JPS5983090A - Subcriticality monitoring device - Google Patents
Subcriticality monitoring deviceInfo
- Publication number
- JPS5983090A JPS5983090A JP57193089A JP19308982A JPS5983090A JP S5983090 A JPS5983090 A JP S5983090A JP 57193089 A JP57193089 A JP 57193089A JP 19308982 A JP19308982 A JP 19308982A JP S5983090 A JPS5983090 A JP S5983090A
- Authority
- JP
- Japan
- Prior art keywords
- neutron
- subcriticality
- monitoring device
- neutron beam
- nuclear fuel
- Prior art date
- Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
- Pending
Links
Classifications
-
- Y—GENERAL TAGGING OF NEW TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS; GENERAL TAGGING OF CROSS-SECTIONAL TECHNOLOGIES SPANNING OVER SEVERAL SECTIONS OF THE IPC; TECHNICAL SUBJECTS COVERED BY FORMER USPC CROSS-REFERENCE ART COLLECTIONS [XRACs] AND DIGESTS
- Y02—TECHNOLOGIES OR APPLICATIONS FOR MITIGATION OR ADAPTATION AGAINST CLIMATE CHANGE
- Y02E—REDUCTION OF GREENHOUSE GAS [GHG] EMISSIONS, RELATED TO ENERGY GENERATION, TRANSMISSION OR DISTRIBUTION
- Y02E30/00—Energy generation of nuclear origin
- Y02E30/30—Nuclear fission reactors
Abstract
(57)【要約】本公報は電子出願前の出願データであるた
め要約のデータは記録されません。(57) [Summary] This bulletin contains application data before electronic filing, so abstract data is not recorded.
Description
【発明の詳細な説明】
［発明の技術分野Ｊ
本発明は気体、液体ま１＝は固体の核燃１′ｉｌ物質等
の核分裂性物質を内蔵した処理槽や配管等の未臨界１り
をＲｈ視りる装置に関りる。[Detailed Description of the Invention] [Technical Field of the Invention J] The present invention relates to the treatment of subcritical reactors such as processing tanks and piping containing fissile materials such as gaseous, liquid, or solid nuclear fuel materials. Related to viewing devices.
［発明の技術的背相とその問題点１
核燃料や使用済核燃ｙ！１０謂綿、製造、再処理、貯Ｒ
等の／Ａｉ段にお４Ｊる臨稈安全１１１（未臨界性の保
証）は、施設の安全性を確保Ｊる」Ｃ′必ず行なわなＧ
Ｊればならない重要な管理で゛ある。[Technical background of the invention and its problems 1 Nuclear fuel and spent nuclear fuel! 10 Cotton, manufacturing, reprocessing, storage
The critical safety 111 (guarantee of subcriticality) in the /Ai stage of the above ensures the safety of the facility.''C' Must be carried out.
This is an important management that must be carried out.
従来より、これらの／１１設の未臨界性を保Δ１１りる
ために、適当な濃度おにび組成の核分裂ｆノ［物質を含
む場合についてδ１綽によっ（未臨界度を求め、運転中
はその核分裂性物質のＩＡ度を制御しくいる。Conventionally, in order to maintain the subcriticality of these /11 facilities, the nuclear fission f of an appropriate concentration and composition has been calculated by δ1 (for cases containing substances) (to find the degree of subcriticality during operation). is used to control the IA degree of the fissile material.
しかしながら、これらの施設の装置は一般に複ｆｉｔな
形状をしＣおり、未臨界度を求める６１粋の精度も十分
ひない。However, the equipment in these facilities generally has a complex shape, and the precision required to determine the degree of subcriticality is not sufficiently high.
また、使用済核燃１１には自ブを的ＩＪ、中性了を放出
りる核種が含まれ（いるため、再処理施設の処理槽等で
は体系からの中性子を測定づる中１１ｉ子検出器を配置
し、オンラインで未臨界１召を監視４るｈ法を採用しく
いるところもある。εこれは体系の中性子束φが次式（
・表わされるため（ある。In addition, since spent nuclear fuel 11 contains nuclides that emit IJ and neutral ions, a neutron detector that measures neutrons from the system is installed in the processing tank of a reprocessing facility. Some companies use the h method, in which the neutron flux φ of the system is determined by the following formula (
・To be expressed (there is)
φ−αＳ／（１−川（）
但しｋは増イｉ’ｉ ＊ ｐあり、（１−ｋ）ｆＪ未臨
界度を表わし、Ｓは自発申ｔ’１子源の強度、αは比例
定数ひある。φ−αS/(1−川() where k is increased i'i * p, (1−k)fJ represents the subcriticality, S is the strength of the spontaneous force t'1 source, and α is the proportionality constant There is.
１ノかしながら、この方法も核分裂性物質の濃度や組成
が変化した場合には、未臨界度だけでなく自弁中性子源
の強さも変化づるのＣ１これだｔＪぐは十分な監視方法
どは言えず、厳重な濃度や組成の管ＪＭＩも必要（゛あ
る。また未照射の核燃料Ｃは、自発中性子の放出惜が極
めて小さいのＣ゛この方法はイｊ効Ｃはない。However, even with this method, if the concentration or composition of fissile material changes, not only the subcriticality but also the strength of the self-developed neutron source will change. However, a tube JMI with a strict concentration and composition is also required.Also, unirradiated nuclear fuel C has an extremely small amount of spontaneous neutron emission.This method has no effect.
［発明の目的１
本発明は以上の点に苅処してなされたもので、核分裂性
物質の濃度や組成に影響されずに施設の未臨界度をＡン
ラインＣ監視することができる未臨界性監視装置を提供
づることを目的とりる。[Objective of the Invention 1 The present invention has been made in consideration of the above points, and is a subcriticality monitoring system that can monitor the subcriticality of a facility without being affected by the concentration or composition of fissile material. The purpose is to provide equipment.
１光明の概要Ｊ
４１ ｉｆわｊ）本発明の未臨界性監視装置は、核分裂
性物質を含イ１りる被測定物に中性子線を照Ｑ＝Ｉする
１、：めの定常中１１子線源と、該定常中１子線源から
ｈ９出される中性子線強度を周期的に変化させる照射率
周期変化装置と、前記被測定物よりｂり出される中ゼ１
子を検出りる中性子検出器とからなること「発明の実施
例」
以下本発明の訂細を図面に承り一実施例に−）いて説明
する。1 Overview of Komei J 41 ifwa j) The subcriticality monitoring device of the present invention illuminates a neutron beam Q=I on an object to be measured containing fissile material. a radiation source, an irradiation rate periodic changing device that periodically changes the intensity of the neutron beam emitted from the stationary medium 1 ion source, and a neutron radiation source 1 emitted from the object to be measured.
``Embodiment of the Invention'' The details of the present invention will be described below with reference to the drawings and an embodiment.
第１図は本発明の未臨界性監視装置４の一実施例Ｃあり
、この図においＣ符号１は核燃才８１物質２等を収容し
た未臨界度を監視すべき処理槽で、この周囲に定富中性
子源３Ｊ３よび中性子検出器４が配置される。定量゛中
１’１子源３は処理槽１に中１’ｌ了線を照射づるため
の照射［１を除いく周囲を遮蔽体５１こよ−）（）■わ
れるどと（）に、その照射１１の前面には中性子線強度
を周期的に変化さける装置、例えばブＦｌｌツバ−６が
設訂される。Fig. 1 shows an embodiment C of the subcriticality monitoring device 4 of the present invention, and in this figure, C numeral 1 is a treatment tank that contains nuclear fuel 81 material 2 and the like and is to be monitored for subcriticality. A Sadatomi neutron source 3J3 and a neutron detector 4 are arranged. The 1'1 radiation source 3 is used to irradiate the processing tank 1 with a 1'1 beam (with the shield 51 surrounding it except for 1). In front of the irradiation device 11, a device for periodically changing the neutron beam intensity, for example, a full tube 6 is installed.
このブーヨッパー６は第２図ａ、ｂに示１にう（ご、中
性子をよく吸収覆る物質、例え（、Ｅ小１−１ンをｎ０
したポリエチレンから４．る内板に一定間隔Ｃ゛複数個
のスリット２０を段（］た回転１ル２１と、この回！、
！、板２１を回転さけるだめの回転駆動装置２？からな
り、回転板２１が回転することにより周期的に中性子線
を通過させるようにした装置ひある。This booper 6 is shown in Figures 2a and b.
4. One rotation 21 with a plurality of slits 20 at regular intervals C in the inner plate, and this time!
! , rotation drive device 2 to avoid rotating the plate 21? There is a device in which a rotating plate 21 rotates to periodically pass neutron beams.
中性子検出器１は中性子のバックグラウンドおよび自害
４にガンマ線の照射を避番ノるために遮蔽体７に囲まれ
Ｃ’ ｉＪ）す、処理槽１がら放出される中性子を検出
する。また、中性子検出器４には中性子検出器／Ｉ ｈ
＋ ｌらの検出信号を処理するための削数処ｊ！ｌ！
！！ｉ盾８が接続される。The neutron detector 1 is surrounded by a shield 7 to avoid neutron background and self-harm 4 from gamma ray irradiation, and detects neutrons emitted from the processing tank 1. In addition, the neutron detector 4 includes a neutron detector/I h
+ Reduction processing for processing the detection signals of l et al. l!
! ! i-shield 8 is connected.
次に以上のように構成された未臨界性監視装置の作用に
ついて説明ブる。Next, the operation of the subcriticality monitoring device configured as above will be explained.
照射率周期変化装置である壬ヨッパー６にょっし強１印
を周期的に変化させた中性子線を処理槽′１（５人的さ
けると、処理槽１内の中性子束も周期的に変化し、中性
子検出器４の計数率も周期的に変ｆｅ ＩＩ令。A neutron beam with a periodic change in intensity of 1 is applied to the Mijoppa 6, which is an irradiation rate periodic change device, into the processing tank '1 (5 people). , the counting rate of the neutron detector 4 also changes periodically.
今、処理槽１に八〇＝１７する中性子線強度Ｉ （ｔ
）が周期を−１どした時次式で表わされるとりると、１
（ｔ ） ＝Ｓ （１−＋−ｃｏｓ （２π／−１
’） −ｔ ）・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・
・・・ （Ｉ）１本系内の中１１子密度＋＋（１，）は
核燃料物質にＪこる１１１倍にＪ、っＣ次式に従っ゛Ｃ
変化する。Now, the neutron beam intensity I (t
) is expressed as a temporal formula with the period divided by -1, then 1
(t) = S (1−+−cos (2π/−1
') -t )・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・
... (I) The middle 11 element density ++ (1,) in a single system is J, which is 111 times larger than the nuclear fuel material, according to the following formula.
Change.
０ （ｔ＞父（ＳＪ！、／（１−れ） ｌ （１＋Ｃ
０３（２π１／１＋δ））・・・・・・（ＩＩ）ここで
βは中性子ス１の、δは定数、１（は処理槽の中１（１
子指倍率で・ある。0 (t>Father (SJ!, /(1-re) l (1+C
03(2π1/1+δ))...(II) Here, β is neutron concentration 1, δ is a constant, 1( is 1(1
It's baby finger magnification.
従つＣ１（１■）式より中性子検出器４の４数率は、Ｓ
／（１−ｋ）に比例りる振幅で周期的に変化することが
わかる。りなわ＜５ｒｉｌ数値の変化の振幅は処理４ｇ
１の未臨界度（１−ｋ）ｋこ逆比例し、臨界に近付くと
振幅は急激に増入りる。Accordingly, from the formula C1 (1■), the 4 number rate of the neutron detector 4 is S
It can be seen that the amplitude changes periodically with an amplitude proportional to /(1-k). Rinawa < 5ril The amplitude of the change in numerical value is processed 4g
The degree of subcriticality of 1 (1-k) is inversely proportional to k, and as it approaches criticality, the amplitude increases and decreases rapidly.
−ｈ、処理槽１内の核燃料物′ｊ１かう自発的に７１文
出される中性子【Ｊ周期的に変化しないため、目的とり
る中（’ＩＩＩ、１．Ｊ、る剤数と容易に識別りること
ができる。-h, the nuclear fuel in the treatment tank 1'j1 These 71 spontaneously emitted neutrons [J do not change periodically, so they can be easily identified as can be done.
また、照射された核燃料物別は一般に強いガンマ線を伴
い、中性子検出器４のバックグラウンドとｉ、にるが、
これも周期的に変化しないため容易に８別できる。In addition, the irradiated nuclear fuel is generally accompanied by strong gamma rays, and the background of the neutron detector 4 and i, nil are
This also does not change periodically, so it can be easily divided into eights.
なａ３ホ弁明の原理では、処理槽′１に入射さける中性
子線強度は必ずしも（１）式のＪ、うに三角関数的に周
期変化させる必要はなく、イ「意の周期関故形Ｃｊ、い
。例えば第３図に承りよう’Ｊ ７、ｆｊ形型の同１ガ
変化あるいはパルス型が実際的Ｃ゛ある。According to the principle of the a3 e defense, the neutron beam intensity incident on the treatment tank '1 does not necessarily have to be periodically changed trigonometrically as J in Equation (1); For example, as shown in FIG.
１発明の効宋］
以上の説明からも明らかなように木弁明の未臨界性監視
装置は、監視リベき対象物に含イ１される核燃料物別の
濶１哀や組成に係わらり゛、ＡンラインＣ′未臨界Ｉａ
を監視りることができる。すなわら適当な澗１此や組成
のモデルに基づいて６１粋によっ−（未臨界爪を求める
必要はイ１い。1. Effects of the Invention] As is clear from the above explanation, Ki Benmei's subcriticality monitoring device is effective regardless of the amount and composition of each nuclear fuel substance included in the object to be monitored. A-line C' subcritical Ia
can be monitored. In other words, it is not necessary to find a subcritical value based on an appropriate composition model.
また、バックグラウンドとの識別が容易乙゛゛あるうえ
に、臨界に近いほど測定感度がよくかつ定′常Ｉｌ＋
１！４子線源の強度が小さくＣ済み、無用な照射を避ｔ
）ることかひきる。In addition, it is easy to distinguish from the background, and the closer the criticality is, the better the measurement sensitivity is, and the constant Il+
1! The intensity of the 4-ray source is small and C is completed, avoiding unnecessary irradiation.
) Tokahiru.
第１図は本発明の未臨界性監視装置の一実施例を承り構
成概略図、第２図（ａ ）は第１図におりるヂョツパー
を概略的に示１゛正面図、第２図（（））は第２図（ａ
）のＩＩ −ＩＩ線に沿う断面図、第３図は中慴子照
ｔＪＩ強度の矩形型の同期変化を示す−グラーノ Ｃｕ
る 。
１・・・・・・・・・・・・処理檜
３３・・・・・・・・・・・・定７ｉｉ、中性子源４・
・・・・・・・・・・・中性子検出器６・・・・・・・
・・・・・ブー１ツバ−２１・・・・・・・・・・・・
１１月転板２２・・・・・・・・・・・・回転駆動具（
メイ代１１ｐ人弁理」二 須 山 ｆｌ？ −第
１図
□□□］
第２図
ｂ
■
■
第３図Fig. 1 is a schematic diagram of the configuration of an embodiment of the subcriticality monitoring device of the present invention, and Fig. 2 (a) schematically shows the chopper shown in Fig. 1. ()) is shown in Figure 2 (a
), Figure 3 shows the rectangular synchronous variation of the JI intensity - Grano Cu
Ru. 1・・・・・・・・・・・・Treatment cypress 33・・・・・・・・・・・・Constant 7ii, Neutron source 4・
・・・・・・・・・・・・Neutron detector 6・・・・・・・
・・・・・・Boot 1 Tub-21・・・・・・・・・・・・
November Turning plate 22・・・・・・・・・Rotating drive tool (
Meiyo 11p attorney” Nisuyama fl? -Figure 1□□□] Figure 2b ■ ■ Figure 3
Claims (2)
子線を照射りるための定常中性子線源と、該定常中性子
線源から放出される中性子線強度を周期的に変化させる
照射率周期変化装置と、前記被測定物より放出される中
性子を検出する中性子検出器とからなることを特徴とす
る未臨界性監視装置。(1) A stationary neutron beam source for irradiating a 1TllI constant object containing fissile material with a neutron beam, and a periodic change in irradiation rate that periodically changes the intensity of the neutron beam emitted from the stationary neutron beam source. A subcriticality monitoring device comprising: a device; and a neutron detector that detects neutrons emitted from the object to be measured.
（′きた円板に複数個のスリットを一定間隔ｆ。 に設【）た回転板と、該回転板を回転させるための回転
駒１ｒｉＪＪ″ｔｉｌｅ？どからなることを特徴とする
特許請求の範囲第１Ｊｎ記載の未臨界性監視装置。(2) The irradiation rate periodic change device is made of a material 'C that absorbs neutrons.
Claims characterized in that the invention comprises a rotary plate in which a plurality of slits are provided at regular intervals f. The subcriticality monitoring device described in No. 1 Jn.
Priority Applications (1)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| JP57193089A JPS5983090A (en) | 1982-11-02 | 1982-11-02 | Subcriticality monitoring device |
Applications Claiming Priority (1)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| JP57193089A JPS5983090A (en) | 1982-11-02 | 1982-11-02 | Subcriticality monitoring device |
Publications (1)
| Publication Number | Publication Date |
|---|---|
| JPS5983090A true JPS5983090A (en) | 1984-05-14 |
Family
ID=16302044
Family Applications (1)
| Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
|---|---|---|---|
| JP57193089A Pending JPS5983090A (en) | 1982-11-02 | 1982-11-02 | Subcriticality monitoring device |
Country Status (1)
| Country | Link |
|---|---|
| JP (1) | JPS5983090A (en) |
Cited By (1)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| JP2007121156A (en) * | 2005-10-28 | 2007-05-17 | Toshiba Corp | Subcriticality monitor and method |
-
1982
- 1982-11-02 JP JP57193089A patent/JPS5983090A/en active Pending
Cited By (1)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| JP2007121156A (en) * | 2005-10-28 | 2007-05-17 | Toshiba Corp | Subcriticality monitor and method |
Similar Documents
| Publication | Publication Date | Title |
|---|---|---|
| Tashlykov et al. | Ion-selective treatment as a method for increasing the efficiency of liquid radioactive waste reducing in accordance with acceptance criteria for disposal | |
| JPS5983090A (en) | Subcriticality monitoring device | |
| JPH0213736B2 (en) | ||
| DeVoe | Radioactive contamination of materials used in scientific research | |
| Boulyga et al. | Nuclear track radiography of “hot” aerosol particles | |
| JPH02157696A (en) | Non-destructive analysis apparatus for fissile material | |
| Buchanan | Activation analysis using a research reactor | |
| Wald | Industrial Medical Aspects of Nuclear Technology | |
| Faust et al. | Criteria for safe handling of irradiated plutonium in beta-gamma shielded cells | |
| Shahrokhi et al. | State-of-the art in non-destructive assay systems and their applications to an LMFBR aqueous fuel reprocessing plant | |
| Umbarger et al. | Portable radioactivity monitor for liquid effluents, surface contaminations, and bulk solid wastes | |
| Zaitsev et al. | THE USE OF ION-EXCHANGE MATERIAL IN PREPARING LOW-ACTIVITY RADIATION SOURCES | |
| Tsuruno | Inspection of Pu particle in UO2-PuO2 pellet by neutron radiography | |
| Miyake et al. | LEAKAGE TEST OF HOT CELLS, NAIG RESEARCH LABORATORY | |
| Bokacheva et al. | CALCULATION OF THE $ gamma $-COMPONENT OF HEAT GENERATION | |
| Chupp et al. | Measurement of High‐Energy Gamma‐Rays with a Photographic Bent Crystal Spectrograph | |
| Logsdon et al. | Operational experience in radiological control during the NS Savannah fuel shuffle | |
| Laverlochere et al. | RADIOACTIVE METHODS OF ANALYSIS | |
| Beck | RECENT ADVANCES IN NONDESTRUCTIVE EXAMINATION OF IRRADIATED FUEL CAPSULES | |
| Arlman | TECHNICAL PROBLEMS OF PRODUCTION. PREPARATION AND DELIVERY OF RADIOACTIVE ISOTOPES | |
| Langendorff et al. | RADIATION PROTECTION CONTROL BY THE FILM DARKENING METHOD FOR PERSONNEL WORKING WITH RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS | |
| Morgan | Release of radioactive materials from reactors | |
| Baecklin et al. | On the Properties of the s {sub 1/2}-> d {sub 3/2} Transition in {sup 199} Au | |
| Deigl et al. | Guidelines for determining frequency of wipe surveys | |
| Philippot | NEW ASPECTS OF RADIOACTIVITY MEASUREMENTS ISOCHRONIC MEASUREMENTS AND MEASUREMENTS OF CONTROLLED DURATION |