JPS6354037A - Key distributing device - Google Patents

Key distributing device

Info

Publication number
JPS6354037A
JPS6354037A JP61197610A JP19761086A JPS6354037A JP S6354037 A JPS6354037 A JP S6354037A JP 61197610 A JP61197610 A JP 61197610A JP 19761086 A JP19761086 A JP 19761086A JP S6354037 A JPS6354037 A JP S6354037A
Authority
JP
Japan
Prior art keywords
key
random number
key distribution
communication
user
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Granted
Application number
JP61197610A
Other languages
Japanese (ja)
Other versions
JPH0456501B2 (en
Inventor
Eiji Okamoto
栄司 岡本
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
NEC Corp
Original Assignee
NEC Corp
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by NEC Corp filed Critical NEC Corp
Priority to JP61197610A priority Critical patent/JPS6354037A/en
Priority to EP87112158A priority patent/EP0257585B1/en
Priority to DE8787112158T priority patent/DE3782780T2/en
Priority to CA000545199A priority patent/CA1279709C/en
Priority to US07/088,319 priority patent/US4876716A/en
Publication of JPS6354037A publication Critical patent/JPS6354037A/en
Publication of JPH0456501B2 publication Critical patent/JPH0456501B2/ja
Granted legal-status Critical Current

Links

Abstract

PURPOSE:To increase the efficiency of a key distribution by using a secret integral number specific to a user so as to convert a random number and forming a key distribution data, thereby generating a ciphering communication key under a prescribed condition. CONSTITUTION:A secret integral number and a public integral number in common to membership are stored in the card 203 of a user A and the numbers are read in a terminal 201 via a card reader 202. A terminal equipment 201 generates a random number at the key distribution processing, the number is converted by using the secret integral number and the public integral number and sends the converted random number to a communication opposite party B as a key delivery data, receives the key delivery data generated by the similar procedure from the opposite party B and discriminates whether or not the data is a data satisfying a prescribed condition according to the predetermined algorithm. When the condition is satisfied, the key distribution data is converted depending on the random number generated by the predetermined conversion and the result of conversion is used as the ciphering communication key.

Description

【発明の詳細な説明】 (産業上の利用分野) 本発明は暗号通信に用いるキー配送装置に関する。[Detailed description of the invention] (Industrial application field) The present invention relates to a key distribution device used for encrypted communication.

(従来技術) 公開鍵暗号系や公開鍵配送方式はディフィーとヘルマン
がアイ・イー・イー・イーのトランザクションズ・オン
・インフォメーション・セオリー(IEEETrans
actions on Information Th
eory)の22巻、6号、644頁〜654頁にて提
案した方式である。これらのは公開されている情報を用
いてメツセージの暗号化や暗号化キーの変換を行なう方
式である。
(Prior art) Public-key cryptosystems and public-key distribution systems are based on Diffie and Hellman's Transactions on Information Theory (IEEETrans).
actions on information Th
This is the method proposed in Vol. 22, No. 6, pp. 644-654 of ``Eory''. These methods use publicly available information to encrypt messages and convert encryption keys.

(発明が解決しようとする問題点) 前記の公開されている情報は通信相手毎に異なるため、
全都合わせると膨大な量となり、しかも改ざんされない
ように常に注意しなければならないという欠点がある。
(Problem to be solved by the invention) Since the above-mentioned disclosed information differs depending on the communication partner,
The disadvantage is that the total amount is enormous if you include all of Tokyo, and you have to be careful at all times to make sure it is not tampered with.

(問題点を解決するための手段) 本発明のキー配送装置は、乱数を発生し、該乱数を、あ
らかじめ定められた秘密コードと通信当事者に共通で必
ずしも秘密でなくてもよいディジタルパターンとに依存
してあらかじめ定められた変換で変換し、該変換された
乱数をキー配送用データとして前記通信相手に送るキー
配送用データ作成手段と、前記通信相手において前記キ
ー配送用データ作成手段と同じ手段で作成されたキー配
送用データを受けとり、該キー配送用データが所定の条
件をみたすデータか否かをあらかじめ定められたアルゴ
リズムに従って判定して、みたせば該キー配送用データ
を前もって定められた変換にて前記発生された乱数に依
存して変換し、その変換結果を暗号通信用キーとする暗
号通信用キー作成手段とからすることを特徴とするキー
配送装置である。
(Means for Solving the Problems) The key distribution device of the present invention generates random numbers and converts the random numbers into a predetermined secret code and a digital pattern that is common to communication parties and does not necessarily have to be secret. key distribution data creation means for converting the random numbers according to a predetermined conversion and sending the converted random numbers to the communication partner as key delivery data; and means that is the same as the key delivery data creation means at the communication partner. receives the key distribution data created in , determines whether or not the key distribution data satisfies predetermined conditions according to a predetermined algorithm; The key distribution device is characterized in that the key distribution device includes cryptographic communication key generation means that performs conversion depending on the random number generated in the conversion and uses the conversion result as a cryptographic communication key.

(作用) 本発明の詳細な説明に先立ち、わかりやすくするために
各実施例に共通な原理・作用の部分を第1図を用いて説
明する。第1図において、ユーザAとユーザ3間で暗号
化キーを共有するものとし、ユーザAが起動をかける場
合を想定する。ユーザAは秘密整数SAと、必ずしも秘
密でなくてもよい(以下、公開と言う)整数e、c、α
、nを持ち、ユーザBは秘密整数SBと前記公開整数e
、c、α、nを持つ。これらの整数はあらかじめ信頼で
きる人又は機関が定めて配っておく。定め方については
後述する。
(Operation) Prior to a detailed explanation of the present invention, the principles and operations common to each embodiment will be explained using FIG. 1 for ease of understanding. In FIG. 1, it is assumed that an encryption key is shared between user A and user 3, and that user A initiates the activation. User A has a secret integer SA and integers e, c, α, which do not necessarily have to be secret (hereinafter referred to as public).
, n, and user B has a secret integer SB and the public integer e
, c, α, n. These integers are determined and distributed in advance by a reliable person or organization. The method of determining this will be explained later.

ユーザAは乱数rを生成し、XA = a”(mod 
n)とyA= SA・a”(mod n)を計算して、
(XA13’A)をユーザBに送る。ここでa(mod
 b)はaをbで割った余りを意味する。ユーザBは(
XA、yA)を受は取り、yAe/xAC(modn)
がAの住所、氏名等をコード化したよりAに等しいが否
かを判定する。もし等しくなければキー配送処理を中止
する。等しければユーザBも乱数tを生成し、xB =
 aet(mad n)とyB = SB・aCt(m
od n)を計算して、(xBlyB)をユーザAに送
ると共に、データ暗号化キーwkをwk=xAt(mo
dn)より求める。wkはaer’(modn)に等し
い。一方ユーザAは(XB、yB)を受信して、yBe
/xBc(mod n)がユーザBの住所、氏名等をコ
ード化したよりBに等しいか否かを判定し、等しくなけ
ればキー配送処理を中止し、等しければデータ暗号化キ
ーWkをwk= xBr(mod n)より求める。こ
のWkもαert(mod H)に等しい。なお、ID
Aは全員に知られているものであるが、ユーザAからユ
ーザBに通知してもよい。
User A generates a random number r, XA = a” (mod
n) and yA= SA・a” (mod n),
(XA13'A) is sent to user B. Here a(mod
b) means the remainder when a is divided by b. User B is (
Take XA, yA), yAe/xAC (modn)
It is determined whether or not is equal to A by encoding A's address, name, etc. If they are not equal, the key distribution process is canceled. If they are equal, user B also generates a random number t, and xB =
aet(mad n) and yB = SB・aCt(m
od n), sends (xBlyB) to user A, and sends the data encryption key wk to wk=xAt(mo
dn). wk is equal to aer'(modn). On the other hand, user A receives (XB, yB) and yBe
Determine whether /xBc (mod n) is equal to B, which is the encoded address, name, etc. of user B. If they are not equal, stop the key distribution process, and if they are equal, set the data encryption key Wk to wk=xBr (mod n). This Wk is also equal to αert (mod H). In addition, ID
Although A is known to everyone, user A may notify user B.

さて、ここでSA、SB、e、c、α、nが次のように
定められているものとする。n=p−qはnの因数分解
が困難な程度の大きさの相違なる素数とする。例えば、
p。
Now, assume that SA, SB, e, c, α, and n are defined as follows. Let n=p-q be prime numbers that differ in size to the extent that it is difficult to factorize n. for example,
p.

qとも2256程度なら十分である。e、cをn未満の
素数とし、αはn未満の正整数とする。さらにdをe−
d(mod(p−1)(q−1))=1をみたす整数と
して、SA = IDAd(mod n)、SB = 
IDBd(mod n)とする。
It is sufficient if both q are about 2256. Let e and c be prime numbers less than n, and α be a positive integer less than n. Furthermore, d is e-
As an integer that satisfies d (mod (p-1) (q-1)) = 1, SA = IDAd (mod n), SB =
IDBd (mod n).

以上のようにSA、SB、e、c、α、nが定められて
いるとき、SAe(mod n) = IDA、SBe
(mod n) = IDBとなる。これは雑誌コミュ
ニケーション、ズ・オプ・ザ・ニーシーエム(Comm
unication of the ACM)の第21
巻2号の120頁から126頁に記載されている、いわ
ゆるR8A公開鍵暗量系の暗号、復号と同じ処理なので
、成立する。
When SA, SB, e, c, α, and n are defined as above, SAe (mod n) = IDA, SBe
(mod n) = IDB. This is a magazine communication, Z op the NCM (Com
21 of the ACM)
This is true because it is the same process as the so-called R8A public key cryptographic encryption and decryption described on pages 120 to 126 of Vol. 2, No. 2.

すると、nを法としてyAe/XAC=SAe、αer
C/αerC=IDAとなる。yBe/xBC= ID
Bも同様である。ところが、SAはユーザAのみが持ち
、sBはユーザBのみがもつので(但し、SA、SB等
を作成した信頼できる人又は機関は不正を働かないもの
とする)、yAe/XAC(modn)=■DAをみた
す(XA、yA)はユーザAのみが作れ、yBe/xB
C(mod n)= IDBをみたす(xB、yB)は
ユーザBのみが作れる。ここで、f、b、nがらxf(
mod n) = bをみたすXを求めることは、前記
R8A公開鍵暗量系を破ることに相当するので、困難で
ある。また、XAやxBとnからwkが求められないこ
とは、前記IEEEの文献に出ている。なお、Cを可変
にして、相手に通知するようにしてもキー配送ができる
Then, modulo n, yAe/XAC=SAe, αer
C/αerC=IDA. yBe/xBC= ID
The same applies to B. However, since SA is held only by user A and sB is held only by user B (however, the trusted person or institution that created SA, SB, etc. shall not commit fraud), yAe/XAC(modn) = ■ Only user A can create (XA, yA) that satisfies DA, yBe/xB
Only user B can create (xB, yB) that satisfies C (mod n) = IDB. Here, xf(
mod n) = b is difficult because it corresponds to breaking the R8A public key cryptosystem. Furthermore, it is stated in the above-mentioned IEEE literature that wk cannot be determined from XA, xB, and n. Note that key distribution can also be done by making C variable and notifying the other party.

以上により、各ユーザは自分の秘密整数Sと、全員共通
のe、c、α、nのみを持つだけでキー配送が出来るこ
とが示された。
From the above, it has been shown that each user can perform key distribution by simply having his own secret integer S and e, c, α, and n that are common to all users.

(実施例) 第2図は本発明の第1の実施例を示す構成図である。2
01は端末で、例えばパーソナルコンピュータであり、
202はカードリーグ、203はカード、204は通信
相手と連結されている回線である。カードは、中味を他
人に読まれなければ何でもよいが、読まれる危険がある
場合にはアイ・シー・カード(ICカード)がよい。ユ
ーザをAとする。カード203にはSA、e、c、α、
nが記憶されていて、カードリーダ202を通して端末
201に読まれる。端末201には、カード読出プログ
ラム、乱数rの生成プログラム、αreとSA・αrc
の計算プログラム、送信相手との送受信プログラム等が
ある。具俸的に端末がなすべき作業をフローチャートに
して第3図(a)、(b)に示す。第3図(a)に示す
キー配送処理にはいると、まず乱数rを生成し、カード
からSA、e、c、α、nを読込み、嘉、yAを計算し
て相手側に送る。次に第3図(b)ではもし相手側から
もxB13’Bが送られてくれば、yBe/xBC(m
od n)を計算し、IDHに等しければwk= xB
r(mod n)をデータ暗号化キーとする。もし等し
くなければキー配送処理を中止する。また、相手側から
XB、yBが送られて米ないときもキー配送処理を中止
する。中止した場合には、再試行あるいはアラームを出
して相手端末にも通知する。
(Embodiment) FIG. 2 is a block diagram showing a first embodiment of the present invention. 2
01 is a terminal, for example a personal computer,
202 is a card league, 203 is a card, and 204 is a line connected to a communication partner. Any card may be used as long as the contents cannot be read by others, but if there is a risk of it being read, an IC card is better. Let the user be A. Card 203 includes SA, e, c, α,
n is stored and read by the terminal 201 through the card reader 202. The terminal 201 includes a card reading program, a random number r generation program, αre and SA・αrc.
There are calculation programs, programs for transmitting and receiving data to the other party, etc. The work to be done by the terminal is shown in flowcharts in FIGS. 3(a) and 3(b). When entering the key distribution process shown in FIG. 3(a), first a random number r is generated, SA, e, c, α, and n are read from the card, and KA and yA are calculated and sent to the other party. Next, in Fig. 3(b), if xB13'B is also sent from the other side, yBe/xBC(m
od n), and if it is equal to IDH, wk = xB
Let r(mod n) be the data encryption key. If they are not equal, the key distribution process is canceled. Further, the key delivery process is also canceled when XB and yB are sent from the other party and there is no rice. If the process is canceled, the process is retried or an alarm is issued to notify the other party's terminal.

なお、端末における作業の1部又は全部はソフトでなく
専用ハードで実行してもかまわない。また、カードリー
ダ202は端末201に組込まれた形態でも何らかまわ
ない。
Note that part or all of the work on the terminal may be performed using dedicated hardware instead of software. Furthermore, the card reader 202 may be incorporated into the terminal 201.

第4図は本発明の第2の実施例を示すブロック図で・あ
る。第4図では、本発明装置を端末装置401に接続す
るボードとして実現している。404は乱数rやtを生
成する乱数発生器、405は巾乗剰余を計算する巾乗剰
余回路、406は乗除算回路、407はマイクロプロセ
ッサ、402はマイクロプロセッサ、407のプログラ
ム等を記憶しているROM、403はマイクロプロセッ
サ407の作業領域、のRAMである。公開情報e、c
、α、nはR,OM 402に記憶しておくが、秘密情
報SAは乗除算回路406に組込んでおいて、yA=S
A・α”(tnod n)における乗除算を乗除算回路
406で実行する。マイクロプロセッサ407は第3図
に示す作業のコントロールを行なう。なお、このマイク
ロプロセッサ407は端末装置401内のマイクロプロ
セッサが使える場合には後者で代用できる。
FIG. 4 is a block diagram showing a second embodiment of the present invention. In FIG. 4, the device of the present invention is realized as a board connected to a terminal device 401. 404 is a random number generator that generates random numbers r and t; 405 is an exponentiation remainder circuit that calculates an exponentiation remainder; 406 is a multiplication/division circuit; 407 is a microprocessor; 402 is a microprocessor; The ROM 403 is the RAM of the microprocessor 407's work area. Public information e, c
, α, and n are stored in the R,OM 402, but the secret information SA is incorporated in the multiplication/division circuit 406, and yA=S
The multiplication/division circuit 406 executes the multiplication/division at "A・α" (tnod n).The microprocessor 407 controls the work shown in FIG. If available, the latter can be used instead.

以上の説明において、s、e、c、α、nを作成する際
に用いたd、p、(1は、各人にs、e、c、α、nを
配布してしまえば不要となり、廃棄してよい。また、y
Ae/XAC(modn)は■DAに完全に一致しなく
ても似ていればよい。なぜなら、もしSAを知らない者
がXA+yAを作ると、yAe/XAC(modn)は
ランダムな数になり、■DAとは全く異なってしまうの
が殆んどだからである。ID、も−通りに定まるもので
はないし、住所0氏名でなくてもユーザAを特定できる
ものなら何でもよい。さらに、S、C,e、C,nは整
数として説明したが、有限体の元としても全く同じ議論
が成立する。
In the above explanation, d, p, (1 used when creating s, e, c, α, n will become unnecessary once s, e, c, α, n are distributed to each person, You can discard it.Also, y
Ae/XAC (modn) does not need to completely match ■DA as long as it is similar. This is because if someone who does not know SA creates XA+yA, yAe/XAC (modn) will be a random number and will most likely be completely different from ■DA. The ID is not fixed, and any ID that can identify the user A may be used, even if it is not an address or a name. Furthermore, although S, C, e, C, and n have been explained as integers, the exact same argument holds true even if they are elements of a finite field.

これらの変更は全て本発明にに含まれるものである。All of these modifications are included in the present invention.

(発明の効果) 以上詳細に説明したように、本発明を用いれば、各ユー
ザは1つの秘密情報と数個の公開情報をもつだけでキー
配送ができるという効果を生じる。
(Effects of the Invention) As described above in detail, the present invention has the effect that each user can perform key distribution with only one secret information and several pieces of public information.

【図面の簡単な説明】[Brief explanation of the drawing]

第1図は本発明の作用を示すための図、第2図は本発明
の第1の実施例を示すための構成図、第3図(a)、(
b)は各端末がなすべき作業を示す流れ図、第4図は第
2の実施例を示すブロック図である。 図において、101は起動側ユーザの処理、102ハ被
起動側ユーザの処理を表わし、201は端末、202は
カードリーダ、203はカード、204は相手側端末と
結ぶケーブルである。401は端末装置、402はRO
M、403はRAM、404は乱数発生器、405は巾
乗剰余回路、406は乗除算回路、407はマイクロプ
ロセッサである。                 
2d−訃く;駅肋 第2図
FIG. 1 is a diagram showing the operation of the present invention, FIG. 2 is a block diagram showing the first embodiment of the present invention, and FIGS. 3(a), (
b) is a flowchart showing the work to be done by each terminal, and FIG. 4 is a block diagram showing the second embodiment. In the figure, reference numeral 101 indicates processing by the user on the activation side, 102 indicates processing by the user on the activation side, 201 is a terminal, 202 is a card reader, 203 is a card, and 204 is a cable connecting with the other party terminal. 401 is a terminal device, 402 is RO
M, 403 is a RAM, 404 is a random number generator, 405 is a power remainder circuit, 406 is a multiplication/division circuit, and 407 is a microprocessor.
2d-Death; Station Rib Figure 2

Claims (1)

【特許請求の範囲】[Claims] 暗号通信に際し通信相手と共有すべきキーを配送するキ
ー配送装置において、乱数を発生し、該乱数を、あらか
じめ定められた秘密コードと通信当事者に共通で必ずし
も秘密でなくてもよいディジタルパターンとに依存して
あらかじめ定められた変換で変換し、該変換された乱数
をキー配送用データとして前記通信相手に送るキー配送
用データ作成手段と、前記通信相手において前記キー配
送用データ作成手段と同じ規則で作成されたキー配送用
データを受けとり、該キー配送用データが所定の条件を
みたすデータか否かをあらかじめ定められたアルゴリズ
ムに従って判定して、みたせば該キー配送用データを前
もって定められた変換にて前記発生された乱数に依存し
て変換し、その変換結果を暗号通信用キーとする暗号通
信用キー作成手段とからなることを特徴とするキー配送
装置。
A key distribution device that distributes a key to be shared with a communication partner during encrypted communication generates a random number, and converts the random number into a predetermined secret code and a digital pattern that is common to the communication parties and does not necessarily have to be secret. key distribution data creation means that converts the random number according to a predetermined conversion and sends the converted random number as key distribution data to the communication partner, and the same rules as the key delivery data creation means in the communication partner; receives the key distribution data created in , determines whether or not the key distribution data satisfies predetermined conditions according to a predetermined algorithm; A key distribution device comprising: cryptographic communication key creation means that performs conversion depending on the generated random number and uses the conversion result as a cryptographic communication key.
JP61197610A 1986-08-22 1986-08-22 Key distributing device Granted JPS6354037A (en)

Priority Applications (5)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
JP61197610A JPS6354037A (en) 1986-08-22 1986-08-22 Key distributing device
EP87112158A EP0257585B1 (en) 1986-08-22 1987-08-21 Key distribution method
DE8787112158T DE3782780T2 (en) 1986-08-22 1987-08-21 KEY DISTRIBUTION PROCEDURE.
CA000545199A CA1279709C (en) 1986-08-22 1987-08-24 Key distribution method
US07/088,319 US4876716A (en) 1986-08-22 1987-08-24 Key distribution method

Applications Claiming Priority (1)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
JP61197610A JPS6354037A (en) 1986-08-22 1986-08-22 Key distributing device

Publications (2)

Publication Number Publication Date
JPS6354037A true JPS6354037A (en) 1988-03-08
JPH0456501B2 JPH0456501B2 (en) 1992-09-08

Family

ID=16377333

Family Applications (1)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
JP61197610A Granted JPS6354037A (en) 1986-08-22 1986-08-22 Key distributing device

Country Status (1)

Country Link
JP (1) JPS6354037A (en)

Cited By (2)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
JPH02130078A (en) * 1988-11-09 1990-05-18 Aisin Seiki Co Ltd Information transmitter with confidential function
US11411744B2 (en) * 2017-05-25 2022-08-09 Nec Network And Sensor Systems, Ltd. Encryption communication method, information processing apparatus, and program

Non-Patent Citations (2)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Title
COMMNICATION OF ACM TIMESTAMPS IN KEY DISTRIBUTION PROTOCOLS=1981 *
PROTECTING PUBLIC KEYS AND SIGNATURE KEYS IEEE COMPUTER=1983 *

Cited By (2)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
JPH02130078A (en) * 1988-11-09 1990-05-18 Aisin Seiki Co Ltd Information transmitter with confidential function
US11411744B2 (en) * 2017-05-25 2022-08-09 Nec Network And Sensor Systems, Ltd. Encryption communication method, information processing apparatus, and program

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JPH0456501B2 (en) 1992-09-08

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