JPS6061863A - Method and system for managing code key - Google Patents

Abstract

(57) [Summary] This bulletin contains application data before electronic filing, so abstract data is not recorded.

Description

DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE INVENTION The present invention relates to a system for distributing cryptographic keys to electronic financial institutions. The present key management system is particularly suitable for enabling offline verification of transaction cards at authorized terminals.

In recent years, there has been a clear social trend to eliminate the use of cash in economic transactions. Economic transaction cards 1 are universally used as a substitute for cash. These cards, which can be either credit cards or payment cards, can be used in place of cash to purchase goods or services from merchants. automatic teller machine
c teller machines.

Various cards are also used to purchase cash or traveler's checks from economic institutions or merchants, including through the use of ATMs.

The widespread use of transaction cards has led to an increase in related fraud. There are various forms of transactional fraud. For example, a criminal uses a lost or stolen card to purchase goods or services.

Criminals also used valid account numbers to duplicate or forge cards.

A number of systems have been devised to reduce losses from these frauds. One method is to distribute a list of lost or stolen cards to merchants. This list must be checked at the time of purchase to see if the cart presented is valid. □Unfortunately, there are difficulties with this method.

For example, it takes time to distribute a list of invalid cars after a card is reported lost or stolen. In addition, cart numbers are kept on the list for a limited period of time, and fraud can begin after the number is filtered out. Finally, it is very difficult to ensure that all store clerks refer strictly to the card list.

Another method involves an online authorization terminal that overcomes many of the shortcomings of card listings. In this method, the merchant, perhaps through a central processor,
An electronic terminal connected to the card issuer is provided.

When the customer presents the card, the information encoded on the cart is read into the terminal. The terminal transmits this information through a transmission line to a host (hos) containing information about the cardholder.
t) Communicate to the computer. If the cart is valid and the transaction does not exceed certain limits, the host computer sends an approval back to the merchant.

Although this method is an improvement over the use of revocation lists, it also has drawbacks. For example, counterfeit cards can be produced with valid account numbers that are not filtered out by the above system. Moreover, due to very high communication costs, not all transactions are always approved. Thus, lost or stolen cars can often be used to purchase goods in geographically remote areas.

Because of these latter drawbacks, other systems have been proposed in recent years aimed at increasing security. One method, developed by the applicant, is to place a secret cryptographic code on the card to protect it against counterfeiting. Preferably, the anti-counterfeit check digit number is obtained by encrypting the personal account number (PAN). These cryptographic check digits are encoded on the card's magnetic strap. When this card is presented to a merchant, information on the magnetic strip, including personal account number and inspection rights, is read and transmitted to the central bank. This transmitted personal account number is encrypted in a manner similar to the generation of cryptographic check digits at the central processor.

If the two results are compared and are positive, the card is approved. Il! As can be seen, without knowledge of the encoding used to generate inspection rights, a forgery simply having a valid personal account number cannot generate valid inspection rights.

Another way to reduce losses due to fraud is to require the use of a Personal Identification Number (P-N).

In this method, a specific personal identification number is assigned to each cardholder. This number may either be selected by the cardholder or issued by the economic institution.

This method is currently used by many banks that have automated teller machines. When a transaction occurs, the cart holder enters his or her personal identification number into the terminal. This number is sent to the central host computer along with the account number on the cart. The central host computer compares this transmitted number to the associated personal identification number recorded at the central location. If these numbers match, the cardholder is identified as an authorized user. This latter method is effective in reducing unauthorized use of lost or stolen credit cards.

However, the above method also has some drawbacks. These drawbacks become more severe as the geographic reach of card systems increases. More specifically, both of the security measures described above require information to be transmitted from the merchant to a remote publisher. The communication costs involved in these cases are directly related to the distance between the merchant and the card issuer.

Furthermore, as the number of cardholders increases, the computational time required by the computer increases significantly. It is therefore desirable to provide a security system that can be used without incurring communication costs. This goal is achieved through the use of offline authorization methods.

There are several offline methods proposed in the prior art. One example is to compare at least a portion of the cart holder's personal identification number at the terminal. In this method, a portion of the personal identification number is encrypted and encoded on the card's magnetic strap. The key used to encrypt this partial personal identification number value is provided to the transaction terminal. When the cart is used for a transaction, the encrypted information is read from the magnetic strip and compared using a personal identification number entered by the cardholder and a secret key written on the terminal. be done. This configuration provides a degree of security without incurring extra communication costs. This partial personal identification number value can be used to authorize low value transactions. If a larger transaction needs to be approved, the remainder of the personal identification number can be approved over the wire using online methods. This offline method can also be adapted for use in the anti-counterfeiting method described above.

A fundamental drawback of this offline method proposed in the prior art is that there is no suitable way to distribute the encryption key throughout the system. Therefore, while this system can be implemented on a small scale, difficulties arise when there are thousands of transaction terminals and hundreds of cart issuers. Obviously the simplest answer is to use a single encryption key for all institutions, and this key to be given to all terminals. Although keys stored in terminals can be controlled, it is difficult to ensure the security of keys across a large number of issuing institutions. More specifically, the terminal device can securely implement an encryption key during the manufacturing process. Additionally, these terminals are tamper-proof and therefore secure. But when a large number of banks are involved, the security of the entire system depends on how secure the weakest link in the group is. For example, a dishonest employee at a bank could conspire to uncover the keys that control the system. If the key is discovered, this entire offline world will be brought to its knees.

This system therefore forces each issuing agency to rely on all other issuer security measures to prevent fraud.

To overcome this latter problem, each institution can be given its own encryption key. Therefore, if security is breached at any institution, the rest of the system can still operate. However, this latter method requires providing each terminal with an institution-specific encryption key. Given the number of institutions, this seems unlikely as a long-term solution. It would therefore be desirable to provide a key management system that overcomes the drawbacks mentioned above.

It is therefore an object of the present invention to provide a new and improved key management system.

Another object of the present invention is to provide a new and improved key management/system particularly suited for off-line authorization of transaction cards.

Yet another object of the present invention is to provide a new and improved key management system that is particularly suitable for electronic financial institutions.

Yet another object of the present invention is to
The purpose of the present invention is to provide a new and improved key management system that allows offline proof of authenticity.

Yet another object of the present invention is to provide a new and improved key management system that allows off-line verification of the identity of a cardholder utilizing a transaction card at a terminal.

Based on these and many other objectives, the present invention provides a key management method for use in systems that include multiple car issuers and multiple transaction terminals. This system is intended to provide transaction card offline authorization at the terminal. In this system, responsibility for managing keys is given to a central host computer. Typically, the issuing authority is connected to a host computer via a communications line. Furthermore, the terminal device is also connected to the host computer by a communication line. This configuration allows some transactions to be approved in a typical offline manner using the communication line.

The system also enables security in offline law and analysis of emerging fraud.

Based on this system, a central host computer generates a master encryption key. This master key is supplied to every terminal in the system.

The terminal is intended to be designed such that the master key can be erased or destroyed if someone makes changes to the terminal.

The central host computer also distributes encryption keys to each issuing authority. These encryption keys are derived keys. More specifically, each issuing institution will typically have some form of identification number (i.e. Bank Identification Number, BIN).
). The encryption key sent to the institution is derived by encrypting the bank identification number associated with that bank under the master key. In the remainder of this specification, the terms issuing institution and bank are used interchangeably. It is understood that the scope of the invention includes any institution that issues economic transaction cards.

A set of data is placed on the card when an institution issues the card. This data includes the institution identification number (B
There is IN). Based on the invention, the agency places authorization information on the card. This authorization information may also include anti-counterfeit data, personal identification numbers, or dynamic signature information, as discussed in further detail below. In both cases, the authorization information is placed on the card in encrypted form. Additionally, authorization information is encrypted under a secondary key associated with the institution.

When a car holder initiates a transaction, the information from the card is read by the terminal. The secondary key must be derived by the terminal in order to approve the transaction. The secondary key is derived using a master key stored within the terminal to encrypt the institution identification number located on the card. Once this secondary key has been derived, it can be used to enable analysis of encrypted authorization information located on the card.

The methods for parsing the information on the encrypted card vary depending on the particular authorization provided. A number of comparative methods are described in the detailed description. The scope of the present invention includes these comparative methods.

The above method overcomes the drawbacks found in the prior art.

More particularly, the method enables off-line authorization of a transaction card at a terminal. Furthermore, because each individual issuing authority is given a unique encryption key, compromise of any single issuer's secondary keys does not affect the security of the entire system. From an economic perspective, it is necessary to make each institution take responsibility for its own security. This is accomplished by the key management method of the present invention. Furthermore, while each individual bank is given its unique key, there is no need to give every key to each terminal. Rather, the terminal utilizes the parallel master key and bank identification number provided by the central host computer to derive the necessary secondary keys. Therefore, the terminal device does not require a large storage capacity and only needs to be given one security master key.

Other objects and advantages of the invention will become apparent from the following detailed description, taken in conjunction with the accompanying drawings.

Referring to FIG. 1, a typical configuration for use in an electronic financial transaction system is shown. Also shown is a central host computer (20) which acts as a network switch and communicates information between the transaction terminal and the plurality of transaction terminals (22) and the issuing authority (24). The issuing institution may be a bank or other service institution that distributes transaction cards 1, such as credit cards or payment cards. These cars 1 can be used to obtain goods or services or cash at various merchants or institutions.

Each merchant is provided with one or more terminals (22).

As shown at (22A), a typical terminal includes a reader for accepting information encoded on the magnetic strip of the card. Additionally, the terminal may include a personal identification number terminal area to allow customers to enter their personal identification number. According to the invention, the terminal may include an encryption device which may be provided within the main body of the terminal or separately within the personal identification number terminal area.

The location of this encryption device depends on the particular method chosen.

The terminals are each connected to a central host (2) through a communication line (60).
o). This host is also connected to the issuer through a communications line (32). For most transactions, information about the cardholder and the purchase is transferred from the terminal to the communication line (
62) to the host.

Often a central host makes an approval or rejection decision.

Otherwise, the information is sent through line (32) to the institution that issued the cart. The approval decision made by this authority is transmitted 11j to the merchant through the same communication line.

It will be appreciated that as the use of bank cards increases in usage and geographic scope, these communication costs rise rapidly. Therefore, it is desirable to provide some form of security through offline analysis. As used herein, the term offline refers to operations performed on a terminal that do not include any communication to a host. These objectives are achieved with the key management system of the present invention.

The general key management system of the present invention will now be described with reference to FIG. This method can be used to provide both offline counterfeit testing and personal identification number verification. Flowchart 2A shows the operations performed at the central host.
FIG. 2B depicting the actions performed by the issuer;
It is shown in three parts, with Figure 2c showing the actions taken at the terminal.

See Figure 2A. Central host or control device (20)
first generates a master key (4o). This master key is supplied to all terminals (42).

Since the security of the master key is of paramount importance, the distribution of the master key should be handled in a highly secure manner.

Many methods have been designed in the prior art to distribute keys to terminals in a secure manner.

In one method, the terminal is physically connected to a host that performs the initial loading of the master key.

The terminal is then stored under high security until it is installed at the merchant's location. In another method, a key loading device is connected to the host, into which the master is loaded.

This key loading device is brought to each terminal and physically connected to perform key loading. Either way, any changes attempted to be made to the terminal can never be extracted from the terminal as a result of the terminal being cast to erase or destroy the master key.

The host then generates a plurality of secondary keys (44).

These secondary keys are derived using bank identification numbers. As noted in Section 2, each agency is generally associated with a German identification number. This identification number is encrypted using a master key. The resulting secondary keys are then distributed to their associated issuing authorities. Again, many methods can be used to distribute these keys. Typically, a secure encrypted communication line has already been established between the issuer and the host, so these keys can be sent over the communication line. Keys can also be physically delivered using the key loading devices described above.

Referring to Figure 2B, the issuer can now issue transaction cards. First, the issuer places a bank identification number on each card (50). Typically, this information is placed by encoding the information onto the magnetic strip.

Although this method is fairly universal, there are many other ways to encode data on the card, all of which are within the scope of the present invention.

The issuer then generates authorization information (52). As discussed below, this authorization information may be an anti-counterfeit digit, a personal identification number, or any other identifying code. This authorization information is then encrypted using a secondary key provided by the host (
54). The encrypted authorization information is then placed on the card in the manner described above (56).

Carts can now be approved in an offline manner at the terminal.

Referring to Figure 2c, the card is first read by the terminal (60). The terminal typically has a card reader capable of decoding the encoded information on the magnetic strip. It will be appreciated that if the information is placed on the card in another way, the terminal should have a compatible reader. The information read includes the bank identification number as well as encrypted authorization information.

According to the invention, the terminal then encrypts the institution's bank identification number (bare) using a master key recorded in the terminal.
The next key is derived (62). Once the secondary key is derived, it can be used to parse the encrypted authorization information on the cart (64).

Since the encrypted information is initially encrypted under a secondary key, parsing can be handled in a number of ways. The particular method depends on the design of the system, and several examples are detailed below. When the information is compared, the transaction is approved if identity is detected. If the information does not match, the transaction will be rejected.

Referring to FIG. 6, a more specific scheme of anti-counterfeiting is illustrated. Figure 3A illustrates the actions taken on the part of the issuer, and Figure 6B describes the events at the terminal. 6th
The activity of the central host in Figures 6 through 6 is identical to that shown in Figure 2 and will not be described further here.

Under Applicant's anti-counterfeiting law, the issuer must again
- Place the bank identification number above (70). The publisher also
A unique personal account number (PAN) is issued for each car. This account number is placed on the card (72).

The issuer then encrypts the personal account number using the secondary key (74). The result of this encryption is placed in the cart (76). Although the above discussion is limited to the use of a personal identification number, this number may be combined with any other information typically placed on the card, such as the cart expiration date. Furthermore, the entire encrypted information does not need to be placed on the card, only a portion of it. By selecting specific partial information, the information that must be applied on the card can be saved.

Referring to Figure 6B, the card is read by the terminal (8
'0). Thus, both the bank identification number and the encrypted personal account number information are received. The terminal uses the master key to derive a secondary key to encrypt the bank identification number (82). This secondary key is then used to encrypt the account number placed on the card (84). The result of this encryption (or at least a portion of the result) is then compared to the encrypted account information on the card, and if they match, the transaction is approved.

Referring now to FIG. 4, a more complex anti-counterfeiting method is shown. More specifically, the prior art has developed various security cart features. An example of such properties is "Watermark" manufactured by Marco Plus Snack. Electronic symbols, similar in concept to the denominations found on banknotes, can be embedded deep within the cart's magnetic strip. This secret number is very difficult to reproduce forged. Among other methods are precise measurements of certain physical cart characteristics. These methods can be combined with the present system to provide additional strength to the cart.

With particular reference to Figure 4A, the issuer again places the bank identification number on Karmil (90). A personal account number is also placed on the card (92). In addition, security features, such as watermarks, are imparted to the card. Because of the manufacturing complexity required to embed security features, this stage is typically A cart is provided to the publisher with this security feature added to it.The order in which information is placed on the cart is therefore not intended to limit the scope of the invention.This security feature It provides some numerical information, which is combined with the account number and encrypted using a secondary key (96).

The result of this encryption is then encoded on the card (98
).

Referring to Figure 4B, "Cards with Security Features"
The second information is read by the terminal (100).

The secondary key shall encrypt the bank identification number (derived using the master key (102). The personal account number and security characteristics shall be combined and encrypted using the secondary key (102).
104). The result of this encryption is then compared to the encrypted information encoded on the cart (106). As before, if the information matches, the transaction can be approved.

However, if the information does not match, the transaction can be rejected.

Referring now to FIG. 5, there is illustrated the use of the present key management system for use with information specifically related to a cardholder, such as a personal identification number.

The system can also be used for any other information related to a particular cardholder, such as dynamic symbology information. In the latter case, the cardholder's unique handwriting analysis information is encoded in numerical form and encrypted using a suitable key. For simplicity, further discussion of FIGS. 5 and 6 will be limited to the use of personal identification numbers.

With particular reference to FIG. 5A, the issuer again places the bank identification number on the card (110). A personal identification number is generated in connection with the customer. Banks often issue this personal identification number. This number may also be provided by the cardholder to the issuer. The particular method adopted is left to the judgment of the issuing authority, as each method has various advantages and disadvantages. The benefits of each method are detailed in the American Standards Institute (ANSI) published ``Product Management and Security J ANSI-X9, No. 8 (published in 1982). If so, it must be given to the cart holder.

The selected personal identification number is encrypted using a secondary key (114,1°) and the result of this encryption is placed on the card (IL6). As pointed out above, this system is likely , using only partial personal identification number values.”
It would be best to use it as a case. For example, if four digits make up a personal identification number, only two digits are encrypted and placed on the card. The remaining two digits should be used for online approval with more pathological values. The R11 fractional digit may also be derived using the entire personal identification number. All or only a portion of these derived digits may be placed on the card.

The details of providing a partial personal identification number are known in the prior art and need not be detailed here.

Referring to Figure 5B, the card to be used is read at the terminal (120). In all cases, the secondary key is derived by encrypting the bank identification number using the master key stored in the terminal (+22).

The cart holder then enters his or her personal identification number. This number is entered via the personal identification number terminal area of the terminal (124). The secondary key is then used to compare the encrypted personal identification number information on Car 1 to the personal identification number entered by the cardholder (126). This comparison involves (1) encrypting the personal identification number entered by the card holder or decoding the encrypted personal identification number of the card (2) so that both numbers are of unambiguous meaning; This is accomplished by either of the following:

The method shown in Figure 5C may be used to process personal identification number information. (DES). The system encrypts 64 bits of information and produces a 64 bit decrypted output.

If any of these bits are removed, the code cannot be decrypted.

Because of the storage capacity of magnetic strips on transaction carts, it is often desirable to minimize the amount of information that needs to be encoded. A variety of methods have been developed to achieve this result. One such method is commonly known as a personal identification number offset generation method. This method is illustrated in FIG. 6 and requires less information to be encoded on the cart.

With particular reference to FIG. 6A, the issuer places a personal identification number on the card (130). Additionally, a personal account number is placed on the card (132). The personal identification number is generated in a two-part manner (134). In this embodiment, instead of encrypting the personal identification number, the personal account number is encrypted (13
6). This encrypted result is then combined with the personal identification number to determine the encoded value (138). There are many ways to combine this encrypted personal account number and personal identification number. In a preferred embodiment, a portion of the encrypted personal account number is added to the personal identification number using the method of Monjuro 10. Other more complex methods are also possible.

In either case, the encoded value is placed on the card (140).

Referring to Figure 6B, at the beginning of the transaction the card is read at the terminal (150). A personal identification number is received from the cart holder (152). A secondary key is then derived (154) to encrypt the bank identification number using the master key. The personal account number is then encrypted under the secondary key (156). This encrypted number is then compared to the information on your cart.

This can be done conveniently in two ways as shown in row (158x160). More particularly, the encrypted personal account number (or a portion thereof) is compared to the encoded value and compared to the personal identification number entered by the cart holder. If the original combination in stage (i3a) is additive, the encrypted personal account number is subtracted from the encoded value to generate the personal identification number. Another alternative (160) is to combine the newly encrypted Personal 1' seat number (or a portion thereof) with the Personal Identification Number entered by the Car 1' holder. The result must be the encoded value placed on Car1. In either case, if the comparison results match, the transaction can be approved.

In summary, a new and improved key management system is provided that enables offline authorization of transaction cars 1 for use in electronic financial transaction facilities.

In this system, a central host generates a master key, which is then provided to all terminals in the system.

The host then derives a secondary key for each issuing institution by encrypting the issuing institution's bank identification number under the master key. These secondary keys are then provided to the issuing authority.

When an issuing institution issues a card, that institution places a bank identification number on the card. In addition, the authorization information is on the card.
Second, it is placed on the card in encrypted form. This information is encrypted under a secondary key associated with the institution. This information may include anti-counterfeit digits or personal identification number information. The information on the cart is read on the terminal. The terminal device then uses the master key recorded in the terminal device to derive a secondary key and inputs the bank identification number of the institution concerned.

The secondary key is then used to enable parsing of the encoded authorization information placed on the cart. With this structure, the security of the transaction card processing network can be improved (offline authorization can be carried out. Furthermore, each of the +CACH institutions is given a different cryptographic key)1, and the result is that The overall system's security capabilities are extremely strong.

This disclosure has included many different security methods in which the keyless management system can be used. These methods (can be used alone or in combination; if used together, there is an advantage to using a secondary key for each method. This can be achieved in many ways. Even if bf, a different master key can be generated for each method, or it can be modified in the specified σ) method before encrypting the Gigin hlT1 constant number.

The present invention relates to a preferred embodiment of the tax stamp and various other changes and modifications described above.
ff(j.

BS'l i
- It will be clear to those skilled in the art what could be done without doing so.

[Brief explanation of the drawing]

11y81 is a diagram of a typical electronic financial transaction system in the form of an intercommunication network; FIG. 2 is a flowchart showing the steps giving the general concept of the key management system of the present invention; and FIG. FIG. 4 is a flowchart illustrating the steps necessary to provide a key management system for use in an anti-counterfeiting method; FIG. 4 is a flowchart similar to FIG. 6 is a flowchart illustrating the key management system of the present invention for use in distributing personal identification numbers (PINs); FIG. 1 is a flowchart of the key management system of the present invention. 2o Control device 22 Terminal 24 - Issuing organization Patent application representative Patent attorney Yu Yamazaki Amendment of construction procedure October 2, 1980 Commissioner of the Japan Patent Office 1 Indication of case 1982 Patent application No. 168734 2 Title of the invention Encryption key management method and system 3 Relationship with the person making the amendment Patent applicant name Pizza Ni Nis A Incorporated 4 Agent address Mutual No. 10 Building, 1-11-28 Nagatacho, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo 8th floor Telephone 581-93716
Target of correction @ type engraving

Claims (1)

[Claims] (]) A method for distributing cryptographic keys to a system having a plurality of card issuing institutions and a plurality of transaction terminals, the method comprising the steps of issuing a master key and transmitting the master key to each terminal. deriving a secondary key for each such issuing authority by encrypting data fixing the issuing authority under the master key; and providing the secondary key to its associated issuing authority. placing on said cart said data identifying said issuing institution; and placing authorization information on each said cart so that said approval information is associated with said institution issuing said card. Since the secondary key is encrypted in the secondary key, the issuing institution identification information on the card can be used with any terminal by deriving the secondary key using the master key stored in the terminal. arranging authorization information, wherein the authorization information is authorized to be encrypted with a power card, so that the authorization information placed on the card can be analyzed. . (2) A method of distributing cryptographic keys to a system having multiple card issuing institutions and multiple transaction terminals, which method allows the terminals to prove the authenticity of the economic transaction car F offline, generating a master key; supplying the master key to each of the terminals; and deriving a secondary key for each issuing authority using encrypted data identifying the issuing authority under the master key. providing the secondary key to its associated issuing authority; placing the issuing authority identification data on the card; generating unique account information for each cart; deriving authorization information for each cart by encrypting the associated account information under the secondary key; and placing the encrypted authorization information on the cart. By placing at least a portion of the card, the authenticity of the cart can be proven by deriving the secondary key using the master key stored in the terminal, and as a result, the issuing agency identification information on the card can be encrypted; and then using the secondary key to enable a comparison between the encrypted authorization information and the account information on the card. (3) Encrypting the account information on the card by using the secondary key derived by the terminal in the encryption key distribution method according to claim (2); The step of comparing is performed from comparing the encrypted account information to the encrypted authorization information on the card.
,Cryptographic key distribution method. (4) The cryptographic key distribution method according to claim (2) further comprises the step of placing security card characteristics on the car i, as well as the step of deriving the authorization information in combination with the account information. A method for distributing cryptographic keys, the method comprising the step of deriving the security information according to the method. (5) A method of distributing cryptographic keys to a system having multiple cart issuing institutions and multiple transaction terminals, in which the identity of the cart holder using the economic transaction car 1 is verified offline at the terminal. The method includes the steps of generating a master key, supplying the master key to each terminal, and encrypting data identifying the issuing authority under the master key. deriving a secondary key for an issuing authority; providing the secondary key to its associated issuing authority; placing the issuing authority identification data on a cart; and each said cart and its associated card holdings. generating personally identifying information for each individual card; encrypting the personally identifying information under the secondary key associated with the institution issuing the cart; and encrypting the personally identifying information for each card. at least a portion of the encrypted personal identification information (at a step), the master key stored in the terminal device is used to encrypt the secondary key to encrypt the issuing institution identification information on the card; The identification of the cart holder can be verified by issuing the card, and the encrypted personal identification information on the card and the card can then be verified using the secondary key.
- a method for distributing a cryptographic key, comprising: enabling comparison with the personal identification information entered into the terminal by the holder; (6) In the encryption key distribution method according to claim (5), the personal identification information on the cart is decrypted using the secondary key derived by the terminal device, and Check out the decoding results for the corresponding car! - A cryptographic key distribution method, wherein the step of comparison is performed by comparing with personal identification information entered into the terminal by the holder. (7) In the encryption key distribution method set forth in claim (5), the information derived by the terminal device in order to encrypt the personal identification information inputted into the terminal device by the cart holder. A method for distributing cryptographic keys, wherein a secondary key is utilized and the comparison step is performed by comparing the result of its encryption to the encrypted personal identification information of the cart-4. (8) A method of distributing cryptographic keys to a system having multiple curl issuing institutions and multiple transaction terminals, the method comprising:
This is a method for identifying a cardholder who uses an economic transaction card 1 at a terminal device by offline authentication, and includes the steps of generating a master key, supplying the mass key to each terminal device, deriving a secondary key for each issuing authority with encrypted data identifying the issuing authority under the master key; supplying the secondary key to its associated issuing authority; placing institutional identification data on the card; generating unique account information for each car; placing the account information on its associated cart; and placing the account information on its associated cart. generating personally identifying information for a cart holder of the card; encrypting the account information associated with the card under the secondary key associated with the institution issuing the cart; generating an encoded message by combining at least a portion of the encoded account information and the personally identifying information; and placing at least a portion of the encoded message on the card. By deriving the secondary key using the master key stored in the terminal device, the identity of the cart holder is proven, which not only identifies the issuing authority on the cart, but also identifies the issuing authority on the cart. a step of arranging a message such that the encoded message on the cart can be compared with the personal identification information entered into the terminal by the car holder using a secondary key; A cryptographic key distribution method including , . 9) In the cryptographic key distribution method as set forth in claim (8), the terminal device uses the secondary key to
Deriving a next key to encrypt the account information on the card, and combining at least a portion of the encrypted result with the encoded message on the card to enable the cart holder to A cryptographic key distribution method in which the comparison step is performed by making it possible to compare the personal identification information inputted into the terminal device. θ0 Cryptographic key distribution according to claim (8) The law requires that the account information on the card be encrypted using the secondary key derived at the terminal, and that at least a portion of the result of the encryption is transferred to the cardholder by the cardholder. a cryptographic key distribution method in which the step of comparing is performed by enabling a comparison with the encoded message on the card by comparing it with the personal identification information entered into a device; A cryptographic key distribution system that includes an issuing institution and a plurality of transaction terminals, which is capable of offline authorization of economic transaction cards at the terminals, and is capable of generating and supplying a master key to each terminal. a controller capable of also deriving a secondary key for each issuing authority by encrypting the issuing authority identification data under the master key; and a device transmitting the secondary key to its associated issuing authority. and the issuing institution that issues the card can not only place the data identifying the issuing institution on the card, but also generate authorization information and store the authorization information in a central device. a device capable of encrypting the encrypted authorization information into the secondary key provided by the card and placing the encrypted authorization information on the card; a device for reading the encoded authorization information; and a device in the terminal device for deriving the secondary key using the master key stored in the terminal device and encrypting the issuing agency identification data. A cryptographic key distribution system comprising: a device that enables analysis of the above authorization information; It is a system that can prove authenticity off-line, and can generate and supply a master key at each terminal, as well as encrypting the issuing agency identification take under the mask-key to verify the authenticity of the secondary certificate for each issuing agency. a control device capable of also deriving the key; a device for transmitting the primary and secondary keys to its associated issuing agency; and a device for placing the issuing agency identification data on the card at the issuing agency issuing the cart Not only can the account information be generated uniquely for each car, this account information can be placed on its associated card, and the account information can be encrypted under the secondary key. a car issuing device for placing at least a portion of the encrypted authorization information on the card; and the issuing institution identification data on the card, the account information on the card. , a device for reading the encrypted authorization information, and a device for deriving the secondary key using the master key stored in the terminal device, and deriving the secondary key from the issuing agency identification data. a secondary key derivation device that enables comparison of the account information on the card and the encrypted approval information by using the secondary key; and a cryptographic key distribution system comprising: . α3 In the encryption key distribution system according to claim 1 (1), the encryption device in the terminal device uses the secondary key derived by the terminal device to encrypt the account number on the card. A cryptographic key distribution system that compares at least a part of the encrypted result with the encrypted authorization information on the card. further comprising an apparatus for providing secured card characteristics on the card as a key distribution system, and an encryption device at the issuing institution encrypting the combination of both the secured card characteristics and the account information; Place a portion on the card,
The cryptographic key distribution system further comprises a device for reading the security cart characteristics. 0υ It is a cryptographic key distribution system that includes multiple cart issuing institutions and multiple transaction terminals, and is a system that can prove the identity of economic transaction cards offline at the terminals, and each terminal generates and supplies a master key. a controller capable of deriving also a secondary key for each said issuing authority by obtaining and encrypting said issuing authority identification data under said master key, and means for transmitting said secondary key to its associated issuing authority; and a card issuing device located at the issuing institution that can not only place the issuing institution identification data on the cart, but also generate unique account information associated with the card; placing on the card, generating personally identifying information for each card associated with each cardholder, and encrypting the account information under the secondary key;
and a device for combining at least -ml of the encrypted account information with the personal identification information to generate an encoded message and then placing the encoded message on the card; a device on the device for reading the issuing institution identification data, the account information, and the encoded message on the card; a device for receiving personal identification information entered by the cart holder on the terminal device; The coded message on the card is encoded by using a device in the terminal device that derives the secondary key using the master key stored in the terminal device and encrypts the issuing agency identification information. A cryptographic key distribution system comprising: a secondary key derivation device that allows comparison with the personal identification information input by the cardholder into the terminal device. (IQ Claim No. 0Q) In the cryptographic key distribution system described in paragraph 1, the encryption device in the terminal encrypts the account information on the card using the secondary key derived by the terminal, and also encrypts the account information on the card. combining at least a portion of the results with the encoded message on the cart such that a comparison can be made with the personally identifying information entered into the terminal by the cart holder; , a cryptographic key distribution system. α Power In the cryptographic key distribution system according to claim 00, the encryption device in the terminal device uses the secondary key derived in the terminal device to perform the cryptographic key distribution system. As a result of encrypting the account information on the cart and combining at least a portion of the encrypted result with the personally identifying information entered by the cardholder at the terminal, A cryptographic key distribution system that enables comparison with messages to the north of the code.