JPS61110285A - Detection system of falsification for ballot ticket - Google Patents

Abstract

(57) [Summary] This bulletin contains application data before electronic filing, so abstract data is not recorded.

Description

[Detailed Description of the Invention] [Industrial Application Field] The present invention provides a method for detecting forgery and alteration of betting tickets for horse racing, bicycle racing, etc., which detects forged or altered betting tickets at the time of refund and prevents incorrect refund processing. Regarding.

[Conventional technology]

In order to make it possible to mechanically check forgery or falsification of voting tickets for horse racing, bicycle racing, etc., the back of the voting ticket is magnetically coated and a secret code indicating that it is a genuine voting ticket is magnetically stored therein. There is a way to keep it. FIG. 3 shows an example of a horse racing betting ticket, and the venue, date, race number, voting details, etc. are written on the surface as shown. The entire back side is made of a magnetic film, and the information written on the surface of this magnetic film is the date, venue name, venue, race number, race/single/multiple race, horse (car) number, etc. The secret code is magnetically recorded along with the group number, amount, etc.

[Problem that the invention seeks to solve]

By the way, the above secret code is generally the same for all voting tickets for the same event date, so if the secret code is stolen, voting tickets can easily be forged or altered.
The present invention aims to more reliably check for forgery by magnetically recording a unique number on each voting ticket.

[Means for solving problems]

The present invention magnetically records a secret code indicating that the ticket is a genuine voting ticket for horse racing, bicycle racing, etc. and sells it, and checks the secret code at the time of refund to detect forged or altered voting tickets. In the method for detecting forgery and alteration of voting tickets, a unique number is magnetically recorded on each voting ticket, and at the time of sale, the unique number is transmitted to a refund management center and stored in its file,
When making a refund, in addition to checking the secret code, the unique number read from the voting ticket for which a refund was requested is sent to the refund management center and compared with the unique number in the file, and if a refund has already been made, the refund is prohibited, Further, if the payment is unpaid, a refund process is executed and the unique number is processed to be paid.

[Operation] The unique number magnetically recorded on each voting ticket is, for example, a combination of the name of the place of sale and a series of serial numbers. Therefore, it is impossible for officially sold voting tickets to have duplicate unique numbers. The first difficulty in forgery and alteration in this case is that it is difficult to estimate the unique number. Therefore, even if a similar unique number is given by forgery or alteration, refunds will be prohibited unless it is found among the authorized unique numbers stored in the file. However, this alone cannot deal with counterfeiting such as copying genuine voting tickets, so the unique number of the refunded voting ticket must be processed to that effect, such as by being deleted from the file or indicating that it has already been paid. mark to prevent duplicate refunds from being made more than once with one unique number. This will be explained in detail below with reference to illustrated embodiments.

〔Example〕

FIG. 1 is an explanatory diagram showing an embodiment of the present invention, in which 10 is a voting ticket sales office such as outside the venue, 11 is a refund office that may also serve as the sales office 10, and 20 is each sales office ゛ (refund office). When voting ticket 30 is issued (sold) at 0 sales office 10, which is a common refund management center connected online with ■,
The unique number (indicated by an x mark) 31 is sent to the center 20 and stored in the file 21. In addition to this, a secret code (indicated by an O mark) 32 is magnetically stored on the voting ticket 30, but it is not used at the time of issuance.When withdrawing, the secret code 32' of the voting ticket 30' is checked at the refund desk 11. ■
, If OK, send the unique number 31' to the center 20■,
Ask them to check it. The unique number check (3) is performed depending on whether the unique number 31' at the time of refund is stored in the file 21 or not. For example, there are 100 voting tickets 30 issued at the sales office 10, and their unique number 31 is 100.
Assuming that serial numbers are given from 199 to 199, if the unique number 31' at the time of refund is within that range, for example 103, then the determination result (2) is OK (pass). However, the unique number 31
If ' is outside the range of the above serial numbers, such as 300, the determination result (2) will be NG and refunds will be prohibited. Once the center 20 issues an OK determination result, it deletes the unique number 31 from the file 21. This process is included in the unique number check ■. Therefore, in the above example, if a refund is made once when the unique number 31' is 103, only a refund is prohibited for the voting ticket 30' whose unique number 31' is the same 103.

Figure 2 shows the above process as a flowchart, and the steps corresponding to the process in Figure 1 are denoted by the same symbols.
■ is attached. In the conventional method that does not use a unique number, ■
, there are no steps from ■ to ■.

The unique number only needs to be one for each voting ticket sold, and does not need to be a consecutive number.

In addition, the unique number of the refunded voting ticket has the valid bit set to “0”.
” (refunded), etc.

[Effects of the Invention] As described above, according to the present invention, a unique number, which is different for each voting ticket, is magnetically recorded on each voting ticket, and it is registered at the center at the time of sale, and payment processing is performed at the time of refund. Therefore, by using a different secret code for each event date, there is an advantage that it becomes extremely difficult to obtain a refund due to forgery or alteration. In addition, even if there are multiple refund locations, they are centrally managed at the center, so
Duplicate refunds for the same unique number are prevented.

[Brief explanation of drawings]

FIG. 1 is a block diagram showing an embodiment of the present invention, FIG. 2 is a flowchart thereof, and FIG. 3 is an explanatory diagram showing an example of a voting ticket. In the figure, 10 is a voting ticket sales office, 11 is a refund office, 20 is a refund management center, 21 is a file, 30 and 30' are voting tickets,
31.31' is a unique number, and 32.32' is a secret code.

Claims (1)

[Claims] A method of counterfeiting of voting tickets, in which a secret code is magnetically recorded on voting tickets for horse races, bicycle races, etc. to show that they are genuine voting tickets, and sold, and the secret code is checked at the time of refund to detect forged or altered voting tickets. In the tampering detection method, a unique number is magnetically recorded on each voting ticket, and at the time of sale, the unique number is sent to the refund management center and stored in its file.When refunding, in addition to checking the secret code, if a refund request is made, The unique number read from the voting ticket is sent to the refund management center and compared with the unique number in the file. If the refund has already been made, the refund is prohibited, and if the ticket has not been paid, the refund process is executed and the unique number is A method for detecting forgery and alteration of voting tickets, which is characterized by performing payment processing on numbers.