is, the test and associated processor (ETIP, 103) checks the group controller (GC, 101) and loop controller (LC, 102) in the test state, one group controller (GC, 101) or one loop controller (LC) , 102, and only the remaining group controller (GC, 101) and loop controller (LC, 102) can be tested.

In addition, the test and associated processor (ETIP) 103 stops the test when an ESF start signal or an ESF operation signal is input. The test and association processor (ETIP. 103) receives each ESF start signal state for each ESF start signal from the m group controllers GC 101, and tests for equality with each ESF start signal state. When each of the ESF initiation signal states is the same for the m group controllers GC 101, it is determined that the integrity of the input module of the optical splitter, the optical cable, and the m group controllers GC 101 is confirmed.

In addition, a test and link processor (ETIP) 103 confirms whether each ESF start signal received from each of the four channels of the power plant protection system (PPS) is the same, and each of the two channels of the radiation monitoring system (RMS). It is checked whether each ESF start signal received from each other is the same. When the ESF start signals received from each of the four channels or the two channels are all the same, it is determined that the integrity of the optical splitter, the optical cable, and the input modules of the m group controllers GC are confirmed.

The test and associated processor (ETIP) is a hardwire cable and the m groups when the manual operation signals received from the cabinet operator module (COM) in the m group controllers (GC) are all the same in the m group controllers (GC). It is determined that the integrity of the input module of the controller (GC) is confirmed.

Further, the test and association processor (ETIP. 103) and 103 determine whether all of the ESF operation signals transmitted from each of the m group controllers (GC) 101 to the loop controllers LC (102) forming a redundant structure are the same. Check it. The test and associated processor (ETIP) 103 is a logic and communication module of the m group controllers GC, a communication network, and a communication module of a loop controller LC. It is judged that the soundness of is confirmed. The test and association processor (ETIP) 103 confirms whether the ESF operation signals of the m group controllers GC input to the n loop controllers LC are all the same. When the ESF operation signals are the same, it is determined that the integrity of the logic and communication modules of the m group controllers GC, the communication network, and the communication modules of the loop controller LC constituting the redundant structure are confirmed.

The cabinet operator module (Cabinet Operator Module) 104 provides the operator with the operational status of the engineering safety equipment, the operational status of the individual equipment and the operational status of each module. Cabinet operator module (COM, 104) has a display with a touch function, a computer, a peripheral device such as a trackball / keyboard, a communication module for linking the module inside the channel, a communication module for linking the information processing system. The cabinet operator module (COM, 104) provides the operator with status information and test results of all controllers and field devices in the channel, and provides a manual test function by the operator.

The Control Channel Gateway (105) has a redundant structure, and control commands of individual devices from the soft controllers in the main control room (MCR) and the Remote Shutdown Room (RSR) through the soft control network. Receives, checks the channel selection signal input through the control panel signal multiplexer (CPM), and transmits the control command to the loop controller of the corresponding channel and the device (Main Control Room (MCR) and Remote Stop Room (RSR)). The control authority is determined by the changeover switch signal The control channel gateway (CCG) 105 includes a communication module for soft controller connection, a communication module for loop controller connection, and a communication module for receiving a control panel signal multiplexer (CPM) channel selection signal. The control channel gateway (CCG) 105 prevents input of the control signal of the individual devices of other channels and control commands not confirmed by the operator to the loop controller. The control channel gateway CCG 105 receives an individual device state, a process measurement value, and an individual device error state from the loop controller LC 102 and transmits them to the soft controller through the soft control network.

In addition, the engineering safety equipment-device control system 400 provides a control panel signal multiplexer (CPM) having a redundant structure for each channel in the main control room (MCR) and the remote stop room (RSR). The control panel signal multiplexer (CPM) is a control signal for a main processing processor, a digital input module for receiving a channel selection confirmation signal, a communication module for transmitting a channel selection confirmation signal (CCG, 405), a communication module for a minimum stock-related device. It has digital input module for input and communication module for linking loop controller. The control panel signal multiplexer (CPM) acquires the control signal for the minimum inventory-related equipment by real wiring, digitalizes and multiplexes it, and transmits it to the loop controller (LC) 102 through the loop control network. The control panel signal multiplexer (CPM) acquires the soft controller channel selection confirmation signal of the control room on the real wiring and transmits it to the control channel gateway (CCG) 105 of the corresponding channel through the data link. On-site equipment output terminal of each channel of engineering safety equipment-device control system (100) has a field controller connection module (CIM) that can OR the loop controller output, the diversity ESF manual operation signal and the auxiliary water supply operation signal from the diversity protection system. to provide. In addition, the engineering safety equipment-equipment control system 100 includes an output selection switch for unifying the output of the redundant loop controller (LC, 102).

Hereinafter, a test conceptual diagram of an engineering safety equipment-device control system will be described with reference to FIG. 2.

As shown, m (where m has 3) group controllers GC are classified into input acquisition (digital input), 2/4 logic, latch logic and confirmation logic. For input acquisition, the group controller (GC) receives six NSSS-related ESF initiation signals from the plant protection system (PPS) and three BOP-related ESF initiation signals from the radiation monitoring system (RMS). Receive the operator's manual signal for individual operation. Integrity test on input acquisition is an online passive test, which is performed through the hardware self-diagnosis of input card and comparison test of start signal and manual signal. Hardware self-diagnosis is performed by the hardware itself, and the input signal comparison test is performed by the test and associated processor (ETIP). The test and associated processor (ETIP) receives the ESF start signal status and the manual input signal status from the three group controllers (GC), respectively, and confirms the identity of the input signals for each channel between the three group controllers (GC) or the linked system. Perform.

2/4 logic sets the voting result to True if two or more input signals are Trip or both manual operation signals are Trip. Latch logic performs a function of setting the result of decision logic to True when the voting result is three times consecutively and setting the reset signal of the voting input to Reset with the result of the decision logic set. At this time, the latch logic is set first latch logic.

For software logic such as 2/4 logic, latch logic and verification logic, automatic testing is done. The Test and Coupling Processor (ETIP) sends an automatic test initiation signal and a test scenario to the group controller (GC), and the group controller (GC) tests the relevant logic using the test scenario.

The n loop controllers LC (where n has 12) constituting a redundant structure are classified into 2/3 logic, device control logic, latch logic, and control output. In the case of 2/3 logic, the loop controller LC can control the engineering safety equipment when two or more ESF operation signals are generated among the three ESF operation signals received from the three group controllers GC. It performs the function that makes it possible. The test and associated processor (ETIP) performs an operation signal input comparison test to verify the health of each group controller (GC) for the ESF operation signal and the health of the data communication.

In addition, the control logic and the latch logic for each individual device of the engineering safety equipment are made through an online active test. The test and associated processor (ETIP) delivers the automatic test start signal and the test scenario to the loop controller (LC) and the loop controller (LC) uses the test scenario to test the relevant logic.

3 is a diagram illustrating a test conceptual diagram of a test and associated processor according to an embodiment of the present invention.

The triple group controller (GC) receives each ESF start signal from the power plant protection system (PPS) and the radiation monitoring system (RMS) via an optical splitter. The group controller GC transmits an ESF start signal status for each of the received ESF start signals to a test and associated processor (ETIP).

The test and associated processor (ETIP) compares the state of the ESF initiation signal acquired by the three group controllers (GCs). More specifically, (1) the test and the associated processor (ETIP) perform an identity verification test of the ESF start signal input to the triplex group controller (GC). In normal cases, all three ESF start signals inputted to the group controllers (GC) 1 to 3 should have the same state. Therefore, the test and associated processor (ETIP) can check the health of the input module of the optical splitter, the optical cable, and the group controller (GC) when the ESF start signals of the three group controllers (GC) are the same.

(2) The Test and Linked Processor (ETIP) performs an identity test of the ESF start signal input from the plant protection system (PPS) and the radiation monitoring system (RMS). Under normal circumstances, the ESF start signals input from four channels of the power plant protection system (PPS) or two channels of the radiation monitoring system (RMS) should all have the same state. Therefore, the test and link processor (ETIP) can check the health of the input module of the optical splitter, the optical cable, and the group controller (GC) when the start signals input from the channels of two or four other linked systems are the same. .

(3) The test and associated processor (ETIP) carry out a test of identity of manual actuation signals input to three group controllers. The manual operating signal input from the engineering safety equipment-equipment control system cabinet should normally have the same status in group controllers (GC) 1 to 3. Therefore, the test and associated processor (ETIP), if the manual operation signals are the same in the group controllers (GC) 1 to 3, the integrity of the hard wire cable and the input module of the group controller (GC), which is the transmission path of the manual operation signals. You can check it.

The group controller GC performs 2/4 or 1/2 operation logic for each ESF start signal, and then outputs the ESF operation signal to the loop controller LC and the test and associated processor (ETIP).

The test and associated processor (ETIP) performs an input comparison test on the ESF activation signal. More specifically, (1) The test and the associated processor (ETIP) perform an identity test of the ESF operation signal transmitted from the triple group controller (GC) to the loop controller (LC). In the normal case, the ESF operation signal input from the group controllers GC 1 to 3 to the same loop controller LC should have the same state. Thus, the Test and Coupling Processor (ETIP) can verify the health of the group controller (GC) logic and communication module, communication network, and loop controller (LC) communication module.

(2) The test and associated processor (ETIP) performs the ESF operation signal identity verification test of the group controller (GC) input to the multiplexed loop controller (LC). In the normal case, the ESF operation signal state input to the multiplexed loop controller LC should have the same state. Therefore, if the ESF operation signals inputted to the multiplexed loop controller (LC) are the same, the test and associated processor (ETIP) are healthy for the group controller (GC) logic and communication module, communication network, and loop controller (LC) communication module. can confirm.

4 is a view showing a test method of the engineering safety equipment-device control system according to an embodiment of the present invention.

The engineering safety equipment-equipment control system 100 performs the test by a test and associated processor (ETIP), and the test does not lose the original function of the system and prevents malfunction of the system due to the test. Test constraints exist.

(1) Engineering safety equipment-The equipment control system 100 is composed of four channels, which prevents the test from being performed in two or more of the four channels. To this end, the test and association processor (ETIP) transmits and receives a test state with test and association processors (ETIP) of other channels at regular intervals, and analyzes the transmitted and received test state to determine whether the corresponding channel can be tested.

As shown (right figure), the test and association processor (ETIP) analyzes test conditions received from tests and association processors (ETIPs) of other channels to determine how many of the four channels are being tested. . When the test is performed only in the first channel among the four channels, the engineering safety equipment-system control system 100 of the second channel may perform the test and test and link the test start preparation signal for performing the test. Send to processors (ETIP). Tests and associated processors (ETIPs) of other channels may transmit confirmation signals in response to the test start preparation signal. Accordingly, the engineering safety equipment-device control system 100 of the second channel determines whether the test start preparation signal is confirmed from the tests and the associated processors (ETIPs) of other channels. When the acknowledgment signal is received, the engineering safety equipment-device control system 100 of the second channel may start a test and transmit a signal during the test to the test and associated processors (ETIPs) of other channels.

As shown (left figure), (2) the test and associated processor (ETIP) prevents m '(m' is 2) group controllers GC from being performed in one channel. To this end, the test and association processor ETIP assigns IDs to each of the m group controllers GC, and checks the IDs of the group controllers GC in the test state. Accordingly, the test and associated processor (ETIP) is the third group controller (GC) when the first and second group controller (GC) is in the test state so that two or more group controllers (GC) are not tested in one channel. ) Can be controlled so that it is not tested.

(3) The test and associated processor (ETIP) prevents n '(n' is 2) loop controllers LC from being tested. To this end, the test and association processor (ETIP) assigns an ID to each of the n loop controllers LC and checks the ID of the loop controller LC in a test state.

Therefore, the test and associated processor (ETIP) is configured to determine that the first and second groups of loop controllers LC are in the test state so that two or more loop controllers LC are not tested in one channel. The loop controller LC can be controlled so as not to be tested.

In addition, the Test and Linked Processor (ETIP) can control the test group not to be tested if another test group is in a test state so that two or more test groups are not simultaneously tested for a given test group. The test group is a group set to prevent the actual operation of the engineering safety equipment due to unnecessary operation of the individual equipment that may occur due to the test. For example, safety injection isolation valves and safety injection pumps within a series of safety injection systems are divided into different groups. If the safety injection pump is operated unnecessarily by a test group, other test groups to which the safety injection isolation valve belongs will not be tested and the safety injection isolation valve will remain closed, so boric acid is not injected into the reactor. Do not

(4) The test and associated processor (ETIP) stops the test when the ESF start signal or ESF activation signal is input. The test signal already input is released from the internal logic of the controller, and the start signal and the test signal are connected by passive OR logic so that the test signal can be given priority when the start signal is input, and the test function is removed by removing the test result. Do not affect the function.

5 is a diagram illustrating a test logic of an engineering safety equipment-device control system according to an embodiment of the present invention.

In the group controller (GC), the Test and Coupling Processor (ETIP) performs a condition in which there is no other channel test enable, a channel # test enable signal of the own channel, and a start signal of the module to be tested. Combine (GC # Test Start). In addition, the combined signal is combined with a condition that no actual start signal (Reallnit) exists to generate a test start signal, and the test start signal is combined with a test input (PPS- # Test Init).

In the loop controller (LC), the test and link processor (ETIP) performs a condition in which there is no other channel test enable, a channel # test enable signal of the own channel, and a start signal of the module to be tested. Combine (Component # Test Start). In addition, the combined signal is combined with a condition in which an actual start signal (Real Act) does not exist to generate a test start signal, and the test start signal is combined with a test input (GC # Test Act).

Each group controller output stage and loop controller equipment output stage combine the test start signal and the actual operation output to block the actual operation of the equipment under test by prohibiting the operation output when the test start signal exists.

Automatic testing of the integrated digital engineering safety equipment-device control system 100 has scenario-based testing features. Scenario-based testing involves analyzing input combinations that the logic of group controllers (GCs) and loop controllers (LCs) may have, determining the necessary combinations based on them, and extracting the results for those combinations. To list the output. The engineering safety equipment-device control system 100 inputs the combination corresponding to the scenario to the controller based on the test scenario and checks whether the result of the actual logic is equal to the expected output, and verifies the logic of the controller.

For this purpose, the group controller (GC) test scenario and the loop controller (LC) test scenario are prepared separately. These scenarios are prepared by the Test and Coupling Processor (ETIP) and are sent over the network to the Group Controller (GC) or Loop Controller (LC) with the test start signal.

Hereinafter, a test scenario of the group controller GC will be described with reference to FIG. 6.

As shown, the test scenario of the group controller GC consists of 18 steps. The first twelve steps consisted of testing six combinations that triggered the operation on 2/4 voting logic, consisting of the operation logic test for each combination and two steps of eliminating it. The following is about the verification logic test, which consists of one phase of operation elimination by the 2/4 voting logic test and four phases of three phases of three consecutive operation combinations for the verification logic output. The last two steps are for the latch logic test, confirming that the operation signal is maintained with all individual start signals removed in the confirmation logic test step, and finally removing the operation signal.

Hereinafter, a test scenario of the loop controller LC will be described with reference to FIG. 7.

As shown, the test scenario for each device of the loop controller LC is composed of 16 steps. The first seven steps are tests for combinations that cause operation on 2/3 voting logic, consisting of six steps for eliminating the operation logic test by two operations and one operation logic test by three operations. The next four steps are control room manual input logic tests, which test Act / DeACt (on / off) for the Soft Controller (CNTR) and the Minimum Inventory Switch. The next three steps are a test of the transfer switch input function, which tests the disablement of the control room input to the transfer signal input. The final two phases consist of a priority test and the return to steady state of the soft controller input of the activation signal generation.

The test method of the engineering safety equipment-equipment control system according to the present invention can be implemented in the form of program instructions that can be executed by various computer means and recorded in a computer readable medium. The computer readable medium may include program instructions, data files, data structures, etc. alone or in combination. Program instructions recorded on the media may be those specially designed and constructed for the purposes of the present invention, or they may be of the kind well-known and available to those having skill in the computer software arts. Examples of computer-readable recording media include magnetic media such as hard disks, floppy disks, and magnetic tape, optical media such as CD-ROMs, DVDs, and magnetic disks, such as floppy disks. Magneto-optical media, and hardware devices specifically configured to store and execute program instructions, such as ROM, RAM, flash memory, and the like. Examples of program instructions include not only machine code generated by a compiler, but also high-level language code that can be executed by a computer using an interpreter or the like. The hardware device described above may be configured to operate as one or more software modules to perform the operations of the present invention, and vice versa.

As described above, although the present invention has been described with reference to limited embodiments and drawings, the present invention is not limited to the above embodiments, and those skilled in the art to which the present invention pertains various modifications and variations from such descriptions. This is possible.

Therefore, the scope of the present invention should not be limited to the described embodiments, but should be determined not only by the claims below but also by the equivalents of the claims.

As described above, in the digital engineering safety equipment-equipment control system and the test method thereof, a tripled group controller and a group controller integrating the NSSS-related engineering safety equipment and the BOP-related engineering safety equipment-related logic control Periodic tests and inspections of the integrated digital engineering safety equipment-equipment control system with redundant loop controllers, ESF tests, and associated processors and cabinet operator modules, which perform two-thirds logic of the operation signals to generate individual instrument control signals. In this regard, it is possible to test the health and functional logic of the system without bypassing one of the multiple controllers in the channel for the test, thereby increasing the system reliability and availability, and simultaneously operating the group control logic and the loop control logic online. Enables testing to drastically reduce test time and reduce operator error By ensuring there is an effect that can contribute to improved utilization and safety of nuclear power plants.

Claims (18)

In the test method of an engineering safety equipment-equipment control system (ESF-CCS) consisting of m group controllers (GC) and a test and associated processor (ETIP), Receiving, at the m group controllers (GCs), respective ESF start signals generated from a power plant protection system (PPS) and a radiation monitoring system (RMS); Sending, at the m group controllers (GCs), each ESF initiation signal state for each received ESF initiation signal to the test and cooperative processor (ETIP); And Testing, at the test and associated processor (ETIP), the identity of each ESF initiation signal state; Engineering safety equipment characterized in that it comprises a-test method of the equipment control system. The method of claim 1, The step of testing the identity for each ESF start signal state, Checking whether each of the ESF start signal states received at each of the m group controllers (GCs) is the same; And Determining the integrity of the optical splitter, the optical cable, and the input modules of the m group controllers (GCs) when the state of each of the ESF start signals is the same. Engineering safety equipment characterized in that it comprises a-test method of the equipment control system. The method of claim 1, The testing of the identity for each of the ESF start signal states, Checking whether each ESF start signal received from each of the four channels of the power plant protection system is the same; Checking whether each ESF start signal received from each of the two channels of the radiation monitoring system (RMS) is the same; And Determining the integrity of the optical splitter, the optical cable, and the input modules of the m group controllers (GCs) when all of the ESF start signals received from each of the four channels or the two channels are the same. Engineering safety equipment characterized in that it comprises a-test method of the equipment control system. The method of claim 1, Receiving, by the m group controllers (GCs), a manual operation signal from a cabinet operator module (COM); Sending, at the m group controllers (GCs), the received manual actuation signal to the test and associated processor (ETIP); And Testing for equality of the manual activation signal in the test and associated processor (ETIP) Engineering safety equipment, characterized in that it further comprises a test-device control system test method. The method of claim 4, wherein The step of testing the identity for the manual operation signal, If the received manual operation signals are the same in the m group controllers GC, determining that the integrity of the hardwire cable and the input modules of the m group controllers GC is confirmed Engineering safety equipment characterized in that it comprises a-test method of the equipment control system. In the test method of an engineering safety equipment-equipment control system (ESF-CCS) consisting of m group controllers (GC), n loop controllers (LC) forming a redundant structure, and a test and link processor (ETIP), Performing operation logic on each of the m group controllers (GCs) for each ESF start signal generated from a power plant protection system (PPS) and a radiation monitoring system (RMS); Transmitting, at the m group controllers (GCs), an ESF operation signal to each of the n loop controllers (LC) based on the operation logic performed; Receiving, at the n loop controllers (LC), the ESF activation signal and transmitting it to the test and associated processor (ETIP); And In the test and associated processor (ETIP), testing for equality to the ESF activation signal; Engineering safety equipment characterized in that it comprises a-test method of the equipment control system. The method of claim 6, The step of testing the identity for the ESF operation signal, Checking whether all of the ESF operation signals transmitted from each of the m group controllers (GCs) to the loop controller (LC) forming a redundant structure are the same; And Determining that the integrity of the logic and communication modules of the m group controllers (GC), the communication network, and the communication modules of the loop controller (LC) forming the redundant structure are confirmed when all of the ESF operation signals are the same. Engineering safety equipment characterized in that it comprises a-test method of the equipment control system. The method of claim 6, The step of testing the identity for the ESF operation signal, checking whether all of the ESF operation signals of the m group controllers (GCs) input to the n loop controllers (LC) are the same; And Determining that the integrity of the logic and communication modules of the m group controllers (GC), the communication network, and the communication modules of the loop controller (LC) forming the redundant structure are confirmed when all of the ESF operation signals are the same. Engineering safety equipment characterized in that it comprises a-test method of the equipment control system. The method of claim 6, The step of performing the operation logic for each ESF start signal, Receiving each ESF start signal from each of four channels of the power plant protection system (PPS) and performing 2/4 operation logic; And Receiving each ESF start signal from each of the two channels of the radiation monitoring system (RMS) and performing 1/2 operation logic Engineering safety equipment characterized in that it comprises a-test method of the equipment control system. A computer-readable recording medium having recorded thereon a program for executing the method of any one of claims 1 to 9. In engineering safety equipment-equipment control system (ESF-CCS), M group controllers GC operating independently; N loop controllers LC that form a redundant structure that operates independently; And Test and Linkage Processor (ETIP) to determine if a channel can be tested It consists of, each of which includes a plurality of channels that operate independently, Each of the m group controllers (GCs), Receives the ESF start signal generated from the power plant protection system (PPS) and radiation monitoring system (RMS), and performs the corresponding logic according to the ESF start signal to output the ESF operation signal, Each of the n loop controllers LC is Controlling the respective engineering safety equipment by performing the control logic on the output ESF operation signal, The test and associated processor (ETIP), (1) send and receive test state and test processor (ETIP) of the other channels at regular intervals, and analyzes the transmitted and received test state to determine whether the corresponding channel can be tested, and (2) the m group controllers ( GC) and each of the n loop controllers (LC) are assigned IDs, and IDs of the group controller (GC) and the loop controller (LC) which are in a test state are checked, and m 'group controllers (GCs) are controlled in one channel. And n 'loop controllers (LC) are tested. delete The method of claim 11, The test and associated processor (ETIP), Engineering safety equipment-equipment control system, characterized in that the test is stopped when the ESF start signal or the ESF operation signal is input. The method of claim 11, The test and associated processor (ETIP), Receive each ESF start signal state for each ESF start signal from the m group controllers (GCs), test for equality with each ESF start signal state, If the ESF start signal state is the same in all the m group controller (GC), the engineering safety equipment, characterized in that it is determined that the integrity of the optical splitter, the optical cable, the input module of the m group controller (GC) is confirmed -Device control system. The method of claim 11, The test and associated processor (ETIP), Whether each ESF start signal received from each of the four channels of the power plant protection system (PPS) is the same, and whether each ESF start signal received from each of the two channels of the radiation monitoring system (RMS) is the same Check the When the ESF start signals received from each of the four channels or the two channels are all the same, it is determined that the integrity of the optical splitter, the optical cable, and the input modules of the m group controllers (GCs) are confirmed. Engineering safety equipment-equipment control system. The method of claim 11, The m group controllers (GCs) Receive manual operation signal from the cabinet operator module (COM), transmit the received manual operation signal to the test and associated processor (ETIP), The test and associated processor (ETIP), If the received manual operation signal is the same in all the m group controller (GC), engineering safety equipment, characterized in that it is determined that the integrity of the hardwire cable and the input module of the m group controller (GC) is confirmed -Device control system. The method of claim 11, The test and associated processor (ETIP), Check whether all of the ESF operation signals transmitted from each of the m group controllers GC to the loop controller LC forming a redundant structure are identical; When the ESF operation signals are all the same, it is determined that the integrity of the logic and communication modules of the m group controllers (GC), the communication network, the communication module of the loop controller (LC) forming the redundant structure is confirmed. Engineering safety equipment-equipment control system. The method of claim 11, The test and associated processor (ETIP), check whether all the ESF operation signals of the m group controllers GC input to the n loop controllers LC are the same; When the ESF operation signals are all the same, it is determined that the integrity of the logic and communication modules of the m group controllers (GC), the communication network, the communication module of the loop controller (LC) forming the redundant structure is confirmed. Engineering safety equipment-equipment control system.

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