JPS63133267A - Forgery preventing system for ic card - Google Patents

Abstract

PURPOSE:To prevent the forgery of an IC card by rewriting the content of the card only when coincidence is secured between a 2nd identification number produced by a control computer and a 2nd identification number stored in the card. CONSTITUTION:A registered 1st identification number is inputted through a terminal equipment 20, a processor 1 of the IC card 10 receives the identification number via an external interface circuit 3. Then the processor 1 reads out the identification information on the owner of the card 10 and sends it out to a control computer 21 when the input identification number is coincident with the 1st identification number stored in a memory area 2B. The computer 21 extracts the 2nd identification number produced in a register mode based said identification information and sends it to the card 10 and then to the processor 1. The processor 1 rewrites the contents of a memory are 2C of the card 10 when coincidence is obtained between said 2nd identification number and the 2nd identification number stored in a memory area 2A.

Description

DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE INVENTION [Field of Industrial Application] The present invention relates to an IC card, and particularly to an IC card counterfeiting prevention method for preventing counterfeiting such as rewriting of information in the IC card.

[Conventional technology]

2. Description of the Related Art A technique described in Japanese Patent Application Laid-Open No. 58-203572 is known as a conventional technique for preventing fraudulent use or counterfeiting of cards in card usage systems such as bank automatic teller machines. This conventional technique uses two passwords, one written on the card and one owned by a management computer, and can be applied to cases where an IC card is used instead of a magnetic card. When this conventional technology is used in a card usage system using an IC card, even if the IC card's PIN number can be decoded, the PIN number registered in the management computer is unknown, resulting in card fraud. It is possible to prevent use or counterfeiting.

[Problem that the invention seeks to solve]

However, in the prior art, the card user enters the PIN number
There are problems in that it is a heavy burden on the card holder, such as having to memorize two personal identification numbers and easily inputting the two personal identification numbers in the wrong order.

In addition, IC cards, in particular, can now have large-capacity memories due to advances in semiconductor integrated circuits. information, password, service type and restrictions, journal, etc. are stored. For this reason,
It is conceivable that the card holder himself decodes and rewrites this information for forgery, but the above-mentioned conventional technology has the problem that the card provider's defense measures are not perfect in such cases. There is.

SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION An object of the present invention is to provide an IC card counterfeiting prevention method that does not place a burden on the card holder regarding the personal identification number and allows the card provider to easily prevent card forgery.

[Means for Solving the Problems] According to the present invention, the purpose is to identify the first PIN registered by the cardholder and the second PIN generated by the management computer.
A second PIN number is stored in the memory of the IC card, a second PIN number is held within the IC card so as not to be output outside the IC card, and the second PIN number is stored in the IC card so as not to be output outside the IC card. By outputting only the result of whether or not the number matches the second PIN number, and only when the result matches, the internal information of the IC card can be rewritten, This is achieved by making it impossible to rewrite the internal information of the IC card when one of the two passwords does not match.

[Effect]

The IC card holder sets the IC card in the terminal device,
When the first PIN is entered from the terminal device, the I
It is checked in the C card. If a match is found, the terminal device transmits identification information such as the card holder's name and passbook number stored in the memory of the IC card to the management computer. The management computer transmits the second password to the terminal device based on this identification information. This second password from the management computer is input into the IC card, and checked within the IC card to see if it matches the second password stored in the IC card. The IC card reports only this check result to the management computer via the terminal device. If the results match, the management computer permits rewriting of the information in the IC card.

As mentioned above, when rewriting the information in the IC card, it is necessary that not only the first PIN number but also the second PIN number generated in the management computer without human intervention match. . This second PIN is a number that is not disclosed to the card holder, is held within the IC card so that it cannot be read from the IC card, and the number of digits can be increased. This makes it possible to prevent counterfeiting of IC cards.

〔Example〕

Hereinafter, one embodiment of the IC card counterfeit prevention method according to the present invention will be described in detail with reference to the drawings.

FIG. 1 is an internal block diagram of an IC card according to an embodiment of the present invention, and FIG. 2 is a system configuration diagram of an embodiment of the present invention. In FIGS. 1 and 2, ■ is a processor, 2 is a memory, 3 is an external interface circuit, 10 is an IC card,
20 is a terminal device, and 21 is a management converter.

As shown in FIG. 1, the IC' card 10 is composed of a processor 1, a memory 2, and an external interface circuit 3, which are connected by an internal bus. The memory 2 is composed of a plurality of memory areas 2A to 2C, and each memory area is managed by the processor 1 to determine whether the IC card can be rewritten or read from outside.

The memory area 2A is a memory area that cannot be rewritten or read, and stores a second password generated within the management computer 21, which will be described later. Memory area 2
B is a memory area that cannot be rewritten but is readable, and stores identification information such as the first password registered by the holder of the IC card 10, the holder's name, and passbook number.

Further, the memory area 2C is a rewritable and readable memory area, and stores journals and the like.

A system in which such an IC card 10 is used, as shown in FIG. This is, for example, a bank online system, etc., which is configured with a connected management computer 21.

When carrying out business such as transactions using the IC card 10, the holder of the IC card 10 transfers the IC card lO to the terminal device 2.
0, then manually input the first password from the keyboard of the terminal device 20. The terminal device 20 is
The input first password is input into the IC card 10. The processor 1 in the IC card 10 receives this first PIN number via the external interface circuit 3, and determines whether this PIN number matches the first PIN number stored in the memory head 2B. Find out whether or not.

When a match is obtained between the password entered from the keyboard and the first password in the IC card 10, the processor 1 outputs a signal indicating this to the outside of the IC card 10 via the external interface circuit 3. . Thereafter, the processor l reads identification information such as the name of the holder of the IC card 10 from the memory area 2B, and also outputs this to the outside via the external interface 3. The terminal device 20 transmits this identification information to the management computer 21. The management computer 21 retrieves the second password generated by the management computer 21 using random numbers or the like when registering the IC card 10 based on the identification information 1 and sends it to the IC card 10 via the terminal device 20. .

The second password is given to the processor 1 via the external interface circuit 3. The processor 1 checks whether the second password stored in the memory area 2A and the password from the management computer 21 match. If this match is obtained, the processor 1 outputs a signal to that effect to the outside of the IC card 10 via the external interface circuit 3. After that, the terminal device 20 or the management computer 21 adds transaction information etc. to the memory area 2C inside the IC card ll, or when there is no empty area in the memory area 2C,
It becomes possible to erase the contents of.

Further, if the first password number or the second password number does not match within the IC card 10, the IC card 10 will not accept subsequent processing such as transactions.

In the embodiment described above, the information stored in each memory area is fixed, but it is sufficient that only the second password is stored in the memory area 2A that cannot be read or rewritten. Further, in the above-described embodiment, the management computer 21 and the IC card 10 are
For example, if you want to add information such as a journal to the memory area 2C, you can process it using only an offline terminal device and an IC card.
The memory area 2C may be erased under the control of the management computer via an online terminal device only when there is no more free area in the memory area 2C. Furthermore, whether or not to perform online processing with the management computer may be determined based on the transaction content, business content, etc.

〔Effect of the invention〕

As explained above, according to the present invention, not only the first PIN number but also the second PIN number generated by the management computer and the second PIN number unreadably stored in the IC card can be used. By making it possible to rewrite the contents of an IC card only when the two match, it becomes extremely difficult to forge an IC card. In addition, since the second PIN is a number that the cardholder does not need to memorize, it can have a large number of digits, such as 20 digits, and even if a high-speed computer is used, the second PIN does not need to be memorized. It takes a lot of time to decipher a PIN; for example, it takes about 1.5 million years on average to decipher a 20-digit PIN using a computer that generates one PIN in 1 μs).
Furthermore, it is difficult to counterfeit RC cards.

[Brief explanation of the drawing]

FIG. 1 is an internal block diagram of an IC card according to an embodiment of the present invention, and FIG. 2 is a system configuration diagram of an embodiment of the present invention. 1---processor, 2--memory, 3--
-m--external interface circuit, 10--rc card, 20--one terminal device, 21--management computer. Agent: Patent attorney Kenjibu Take (1 other person) Figure 1 Figure 2

Claims (1)

[Claims] 1. In an IC card counterfeit prevention system that stores a first PIN registered by the IC card holder, at least identification information such as name, and a journal, the IC card is stored outside the IC card once it has been written. It has a memory area that cannot be read or rewritten from the IC card, and the second PIN number generated by the management computer is stored in this memory area, and the second PIN number input by the IC card holder and the IC card holder are stored in the memory area.
Only when the first PIN in the C card matches and the second PIN given from the management computer and the second PIN in the IC card match, the information stored in the IC card will be released. A method for preventing counterfeiting of an IC card, which is characterized in that it can be rewritten or erased.