JPH10274928A - User authentication device and method - Google Patents

Abstract

PROBLEM TO BE SOLVED: To safely transmit accessory information such as information intrinsic to digital intelligent property and the information recorded on a digital intelligent property side to a verification device in a user authentication procedure and to make a user able to confirm the accessory information transmitted in the process of the transmission. SOLUTION: An accessory information storage part 11 stores the accessory information of a transmission object, a test information generation part 12 generates test information from the set of data for authentication and the accessory information and a test information transmission part 13 transmits the test information and the accessory information to the verification device 30. The test information reception part 31 of the verification device 30 receives the pair of the test information and the accessory information and a verification data generation part 32 generates verification data from the test information and the accessory information. In an accessory information storage part 34, the accessory information is recorded in an IC card. The verification data reception part 14 of the verification device 30 receives the verification data and an arithmetic part 15 for verification verifies the verification data.

Description

DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE INVENTION

[0001]

BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION The present invention relates to a user authentication technology for authenticating the authority of a user by verifying the validity of proof data generated to prove the authority of the user. A user who can securely transmit additional information such as information unique to the certificate and information recorded on the digital intellectual property side to the proving device, and in the process of transmission, the user can verify the transmitted additional information. Regarding authentication technology.

[0002]

2. Description of the Related Art Digital information is characterized in that the copying cost is almost zero and that a copy identical to the original information can be obtained. Therefore, in order to protect the copyright of digital intellectual property (digital information having a proprietary value) such as computer software and multimedia titles, a mechanism for controlling the use thereof is required.

[0003] As a mechanism for this, an access control that controls the use of digital intellectual property by encrypting part or all of the digital intellectual property so that only a user who has a legitimate right can decrypt it. There is a method. As a result, even if a malicious user illegally copies the digital intellectual property, it can be prevented from using the digital intellectual property. That is, by controlling the distribution of the decryption key of the digital intellectual property, the use of the digital intellectual property can be controlled.

[0004] As an example of access control satisfying the above requirements, "Access control scheme for distribution of digital works", IEICE technical report ISEC97-20
(1997-07), 1997 (Shoyoshi Hiroshi, Kojima Shunichi)
There is a method proposed in this paper. In the method described in this paper, access control is performed as follows.

Each user holds unique information different for each user in hardware called a token, such as an IC card, which has tamper-resistant characteristics, and an access right granter gives an access right to a specific digital intellectual property. Is distributed in a form called an access ticket customized for each user's unique information. In this method, since the decryption key of the encrypted digital intellectual property is not directly distributed, the decryption key is not illegally copied. In addition, since only a user having a set of the unique information of the correct user and the access ticket can access the digital intellectual property, even if the access ticket of another person is copied, it is impossible to decrypt the digital intellectual property. No, it can prevent unauthorized use. In addition, since all processes requiring security, such as determination of the expiration date of the access ticket and retention of the use history, are performed in the token, the information cannot be falsified or spoofed.

[0006] The technique described in the above-mentioned article makes it possible to realize access control for each user on digital intellectual property. Further, the history of decryption of digital intellectual property is recorded in the token together with the information of the used access ticket, and the history is collected by a charging company at an appropriate timing, so that charging is performed according to the use of digital intellectual property. , You can also charge for usage.

[0007]

[0007] The usage charge by the method of the above-mentioned paper is realized by recording the use history of the access ticket. However,
With this method, the following types of histories cannot be recorded. This is a factor that hinders the diversity of usage charge accounting.

The same access right (access ticket)
In the case where the use of a plurality of different digital intellectual properties is controlled by using the information, unique information cannot be recorded as a history for each digital intellectual property to be controlled. It is not possible to record the type of usage history that is determined when using digital intellectual property.

[0009] These will be described in detail below.

[0010] In the method of the above-mentioned paper, a mechanism is provided such that information unique to an access right (access ticket) can be recorded as a history in a token. Therefore, if the specific software is associated with a specific access right (access ticket), the purpose can be achieved by recording the unique information of the access ticket. However, when using a specific access ticket to control the use of a plurality of digital intellectual properties, the mechanism cannot be used. For example, it is assumed that two types of application software a and b can be used in a certain access ticket A. In this case, only the history of using the access ticket A can be recorded as the history, and the history of which application software of the application software a or b is used cannot be recorded.

Such a problem is conspicuous when, for example, an application program is upgraded. In the version upgrade, the creator of the application does not need to distribute access rights every time the version is upgraded, and the user can continue to use the new version of the application without acquiring a new access ticket, It is desirable that the use of different versions of software can be controlled with the same access ticket. However, in order to perform processing such as making a difference in the one-time usage fee between the old version and the new version, it is necessary to record the version used by the user as a history.

Regarding the method of the above-mentioned paper, the use history of digital intellectual property can be recorded only at the time of decryption. Only by recording the history of decryption, it is possible to measure only the number of uses of the digital intellectual property, and for digital intellectual property such as an application program that includes multiple functions, only the use of the history is recorded. , But it is not possible to record a history according to the use function or use status of the application program. For example, in the case of an application program such as a word processor, the charge for the usage amount, such as the difference between the data amount of the target document at the start of editing and the data amount at the end of editing, or the total amount of operations performed on the target document, This cannot be done with the decryption history. In order to record a detailed history, the usage amount must be measured not when decoding but when using the application program. For this purpose, it is necessary to measure the usage on the digital intellectual property side.

In order to solve the above problems, it is necessary to transmit information on the digital IP side, such as the identifier of the digital IP and the measured usage amount, to a token which is a recording medium. . This information must be securely transmitted to the token to prevent tampering by a malicious user.

On the other hand, as an example of a method for safely transmitting information, there is JP-B-07-118709. In Japanese Patent Publication No. 07-118709, a one-way function value to which proof secret data is input is disclosed in advance as public data. After the receiving side obtains the public data, the transmitting side concatenates the secret information and the authentication secret data and transmits an encrypted value to the receiving side. The receiving side decrypts the transmitted data, calculates a one-way function value of the secret data for authentication, and compares it with the public data to verify the validity of the transmitted data.

However, Japanese Patent Publication No. 07-118709
In this case, the history information is transmitted as confidential information, and the user of digital intellectual property has no way of knowing what history is sent from the verification side to the proof side.

Since the recorded history information becomes the original data of the usage charge, it is not desirable to hide the history information from the user. This is because a malicious verification device may forge and transmit an expensive usage history, or an inappropriately high usage history may be transmitted due to an accident.

Therefore, the history sent from the verification side must be in a form that can be confirmed by the user. further,
It is desirable to provide a mechanism that can interrupt the transmission of the history when the user is distrusted.

The present invention has been made to solve the above-mentioned problem, and securely transmits ancillary information such as information unique to digital intellectual property and information recorded on the digital intellectual property side to a certification device. It is another object of the present invention to provide a user authentication device capable of confirming ancillary information transmitted during the transmission process.

[0019]

According to the present invention, there is provided a user authentication apparatus for authenticating the authority of a user by verifying the validity of proof data generated to prove the authority of the user. , A first storage means for storing authentication data, a second storage means for storing attached information of digital intellectual property, an authentication data stored in the first storage means, Test information generating means for performing a predetermined operation on the attached information of the digital intellectual property held in the storage means to generate test information; and the test information generated by the test information generating means and the second storage Certifying data generating means for performing a predetermined operation on the attached information stored in the means to generate proof data; and performing a predetermined operation on the proof data generated by the proof data generating means. And having a proof data verification means for verifying the validity.

[0020]

Embodiments of the present invention will be described below. In the present embodiment, an encrypted application program is used in an information processing apparatus such as a personal computer or a workstation. This is a system for recording data on an IC card connected to a PC.

FIG. 1 shows a configuration example of the present invention. The components of this configuration example are common to the following embodiments, and will be described together in the description of the first embodiment.

[Embodiment 1] In Embodiment 1, the present invention is used for controlling the execution of an application program running on a user's PC (personal computer) or a workstation, and the identifier of the application program is stored in an IC card as attached information. The case of transmission will be described.

[0023] The encrypted application program is managed by the verification device, and the identifier of the application program is the ID of the application program managed by the certification device.
It is transmitted to the C card and recorded.

In FIG. 1, a verification device 10 includes an attached information storage unit 11, a test information generation unit 12, and a test information transmission unit 1.
3. It is configured to include the proof data receiving unit 14, the verification operation unit 15, and the execution unit 16, and at an arbitrary timing such as at regular time intervals or at a moment when a specific function inherent in the application program being used is activated. , And generates test information and transmits it to the certification device 30. When transmitting the application identifier, the test information generation unit 12 combines the authentication data C and the application identifier I and encrypts them to generate the test information T. Further, the certification device 30 includes a test information receiving unit 31, a certification data generation unit 32,
It is configured to include a proof data transmission unit 33 and an attached information storage unit 34, and generates proof information based on the test information T and the like sent from the verification device 10 and returns it to the verification device 10. The identifier I sent from the verification device 10 is stored in the attached information storage unit 34.

Here, RSA (Rivest-
A case using Shamir-Adleman encryption will be described.

FIG. 2 shows the configuration of the verification device 10. In FIG. 2, the attached information storage unit 11 stores an identifier of an application program. Test information generator 12
Comprises a random number generation unit 17, an authentication data generation unit 18, a verification information storage unit 19 for storing verification information K, and a public key storage unit 20 for storing an RSA public key (E, n). To generate the test information T to be transmitted.

The test information transmitting unit 13 includes the test information generating unit 1
The pair of the test information T generated in step 2 and the unencrypted identifier I is transmitted to the certification device 30. Proof data receiving unit 1
4 receives the proof data sent from the proof device 30 and passes it to the verification operation unit 15. The verification operation unit 15 verifies the proof data received from the proof device 30, and if correct, decrypts the application program and executes
Pass to 6 and execute.

FIG. 3 shows the configuration of the proving device 30. FIG.
The certifying device 30 includes a test information receiving unit 31, a proof data generating unit 32, a proof data transmitting unit 33, an attached information storing unit 34, and a secret key storing unit 35 for storing an RSA secret key D / modulus n. You.

The test information receiving unit 31 receives the pair of the test information T and the identifier I transmitted from the verification device 10. The proof data generation unit 32 generates proof data from the test information using the received test information T, the unencrypted identifier I, and the RSA secret key D / modulus n. The proof data transmission unit 33 transmits the proof data generated by the proof data generation unit 32 to the verification device 10.

In the attached information storage unit 34, the unencrypted identifier I received together with the test information is recorded on the IC card.

The RSA private key stored in the RSA private key storage unit 35 of the certification device 30 is D, and the public key pair is (E,
n).

FIG. 4 shows a processing flow.

[Step 1] In the verification device 10, the random number generation unit 17 generates a random number r, and the authentication data generation unit 18
And authentication data C

[0034]

## EQU1 ## Generate C = rK mod n.

[Step 2] The authentication data C generated in step 1 and the identifier I are combined and encrypted with the public key E to generate test information T.

[0036]

## EQU2 ## T = (C + I) ^E mod n

[Step 3] The test information transmitting unit 13 of the verification device 10 transmits the test information T and the unencrypted identifier I to the certification device 30.

[Step 4] The test information receiving unit 31 of the proving device 30 transmits the test information T
Then, the non-encrypted identifier I is received and passed to the proof data generation unit 32.

[Step 5] The proof data generation unit 32 of the proof device 30 decrypts the received T with the secret key D.

[0040]

T ′ = T ^D mod n

[Step 6] Further, I is removed from T ′ using the unencrypted identifier I transmitted from the verification device 10 to generate proof data R.

[0042]

R = (T'-I) mod n

[Step 7] The proof data transmitter 33 of the proof device 30 transmits the generated proof data R to the verification device 10.
Send to

[Step 8] The attached information storage unit 34 of the certification device 30 records the identifier I on the IC card.

[Step 9] The proof data receiving unit 14 of the verification device 10 receives the proof data R, generates K ′ as follows in the verification operation unit 15 and compares it with the verification information K to perform verification. Do.

[0046]

K ′ = r ⁻¹ R mod n

[Step 9 '] If the proof data R has not been returned for a certain period of time, the verification device 10 determines that the authentication has failed, and stops using the application program.

[Step 10] As a result of step 9, K
If K ′ and K ′ are equal, the authentication is successful, and the application program is decrypted and executed. Otherwise, continuation of use of the application program is stopped.

The user checks the identifier I transmitted in the process of step 3, and can stop transmitting the identifier at this stage. In this case, the verification device 10 includes the proof data R
Is not returned, the authentication fails, and the use of the application program is stopped. Here, the identifier I
If the data is tampered with, the authentication data C generated in the process of step 1 becomes invalid, and the authentication fails.

The transmission of information unique to digital intellectual property, such as an identifier, has a useful effect not only on usage charge but also on access control. For example, in addition to the expiration date of the access right given to each user, an expiration date is also provided in the digital intellectual property itself, and the certification device inspects the expiration date sent to determine whether or not use is possible. The device can be configured as follows. With such a configuration, access control for each user and access control for each digital intellectual property can be used together.

[Second Embodiment] In a second embodiment, a case will be described in which the use history of the application program is transmitted to the IC card as additional information.

Normally, when an application program records a history of used functions, time, and the like, it is expected that the recorded amount will be considerably large. In the present invention, since the encryption / decryption is performed by combining the authentication data and the additional information, the time required for the encryption / decryption depends on the size of the additional information.

Also, since a variety of formats can be considered for the format of the history to be transmitted, a method that can handle any format is desirable.

For this purpose, in this embodiment, the verification device and the proving device have the same one-way hash function, and this output is used for the additional information combined with the authentication data.

The one-way hash function is defined as h (x) = h
It is a function having the property that it is extremely difficult to calculate different x and y that satisfy (y). As an example of a one-way hash function, RSA Data Security
y Inc. MD2, MD4, MD5 by the US Federal Government SHS (Secure Hash St)
and is known.

FIG. 5 shows the configuration of the verification device 10. In FIG. 5, the usage amount of the application program is recorded in the attached information storage unit 11.

The test information generator 12 includes a random number generator 17,
An authentication data generation unit 18, a hash value generation unit 21, a verification information storage unit 19 for storing verification information K, and a public key storage unit 20 for storing an RSA public key (E, n). Generate test information T to be transmitted.

The test information transmitting unit 13 includes the test information generating unit 1
The pair of the test information T generated in step 2 and the unencrypted use history ud is transmitted to the certification device 30.

The proof data receiving unit 14 receives the proof data R sent from the proof device 30, and
Hand over to 5. The verification operation unit 15 verifies the proof data R received from the proof device 30, and if correct, decrypts the application program and passes it to the execution unit 16 for execution.

FIG. 6 shows the configuration of the certification device. 6, the certifying device 30 stores a test information receiving unit 31, a hash value generating unit 36, a proof data generating unit 32, a proof data transmitting unit 33, an attached information storage unit 34, and an RSA secret key D / modulus n. It is composed of a secret key storage unit 35.

The test information receiving section 31 receives a pair of the test information T and the usage history ud transmitted from the verification device 10.
The hash value generation unit 36 generates a hash value using the received usage history ud as an input. Proof data generation unit 32
Then, the certification data R is generated from the test information T using the received test information T, the hash value generated by the hash value generation unit 36, and the RSA secret key D / modulus n. The proof data transmission unit 33 transmits the proof data R generated by the proof data generation unit 32 to the verification device 10.

In the attached information storage unit 34, the unencrypted use history ud received together with the test information is recorded on the IC card.

The RSA private key stored in the RSA private key storage unit 35 of the certification device 30 is D, and the public key pair is (E,
n).

FIG. 7 shows a processing flow. [Step 1] In the verification device 10, the random number generation unit 17 generates a random number r, and the authentication data generation unit 18 generates the authentication data C.

[0065]

## EQU6 ## Generate C = rK mod n.

[Step 2] Further, the following calculation is performed by the hash value generation unit 21.

[0067]

Hash (ud)

[Step 3] The authentication data C generated in step 1 and the value generated in step 2 are combined,
The test information T is generated by encryption with the public key E.

[0069]

T = (C + Hash (ud)) ^E mod n

[Step 4] The test information transmitting unit 13 of the verification device 10 transmits the test information T and the unencrypted use history ud to the certification device 30.

[Step 5] The test information receiving unit 31 of the proving device 30 transmits the test information T
Then, it receives the unencrypted use history ud and passes it to the proof data generation unit 32.

[Step 6] The hash value generation unit 36 of the certification device 30 performs the following calculation, and passes the result to the certification data generation unit 32.

[0073]

[Equation 9] Hash (ud)

[Step 7] The proof data generation unit 32 of the proof device 30 decrypts the received test information T with the secret key D.

[0075]

[Mathematical formula-see original document] T '= T ^D mod n

[Step 8] Further, the hash value generated from the hash value generation unit 36 is used to convert Hash from T ′ to Hash.
(Ud) is removed, and proof data R is generated.

[0077]

R = (T′−Hash (ud)) mod n

[Step 9] The proof data transmitting unit 33 of the proof device 30 transmits the generated proof data R to the verification device 10.
Send to

[Step 10] The attached information storage unit 34 of the certification device 30 records the usage history ud on the IC card.

[Step 11] The proof data receiving unit 14 of the verification device 10 receives the proof data R, generates K ′ in the verification operation unit 15 as follows, and compares it with the verification information K to perform verification. Do.

[0081]

K ′ = r ⁻¹ R mod n

[Step 11 '] If the proof data R is not returned for a certain period of time, the verification device 10 determines that the authentication has failed, and stops using the application program.

[Step 12] As a result of step 11,
If K and K 'are equal, the authentication is successful, and the application program is decrypted and executed. Otherwise,
Stop using the application program.

The user checks the usage history ud transmitted in the process of step 3 and can stop transmitting the history at this stage. In this case, since the certification data R is not returned to the verification device 10, the authentication fails and the use of the application program is stopped. If the usage history ud is altered here, the authentication data C generated in the process of step 1 becomes invalid, and the authentication fails.

[Embodiment 3] Next, an embodiment for transmitting a use history based on the above-described paper authentication method will be described. FIG.
FIG. 9 shows the configuration of the verification device 10, and FIG. In FIG. 8, reference numeral 22 denotes a certification auxiliary information storage unit that stores the certification auxiliary information (access ticket) t. In FIG. 9, reference numeral 37 denotes a user unique information storage unit that stores the user unique information d _U.

In the method of the above-mentioned paper, it is assumed that a center manages secret information unique to users and digital intellectual property.
When a specific user accesses a specific digital intellectual property, the center generates in advance the following proof auxiliary information t which depends on the information unique to the digital intellectual property and the information specific to the user, Authentication is performed using this.

FIG. 10 shows a processing flow. The proof auxiliary information t is generated as follows, for example.

[0088]

T = D−W (n, d _U ) where d _U is user-specific information, W (x, y) is a one-way function, and p and q are two values satisfying n = pq. It is a prime number. The proving device 30 does not have the secret keys D and n, but holds the user's unique information d _U.

[Step 1] The verification device 10 generates the following authentication data C.

[0090]

## EQU14 ## C = r ^E K ^E mod n

[Step 2] The authentication data C generated in step 1 and the use history ud are combined and encrypted with the public key E to generate test information T.

[0092]

T = (C + ud) ^E mod n

[Step 3] The test information transmitting unit 13 of the verification device 10 transmits the test information T, the unencrypted use history ud, the modulus n, and the auxiliary information for proof t to the certifying device 3.
Send to 0.

[Step 4] The test information receiving unit 31 of the certifying device 30 receives the test information T, the unencrypted use history ud, the modulus n, and the proof auxiliary information t transmitted from the verification device 10. Then, it passes to the proof data generation unit 32.

[Step 5] The proof data generation unit 32 of the proof device 30 decrypts the received test information T using the user's unique information d _U , the proof auxiliary information t, and the modulus n.

[0096]

T ′ = T ^{(t + W (n, dU))} mod n

[Step 6] Further, the use history ud is removed from T ′ using the unencrypted use history ud transmitted from the verification device 10, and the user unique information d _U , the proof auxiliary information t, the modulus proof data R using
Generate

[0098]

R = (T′-ud) ^{(t + W (n, dU))} mod n

[Step 7] The proof data transmission unit 33 of the proof device 30 transmits the generated proof data R to the verification device 10.
Send to

[Step 8] The attached information storage unit 34 of the certification device 30 records the usage history ud on the IC card.

[Step 9] The proof data receiving unit 14 of the verification device 10 receives the proof data R, generates K ′ as follows in the verification operation unit 15, compares it with the verification information K, and Notify the digital intellectual property management unit (execution means 16).

[0102]

K ′ = r ⁻¹ R mod n

[Step 9 '] If the proof data R has not been returned for a certain period of time, the verification device 10 determines that the authentication has failed, and stops using the application program.

[Step 10] As a result of step 9, K
If K ′ and K ′ are equal, the authentication is successful, and the application program is decrypted and executed. Otherwise, continuation of use of the application program is stopped.

FIG. 11 shows the flow of processing in the verification device 10, and FIG. 12 shows the flow of processing in the proving device 30. After step 7, the same processing as in the second embodiment is performed. As in the second embodiment, the user checks the usage history ud transmitted in the process of step 3 and can stop transmitting the history at this stage.

In this embodiment, the verification device 10 holds the proof auxiliary information t and transmits it to the proof device 30. However, the user may give the proof device 30 to the proof device 30. A configuration that the proving device 30 maintains from the beginning may be employed.

[Embodiment 4] In this embodiment, an embodiment having a different configuration using the auxiliary information for certification t will be described.

FIG. 13 shows the configuration of the verification device 10 and FIG.
FIG. 4 shows the configuration of the certification device. FIG. 15 shows a processing flow in this embodiment. The proof auxiliary information t is calculated in the same manner as in the third embodiment.

[Step 1] The verification device 10 generates the following authentication data.

[0110]

[Equation 19] C = rK mod n

[Step 2] The authentication data C generated in step 1 and the usage history ud are combined, and encrypted with the public key E to generate test information T.

[0112]

T = (C + ud) ^E mod n

[Step 3] The test information transmission unit 13 of the verification device 10 transmits the test information T, the unencrypted use history ud, and the modulus n to the certification device.

[Step 4] The test information receiving unit 31 of the certifying device 30 receives the test information T, the unencrypted use history ud, and the modulus n transmitted from the verification device 10, and outputs the proof data generating unit 32 Pass to.

[Step 5] The first arithmetic unit 39 in the proof data generation unit 32 performs the following calculation using the received test information T and the proof auxiliary information t to obtain T ″.

[0116]

T ″ = T ^t mod n

[Step 6] The second operation unit 40 in the proof data generation unit 32 generates the T ″ generated by the first operation unit 39.
And the user specific information d _U and the modulus n, the following calculation is performed to obtain T ′.

[0118]

T ′ = T ″ T ^{W (n, dU)} mod n

[Step 7] The proof data operation unit 41 in the proof data generation unit 32 uses the unencrypted use history ud transmitted from the verification device 10 to remove the use history ud from T ′, and Generate data R.

[0120]

R = T'-ud mod n

[Step 8] The proof data transmission unit 33 of the proof device 30 transmits the generated proof data R to the verification device 10.
Send to

[Step 9] The attached information storage unit 34 of the certification device 30 records the usage history ud on the IC card.

[Step 10] The proof data receiving unit 13 of the verification device 10 receives the proof data R, generates K ′ as follows in the verification operation unit 15, compares it with the verification information K, and Notify the digital intellectual property management unit (execution means 16).

[0124]

K ′ = r ⁻¹ R mod n

[Step 10 '] If the proof data R has not been returned for a certain period of time, the verification device 10 determines that the authentication has failed, and stops using the application program.

[Step 11] As a result of step 10,
If K and K 'are equal, the authentication is successful, and the application program is decrypted and executed. Otherwise,
Stop using the application program.

FIG. 16 shows the processing in the verification device.
FIG. 7 is a diagram showing a flow of processing in the proving device. After step 8, the same processing as in the third embodiment is performed. As in the third embodiment, the user checks the usage history ud transmitted in the process of step 3 and can stop transmitting the history at this stage.

In the present embodiment, in the proving device 30, a part for performing an operation using the auxiliary information for proof t and a part for performing an operation using the unique information d _{U of the} user are separated.
In order to prevent unauthorized use of application programs, it is necessary to protect the user's unique information and the calculation part using the user's unique information, but it is necessary to protect the proof auxiliary information and the calculation part using the proof auxiliary information. Absent. For this reason, when the calculation part is separated as in the present embodiment, the calculation of the part related to the user's unique information is performed in a protection means such as an IC card, and the other calculation is performed externally. It becomes possible.

[0129]

According to the present invention, it is possible to safely transmit information unique to the digital intellectual property side and additional information such as information recorded on the digital intellectual property side to the certification device. In addition, the user can verify the attached information to be transmitted and determine to stop using digital intellectual property. Furthermore, the digital intellectual property side can verify whether correct information has been recorded on the certification device, and can prohibit the use of digital intellectual property if unauthorized information is recorded.

[Brief description of the drawings]

FIG. 1 is a diagram showing a configuration of an embodiment.

FIG. 2 is a diagram illustrating a configuration example of a verification device according to the first embodiment.

FIG. 3 is a diagram illustrating a configuration example of a certification device according to the first embodiment.

FIG. 4 is a diagram illustrating a flow of a process according to the first embodiment.

FIG. 5 is a diagram illustrating a configuration example of a verification device according to a second embodiment.

FIG. 6 is a diagram illustrating a configuration example of a certification device according to a second embodiment.

FIG. 7 is a diagram illustrating a flow of a process according to a second embodiment.

FIG. 8 is a diagram illustrating a configuration example of a verification device according to a third embodiment.

FIG. 9 is a diagram illustrating a configuration example of a certification device according to a third embodiment.

FIG. 10 is a diagram illustrating a flow of a process according to a third embodiment.

FIG. 11 is a diagram illustrating a flow of a process performed by a verification device until test information is sent to a certification device according to a third embodiment.

FIG. 12 is a diagram illustrating a flow of processing in a certification device according to a third embodiment.

FIG. 13 is a diagram illustrating a configuration example of a verification device according to a fourth embodiment.

FIG. 14 is a diagram illustrating a configuration example of a certification device according to a fourth embodiment.

FIG. 15 illustrates a flow of a process according to the fourth embodiment.

FIG. 16 is a diagram illustrating a flow of a process performed by a verification device until test information is transmitted to a certification device according to a fourth embodiment.

FIG. 17 is a diagram illustrating a flow of a process in a certification device according to a fourth embodiment.

[Explanation of symbols]

 REFERENCE SIGNS LIST 10 verification device 11 attached information storage unit 12 test information generation unit 13 test information transmission unit 14 proof data reception unit 15 verification operation unit 16 execution unit 17 random number generation unit 18 authentication data generation unit 19 verification information storage unit 20 public key Storage unit 21 Hash value generation unit 22 Auxiliary information storage unit for certification 30 Certification unit 31 Test information reception unit 32 Certification data generation unit 33 Certification data transmission unit 34 Attached information storage unit 35 Private key storage unit 36 Hash value generation unit 37 User-specific Information storage unit 38 Certification auxiliary information storage unit

Claims (24)

[Claims] 1. A user authentication device that authenticates a user's authority by verifying the validity of proof data generated for certifying the user's authority, wherein the first memory stores authentication data. Means, second storage means for storing information attached to the digital intellectual property, authentication data held in the first storage means,
A test information generating means for performing a predetermined operation on the attached information of the digital intellectual property held in the second storage means to generate test information; a test information generated by the test information generating means; A proof data generating means for performing a predetermined operation on the attached information stored in the storage means of No. 2 to generate proof data; and performing a predetermined operation on the proof data generated by the proof data generating means for validating the proof data. And a proof data verification means for verifying the character. 2. A third method for storing secret information for user authentication.
The test information generating means stores predetermined information in the authentication data held in the first storage means and the attached information of the digital intellectual property held in the second storage means. Performing test operation to generate test information, wherein the proof data generating means includes: the test information generated by the test information generating means; the auxiliary information stored in the second storage means; 2. The user authentication apparatus according to claim 1, wherein a predetermined operation is performed on the secret information stored in a storage unit to generate certification data. 3. A fourth storage means for storing user's unique information, and a proof auxiliary information which is an execution result of executing a predetermined calculation on the user's unique information and the secret information. 5. The test information generating means stores the authentication data held in the first storage means and the attached information of the digital intellectual property held in the second storage means. Performing a predetermined operation to generate test information; the proof data generating means includes: the test information generated by the test information generating means; the auxiliary information stored in the second storage means; Performing a predetermined operation on the unique information of the user stored in the storage means and the auxiliary information for proof stored in the fifth storage means to generate proof data; , The above proof data User authentication device according to claim 1, wherein verifying that are generated based on the unique information of the serial user. 4. The proof data generating means comprises a first calculating means and a second calculating means, wherein the first calculating means includes the test information generated by the test information generating means, A predetermined calculation is performed on the proof auxiliary information stored in the fifth storage unit, and the second calculation unit stores the calculation result by the first calculation unit and the calculation result stored in the second storage unit. Attached information and
4. The user authentication apparatus according to claim 3, wherein a predetermined calculation is performed on the user's unique information stored in the fourth storage means, and the proof data is generated as a result. 5. A storage device for storing authentication data, a second storage device for storing additional information of digital intellectual property, and the additional information stored in the second storage device. Test information generation means for generating test information based on the authentication data stored in the first storage means, sixth storage means for storing the proof data generated by a corresponding proof device, 6. A verification device, comprising: a proof data verification unit that verifies the proof data stored in the storage unit of (6). 6. The test information generating means for generating the test information, performs the encryption by combining the additional information and the authentication data in a format that cannot be separated unless the additional information is used. The verification apparatus according to claim 5, wherein the test information is generated. 7. Third storage means for storing secret information of user authentication, seventh storage means for storing test information generated by a corresponding verification device, and eighth storage means for storing auxiliary information of digital intellectual property. Storage means, the test information stored in the seventh storage means, the auxiliary information stored in the eighth storage means, and the secret information stored in the third storage means. And a proof data generating means for generating proof data by performing a predetermined operation on the proof device. 8. Fourth storage means for storing user specific information, fifth storage means for storing auxiliary information for certification, and seventh storage means for storing test information generated by a corresponding verification device. Eighth storage means for storing information attached to digital intellectual property; unique information of the user stored in the fourth storage means; and proof for use stored in the fifth storage means. Certification data for generating certification data by performing a predetermined operation on auxiliary information, the test information stored in the seventh storage means, and the auxiliary information stored in the eighth storage means A certification device comprising: a generation unit. 9. The verification device is stored in at least first storage means for storing authentication data, second storage means for storing information attached to digital intellectual property, and second storage means. Test information generating means for generating test information based on the attached information and the authentication data stored in the first storage means, and sixth storage means for storing the proof data generated by the certifying device And proof data verification means for verifying the proof data stored in the sixth storage means, wherein the proof device stores at least test information generated by the verification device. Means, eighth storage means for storing additional information of digital intellectual property, and the test information stored in the seventh storage means and the additional information stored in the eighth storage means. Performs a predetermined operation And a certifying data generating means for generating certifying data, wherein the verifying device and the certifying device authenticate a user by communicating with each other. The test information generated by the means is written to the seventh storage means of the certification device, and the attached information stored in the second storage means is written to the eighth storage means of the certification device. The certification device includes: the test information written in the seventh storage unit by the test information generation unit;
The proof data generated by the proof data generation means based on the additional information written in the storage means is written into the sixth storage means of the verification device, and the verification device A user authentication device for authenticating a user using the certification data written in a storage unit. 10. The user authentication device according to claim 9, wherein the user can confirm the attached information written from the verification device to the certification device, and determine to stop using the digital intellectual property. 11. When the attached information written from the verification device to the certification device is altered or damaged intentionally or by accident, the certification data generated by the certification device becomes invalid, and the verification device generates the digital data. The user authentication device according to claim 9, wherein the user authentication device is capable of determining a prohibition of use of intellectual property. 12. After the test information and the attached information are written from the verification device to the certification device, if the verification device cannot write the certification data from the certification device for some reason. 12. The user authentication device according to claim 9, wherein the verification device can determine whether to prohibit use of the digital intellectual property. 13. The user authentication apparatus according to claim 1, wherein the attached information of the digital intellectual property is an identifier for identifying the digital intellectual property. 14. The user authentication device according to claim 1, wherein the attached information of the digital intellectual property is a usage history of the digital intellectual property. 15. The user authentication apparatus according to claim 1, wherein the additional information of the digital intellectual property is a value calculated from a use history of the digital intellectual property as an input of a non-collision function. 16. A verification apparatus for authentication, wherein test information is generated based on information attached to digital intellectual property and authentication data for authenticating a user. Transmitting the test information together with the accessory information to the certifying device; storing the transmitted accessory information; generating proof data from the accessory information and the test information; Verifying the proof data in the verification device. 17. The user authentication method according to claim 16, wherein the user can confirm the attached information transmitted from the verification device to the certification device, and determine to stop using the digital intellectual property. 18. The user authentication method according to claim 16, wherein use of the digital intellectual property is prohibited when the verification by the verification device fails. 19. After the test information and the attached information are transmitted from the verification device to the certification device, if the verification device does not receive the certification data from the certification device, use of the digital intellectual property is prohibited. 19. The user authentication method according to claim 16, wherein: 20. The verification device transmits, along with the test information and the attached information, auxiliary information for certification necessary for performing authentication to the certification device, the certification device transmits the attached information transmitted from the verification device. 20. The user according to claim 19, wherein certifying data is generated from the test information using information, the certifying auxiliary information, and user-specific information held in the certifying device, and is transmitted to the verification device to perform authentication. Authentication method. 21. A user authentication method for transmitting ancillary information generated by a digital intellectual property management unit to a user accessible area from the digital intellectual property management unit, wherein the ancillary information generated by the digital intellectual property management unit Generating test information in an authentication verification device provided on the digital intellectual property management unit side based on the information and authentication data for authenticating a user; and performing authentication from the authentication verification device. Transmitting the test information to the certifying device; transmitting the accessory information to the user-accessible area and the certifying device; storing the transmitted accessory information; Generating proof data from test information; and verifying the generated proof data in the verification device. A user authentication method characterized in that: 22. The user authentication method according to claim 16, wherein the additional information of the digital intellectual property is an identifier for identifying the digital intellectual property. 23. The method according to claim 16, wherein the attached information of the digital intellectual property is a use history of the digital intellectual property.
22. The user authentication method according to any one of claims 21 to 21. 24. The user authentication method according to claim 16, wherein the additional information of the digital intellectual property is a value obtained by calculating a use history of the digital intellectual property as an input of a non-collision function.