KR100654043B1 - Mobile telecommunications terminal - Google Patents

Abstract

A mobile communication terminal is provided to improve the overall contents file security mechanism of the terminal into a file level-type direct security pattern through the separation of header information, thereby preventing a contents file from being normally open unless the header information is obtained. A memory(14) is controlled by a terminal control module(11), and stores/manages contents files and lots of information related to terminal operation. A contents security management module(20) is controlled by the terminal control module(11), selectively communicates with the memory(14), and copies header information of contents files to which security setup is requested as deleting the copied header information, when a security setup event occurs by a user, then individually manages the copied header information separately from the contents files. The management module(20) records security codes in some of the contents files, and selectively provides the separately managed header information, depending on whether a user password is identical with the security codes if opening of the contents files is requested, so as to induce the opening of the contents files to be selectively conducted.

Description

Mobile telecommunications terminal

1 is an exemplary diagram conceptually showing the internal module structure of a mobile communication terminal according to the prior art.

2 is a conceptual diagram illustrating an internal module structure of a mobile communication terminal according to the present invention.

3A to 3C are conceptual views illustrating a publishing state of various menus generated by the menu configuration module according to the present invention.

4A and 4B are conceptual views conceptually illustrating a content file security related procedure according to the present invention.

5 conceptually illustrates an internal configuration of a content security management module according to the present invention.

6A and 6B are conceptual diagrams conceptually showing a content file security related procedure according to another embodiment of the present invention.

The present invention relates to a mobile communication terminal, and more specifically, to improve the overall content file security mechanism of the terminal from <user interface level indirect security pattern>, to <file-level direct security pattern through the separation of header information> Security passwords (e.g., passwords) set for each content file, even if a malicious outsider accesses the content file through another bypass path (or direct path) that circumvents the user interface (or through the user interface). By normal authentication, the present invention relates to a mobile communication terminal capable of guiding a user from normally opening (copying, executing, etc.) a content file unless header information is secured.

Recently, with the rapid development of electric, electronic and communication related technologies, mobile communication terminals are also showing a rapid spreading speed.

Unlike a conventional wired communication terminal, such a mobile communication terminal provides a mobile communication infrastructure between users based on a series of wireless communication networks, and according to the conventional mobile communication terminal system, a user can communicate with a desired partner regardless of location. The advantage of making a call freely can be easily obtained.

In recent years, as the quality of the mobile communication terminal is diversified, a mobile communication terminal that can selectively provide such content according to a user's request event while maintaining and managing various content files such as images, videos, music, and documents is also fast. It is spreading.

Usually, under the performance of the content providing function of the mobile communication terminal 5 according to the related art, a menu configuration module placed under the control of the terminal control module 1 by the user's terminal operation, as shown in FIG. 2) causes a situation in which a series of menus (M: album, folder, etc.) related to content execution are output based on the menu source 4a stored in the memory 4, and the user further generates a series of menus. When requesting the execution of the content file 4b through the operation, the menu configuration module 2 calls a content open component (for example, an image execution application) that can open and execute the content file, and then open the content. Through the component, a procedure of externally outputting the content file 4b is performed.

Of course, in this situation, if no action is taken, a problem that the private content file 4b of the user may be exposed by an outsider may occur, so that the conventional mobile communication terminal 5 has a terminal control module ( In the control system of 1), an action of further arranging the menu lock management module 3 is taken.

In this case, the menu lock management module 3 forms a series of communication relations with the menu configuration module 2, and upon the user requesting the execution of the content file 4b, the menu lock management module 3 attaches to the portion of the menu M. A pop-up window (PM)> requesting the input of a password (password) is output (of course, such a security password input request form can be variously modified depending on the situation). The process of requesting to input the preset security password is performed.

Under this procedure, if the security password inputted by the user (external) is different from the preset security password, the menu lock management module 3 immediately communicates with the menu configuration module 2 by the menu (M). Measures to prevent the opening of the album (ie, the opening of the album, the opening of the folder, etc.) are appropriately taken. Consequently, in the case of the non-opening situation of such an album / folder, for example, an outsider may use a content file of a party user. (4b) can be freely examined or copied, and as a result, the user can flexibly take advantage of the improved security of the self-content file 4b stored in the mobile communication terminal 5. You can enjoy it.

However, under such a conventional system, as described above, the menu lock management module 3 is provided only at the user interface level (ie, menu level of album, folder, etc.) without individual one-to-one defense of the content file 4b itself. Since it adheres to indirect security mechanisms to protect outsiders' access, if a situation arises where a malicious outsider accesses the content file 4b via another bypass, avoiding the user interface, This can not be blocked at all, and finally, under this situation, even if the content file 4b is unjustly opened (copied, executed, etc.) by an outsider, it is very difficult to accept it without any measures. You will be in

For example, under the user interface level indirect security mechanism of the menu lock management module according to the related art, <the external person copies the content file 4b of the mobile communication terminal 5 side through the external memory 101, The situation in which the content file 4b is opened>, <The situation in which an outsider copies the content file 4b of the mobile communication terminal 5 side through the external information processing device 102 to open the content file 4b> , <The situation in which an external person remotely connects to the terminal control module 1 side through the mobile communication terminal 103, the wireless communication network 104, etc., and then opens the content file 4b of the mobile communication terminal 5 side.> Even if such a detour occurs, the conventional menu lock management module 3, which cannot securely manage the content file 4b one-to-one, may naturally have no choice but to allow it without any countermeasures. Own security Value (album / folder-specific security password setting action), even if the normal take, it will be forced to suffer enormous damage due to the external leakage of the contents file 4b.

Furthermore, under the user interface level indirect security mechanism according to the prior art, each content file 4b is bundled in an album unit or a folder unit, and security passwords are set and managed collectively. Even if the user wants to enforce security setting (for example, security password setting) for each other, such a desire cannot be realized at all, and as a result, large and small damages inevitably endure.

Accordingly, an object of the present invention is to remove some or all of the header information necessary for opening of individual content files from the body information of the corresponding content files in the control system of the terminal control module. In addition, a computer module that can manage this header information separately for each content file is additionally placed, and through this, the overall content file security mechanism of the terminal is <file-level direct security pattern through separation of header information>. By encouraging improvements, the security established for each content file, even if a malicious outsider has access to the content file through another bypass (or direct path) that circumvents the user interface (or through the user interface). By normal authentication of a password (e.g., a password), unless the header information is secured, the corresponding content file It is to guide the normal opening (copying, execution, etc.).

Another object of the present invention is to improve the overall content security mechanism of the terminal to <file level type direct security pattern through the separation of header information>, as well as minimizing the risk of fraudulent leakage and opening of the content file by detour access by outsiders In addition, by maximizing security setting flexibility for each content file, the user side minimizes damages caused by the external leakage of the content file, and furthermore, the user performs security setting (eg, security password setting) for each individual content file. It is to induce to satisfy naturally the desire to do.

Still other objects of the present invention will become more apparent from the following detailed description and the accompanying drawings.

In order to achieve the above object, the present invention is controlled by the terminal control module, the terminal control module, a memory for storing and managing content files and various information related to the operation of the terminal, and controlled by the terminal control module. And selectively communicating with the memory, when a security setting event is generated by a user, simultaneously deleting the header information of the content file for which the security setting is requested, and managing the duplicated header information separately from the content file. A security code is recorded in a part of the content file, and upon request of opening the content file, the header information which is separately managed is selected and provided according to whether the user password and the security password match, and the opening of the content file is selected. Mobile communication terminal consisting of a combination of content security management module that leads to Initiate the terminal stage.

Hereinafter, with reference to the accompanying drawings, described in more detail the mobile communication terminal according to the present invention.

As shown in FIG. 2, the mobile communication terminal 10 according to the present invention is largely controlled by the terminal control module 11 and the terminal control module 11 and variously required for the operation of the terminal 10. The memory 14 for systematically storing and managing necessary information (eg, program information, content information, setting information, etc.) and various content files (eg, image files, sound files, video files, etc.) Get drunk.

In this case, the terminal control module 11 includes terminal function auxiliary modules 12 (eg, a keypad driving module, a vibration motor, an LED driving module, a microphone interface module, etc.) and a communication related circuit module 13 (eg, a signal transmitter, a signal receiver). , An antenna, a duplexer, a frequency synthesizer, etc.), the display driving module 16, the menu configuration module 15, and the like as a whole, by the computerized control, the mobile communication terminal 10 has a wireless call connection function given to him, Even the contents file providing function can be supported to be flexible.

At this time, when the menu configuration module 15 controlled by the terminal control module 11 needs to update the menu (platform) displayed on the display window 17, it communicates with the memory 14 and stores a series of stored data therein. After acquiring the necessary information, a new menu (platform) is constructed on the basis of the acquired necessary information, and the configured new menu (platform) is transferred to the display drive module 16 side to display on the display window 17 according to the situation. The menu (platform) that has been set up will be promptly updated to the new menu (platform).

In the situation where such an infrastructure is provided, a series of menus related to the execution of the content file (205: album, etc.) is executed by the user terminal operation based on the menu source stored in the memory 14 by the menu configuration module 15. A folder or the like) (shown in FIG. 3C) is output through the display window 17. Further, when the user requests execution of a content file through a series of menu operations, the menu configuration module 15 Immediately after calling the content open component 19 capable of opening and executing the content file, the content open component 19 proceeds to externally output the content file.

Of course, in this situation, as in the prior art, without an individual one-to-one defense of the content file itself, only an indirect security mechanism is enforced that protects outsiders' access at the user interface level (ie, menu level of album, folder, etc.). If a malicious outsider accesses the content file through another bypass path that has circumvented the user interface, the terminal cannot block it at all. Even if it is unfairly opened (copying, executing, etc.), it is in a very difficult situation that is forced to accept it without any measures.

In this sensitive situation, as shown in the figure, the present invention takes measures to further arrange the content security management module 20 in the control system of the terminal control module 11.

In this case, the content security management module 20 selects and forms a series of communication relationships with the terminal control module 11, the memory 14, the menu configuration module 15, the content open component 19, and the like. As shown in FIG. 3B, the menu pages 201 and 203 related to the security setting generated by the menu configuration module 15 are output through the display window 17, and in this situation, the user of the corresponding menu pages 201 and 203 is displayed. When the security setting items 202 and 204 are selected and a series of security setting events occur, as shown in FIG. 4A, the content file C requested for security setting is accessed, and a header of the content file C is shown. All of the information (H) is deleted at the same time as duplication, and all of the duplicated header information (H) is written in the user access prohibited area (14a), for example, the NV data area of the memory (14). All of the header information (H) can be managed separately from the body information of the content file (C). In addition, as shown in Figure 4b, a set of security settings for recording the security code (K3) set by the user in a portion of the content file (C, for example, where the header information (H) is deleted) Proceed with the procedure.

In this case, the overall content file security mechanism of the terminal can be significantly improved to <file level type direct security pattern through separation of header information (H)> naturally, out of the <user interface level indirect security pattern>. do.

In this situation, a menu page 205 related to the execution of the content file as shown in FIG. 3C is output through the display window 17 later by the user's menu operation, and in this situation, the user can display the content. When the execution of the file is requested and a series of content file opening request events occur, the content security management module 20 accesses the content file C requested to be opened, as shown in FIG. 4B, A procedure of authenticating whether or not the user password entered by the user and the security password (K3) match is performed.

Of course, under this procedure, the content security management module 20 matches the user password inputted by the user with the security password K3, so that the user access prohibited area 14a of the memory 14 when the corresponding authentication is normally performed. The header information (H), which was separately managed by the user, is extracted, and a normal action is provided to the content opening component 19. However, the user password input by the user has a security password (K3) previously set. If the user password is not properly authenticated, the header information H is not provided to the content opening component 19 without any action.

As a matter of course, since the body information of the content file C without the header information H is only a simple data set, in the situation where the header information H is not provided, the content opening component 19 is repeatedly loaded. Nevertheless, the content file C cannot be decoded normally and opened, and eventually, even if a malicious outsider whose authentication password is unknown accesses the content file C normally, the corresponding content file C You will not be able to open it at all.

Of course, under the <file level type direct security pattern through the separation of the header information (H)> by the content security management module 20 of the present invention, the malicious outsider is a user interface (for example, shown in FIG. The direct path through the menu page, as well as through other bypass paths avoiding the user interface, unlike the prior art, the content file C cannot be opened at all.

For example, under the file-level direct security mechanism according to the present invention, a malicious outsider copies the content file C of the mobile communication terminal 10 through the external memory 101 via the port 18, However, even if this is obtained, inevitably, <the content file C is only a simple data collection without header information> is inevitably faced with a difficulty, and finally, due to the normal input of the security password, the header information ( Unless H) is obtained, the content file C cannot be opened at all.

As another example, a malicious outsider may copy the content file C on the mobile communication terminal 10 side through the external information processing apparatus 102 and obtain it. Inevitably, the content file C may also have a header. It is only a simple data collection without information (H)>, which is inevitably facing difficulties, and as a result, unless the header information (H) is obtained by the normal input of the security password, the corresponding content file (C) is acquired. You won't be able to open it at all.

Furthermore, a malicious outsider remotely accesses the terminal control module 11 side through the mobile communication terminal 103, the wireless communication network 104, and then accesses the content file C of the mobile communication terminal 10 side. However, even if this is obtained, inevitably, <this content file (C) is also a simple data set without header information (H)> is inevitably encountered a difficulty, and finally, by the normal input of the security password. If the header information H is not obtained, the corresponding content file cannot be opened at all.

In short, under the file-level type direct security pattern by the content security management module according to the present invention, the outsider of the malicious can directly access the content file C through the direct path through the user interface, as well as other bypass paths avoiding the user interface. Even if access is made, by normal authentication of a security password (for example, a password) set for each content file, the content file C cannot be normally opened (copyed, executed, etc.) unless the header information H is secured. As a result, under such an implementation environment of the present invention, the self-content file (C) is simply performed by the party user on the basis of simple security setting (for example, security password setting) for each desired content file (C). It is possible to effectively avoid the enormous damage caused by the external spill.

On the other hand, as described above, under the user interface level indirect security mechanism according to the prior art, each content file is grouped by album or folder, and the security password is set and managed collectively. Even if they wanted to implement security settings (for example, security passwords) very much, these needs could not be realized at all, resulting in large and small damages.

However, unlike this conventional case, under the system of the present invention, as described above, the content security management module 20 accesses each content file C one-to-one to separate their header information H. Because of the flexible operation of a series of file-level direct security mechanisms, the user can flexibly implement a set of security settings for each desired content file (C) under the implementation environment of the present invention without any difficulty on the part of the user. In the end, it is possible to effectively enjoy the big and small benefits.

On the other hand, as shown in Figure 5, the content security management module 20 according to the present invention, the content security control unit 21, the security setting event receiving unit 24, which is collectively managed by the content security control unit 21, The security setting execution unit 25, the content open control unit 26, the content execution check unit 27, the content open component communication unit 23 and the like take a close combination.

In this case, the content security control unit 21 establishes a series of communication relationships with the terminal control module 11, the memory 14, the menu configuration module 15, the content open component 19, and the like through the interface unit 22. While forming, the duplication procedure for the header information H, the procedure for deleting the header information H, the procedure for recording the security password K3, the procedure for recording the security history, the comparison / determination procedure for the security password and the user password, and the security are set. It plays a role of controlling overall control of the opening and closing of the content file (C).

At this time, the security setting event receiving unit 24 controlled by the content security control unit 21 selects and forms a series of communication relationships with the menu configuration module 15 via the interface unit 22, as shown in FIGS. As shown in 3b, the menu pages 201 and 203 related to the security settings generated by the menu configuration module 15 are output via the display window 17, in which the user may secure the menu pages 201 and 203. By selecting the setting items 202 and 204, when a series of security setting events occur, it checks them and delivers the check results to the content security control unit 21 side.

In addition, the security setting execution unit 25 controlled by the content security control unit 21 forms a series of communication relationships with the terminal control module 11, the memory 14, etc. via the interface unit 22, When the occurrence of the security setting event is confirmed by the functioning of the setting event receiving unit 24, immediately after the communication with the memory 14, the header information (H) of the content file (C) for which security setting is requested is made. Is copied to the user prohibition area 14a of the memory 14, and after the duplication is completed, the header information H is deleted, and the security including the previous security password K3 at the place where the header information H is deleted. It serves to record the details closely (see FIGS. 4A and 4B).

In this case, as the security record recorded by the security setting execution unit 25, preferably, &quot; mark data K2 indicating that security is set &quot; and &quot; copying position of the header information H &quot; Address data K1> indicating the position of the prohibited area) can be selected.

At this time, as shown in the figure, the above-described security setting execution unit 25 is, for example, the header information duplication unit 25a, the header information deletion unit 25b, the security history recording unit 25c and the like are closely combined It takes a configuration.

Here, the header information duplication unit 25a accesses the content file C, copies the header information H, and stores the duplicated header information H in response to the occurrence of the user-side security setting event. It is to perform the role of recording in the user access forbidden area 14a of the), the header information deleting unit 25b is the memory 14, when the header information (H) is completed by the header information duplication unit 25a, By communicating with the user, the content file C is accessed, and the role of deleting the corresponding header information H is performed.

Further, when the header information H is deleted by the header information deleting unit 25b, the security history recording unit 25c accesses the content file C by communicating with the memory 14, and accesses the header information ( Where H) is deleted, <security code K3 set by user>, <mark data K2 indicating security is set>, <copying position of header information H (e.g., user access prohibited area of memory) Address data K1>, etc.), and then the content opening control unit 26 can proceed with the security setting determination procedure, the authentication procedure of the user password, and the extraction procedure of the header information (H). It will play a dedicated role in encouraging them to do so.

Meanwhile, together with each of the above components, the content execution checker 27 controlled by the content security controller 21 is the terminal control module 11 and the menu configuration module 15 via the interface unit 22. As shown in Fig. 3C, a menu page 205 related to the execution of the content file is output through the display window 17, and in this situation, the user selects the content. By performing the execution request, if a series of content file open request event occurs, it is checked, and the result is delivered to the content security control unit 21 side.

In addition, the content opening control unit 26 controlled by the content security control unit 21 via the interface unit 22, the terminal control module 11, memory 14, menu configuration module 15, the content opening If a generation of the content file open request event is confirmed by performing the function of the content execution checker 27 while selectively forming a series of signal exchange relationships with the component 19 and the like, immediately communicate with the memory 14. After accessing the content file C, it is checked whether <mark data K2 indicating that security is set> is displayed on the content file C. If (K2) is displayed and the corresponding content file (C) is confirmed to be a security file, immediately confirm whether the security password (K3) and the user password of the content file (C) requested to be opened are matched. If the security password (K3) and user password match The user 14 is prohibited from accessing the memory 14 in accordance with &quot; address data K1 indicating the copying position of the header information H (for example, the position of the user access prohibited area of the memory) &quot; recorded in the content file C. The header information H, which has been duplicated in the area 14a, is extracted and transferred to the content opening component 19 responsible for opening the content file C, so that the content opening component 19 selects the content file C. It will play a role in inducing to be opened.

In this case, as shown in the figure, the content opening control unit 26 includes a security history reading unit 26a, a user password authentication unit 26b, a header information extraction unit 26c, a header information delivery unit 26d, and the like. This tightly combined configuration is taken.

Here, the security history reading unit 26a accesses the header trace portion (that is, where the existing header information is deleted) of the content file C requested to be opened in response to the user side content file opening request event. Role of reading the password (K3)>, <mark data (K2) indicating security is set>, <address data (K1) indicating a copy position of the header information (e.g., the position of the user access prohibited area of the memory)>, and the like. Will be dedicated.

In addition, when the user password authentication unit 26b confirms that <the mark data K2 indicating that security is set in the content file C> is confirmed by the security history reading unit 26a (that is, it is opened). If it is confirmed that the requested content file is a secured content file), immediately by communicating with the menu configuration module 15 via the interface unit 22, through the menu displayed on the display window 17, &Lt; Message requesting input of user password > &quot;, the user password inputted by the current user (external) is communicated with the security history reading unit 26a when the user password is inputted. And a role of authenticating whether or not the read security password (K3: that is, the original security password recorded in the content file) matches.

When the header information extracting unit 26c normally authenticates the user password and the security password K3 by the user password authentication unit 26b, the header information extraction unit 26c reads the <header information read by the security history reading unit 26a. In accordance with the address data K1> representing the copying position of the memory (e.g., the position of the user access prohibited area of the memory), the user access prohibited area 14a of the memory 14 is accessed, and the user access prohibited area 14a is accessed. It is responsible for extracting the header information (H) that was duplicated in.

Further, when the header information H is extracted by the header information extracting unit 26c, the header information delivery unit 26d opens the contents of the extracted header information H through the content opening component communication unit 23. Delivering to the component 19 side, the content opening component 19 is responsible for inducing the content file (C) to open normally.

Of course, under the functioning mechanism of each of these components, the user password inputted by the user does not match the preset security password K3 (i.e., the current user is confirmed to be an outsider of the malicious), and thus the header information. When (H) is not provided to the content opening component 19, the content opening component 19 cannot decode and open the content file C normally, despite the repetitive loading procedure. A malicious outsider whose authentication password is unknown, despite the normal access to the content file C, cannot open the content file at all.

On the other hand, under another embodiment of the present invention, the menu pages 201 and 203 related to the security settings generated by the menu configuration module 15 are output through the display window (see FIGS. 3A and 3B), and in this situation, the user When the security setting items 202 and 204 of the corresponding menu page are selected and a series of security setting events occur, as shown in FIG. 6A, the content security management module 20 is different from the previous embodiment. By accessing the requested content file (C), only a part of the header information (H) of the content file, preferably size information of the content file (C), is deleted at the same time as the copy, and the copied <content file (C) Size information> is written in the user prohibition area 14a of the memory 14, for example, the NV data area, and as shown in Fig. 6B, a part of the content file C (e.g., the size of the content file); By the user where the information was deleted) Another form of security setting procedure for recording the set security password K3 may be performed.

Of course, since the size information of the content file C forms only a part of the above-described header information H, the size (size) of the content file C is much smaller than the header information itself. By the way, when the information copied and deleted from the content file C is flexibly limited to <size information of the content file>, the terminal 10 side <the advantage that a series of duplication and deletion procedures can be made faster> For example, the advantage of reducing the operational burden of the memory 14 and the advantage of effectively utilizing terminal resources can be enjoyed more flexibly.

As a matter of course, even under this embodiment of the present invention, the content security management module 20 prohibits user access to the memory 14 only when the user password inputted by the user and the security password coincide with the corresponding authentication. The <content information of the content file>, which is separately managed in the area 14a, is normally provided to the content-opening component 19 side, and the user password input by the user does not match the preset security password K3. If the authentication of the user password is not normally performed, the <size information of the content file C> is not provided to the content opening component 19 at all.

In this case, since <content file C without size information> is also impossible to decode at all, similar to <content file C without header information H>, the above-mentioned <content file size information> is not provided. Even under the circumstances, the content opening component 19 is unable to open the content file normally despite the repetitive loading procedure. As a result, a malicious outsider whose identity is not known to access the content file C normally. Despite this, the content file C cannot be opened at all.

As described in detail above, in the present invention, in the control system of the terminal control module, <in part or all of the header information necessary for the opening of individual content files according to the user's security setting request, from the body information of the content files. After detaching, additionally arrange a computer module that can manage this header information one by one separately for each content file, and through this, the overall content file security mechanism of the terminal is <file level type direct security pattern through separation of header information. By encouraging natural improvements to>, a malicious outsider can access the content file through another bypass (or direct path) that circumvents the user interface (or through the user interface). The header information is not secured by normal authentication of the set security password (for example, password). Can guide you, prevents normally open (copy, running, etc.) the content files.

In addition, in the present invention, by improving the overall content security mechanism of the terminal to <file level type direct security pattern through the separation of header information>, as well as minimizing the risk of fraudulent leakage and opening of the content file by detour access by outsiders, Security settings for individual content files can be maximized to minimize the user's damage caused by the external leakage of the content files. Furthermore, on the user's side, security settings (for example, security password settings) can be implemented for each content file. Encourage them to meet their natural needs.

The present invention is not limited to only a mobile communication terminal, but has an overall useful effect in various types of electronic devices that require security of a content file.

And, in the foregoing, specific embodiments of the present invention have been described and illustrated, but it is obvious that the present invention may be variously modified and implemented by those skilled in the art.

Such modified embodiments should not be understood individually from the technical spirit or point of view of the present invention and such modified embodiments should fall within the scope of the appended claims of the present invention.

Claims (7)

A terminal control module; A memory controlled by the terminal control module to store and manage content files and various information related to operation of the terminal; Controlled by the terminal control module, and selectively communicates with the memory, when a security setting event occurs by the user, and deletes the header information of the content file for which security settings are requested at the same time, and duplicated the header information While separately managing a file, a security code is recorded in a part of the content file, and upon request of opening the content file, the header information, which is separately managed, is selected and provided according to whether a user password matches the security password. And a content security management module for inducing opening of the content file selectively. The method of claim 1, wherein the content security management module communicates with the terminal control module and the memory, and processes the header information, records the security password, determines whether the security password matches the user password, and the contents file. A content security control unit which collectively controls the opening / closing adjustment procedure of the system; Controlled by the content security control unit, in response to the occurrence of the security setting event, after communicating with the memory, the header information of the content file for which security setting is requested is copied to a user access prohibited area of the memory, and after completion of copying. A security setting execution unit for deleting the header information and recording security details including the security password in place of the header information; Controlled by the content security control unit, and in accordance with the content file open request event, the communication with the memory, and authenticates whether the security password and the user password of the content file is requested to open, and the security password and the user If the passwords match, the header information, which has been copied in the user prohibition area of the memory, is extracted and transferred to the content opening component responsible for opening the content file according to the security history recorded in the content file. And a content opening control unit for inducing a content opening component to selectively open the content file. The mobile communication terminal of claim 2, wherein the security setting execution unit selectively copies and deletes only a part of the header information. 4. The mobile communication terminal of claim 3, wherein a part of the header information copied and deleted by the security setting execution unit is size information of the content file. The mobile communication terminal according to claim 2, wherein the security record recorded in the content file by the security setting execution unit is mark data indicating that security is set and address data indicating a copy position of the header information. . The header of claim 2, wherein the security setting execution unit accesses the content file according to the occurrence of the security setting event, duplicates the header information, and records the copied header information in a user access prohibited area of the memory. An information replication unit; A header information deletion unit for accessing the contents file and deleting the header information through communication with the memory when the header information has been copied by the header information duplication unit; When the header information deletion unit completes the deletion of the header information, accessing the content file through communication with the memory records the security password and the security history in the place where the header information is deleted, and then, And a security history recording unit for inducing the content opening control unit to normally proceed with the authentication procedure of the user password and the extraction procedure of the header information. According to claim 2, wherein the content opening control unit according to the content file opening request event, access to the content file is requested to open, the security history reading unit for reading the security password and security history; When the security password and the security history have been read by the security history reading unit, requesting the input of the user password according to the read result, and if the user password is input, it is determined whether the input user password and the security password match. A user password authentication unit for authenticating; When the user password authentication unit authenticates whether the user password and the security password match, the user access prohibited area of the memory is accessed according to the security history read by the security history reading unit. A header information extraction unit for extracting header information copied in the header; When the header information is extracted by the header information extracting unit, the header information is delivered to the content opening component, including a header information delivery unit for inducing the content opening component to open the content file normally. Mobile communication terminal characterized in that.

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