JPS61137273A - Recording reader of magnetic card - Google Patents

Abstract

PURPOSE:To obtain a device of which a forgery can not be simply fabricated by forming a means for reading/writing data, a means for reading out inherent data in each car, an arithmetic means for forming security data, and a means for matching the security data and discriminating the coincidence. CONSTITUTION:When a magnetic card written in data is inserted into a magnetic card reader/writer connected to a telephone set e.g., the card is sent in a scanning direction by a scanning mechanism, both variable data (residual number) and security data are read out by a magnetic reading head 12 in a magnetic reading/writing part 10 and applied to an MPU part 30 through a magnetic data reading circuit 14. In an inherent data reader part 20, the rays of light are irradiated to the surface of the card by a projector 21 and is reflected light is detected by a photodetector 22 and applied to the MPU part 30 through an inherent data reading circuit 23. The MPU part 30 converts the variable data (residual number) and the inherent data into security data on the basis of prescribed algorithm.

Description

DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE INVENTION [Technical Field] The present invention relates to a magnetic card counterfeit prevention technology, and more particularly to a data recording/reading device for a magnetic card that uses both magnetic data recording and non-magnetic data recording.

[Technical dorsal fin]

In recent years, so-called magnetic cards on which data is recorded magnetically have been on the market. There are two types of magnetic cards: one that specifies the user using a PIN number, such as a cash card, and one that does not specify the user, such as telephone cards, which have recently become popular. There are types.

Here, even if a card is forged, it cannot be used as it is because it has a PIN number, but in the latter case, there is a high possibility that a counterfeit card will become available because it will be duplicated without a PIN number.

Therefore, various anti-counterfeiting measures have been taken in the past. The first method is to use the r@test code, but this is not effective unless the user is identified.

In order to identify the user, the magnetic record can be developed with iron powder or the like and visually identified, so it is possible to decipher and override the password. Part 2 is to embed special elements other than magnetic data inside the card so that they cannot be seen.
To detect the presence or absence of this special element, there is a method of determining the authenticity of J:, but it has the drawback that the presence of the special element is easily detected. The third method is to provide visual records such as special patterns using fine lines, printing of special characters, and holograms, but while this is difficult for humans to identify, it is difficult for machines to identify it. be. The fourth method is to use a certain algorithm when writing data, but this method is also useless for duplication.

Part 5 is that the magnetic recording layer is made up of multiple magnetic layers with different properties and cannot be read unless special equipment is used. There is a method to prevent this from occurring, but it can be easily destroyed if there is only a small number of magnetic materials with different properties and knowledge.

[Purpose of the invention]

The present invention has been made in consideration of the above points, and it is easy to use t4i.
The purpose of the present invention is to provide a magnetic card data recording/reading device that cannot be counterfeited.

[Invention mold]

In order to achieve this objective, the present invention uses a card that stores card-specific data that can be identified with invisible light, and when magnetically recording, an If function for reading the card-specific data and variable data to be written in the magnetic recording section. and the card-specific data to calculate security data,
A function to magnetically record this security data and other data, a function to read the card-specific data and each magnetic data when reading the card, and a function to read the card-specific data and other magnetic data to generate security data from the read magnetic data. The present invention provides a magnetic card recording/reading device that performs a function of comparing security data recorded in a magnetic recording section to determine whether or not they match.

〔Example〕

The present invention will be described in detail with reference to the accompanying drawings below.

FIGS. 1(A) and 1(B) show the shape of a magnetic card according to the present invention, with FIG. 1(a) showing the front side and FIG. 1(b) showing the back side, respectively. In Fig. 1, reference numeral 1 denotes a magnetic card, and a magnetic recording section 2 is provided along the longitudinal direction at the center of the front side of the card, and a timing mark 3 and a timing mark 3 are provided along the longitudinal direction at the lower center of the back side. An invisible light identification recording section is provided which is read from the mark 4 of card-specific data. In FIG. 1, the invisible light identification recording section and the magnetic recording section 2 are placed on opposite sides of the card, but they may be on the same side.

= 4 - The magnetic recording section 2 is a magnetic stripe or full-surface magnetic in a general magnetic card, and records variable data such as amount of money and security data as described below. The invisible light identification recording section consists of two types of marks, namely a timing mark 3 and a card specific data mark 4, and these data are recorded by being printed using invisible light absorbing ink.

Figure 2 shows the spectral characteristics of invisible light absorbing ink, and 5 is an ink that absorbs in the invisible light region, that is, the infrared region with a wavelength of 700 μm or more, such as TR-750, 770 manufactured by Kuchiki Kayaku ■. This ink is prepared by mixing .degree.

The illustrated ink 5 has some light absorption even in the visible region, so that the mark can be seen, and in order to hide it, cover printing is performed on the mark 3.4 using a visible light absorbing ink 6. This visible light absorbing electric current 6 is required to have low absorbency in the infrared region. In the infrared region, the mark 3.4 cannot be read unless there is a clearly distinguishable difference in characteristics between inks 5 and 6.

Figure 3 shows how to print the timing mark 3 and card-specific data mark 4 in Figure 1 (B).
A timing mark 3 and card-specific data 4 are printed on the card surface using invisible light absorbing ink 5, and then printed with ink 6 that has low absorption (high reflectance) in the invisible light region to hide the marks. do. When printing for concealment, printing a multi-layer solid print on the entire surface and printing an irregular arbitrary pattern thereon has a remarkable effect of concealing the mark.

As a result, the card-specific data mark 4 and the timing mark 3 formed by the invisible light-absorbing ink 5 are not visible, and therefore the existence of these marks is not clearly recognized. Then, the mark can be read by emitting infrared light onto the mark recording surface of the magnetic card using a light projector and detecting the infrared light from the card surface using a light receiver.

Figure 4 shows the spectral characteristics of this emitter, J: and receiver, where 8 is that of the receiver, and a to C are 1())1.
1; It is a vessel. The characteristics of the receiver are approximately 800IIT.
It peaks rL, and the projector is 700 μm.
Those with peaks at 900f1m and 1000μm3
A scale of 900 μm is actually considered to be the best. Furthermore, if an infrared transmitting and visible light filter is used for each of the projector and receiver, the effect will be further improved.

5(A) and 5(B) conceptually show the flow of data regarding writing of data to the magnetic recording section 2 of the magnetic card 1 and reading of data from the magnetic card 1. FIG.

As an example, when writing to the magnetic card 1, as shown in FIG. The variable data to be newly recorded in the magnetic recording section is converted into security data according to a predetermined algorithm. p to 2
Includes 1.

The reading of data from this magnetic card 1 is carried out in the fifth step.
Among the data read from the magnetic recording section, the variable data is converted into security data according to a predetermined algorithm along with the card-specific data read from the mark recording section, and the security data read from the magnetic card is converted into security data according to a predetermined algorithm. Verify the data. This determines whether the read magnetic card passes or fails. FIG. 6 shows the configuration of an embodiment of the present invention for writing data to the magnetic card and continuously outputting data from the magnetic card shown in FIGS. 5 (Δ) and (F3). In the figure, reference numeral 1o denotes a magnetic read/write section that writes data to and reads data from the magnetic recording section 2 of the magnetic card 1, and includes a magnetic write head 11, a magnetic read head 12, and a magnetic data write section It has an integrated circuit 13 and a magnetic data reading circuit 1/+. 20 again
is a unique data reading section, which includes a light projector 21, a light receiver 22, and a unique data reading circuit 23. Further, 30 is an MPU unit constituted by, for example, a microprocessor for processing the read data or data to be written, and 40 is an external device.

When writing to a magnetic card in the apparatus of the present invention, first, the unique data of the card is read by the unique data reading section 20. Furthermore, the variable data is read from the magnetic recording section 2 by the magnetic read head 12 of the magnetic read/write section 10, and the variable data is read from the MPU section 30.
Create new variable data (remaining power) to be written using the signal (used power) from an external device such as a telephone,
The MPU unit 30 creates security data from the card-specific data read previously and the newly created variable data (remaining power). Then, variable data (remaining power) and security data to be newly written are written into the magnetic recording section 2 of the node J using the magnetic write head 11.

When a magnetic card with data written in this way is placed in a magnetic card reader/writer of the device of the present invention connected to, for example, a telephone, the card is sent in the scanning direction by a scanning mechanism (not shown), and the magnetic reading head 12
Both variable data (remaining power) and security data are read by the magnetic data reading circuit 14 and sent to the MPUP 4O10. On the other hand, in the unique data reading device section 20, a light emitter 21 illuminates the surface of the optical system 11, and the reflected light is detected by a light receiver 22 and sent to the MPUP 4O10 via a unique data reading circuit 23.

The MPUP4O10 converts the variable data (remaining power) and unique data read from the magnetic card into security data according to an algorithm specified by the MPUP4O10. The signal is given to the MPU unit 30. The security data obtained by MPUP4O10 conversion is compared with the read security data, and a pass or fail output is generated depending on whether the two match.

If it passes, in the case of a telephone, a signal indicating permission to use it is output, a signal corresponding to the amount of telephone usage (frequency of use) is obtained, and the signal is subtracted from the original variable data (remaining frequency) to create new variable data of 19. (remaining power) and sekiri day data on magnetic card 1
The data is written in the magnetic recording section 2 of. The writing is as follows.

If the test fails, a signal indicating that the telephone cannot be used is output.

[Modified example]

In the above embodiment, a reflective type is used to record card-specific data on a magnetic card, but it is also possible to replace this with a transmissive type. In this case, the light projector 21 and light receiver 22 of the unique data reading section 20 must be placed on opposite sides of the card.

Furthermore, as the material for providing the card-specific data, a substance (ink) that absorbs in the ultraviolet region may be used instead of the infrared absorbing material, or a substance that emits fluorescence may be used. Furthermore, if the ink is completely invisible, printing on the coating ink may be omitted. Furthermore, although in the embodiment described in (1) above, the card-specific data is provided by a timing mark and a corresponding mark, this may also be a bar code or OCR, and exactly the same effect can be obtained.

〔Effect of the invention〕

As described above, the present invention has a function of reading the card-specific data pre-printed on the card when issuing the card, forming security data, and writing it into the magnetic recording section.
Moreover, when reading card-specific data, marks printed using a specific ink and printing method are detected using invisible light of a specific wavelength. For cards, it is impossible for the device of the present invention to read card-specific data.Therefore, the device of the present invention can easily detect counterfeit cards and is very effective in preventing the issuance of counterfeit cards. .

In addition, when reading the card, the card-specific data that is pre-printed and recorded on the card is read using the above method,
It has a function of forming security data from variable data recorded in the magnetic recording section. Therefore, in this case as well, it is impossible to read cards other than cards printed in a predetermined manner, and counterfeit cards can be easily detected.

Furthermore, a person attempting to counterfeit a card that happens to have a mark printed on it that can be detected by the invisible light of a specific wavelength of the device of the present invention, and then steals the data (variable data, security data, etc.) recorded on the real card. Even if you create a card that records exactly the same data as that immortal,
The device of the present invention generates security data from the data detected by this invisible light and the variable data read from the magnetic recording section, and compares this with the security data previously written in the magnetic recording section to find a match. Since the card has a function of determining whether or not the card-specific data match at all, the security data will not match, and a counterfeit card can be easily detected.

In addition, the magnetic data (variable data, security data, and other data) in the magnetic recording section of an invalid card that has already been used (invalidity is recorded in the 11-ki recording section, but the card-specific data is the true data). Even in the case of a counterfeiting method in which magnetic data recorded in the magnetic recording section of a valid card is rewritten, the device of the present invention can easily detect a counterfeit card. In other words, when reading, the security data recorded in the magnetic recording section, such as the security data extracted from the card-specific data detected by invisible light and the variable data recorded in the magnetic recording section, does not match. The device of the invention can easily detect counterfeit cards (because each card has separate and unique data).

Since conventional magnetic card readers/writers only had the function of reading and writing magnetic data, they were completely incapable of counterfeiting as described above. Especially in the case of stored value cards (such as telephone cards), if the wake data of the used card is rewritten with the magnetic data of the valid card, this invalid card will have the same function as the valid card and cannot be detected by conventional devices. Met. The biggest advantage of the magnetic recording material r1 is that data can be easily rewritten, but this is the biggest drawback of these cards. The device of the present invention has the advantage of magnetic material PI (rewritable)
W? It is intended to capture and provide information.

Therefore, the device of the present invention makes it difficult to create counterfeit cards and greatly contributes to promoting the use of cards in the future.

[Brief explanation of the drawing]

Figures 1 (Δ) and (B) are front and actual views showing the shape of the magnetic card according to the present invention, and Figure 2 is a spectrum of ink used in the invisible light identification recording section of the card according to the present invention. Characteristic diagram, Figure 3 is a cross-sectional view showing the structure of the invisible light discrimination recording part of the same card, Figure 4 is a spectral characteristic diagram of the sensor used to read the invisible light discrimination recording part of the same card, and Figure 5 ( A
). (B) is a conceptual diagram to explain each operation of writing and reading various data to the card, and Figure 6 is Figure 5 (Δ).
FIG. 2 is a block diagram showing the configuration of a magnetic card reader/writer for performing the operations shown in FIG. DESCRIPTION OF SYMBOLS 1... Magnetic card, 2... Magnetic recording part, 3... Timing mark, 4... Card specific data mark, 5
... Invisible light absorbing ink, 6... Visible light transmitting (anti-I) 1) ink, 11... Magnetic writing head, 12.
...Magnetic reading head, 21... Light emitter, 22... Light receiver.

Claims (1)

[Scope of Claims] A device for reading and writing data on a magnetic card having a magnetic data recording section and a unique data recording section written with ink that is invisible to the naked eye and can be identified by invisible light,
A magnetic card recording/reading device comprising at least each of the following means 1 to 4. 1. Means for reading and writing data into the magnetic data recording section. 2. Means for irradiating invisible light of a specific wavelength onto a unique data recording section in which card-specific data is printed and recorded in advance on the magnetic card, detecting the intensity of the invisible light obtained from the card, and reading the card-specific data. 3. From the variable data to be written in the magnetic data recording section or the variable data read from the magnetic data recording section and the card-specific data read from the unique data recording section, security is determined according to a predetermined algorithm. Arithmetic means for forming data. 4. Security data formed based on the security data read from the magnetic data recording section, the variable data read from the magnetic data recording section, and the card-specific data read from the card's unique data recording section. A means of comparing and determining whether or not they match.