JPH10282284A - Nuclear power generating facility - Google Patents

Abstract

PROBLEM TO BE SOLVED: To greatly suppress an increase in internal pressure of reactor containment vessel in a reactor accident and improve the reliability of nuclear power generating plant. SOLUTION: A machine room 20 for housing devices, which is arranged adjacent to an RCCV(reinforced concrete containment vessel) 1 conventionally, is installed on the lower side of the RCCV 1, so that the capacity of reactor building including the RCCV 1 is made small. In the machine room, the machine room 20 just beneath a wet well 5 of the RCCV 1 is provided with an ECCS (emergency core cooling system) 10 machine room, an HCU machine room 21 and an RIP(reactor built-in type internal pump) repair room 22. In addition, a machine room 23 just beneath a lower dry well 3 is made of ceramics fire- proof material or its floor space is made large by making it open to the adjacent machine room. An atmosphere may be distributed between the lower dry well 3 and machine room 23. Further, the lower dry well 3 or machine room 23 and the adjacent machine rooms 21 and 22 are communicated with each other through a machine shipping in/out tunnel or hatch.

Description

DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE INVENTION

[0001]

BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION 1. Field of the Invention The present invention relates to a nuclear power plant having a pressure-suppressed reactor containment vessel of a boiling water reactor.

[0002]

2. Description of the Related Art Among the conventional boiling water reactors (hereinafter referred to as BWRs), the latest one is a new improved BWR (hereinafter referred to as AB).
It is called WR. )It has been known. The reactor containment vessel of this ABWR is made of reinforced concrete, and the RCCV (rein
forced concrete containmentvessel). Hereinafter, the outline of the RCCV will be described with reference to FIG.

FIG. 14 is a schematic system sectional view of a conventional ABWR RCCV60. The RCCV 60 includes a reactor pressure vessel 6 containing a reactor core 50, an upper dry well 2 and a lower dry well 3 surrounding the reactor pressure vessel 6,
And a wet well 5 surrounding the reactor pressure vessel 6 and the lower dry well 3 and having a suppression pool 4 therein for storing a suppression pool water 4a.

[0004] A reactor pressure vessel 6 installed at the center of the RCCV 60 is located at the center of the upper dry well 2,
It is supported by a pedestal 14 erected from the floor of the RCCV 60 via a reactor pressure vessel skirt 13. The gas pressure space around the reactor pressure vessel 6 is divided into an upper dry well 2 and a lower dry well 3 by the reactor pressure vessel skirt 13. In the case of ABWR, the reactor pressure vessel skirt 13 has no opening, and the gas phase space around the reactor pressure vessel 6 is separated into the upper dry well 2 and the lower dry well 3 by the reactor pressure vessel skirt 13.

On the other hand, the vent pipe 7 connects these divided areas, and the upper dry well 2 and the wet well 5 are connected by the vent pipe 7. The lower dry well 3 also communicates with the upper dry well 2 and the wet well 5 by the opening 12 provided on the side wall of the vent pipe 7. As described above, since the upper dry well 2 and the lower dry well 3 communicate with each other via the vent pipe 7 and the opening 12, the upper dry well 2 and the lower dry well 3 are generally simply referred to as a dry well.

The lower part of the vent pipe 7 is opened into the suppression pool 4 by a horizontal vent 8, and the suppression pool 4 is always filled with the suppression pool water 4 a at the lower part of the vent pipe 7. Vent pipe 7 is 2 in the figure
Although only books are shown, actually, ten books are uniformly arranged in a circumferential shape.

In the lower dry well 3, an internal pump (hereinafter referred to as RI) which incorporates a reactor for circulating a coolant is provided.
It is called P. ) 18 and a fine adjustment control rod drive mechanism (hereinafter referred to as FMCRD) 19 for inserting and withdrawing a control rod (not shown).

An emergency core cooling system (hereinafter referred to as ECCS) 10 connects the suppression pool 4 to the upper part of the reactor pressure vessel 6. A primary reactor piping 9 is connected to an upper side surface of the reactor pressure vessel 6. The gas phase of the wet well 5 and the lower dry well 3 are connected via a vacuum break valve 11.

In normal operation, in order to strictly prevent the combustion of flammable gas, the gas phase in the RCCV 60 is always filled with nitrogen, and the oxygen concentration in the RCCV 60 is lower than 20% in the air. For example, it is managed so as to limit it to 4 to 3% or less. For this reason, during normal operation, the operator must use equipment such as an oxygen mask for the first time.
It is possible to enter the V60.

Next, a conventional reactor building will be described.
FIG. 15 is a schematic system sectional view of a reactor building storing a conventional RCCV 60. As shown in FIG. The above-mentioned emergency core cooling system 10 is installed in a large number (about 6 units) in order to secure reliability.
In order to store the emergency core cooling system 10, the RCCV 60, and the like, a reactor building 15 is further installed in the case of a BWR. A spent fuel pool 16 for temporarily storing spent fuel taken out from the reactor is installed above the reactor building 15. In the BWR, the reactor building 15 surrounding the RCCV 60 constructs a barrier for radioactive release, thereby
And the reactor building 15 provides a double radioactive storage barrier, which provides extremely excellent safety performance.

From the viewpoint of the minimum required head pressure, all of the emergency core cooling systems 10 of a large number of units need to be installed at a position equal to or lower than the height of the suppression pool 4 as a water source.
For this reason, in the conventional reactor building 15, all the emergency core cooling systems 10 are connected to the RCCV on the lowest basement floor of the reactor building 15.
Since they are installed side by side in an area adjacent to the side of the reactor 1, the floor area of the reactor building 15 must be increased. Therefore, for example, in a conventional ABWR, the volume of the RCCV1 is about 17,000 m ³ , while the volume of the reactor building 15 is about 300,000 m ³ , that is, a volume nearly 20 times the RCCV60. 15 is a fairly large building. Therefore, while the RCCV 60 has high pressure resistance performance, it is difficult to consider strict pressure resistance standards regarding the internal pressure in the construction of the reactor building 15 which is a large building. When the pressure in the RCCV60 exceeds the design pressure, R
The blowout panel 15 provided on the upper part of the CCV 60 is opened to release internal pressure.

If the primary reactor piping 9 connected to the reactor pressure vessel 6 in the RCCV 60 breaks, a so-called coolant loss accident occurs. Even in the event of a coolant loss accident with a very low probability of occurrence, it is necessary to take sufficient measures so as not to give the outside public an unreasonable risk of radiation exposure.

For this reason, in the nuclear power plant, the radioactivity is prevented from being diffused into the atmosphere by a double radioactivity storage barrier composed of the RCCV1 and the reactor building 15, and a plurality of emergency core cooling systems 10 are separately provided. The suppression pool water 4a is injected into the reactor pressure vessel 6 to cool the core fuel and take every possible measure to maintain its soundness.

When the primary system piping 9 of the reactor breaks and a coolant loss accident occurs, high-temperature and high-pressure reactor coolant is released from the break and instantaneously turns into high-temperature and high-pressure steam to form the upper dry well 2 and the lower part. Fill the dry well 3. The reason why the water vapor immediately fills the inside of the lower dry well 3 is that the lower dry well 3 is directly connected to the upper dry well 2 by the vent pipe 7 and the opening 12.

The high-temperature and high-pressure steam further pushes down the water surface inside the vent pipe 7, and is discharged from the horizontal vent port 8 into the suppression pool water 4a and condensed. In this process, the non-condensable nitrogen gas existing in the upper dry well 2 and the lower dry well 3 is also accompanied by the high-temperature and high-pressure steam, passes through the horizontal vent port 8, and enters the suppression pool water 4a. Be guided. However, since the nitrogen gas is non-condensable, it passes through the suppression pool water 4a as it is and moves to the gas phase portion of the wet well 5. If this process continues for a while, a situation appears in which most of the gas in the upper dry well 2 and the lower dry well 3 is occupied by water vapor, while the gas phase of the wet well 5 is almost entirely filled with nitrogen gas.

When such a situation appears, the RCC
Since the nitrogen gas uniformly existing in the entire gas phase portion in V1 is pushed into only the wet well 5, the pressure in the wet well 5 increases. Further, high-temperature and high-pressure steam exists in the upper dry well 2 and the lower dry well 3. Since the sum of the pressure of the water vapor and the pressure in the wet well 5 and the head pressure in the vent pipe 7 is the actual pressure of the upper dry well 2 and the lower dry well 3,
The pressure of RCCV1 becomes the highest value in this state.

That is, after that, the ECCS 10 operates and the suppression pool water 4a is injected into the upper dry well 2 through the breakage of the reactor pressure vessel 6 and the reactor primary system piping 9 (this phenomenon is referred to as ECCS Therefore, the water vapor in the upper dry well 2 and the lower dry well 3 is rapidly condensed. This allows
The upper dry well 2 and the lower dry well 3 are in a vacuum state, and the nitrogen gas accumulated in the wet well 5 from the vacuum break valve 11 circulates in the lower dry well 3 and the upper dry well 2, and the pressure in the RCCV 1 is rapidly increased. To decline.

Therefore, it can be said that the pressure immediately before the ECCS coming out determines the maximum pressure at the time of the LOCA of the RCCV1. In order to reduce such a maximum pressure of the RCCV1, the gaseous phase volume on the dry wells 2 and 3 side is made as small as possible, the gaseous phase volume on the wet well 5 side is made as large as possible, and nitrogen gas in the wet well 5 is formed. It is important to reduce the pressure accumulation phenomenon caused by the pressure.

[0019]

As described above, in the conventional reactor building 15, a large number of ECCSs 10 are installed beside the RCCV 60, so that the width and floor area of the building become large.
Since the entire building must be enlarged, the economics of the nuclear power plant have deteriorated, and this has been an obstacle when the reactor building 15 is used as a pressure-resistant structure as a second pressure barrier in addition to the RCCV 60.

In the future, there is an increasing demand from society for generating power by increasing the output per unit with a small number of plants in view of power generation efficiency. Current ABW
The output of the R plant is already a large output of 1.35 million KWe, and for example, 1.5 million KWe or 17
If a plant with an output increased to 100,000 KWe is to be realized, the pressure in the RCCV 60 at the time of a coolant loss accident will increase in proportion to the output, so the design pressure of the RCCV 60 will be significantly increased, or It is necessary to greatly increase the volume of the wet well 5 of the RCCV60.

However, the design pressure of the RCCV 60 has almost reached the limit at present due to the characteristics of the containment vessel of the concrete reactor, and it is difficult to further increase it further.
Also, increasing the volume of the wet well 5 requires RCC
This is not preferable because it leads to an increase in the size of the V60 and, in turn, an increase in the size of the reactor building 15.

Further, in addition to the coolant loss accident, which is a design standard accident, the core is damaged due to an excessive rise in temperature of the fuel rods constituting the reactor core, or the core is damaged and the core is melted for a long time. According to the probabilistic safety assessment, such a severe accident has a very low probability of occurrence, but it can be said that it is an event to be considered in order to aim for higher safety. In fact, it has been confirmed that the conventional RCCV 60 does not break even if the pressure increases to about twice the design pressure, and sufficient safety against severe accidents has been confirmed.

However, when the core fuel is seriously damaged during a severe accident, there is a possibility that a large amount of hydrogen gas is generated due to a reaction between zirconium of the fuel cladding tube material and water of the coolant. As described above, the RCCV60 is filled with nitrogen gas during normal operation and has excellent characteristics of strictly preventing the combustion of hydrogen gas and the occurrence of excessive reaction. However, since the volume is small, a large amount of hydrogen gas is used. RCCV if it occurs
There is a possibility that the internal pressure of the reactor 60 increases and radioactive leakage occurs in the reactor building 15. In this case, R
Gas such as water vapor in the CCV 60 leaks excessively into the reactor building 15, thereby increasing the internal pressure inside the reactor building 15. As described above, the reactor building 15 of the current ABWR
Because of its large volume, the pressure resistance performance with respect to the internal pressure is lower than that of the RCCV60, and when the internal pressure of the reactor building 15 increases, the blowout panel 17 installed at the upper part of the reactor building 15 opens to suppress the pressure increase. However, radioactivity is directly released to the environment. Even in pursuit of higher safety than the current situation, such events must be strictly prevented.

Therefore, the present invention provides a secondary containment vessel smaller than the conventional reactor building by changing the arrangement of the peripheral containment vessel such as the suppression pool of the reactor containment vessel and the ECCS, etc. To provide a nuclear power plant in which the entire facility is downsized by surrounding the RCCV.

Although the probability is extremely low, there is a possibility that molten core fuel (hereinafter referred to as debris) may penetrate the lower part of the reactor pressure vessel 6. At this time, the debris falls to the lower part of the lower dry well 3, and if the debris cannot be sufficiently cooled, concrete under the lower dry well 3 may be eroded. If this situation is left unchecked, RC
It is conceivable that the bottom of the CV 60 may be melt-penetrated.

Accordingly, the present invention provides a nuclear power plant capable of reliably cooling molten debris even if the debris falls to the lower part of the lower dry well.
In the lower drywell 3, RIP18 or FMCR is used.
Although important equipment such as D19 is installed for normal operation of the plant, since the current lower drywell 3 is filled with nitrogen during normal operation, it is difficult for operators to access the drywell 3 easily. It is difficult to directly check the soundness of important equipment or to repair it immediately if it breaks down.

Therefore, the present invention improves the workability in the lower dry well by making the lower dry well an air atmosphere by obviating the need for encapsulating nitrogen in the lower dry well, which has been conventionally performed normally. Provide a nuclear power generation facility.

[0028]

According to the present invention, there is provided a reactor pressure vessel containing a reactor core, an upper dry well surrounding the reactor pressure vessel, and a reactor pressure vessel. In a nuclear power plant having a reactor containment vessel consisting of a lower dry well located below and a wet well adjacent to the lower dry well and located below the upper dry well and constituting a suppression pool, Provided is a nuclear power generation facility characterized by comprising an equipment room for storing equipment below.

According to this configuration, by changing the arrangement of the equipment room which is conventionally arranged adjacent to the containment vessel,
The volume and installation area of the reactor building containing the reactor containment vessel, the equipment room, and the like or a building corresponding to the reactor building can be significantly reduced.

Further, according to the present invention, at least some of the equipment chambers located immediately below the wet well of the containment vessel include an emergency core cooling system, a control rod drive system, a water pressure control unit, and an internal pump. Equipment related to any of the above shall be housed. By thus arranging the peripheral equipment close to the containment vessel, the utilization efficiency of such equipment is improved.

Further, in the present invention, a refractory material such as a ceramic material is disposed on the floor of the equipment room located at least immediately below the lower dry well of the containment vessel in the equipment room. With this configuration, even if the core is damaged during a severe accident and melts through the reactor pressure vessel and falls,
The refractory material allows the debris to be held inside the nuclear power plant and severely prevented from being released to the outside.

Alternatively, the equipment room located immediately below the lower dry well in the equipment room is set to be opened to at least a part of the equipment room located immediately below the wet well. With this configuration, even if the reactor core is damaged during a severe accident and the reactor melts and penetrates through the reactor pressure vessel and falls, the debris can be reliably diffused by spreading the debris on the floor by increasing the floor area by opening the equipment room. Can be cooled and the release to the outside can be strictly prevented.

Further, in the present invention, the lower drywell and the equipment room located immediately below the lower drywell are separated by a non-blocking member having a hole through which the atmosphere flows, and the equipment room and the equipment room adjacent to the equipment room are separated. It shall be equipped with a hatch or a tunnel for carrying in / out equipment for distribution. Alternatively, the floor height of the equipment room located immediately below the wet well of the containment vessel is set to be substantially the same as the floor height of the lower dry well, and the equipment room and the lower dry well are connected to each other. It shall be equipped with a hatch or a tunnel for carrying in / out equipment for distribution. With this configuration, loading and unloading of equipment into and from the lower drywell is facilitated, and workability in the lower drywell is improved.

In the present invention, an airtight chamber is provided for communicating with the gas phase in the containment vessel via a communication pipe, and an isolation means is provided in the communication pipe. With this configuration, the airtight chamber and the reactor containment gas phase are normally isolated by the isolation means, but when the internal pressure of the reactor containment vessel rises, the isolation means operates and the reactor containment gas phase is separated. By communicating with the airtight chamber and flowing the atmosphere, part of the hydrogen gas expected to be generated at the time of a severe accident is released into the airtight chamber to alleviate a rise in the internal pressure of the containment vessel. In addition, by using the equipment room located immediately below the containment vessel as at least a part of the hermetic chamber, it is possible to shorten the communication pipe and increase the pressure resistance of the hermetic chamber.

Further, in the present invention, the upper dry well and the lower dry well are completely separated as a space by the outer wall and the skirt of the reactor pressure vessel, and the upper dry well and the suppression pool are connected to each other, and the lower dry well is connected to the lower dry well. A first vent pipe which does not communicate with the lower drywell and the suppression pool and a second vent pipe which does not communicate with the upper drywell, and a nitrogen filling means for filling the lower drywell with nitrogen gas. It shall be provided. Further, a third vent pipe extending downward from the upper dry well and having an opening in the suppression pool water is provided.

With this configuration, the upper dry well and the lower dry well are independent spaces that are not communicated spatially or through a vent pipe. Prevents gas from flowing into the phase, and alleviates the rise in the internal pressure of the containment vessel during a coolant loss accident.

In this case, the upper dry well and the wet well gas phase are usually set to a nitrogen atmosphere and the lower dry well is set to an atmosphere containing nitrogen and oxygen. When this occurs, the inside of the lower drywell is set to a nitrogen atmosphere by nitrogen filling means. This severely prevents hydrogen combustion and excessive reaction in the lower drywell. Further, a nitrogen gas filling system in the storage container may be used as the nitrogen filling means.

In the present invention, the containment vessel is doubled by installing a pressure-resistant secondary containment vessel surrounding the reactor containment vessel and the equipment room. In response to the downsizing of the facility due to the change in the arrangement of the equipment room, it has become possible to provide a pressure-resistant secondary containment vessel instead of the conventional reactor building. As a result, external discharge of gas generated in the secondary containment vessel at the time of an accident can be strictly prevented.

Further, an auxiliary building is installed outside the secondary containment, and a fuel pool, a fuel pool purification system, a condensate storage tank, a condensate replenishment system, and an emergency for communicating with the secondary containment inside the auxiliary building. At least one facility of the gas treatment system is arranged. Thereby, the size of the secondary storage container can be further reduced.

Further, by using the secondary containment vessel, it is possible to share the equipment installed in the auxiliary building for the plurality of secondary containment vessels in a nuclear power plant having a plurality of nuclear power plants.

Further, in the present invention, this secondary containment vessel is installed on a bedrock through a seismic isolation element made of an elastic body. As this seismic isolation element, for example, an element made of a laminated body of rubber and a steel plate or a spring is used. As described above, by reducing the size of the facility, the entire facility can be provided with a seismic isolation function by the seismic isolation element.

[0042]

DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE PREFERRED EMBODIMENTS A first embodiment of the present invention will be described with reference to the drawings. FIG. 1 is a schematic system sectional view of a nuclear power generation facility including a reactor containment vessel and peripheral equipment according to the present embodiment, and FIG. 2 is a schematic system sectional view of a reactor building including the nuclear power generation facility according to the present embodiment. is there. In the drawing, the same components as those of FIG. 14 described in the related art are denoted by the same reference numerals, and the description of the overlapping portions will be omitted. Only the main parts of the present embodiment will be described below.

The nuclear power generation facility in the present embodiment
An equipment room is provided below CCV1. In the drawing, at least a part of the equipment room provided below the wet well 5 constituting the suppression pool 4
They are used as the equipment room 20, the HCU equipment room 21, and the RIP repair room 22. In the figure, the HCU equipment room 21 and the RIP repair room 22 are displayed at the same position because they overlap in the depth direction.

By providing the equipment room below the RCCV1, the RCCV1 according to the present embodiment is arranged above the conventional RCCV60 shown in FIG.
For example, it is assumed that the height of the RCCV1 is about 8.5 m higher than the conventional one, and an equipment room with a height of about 6.5 m is provided below the RCCV1.

By arranging the RCCV 1 itself at a higher position than before, if the installation height of various devices from the base is increased, various devices in the RCCV 1, especially the reactor pressure vessel 6
And the seismic resistance of the peripheral equipment deteriorates. In order to prevent this and obtain at least seismic resistance equivalent to the conventional one, in the present embodiment, the height of the reactor pressure vessel 1 from the bottom surface of the wet well 3 of the RCCV 1 is reduced, so that the Keep it high. For example, the height distance between the bottom surface of the dry well 3 and the reactor pressure vessel 1 is set to about 4.1 compared to the conventional case.
m.

Accordingly, the conventional RCC shown in FIG.
The conventional design in which the floor surface of the lower dry well 3 in the V60 floor portion is set at a position slightly higher than or substantially equal to the floor surface of the wet well 5 is changed. That is, RCC
The floor surface of the lower dry well 3 among the floor surfaces of V1 is dug down stepwise so that the floor surface of the lower dry well 3 is arranged at a position lower than the floor surface of the adjacent wet well 5 and the RCC is formed.
The inner diameter of V1 is made larger than before, and the distance between the bottom surface of the wet well 5 and the water surface during normal operation of the suppression pool water 4a is reduced. For example, the conventional RCC shown in FIG.
While the inner diameter of the V60 is about 29 m, in the present embodiment, the inner diameter of the RCCV1 is about 35 m. As a result, the height distance between the bottom surface of the dry well 3 and the reactor pressure vessel 1 is made smaller than before, and the volume of the gas phase of the wet well 4 is made substantially equal to that of the conventional case.

As shown in FIG. 14, in the conventional ABWR, E
Various equipment rooms such as the CCS equipment room 20 were installed adjacent to the side surface of the RCCV1, but by arranging these equipment rooms below the RCCV1, the width of the reactor building 15 was greatly reduced, and the reactor building 15 The whole can be reduced in size. For example, the width of the conventional reactor building 15 is about 60
m, whereas in the present embodiment, the width is about 45
m.

Hereinafter, a second embodiment of the present invention will be described.
FIG. 3 is a schematic system sectional view of the nuclear power generation facility according to the present embodiment. The same components as those in the first embodiment are denoted by the same reference numerals, and detailed description is omitted.

In the present embodiment, the lower equipment room 23 located immediately below the lower dry well 3 has a storage function like the RCCV1 and has a core catcher 23a inside the room.
Was installed as a core catcher equipment room,
Other configurations are the same as in the first embodiment. The core catcher 23a is made of a refractory material, and is disposed on the floor of the core catcher installation room 23, for example. Here, as the refractory material, zirconia (ZrO) is typically used.
2) There are ceramics such as magnesia (MgO), but the material is not limited to this as long as it has fire resistance.

The boundary 23b between the core catcher equipment chamber 23 and the lower drywell 3 is made thinner than other parts, for example, in order to minimize a reaction such as non-condensable gas generation due to contact with falling debris. It is made of pressure concrete.

With this configuration, the same function and effect as those of the first embodiment can be obtained. Further, even in the event that a severe accident occurs and core fuel is seriously damaged, and debris melts and penetrates the lower part of the reactor pressure vessel 6 and falls into the lower dry well 3, the floor surface 23b of the lower dry well 3 may be used. And a core catcher 23a made of a refractory material
By dropping the debris on the upper side, it is possible to strictly prevent the RCCV 60 from being melted and penetrated by the debris, and to further enhance the soundness of the nuclear power generation facility as compared with the current situation.

Hereinafter, a third embodiment of the present invention will be described.
FIG. 4 is a schematic system sectional view of the nuclear power plant according to the present embodiment. The same components as those in the first or second embodiment are denoted by the same reference numerals, and detailed description is omitted.

In the present embodiment, by integrating at least a part of the lower equipment room located below the lower dry well 3 and the equipment room adjacent to the lower equipment room and located below the wet well 5, The debris diffusion equipment room 24 has a larger floor area than the lower equipment room in the first embodiment. In this embodiment, instead of installing a core catcher made of a refractory material in the equipment room 24, the equipment room 24
The debris is reliably cooled by setting the diffusion floor area of the debris sufficiently large.

With this configuration, the same function and effect as those of the first embodiment can be obtained. Further, even if a severe accident occurs and the core fuel is seriously damaged, and the debris melts and penetrates through the lower part of the reactor pressure vessel 6 and falls into the lower dry well 3, it falls into the debris diffusion equipment room 24. The thickness of the debris is restricted by the debris being diffused over a sufficiently large area, so that when the cooling water is sprayed from above, the debris can be uniformly and reliably cooled. Therefore, by reliably cooling the debris, the penetration of the RCCV 60 by melting can be strictly prevented, and the soundness of the nuclear power generation facility can be further improved from the current state.

Although the core catcher 23a is not particularly provided in the present embodiment, a debris diffusion equipment room in which the core catcher 23a is provided as in the second embodiment can be realized.

Hereinafter, a fourth embodiment of the present invention will be described.
FIG. 5 is a schematic system sectional view of the nuclear power generation facility according to the present embodiment. The same components as those in the first to third embodiments are denoted by the same reference numerals, and detailed description is omitted.

In the present embodiment, the airtight chamber 25 is provided outside the RCCV1, and the gas phase portion inside the RCCV1 and the airtight chamber 25 are provided.
Are connected by a gas phase vent pipe 26, and a rupture disk 27 is provided in the gas phase vent pipe 26 as isolation means. In the figure, the case where the opening of the gas-phase vent pipe 26 is provided in the gas-phase part of the wet well 5 in the RCCV 1 is typically shown, but the position of the opening is not limited to this.

In the airtight chamber 25, during normal operation, the RCC
Nitrogen gas is sealed as in V1. The rupture disk 27, which normally functions as an isolation means, is destroyed when the pressure exceeds a certain set pressure so that the airtight chamber 25 and the RCCV1 can communicate with each other. The design pressure of the rupture disk 27 is, for example, the design pressure of the RCCV1. . Note that an isolation valve may be provided instead of the rupture disk 27.

With this configuration, the same function and effect as those of the first embodiment can be obtained. Further, this embodiment has the following operation. That is, a coolant loss accident, which is a design standard accident, occurs, and the maximum pressure at the time of the accident of RCCV1 is RCCV1.
When the pressure is limited to the design pressure of V1 or less, the rupture disk 27 does not operate and the soundness of the RCCV1 is maintained. However, if a severe accident occurs and the reactor core is seriously damaged, a large amount of hydrogen is generated in the RCCV1 and the internal pressure exceeds the design pressure, the rupture disk 27 operates and the RCCV1 is operated. By letting a part of the gas into the hermetic chamber 25, the hermetic chamber 25 can be used as a substantial part of the containment vessel. As a result, it becomes possible to prevent a reactor containment damage event leading to damage due to an abnormal rise in the pressure of the RCCV1.

Further, since the inside of the hermetic chamber 25 is always filled with nitrogen gas, a large amount of hydrogen is supposed to be supplied in the event of a severe accident.
5 can prevent an excessive reaction such as combustion by hydrogen.

Further, in this embodiment, since the hermetic chamber 25 is normally isolated from the RCCV1, when the plant is stopped and the periodic inspection is performed, nitrogen in the secret chamber 25 is released before the RCCV1. On the contrary, when the plant is started, an operation of charging nitrogen gas after RCCV1 is performed. According to the efficient replacement of the nitrogen atmosphere, in the present embodiment, although the volume of the RCCV1 is substantially increased as compared with the first embodiment, the time required for releasing and filling nitrogen in the RCCV1 is the first embodiment. Since it is the same as the embodiment, the stop time of the plant at the time of the periodic inspection can be suppressed as short as in the first embodiment.

In this embodiment, nitrogen gas is sealed in the hermetic chamber 25 during normal operation. In addition, for example, the air inside the hermetic chamber 25 is usually set to an air atmosphere during normal operation.
It is also conceivable to use an operation to fill the airtight chamber with nitrogen gas early after the accident. In this case, the same operation and effect as described above can be obtained.

Hereinafter, a fifth embodiment of the present invention will be described.
FIG. 6 is a schematic system sectional view of the nuclear power plant according to the present embodiment. The same components as those in the first to fourth embodiments are denoted by the same reference numerals, and detailed description will be omitted.

In the present embodiment, at least a part of various equipment rooms provided below the RCCV 1 is diverted as the hermetic chamber 25 in the fourth embodiment.
For example, the core catcher installation room 23a, the RIP repair room 22, or the debris diffusion room 24 is used. Alternatively, an airtight chamber 25 may be separately provided at the same level as the equipment room. A gas-phase vent pipe 26 connecting the airtight chamber 25 and the gas-phase part in the RCCV1 is installed near the wall of the RCCV1 or inside the wall of the RCCV1 as shown.

With this configuration, the same operation and effect as those of the fourth embodiment can be obtained, and at the same time, in this embodiment, since the airtight chamber 25 is close to the RCCV1, the gas-phase vent pipe 2
Since the length of the pipe 6 can be reduced, the pipe pressure loss can be reduced and the peak pressure of the RCCV1 at the time of an accident can be reduced accordingly. Further, since the hermetic chamber 25 located below the RCCV1 is constructed integrally with the RCCV1, it is possible to further strengthen the pressure resistance of the hermetic chamber 25 as compared with the fourth embodiment.

Hereinafter, a sixth embodiment of the present invention will be described.
FIG. 7 is a schematic sectional view of a nuclear power plant according to the present embodiment. The same components as those in the first to fifth embodiments are denoted by the same reference numerals, and detailed description is omitted.

In the RCCV 1, the upper dry well 2 and the lower dry well 3 are completely separated by the outer wall of the reactor pressure vessel 6 and the reactor pressure vessel skirt 13.
In the conventional RCCV and the first to fifth embodiments, the upper dry well 2 and the lower dry well 3 are connected to the suppression pool 4 through the vent pipe 7 having the horizontal vent port 8. The configuration is such that the structure of the vent pipe is changed so that the upper dry well 2 and the lower dry well 3 are separated as a space.

That is, in the present embodiment, the pedestal 14
The upper drywell vent pipe 28, which communicates the upper drywell 2 with the suppression pool 4 and is arranged independently of the lower drywell 3, communicates the lower drywell 3 with the suppression pool 4 as an internal vent pipe, and A lower drywell vent pipe 29 is provided independently of the drywell 3. These vent pipes 28 and 29 are both opened into the suppression pool 4 by the horizontal vent 8. Further, as a vent pipe for the upper dry well 2, an upper dry well vertical vent pipe 30 connected directly downward from the upper dry well 2 and led to the suppression pool 4 is separately provided.

During normal operation, the separated lower dry well 3 was filled with air, the upper dry well 2 was filled with nitrogen gas, and the lower dry well 3 was provided with a remote control valve 31. A nitrogen gas tank 32 is provided.
In addition, a vacuum break valve 33 dedicated to the upper dry well 2 and a vacuum break valve 34 dedicated to the lower dry well 3 are independently installed. The nitrogen gas tank 32 may be installed outside the RCCV 1 and connected to the inside of the lower drywell 3 by piping.

With this configuration, the upper dry well 2 and the lower dry well 3 are completely separated from each other even when a coolant loss accident, which is a design standard accident, occurs due to an instantaneous complete break of the reactor primary system piping 9. Therefore, the wet well 5 passes through the vent pipe 28 and the vertical vent pipe 30 accompanying the high-temperature and high-pressure steam released from the pipe break.
The nitrogen gas transferred to the gas phase portion is only the gas in the upper dry well 2. Therefore, the peak pressure of the RCCV1 at the time of the coolant loss accident can be significantly reduced as compared with the conventional case where even the nitrogen gas in the lower dry well 3 has shifted to the gas phase in the wet well 5. When the pressure of the nitrogen gas accumulated in the wet well 5 rises, the vacuum break valve 34 dedicated to the lower dry well 3 is immediately activated, and the nitrogen gas is immediately transferred to the lower dry well 3. The pressure in the gas phase is further reduced. Therefore, the peak pressure of the RCCV1 at the time of the coolant loss accident can be maintained at an extremely low value as compared with the conventional case.

In the present embodiment, the lower dry well 3 is filled with air during normal operation, which makes it much easier for an operator to enter than in the conventional case of filling with nitrogen. As a result, RIP1 which is an important device necessary for normal operation of the reactor installed in the lower drywell 3 is provided.
Even if the control rod 8 or the control rod drive mechanism 19 breaks down, the operator can enter the lower drywell 3 to check the situation and perform repairs. In addition, it is possible to perform preventive maintenance by checking the soundness of these important devices by periodically entering an operator in the lower drywell 3. Therefore, in the present embodiment, the reliability of the normal operation of the plant can be further improved as compared with the related art.

Further, in this embodiment, if a severe accident occurs and the core fuel is seriously damaged and hydrogen gas is generated, the remote control valve 31 is opened and the nitrogen gas tank 32 is opened.
The lower dry well 3 is filled with more nitrogen gas. Since the lower dry well 3 has a relatively small capacity as compared with the upper dry well 2 and the like, the inside of the lower dry well 3 becomes a nitrogen atmosphere relatively early after the remote isolation valve 31 is opened. Therefore, even if the lower part of the reactor pressure vessel 6 is melted and penetrated by the high temperature core fuel and debris and hydrogen gas are discharged into the lower dry well 3, the combustion and excessive reaction of hydrogen in the lower dry well 3 are prevented. It can be strictly prevented.

In this embodiment, the structure of the vent pipe of the RCCV1 in the first embodiment is modified. The structure of the vent pipe is the same as that of the conventional RC pipe shown in FIG.
It goes without saying that the present invention can be applied to the CV60.

Hereinafter, a seventh embodiment of the present invention will be described.
FIG. 8 is a schematic system sectional view of the nuclear power generation facility according to the present embodiment. The same components as those in the first to sixth embodiments are denoted by the same reference numerals, and detailed description thereof will be omitted.

In the present embodiment, instead of the nitrogen gas tank 32 of the sixth embodiment, the lower dry well 3 is filled with a nitrogen gas filling system (PN) in the reactor containment vessel.
IS) 51.

The PNIS 51 prevents the inside of the reactor containment vessel 1 from reaching the negative pressure or the flammability limit by injecting nitrogen gas into the reactor containment vessel 1 as shown in FIG. DC power supply for PNIS (DDC
S) 52 and an igniter system (DCIC) 53
And a measurement control system (AMCS) 54. P
NIS51 is used as a containment vent as a countermeasure against severe accidents. At the same time, when a coolant is lost as a design standard accident, NIS51 is filled with nitrogen gas by PNIS51 to provide a conventional flammable gas concentration control system (FCS).
It is also used as an alternative. If the containment vessel venting is not performed before the containment vessel venting or at the time of the loss of coolant accident, the concentration of the flammable gas is reduced by causing a recombination reaction of the hydrogen gas by the forced ignition method using the igniter system 53. Shall be reduced. In addition, PNIS51
The device itself can be housed in the equipment room below the RCCV1, but is shown outside for convenience in the drawing.

With this configuration, according to the present embodiment, substantially the same operation and effect as those of the sixth embodiment can be obtained, and the lower part is formed based on the gas concentration in the lower dry well 3 measured by the measurement control system 54. By sealing the nitrogen gas in the dry well 3, the reliability of the nuclear power generation facility can be further increased.

Hereinafter, an eighth embodiment of the present invention will be described.
FIG. 9 is a schematic sectional view of a nuclear power plant according to the present embodiment. The same components as those in the first to seventh embodiments are denoted by the same reference numerals, and detailed description will be omitted.

In the present embodiment, a pressure-resistant secondary containment vessel 35 is installed in place of the reactor building 17 outside the RCCV 1 according to the fifth embodiment. The ceiling of the secondary storage container 35 is hemispherical to enhance pressure resistance, and the design pressure of the secondary storage container 35 is, for example, 2 kg / cm ² .

In the present embodiment, the equipment such as the ECCS 10 is housed in the equipment room below the RCCV 1 so that the equipment room of the conventional ABWR having the equipment room arranged adjacent to the RCCV 60 shown in FIG. The building area and volume of the secondary storage container 35 can be significantly reduced as compared with the building area and volume. For this reason, it is extremely difficult to make the conventional reactor building 15 a pressure-resistant structure, whereas the secondary containment vessel 35 of the present embodiment can be easily made a pressure-resistant structure.

With this configuration, the same function and effect as those of the fifth embodiment can be obtained. Further, in this embodiment, even if a severe accident occurs and excessive radioactivity and non-condensable gas leak from the RCCV1, the leaked gas is retained in the pressure-resistant secondary containment vessel 35 and released to the outside air. Can be strictly prevented. Therefore, the risk of radiation given to the general public at the time of a severe accident can be significantly reduced.

The RCCV1 in this embodiment is not limited to the RCCV in the fifth embodiment, but can be sufficiently withstand by providing a similar secondary storage container 35 outside the RCCV in each embodiment. A small secondary storage container having a structure can be realized.

Hereinafter, a ninth embodiment of the present invention will be described.
FIG. 10 is a schematic sectional view of a nuclear power plant according to the present embodiment. The same components as those in the first to eighth embodiments are denoted by the same reference numerals, and detailed description is omitted.

This embodiment relates to a nuclear power plant in which two nuclear power plants including secondary containment vessels are arranged adjacent to each other in the eighth embodiment. That is,
The two secondary storage containers 35a according to the eighth embodiment,
A common facility auxiliary building 36 is installed adjacent to the outside of the storage facility 35b, and an external fuel pool 37, a fuel pool cooling / purifying system (FPC) 38, and a condensate storage tank (CS) are installed inside the auxiliary building 36.
P) 39, condensate supply system (MUWC) 40, and reactor 2
A system such as an emergency gas treatment system (SGTS) 41 for purifying the atmosphere in the secondary containment vessel 35 with a filter is housed, and each system in the common facility auxiliary building 36 is shared by two reactor plants. And

According to this configuration, each system such as the fuel pool 37 is installed in the common facility auxiliary building 36 without being installed in the secondary storage containers 35a and 35b, and each system is shared by two units. Accordingly, compared to the eighth embodiment in which these various facilities are arranged in the secondary storage container 35, the secondary storage container 35 can be further miniaturized and the pressure resistance performance can be improved. Further, by sharing various systems, the economic efficiency of the entire nuclear power plant with two units can be further improved.

As a modification of this embodiment, the external fuel pool 37, the fuel pool cooling and purifying system (FPC) 38,
Condensate storage tank (CSP) 39, condensate supply system (MUWC) 4
0 and a part of the emergency gas treatment system (SGTS) 41 are housed in the common facility auxiliary building 36 and shared by two units.
a, 35b.

Hereinafter, a tenth embodiment of the present invention will be described. FIG. 11 is a schematic system sectional view of the nuclear power plant according to the present embodiment. The same components as those in the first to ninth embodiments are denoted by the same reference numerals, and detailed description will be omitted.

The secondary storage container 35 according to the eighth embodiment.
Is significantly smaller and lighter than the conventional reactor building 15 shown in FIG. The present embodiment takes advantage of this feature, and the secondary storage container 35 is connected to a plurality of seismic isolation elements 42.
RCCV1 by installing on the bedrock 46 through
And the entire secondary containment vessel is to be seismically isolated. The seismic isolation element 42 installed on the building foundation is made of laminated rubber or a spring, and is generally designed to withstand a load of about 500 tons per piece. Approximately several tens to 100 of these are arranged at the bottom of the building.

As the seismic isolation element 42, for example, a laminated rubber or a spring is used. The seismic isolation element made of laminated rubber is formed by alternately stacking a plurality of thin rubber plates and thin steel plates, disposing flange steel plates above and below these laminates, and vulcanizing and pressing them together. .

With this configuration, the present embodiment provides the same operation and effect as the eighth embodiment, and at the same time, removes the most important core fuel and the reactor pressure vessel 6 for safety from the RCCV 1 and the secondary By storing the reactor inside the containment vessel 35, the safety of the reactor against earthquakes can be further greatly improved.

It is to be noted that this embodiment may be applied to the ninth embodiment, and the seismic isolation element 42 may be provided on the building foundation of the two secondary storage containers 35a and 35b. Hereinafter, an eleventh embodiment of the present invention will be described. FIG. 12 is a schematic system sectional view of the nuclear power generation facility according to the present embodiment. In addition,
The same components as those in the first to tenth embodiments are denoted by the same reference numerals, and detailed description will be omitted.

This embodiment is different from the sixth embodiment shown in FIG. 7 in that the boundary 23b between the lower drywell 3 and the core catcher installation chamber 23 immediately below the lower drywell 3 has an opening such as a grating. 43, the lower drywell 3 and the core catcher installation room 23
Is set to circulate, and the core catcher installation room 23 is spatially regarded as a part of the RCCV1. Further, an equipment carry-in / out hatch 44 that circulates between the RIP repair room 22 and the core catcher installation room 23 is installed, and an equipment carry-in / out tunnel 45 that circulates between the core catcher installation room 23 and the HCU equipment room 21 is installed. In addition, a power cable 47 and a scrum pipe 48 necessary for the operation of the RIP 18 and the FMCRD 19 are guided to the outside of the RCCV 1 through the grating 43 and the equipment carry-in / out tunnel 45.

In the conventional ABWR, as shown in FIG.
The equipment loading / unloading tunnel 49 for maintenance and inspection of the RIP 18 and the FMCRD 19 has to be installed in a state where the tunnel 49 penetrates the wet well 5 and its lower end is submerged in the suppression pool water 4a. In the conventional design in which the equipment loading / unloading tunnel 49 penetrates the wet well 5, a shock is applied to the tunnel 49 when a sudden pressure is applied to the suppression pool water 4a during a coolant loss accident.

However, in this embodiment, RCCV1
Using the core catcher installation room 23a, which is an equipment room provided at the lower part of the device, the equipment carry-in / out tunnel 45 is directly connected to the H outside the RCCV1 without penetrating through the wet well 5.
It can be installed so as to communicate with the CU equipment room 21. This makes it possible to maintain high soundness of the equipment carry-in / out tunnel 49 even in the event of a coolant loss accident.

Further, during the periodic inspection of the plant, RIP18
When the FMCRD 19 is taken out of the RCCV 1 for disassembly and inspection, conventionally, the carry-out is performed through the equipment carry-in / out tunnel 49. In this embodiment, however, the core catcher installation room 23 and the RIP repair room 22 It is possible to remove a part of the grating 43 installed therebetween and carry it out directly to the RIP repair room 22 through the equipment carry-in / hatch 44. Therefore, the workability during the periodic inspection can be greatly improved.

Hereinafter, a twelfth embodiment of the present invention will be described. FIG. 13 is a schematic sectional view of a nuclear power plant according to the present embodiment. The same components as those in the first to eleventh embodiments are denoted by the same reference numerals, and detailed description is omitted.

In the present embodiment, the core catcher installation chamber 23 located immediately below the lower dry well 3 and the non-blocking member 43 such as grating are removed from the eleventh embodiment shown in FIG. Accordingly, the eleventh
The height of the gas phase space of the wet well 5 is reduced as compared with the embodiment.

That is, in this embodiment, the equipment rooms 21 and 22 are located immediately below the wet well 5 of the containment vessel 1.
The equipment chambers 21 and 22 are adjacent to the lower dry well 3 and are located immediately below the wet well 5.
Is approximately the same as the floor height of the lower drywell 3. Further, as compared with the case of FIG. 12, the core catcher installation chamber 23 is integrated with the lower dry well 3 and the height of the gas phase portion of the wet well 5 is reduced, so that the installation height of the RCCV 1 is reduced and the overall volume is reduced. Has been reduced.

Further, an equipment loading / unloading hatch 44 which circulates between the RIP repair room 22 and the core catcher installation room 23 is installed, and the core catcher installation room 23 and the HCU equipment room 21 are provided.
Is installed. In addition, a power cable 47 and a scrum pipe 48 necessary for the operation of the RIP 18 and the FMCRD 19 are guided to the outside of the RCCV 1 through the equipment loading / unloading tunnel 45.

According to this configuration, the present embodiment is the same as the eleventh embodiment.
The third embodiment has substantially the same operation and effect as that of the first embodiment, and can greatly improve the workability at the time of the periodic inspection.
By reducing the installation height of the reactor pressure vessel 6 and reducing the overall height of the RCCV 1 as compared with the embodiment described above, seismic performance can be significantly improved.

[0101]

According to the present invention, the pressure inside the reactor containment vessel at the time of a coolant loss accident as a design standard accident is greatly reduced, and a large amount of hydrogen gas can be generated at the time of a severe accident. Dramatically improves the reliability of normal operation of the plant by greatly reducing the rise in internal pressure of the containment vessel and enabling operators to enter the lower drywell during normal operation, and to perform repairs and preventive maintenance. can do. Furthermore, reliability is improved by providing a secondary containment vessel with pressure resistance in place of the conventional reactor building, and in addition, the size is greatly reduced, and various systems are installed when two plants are arranged adjacent to each other. The common use can greatly improve the economics of the plant.

[Brief description of the drawings]

FIG. 1 is a schematic system sectional view of a nuclear power generation facility including an RCCV and various equipment rooms according to a first embodiment of the present invention.

FIG. 2 is a schematic sectional view of a reactor building including the RCCV shown in FIG.

FIG. 3 is a schematic system sectional view of a nuclear power generation facility including an RCCV and various equipment rooms according to a second embodiment of the present invention.

FIG. 4 is a schematic system sectional view of a nuclear power plant including an RCCV and various equipment rooms according to a third embodiment of the present invention.

FIG. 5 is a schematic system sectional view of a nuclear power generation facility including an RCCV and various equipment rooms according to a fourth embodiment of the present invention.

FIG. 6 is a schematic sectional view of a nuclear power plant including an RCCV and various equipment rooms according to a fifth embodiment of the present invention.

FIG. 7 is a schematic sectional view of a nuclear power plant including an RCCV and various equipment rooms according to a sixth embodiment of the present invention.

FIG. 8 is a schematic sectional view of a nuclear power plant including an RCCV and various equipment rooms according to a seventh embodiment of the present invention.

FIG. 9 is a schematic sectional view of a nuclear power plant including an RCCV and various equipment rooms according to an eighth embodiment of the present invention.

FIG. 10 is a schematic sectional view of a nuclear power plant including an RCCV and various equipment rooms according to a ninth embodiment of the present invention.

FIG. 11 is a schematic sectional view of a nuclear power plant including an RCCV and various equipment rooms according to a tenth embodiment of the present invention.

FIG. 12 is a schematic sectional view of a nuclear power plant including an RCCV and various equipment rooms according to an eleventh embodiment of the present invention.

FIG. 13 is a schematic sectional view of a nuclear power plant including an RCCV and various equipment rooms according to a twelfth embodiment of the present invention.

FIG. 14 is a schematic sectional view of a reactor containment vessel employed in a conventional ABWR.

FIG. 15 is a schematic sectional view of a conventional reactor building of ABWR.

[Explanation of symbols]

1, 1a, 1b, 60 ... reactor containment vessel (RCCV),
2 ... upper dry well, 3 ... lower dry well, 4 ... suppression pool, 4a ... suppression pool water,
Reference numeral 5: Wet well, 6, 6a, 6b: Reactor pressure vessel, 7: Vent pipe, 8: Horizontal vent port, 9: Primary reactor piping, 10: Emergency core cooling system (ECCS), 11 ...
Vacuum break valve, 12 opening, 13 reactor skirt, 14 pedestal, 15 reactor building, 16 fuel pool, 17 blowout panel, 18 internal pump (RIP), 19 control Rod drive mechanism (FMC
RD), 20: ECCS equipment room, 21: HCU equipment room,
22: RIP repair room, 23: Core catcher installation room,
23a: Core catcher, 24: Debris diffusion room, 25
... airtight chamber, 26 ... gas-phase vent pipe, 27 ... rupture disk, 28 ... upper drywell vent pipe, 29 ... lower drywell vent pipe, 30 ... vertical vent pipe, 31 ...
Remote control valve, 32 ... Nitrogen gas tank, 33 ... Vacuum release valve exclusively for upper drywell, 34 ... Vacuum release valve exclusively for lower drywell, 35, 35a, 35b ... Secondary containment vessel, 36
... Auxiliary building, 37 ... External fuel pool, 38 ... Fuel pool purification system (FPC), 39 ... Condensate storage tank (CSP), 40
... condensate supply system (MUWC), 41 ... emergency gas treatment system (SGTS), 42 ... seismic isolation element, 43 ... grating,
44: hatch for loading / unloading equipment, 45, 49: tunnel for loading / unloading equipment, 46: bedrock, 47: power cable, 48: scram piping, 50: reactor core, 51: nitrogen gas filling system (PNIS) for reactor containment vessel, 52 ... Pnis power supply, 5
3 ... igniter system, 54 ... measurement control system

 ──────────────────────────────────────────────────続 き Continuing on the front page (72) Inventor, Norio Ito 8 Shinsugita-cho, Isogo-ku, Yokohama-shi, Kanagawa Prefecture Inside the Toshiba Yokohama Office (72) Inventor Toshihiro Funabashi 8-shinsugita-cho, Isogo-ku, Yokohama-shi, Kanagawa Inside the Toshiba Yokohama Office (72) Inventor Yoshio Akada Kanagawa Prefecture, Yokohama, 8th, Shinsugita-cho, Isogo-ku, Yokohama, Japan Inside the Toshiba Yokohama Office (72) Inventor Takashi Saito 8th Shinsugita-cho, Isogo-ku, Yokohama, Kanagawa, Japan Toshiba Corporation Inside the Yokohama Office (72) Inventor Masashi Goto 8-8 Shinsugita-cho, Isogo-ku, Yokohama-shi, Kanagawa Prefecture Inside the Toshiba Yokohama Office (72) Inventor Takuya Miyagawa 8-8 Shinsugita-cho, Isogo-ku, Yokohama-shi, Kanagawa Prefecture Toshiba Yokohama Business Co., Ltd. (72) Inventor Yutaka Kawamura 8 Shinsugita-cho, Isogo-ku, Yokohama-shi, Kanagawa Prefecture Toshiba Yokohama Co., Ltd. Work-house (72) inventor Oikawa HiroshiShigeru Yokohama, Kanagawa Prefecture Isogo-ku, Shinsugita-cho, address 8 Co., Ltd. Toshiba Yokohama workplace

Claims (17)

[Claims] 1. A reactor pressure vessel containing a reactor core, an upper dry well surrounding the reactor pressure vessel, a lower dry well located below the reactor pressure vessel, and a lower dry well. In a nuclear power generation facility having a reactor containment vessel which is adjacent to and below the upper dry well and comprises a wet well constituting a suppression pool, an equipment room for storing equipment below the reactor containment vessel is provided. Nuclear power facility characterized by the following. 2. An emergency core cooling system, a control rod drive system, a hydraulic control unit, and an internal pump in at least a part of an equipment room located immediately below the wet well of the reactor containment vessel. 2. The nuclear power generation facility according to claim 1, wherein equipment related to any one of the nuclear power generation facilities is stored. 3. A refractory material such as a ceramic material is disposed on a floor of an equipment room of the equipment room located immediately below a lower dry well of the containment vessel. Nuclear power plant. 4. The equipment room located immediately below the lower dry well in the equipment room is opened to at least a part of the equipment room located immediately below the wet well. The nuclear power plant according to 1. 5. The lower drywell and the equipment room located immediately below the lower drywell are separated by a non-blocking member having a hole for flowing an atmosphere, and the equipment room and the equipment room adjacent to the equipment room are distributed. The nuclear power generation facility according to claim 1, further comprising an equipment loading / unloading hatch or an equipment loading / unloading tunnel. 6. A floor height of an equipment room located immediately below the wet well of the reactor containment vessel is set to be substantially the same as a floor height of the lower dry well, and 2. The nuclear power generation facility according to claim 1, further comprising an equipment loading / unloading hatch or an equipment loading / unloading tunnel which circulates through the lower drywell. 7. The nuclear power plant according to claim 1, further comprising an airtight chamber that communicates with a gas phase section in the containment vessel via a communication pipe, and wherein the communication pipe is provided with an isolation unit. . 8. The isolation means normally isolates the hermetic chamber from the reactor containment vessel gas phase, and when the internal pressure of the reactor containment vessel rises, the reactor containment gas phase and the gas containment are separated from each other. 8. The nuclear power plant according to claim 7, wherein the closed room is communicated to distribute the atmosphere. 9. The nuclear power plant according to claim 7, wherein at least a part of the airtight chamber is the equipment room located immediately below the containment vessel. 10. A reactor pressure vessel containing a reactor core, an upper dry well surrounding the reactor pressure vessel, a lower dry well located below the reactor pressure vessel, and a lower dry well. In a nuclear power plant having a reactor containment vessel consisting of a wet well constituting a suppression pool adjacent to and below the upper dry well, the upper dry well and the lower dry well are formed on an outer wall of the reactor pressure vessel. And a first vent pipe which completely separates as a space by the skirt, communicates the upper dry well with the suppression pool, and does not communicate with the lower dry well;
A second vent pipe that communicates with the lower dry well and the suppression pool but does not communicate with the upper dry well, and further includes a nitrogen filling unit that fills the lower dry well with nitrogen gas. Nuclear power generation facilities. 11. A third extending downward from the upper drywell and having an opening in the suppression pool water.
The nuclear power plant according to claim 10, further comprising a vent pipe. 12. Normally, the upper dry well and the wet well gas phase are in a nitrogen atmosphere, the lower dry well is in an air atmosphere containing nitrogen and oxygen, and hydrogen gas is in the lower dry well. 11. The nuclear power generation facility according to claim 10, wherein the nitrogen atmosphere fills the lower drywell with the nitrogen filling means. 13. The nuclear power plant according to claim 10, wherein a nitrogen gas filling system in a containment vessel is used as said nitrogen filling means. 14. The containment vessel is doubled by providing a pressure-resistant secondary containment vessel surrounding the reactor containment vessel and the equipment room.
Nuclear power plant described in item 0. 15. An auxiliary building is installed outside the secondary storage container, and at least one of a fuel pool, a fuel pool purification system, a condensate storage tank, a condensate replenishment system, and an emergency gas treatment system is installed in the auxiliary building. 15. The nuclear power plant according to claim 14, wherein one facility is arranged. 16. The nuclear power plant according to claim 15, wherein in a nuclear power plant having a plurality of nuclear power plants, equipment installed in said auxiliary building is shared for a plurality of said secondary containment vessels. Facility. 17. The nuclear power plant according to claim 14, wherein said secondary containment vessel is installed on a bedrock through a seismic isolation element made of an elastic body.