JPH10143621A - Card security system, method for improving security, card reading device and card issuing device and hologram reading device - Google Patents

Abstract

PROBLEM TO BE SOLVED: To efficiently improve security in a card security system using an identification card or the like. SOLUTION: In a card security system equipped with a card issuing device 100 and a card reading device 300, the card issuing device 100 reads a hologram 2 and a bar code 3 on a card 1, and obtains data D and E. Also, data A, B, and C are inputted from a computer 200 to the card issuing device 100. An enciphering part 104 generates check data EN based on the data A-E, and a magnetic writer 103 writes the data A-C and EN in a magnetic stripe 4. The card reading device 300 reads the data A-E from the card 1, calculates check data by using this, and compares the check data with the check data EN recorded in the magnetic strip 4 for judging the authenticity of the card.

Description

DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE INVENTION

[0001]

BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION 1. Field of the Invention The present invention relates to a credit card,
The present invention relates to a card security system and a security improvement method using an identification card such as a D card and a driver's license, a card reader, a card issuing device, and a hologram reader suitable for the card security system.

[0002]

2. Description of the Related Art In the early days when credit cards were issued, banks issued cards without care and managed blank cards. That is, there were blank credit cards in which only the bank name was put on many cards, and these were used by criminals. Furthermore, the lack of a printing method for maintaining the reliability of the card also made it possible for a criminal to easily create a counterfeit card in place of a genuine card, and such crimes occurred frequently.

As losses on the part of banks have escalated, banks have strictly restricted customers who are allowed to issue cards and have taken measures to improve the security of the design and manufacturing of the cards themselves. Many means were conceivable, but the main card resource for the criminal, the counterfeit card, was virtually eliminated by introducing a single foil with a holographically generated grating on the front of the card. Was. However, criminals still had ways to fraud for three reasons:

[0004] First, a stolen or lost card is used until a report is received from the cardholder. The second is to recode and use a valid account number on an old or lost card that was once a valid card. Third, use a valid number (without a card), or use a white card with a magnetic stripe for use in ATMs, or use a phone that is only authenticated by machine reading rather than by humans. Is to use. In fact, there is also a fourth type of fraud that attempts to assert that the card itself is legitimate. MasterCard and Visa have been using holograms in this area for eight years. However, soon, somebody will somewhere acquire the technology to make an acceptable counterfeit card. Therefore, it should be considered that the time has come for safe printing for defense measures that is one step ahead of criminal counterfeiting.

[0005]

With today's technology, there is little protection against first-theft or lost-type fraud. However, the present invention can effectively increase the security against the second, third and fourth types of criminal acts.

[0006] A typical credit card transaction involves a salesperson looking at a card and driving the card into a magnetic reader if deemed valid. This is the method disclosed in Chang et al US Pat. No. 4,788,420. The reader sends the transaction account access identification number back to the authentication source. Then, if there is a permission response from the authentication source, the transaction is executed. Eventually, the owner of the legitimate card receives the statement, and the owner pays or denies the statement. if,
If properly denied by the cardholder, the bank would eventually have to absorb the losses since the magnetic reader provided the procedurally authorized transaction account access identification number. This occurs in the first and second types of fraud.

[0007] The transaction account access identification number written or encoded on the magnetic stripe is very similar to a car license plate. There is not much information on license plates and there is not much information on magnetic stripes.
True value information, such as the history of payments, the mother's maiden name of the customer, is all stored deep inside the bank's information system. Only if the credit is valid is reached by request from the sales floor.

The above situation is analogous to a car plate or registration number. That is, there is not much information, and it is a method of reaching information stored in a file of the Ministry of Automobile.

[0009] Access to a small amount of banking information on the part of the customer (card validity period, valid credit amount) depends on the credit card being typed in or magnetically read by devices available to read and report transactions. In addition, it is available to merchants at any time via an electronic network.

Although the supply of generally accepted credit cards for illicit purposes is incomplete and small, obtaining a physically authentic but obsolete credit card to alter magnetic information Or re-embossing the expiration date or name on the top of the card is still relatively easy for criminals. Even though the original name may have been erased and re-embossed, the thorough preparation of a person accustomed to such a scam makes this secular scam generally successful. There, the player hits the card, an account corresponding to the credit is identified, and the machine emits a green light indicating that the transaction is valid.

[0011] Particularly in the case of ATMs, the only thing the criminal needs is to encode a magnetically readable transaction account access identification number and the victim's personal identification number (PIN) who knows nothing. It is a white card having a magnetic tape. In addition, there are many places such as telephone rooms and supermarkets where personal identification numbers are not required and clerks cannot verify actual cards.

Attempts to increase the security of magnetic encoding and to prevent rewriting have been actively made for a long time. Thorne-EMI's Watermark ™ tape was an example. The development of a high Oersted tape by 3M is the same example. Both provided some, but somewhat limited, security improvements in their respective schemes. However, both were unacceptable to the industry because they had to change the current process.

The Thorne-EMI method is to magnetically incorporate a serial number into the tape while the tape is being manufactured. This can be read by a magnetic reader. However, this method was frustrated due to the difficulty of tape production and the serial number. Such methods are considered too costly.

The 3M method involves the production of high coercivity tapes that require more powerful encoding equipment than those used to encode 300 Oersted tape (industry standard). there were. Since such devices are not readily available, safety has been marginally enhanced. The industry has turned to stronger coercivity tapes. However, both the service industry and banks had to buy new encoding devices to match. This is a significant capital investment for groups that do not have a firm motivation to do so, and there was no prospect that such high coercivity tape encoding devices would not be used by criminals. Under the above conditions, only a slight change could be expected from the strong tape and the device.

Whatever is recorded in the magnetic reading environment can be read by anyone using a rudimentary device for reading magnetic encoding. Even if the numbers make no sense by being coded or encrypted, it is still easy to duplicate the coded or encrypted numbers. What has been lacking in the past is the number that the present invention seeks to solve, but another level of cost-effective way of writing to a magnetic stripe that cannot be read by conventional devices. It is.

[0016] Every other effort, including the magnetic number algorithm, has its weaknesses, no matter how complicated it is. The reason is that all magnetic numbers, whether original or forged, can be read by a magnetic reader and the read numbers can be sent to a bank on a communication network for verification. Because.

As a solution to the problem, card manufacturers print batch numbers on most credit cards. The four-digit number found on all American Express cards and some MasterCards is common.
If you suspect that the transaction is fraudulent, call the issuing bank regarding the validity of the card and a) the batch number is authentic and not stolen, or b) pend an individual on the card It checks whether the magnetic information to be read matches the batch number on the front of the card.

[0018] This method is used when the person who gave the card is not suitable for the transaction, for example, when a teenager wearing dirty sneakers tries to buy a brand-new car, or in a situation where there is some restlessness Only incomplete and effortful methods of determining fraud are fraudulent.

[0019] Tominyama et., Published August 8, 1989.
al, U.S. Pat. No. 4,855,584, discloses another method. This eliminates the need to telephone the data by reading the card twice with a machine. However, this method actually requires that the certification medium be hidden by using a barcode that acts like a magnetic stripe. Not only is this unlikely to be possible,
Having the magnetic reader read the barcode (printed in magnetic ink), and even if the barcode was printed so that it could only be seen by the IR reader, the scammer would still be able to read the information below It can be decoded because it is a magnetically readable medium.

All the criminal needs is to copy the entire number. The problem is similar to an attempt to create a visually secure form or system that cannot be copied on a Color Xerox machine. As long as human vision can see the safe form, a color copier can do it. All attempts have been made to defeat copiers, but at the time of writing, everything (extremely awkward or impractical) has failed. The problem of credit card verification is a novel and very practical solution.

SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION The present invention has been made in view of the above-mentioned problems, and a card security system and a security improvement method for effectively improving the security of a card and the like, a card reader and a card issuing device in the system, and the card An object of the present invention is to provide a hologram reading device applicable to a reading device.

[0022]

According to the present invention, there is provided a card security system comprising the following steps. That is, a method for improving security in a card security system including a card issuing device and a card reading device, comprising: a first recording step of recording at least first data on an optically read portion on a card; An input step of inputting at least second data, an obtaining step of obtaining check data based on at least the first data and the second data, and at least the check data accessible from at least the card reader A second recording step of recording on a simple storage medium, data obtained by reading at least the optically read portion, data obtained from the storage medium, and the second data used in the input step. And verifying the card by the card reader.

Further, a card security system according to the present invention for achieving the above object has the following configuration.
That is, a card security system including a card issuing device and a card reading device, wherein reading means for reading at least first data from an optical reading portion on a card, and at least second data input to the card issuing device. Input means, acquiring means for acquiring check data based on at least the first data and the second data, and recording means for recording at least the check data on a storage medium accessible at least from the card reader The card reading device based on at least first data obtained by reading the optical reading portion, check data obtained from the storage medium, and the second data used by the input means. Verification means for verifying the validity of the card.

According to another aspect of the present invention, there is provided a card reading apparatus for reading a card including an optical reading portion, wherein at least the first data is read by the optical reading section. Optical reading means for reading from a reading portion, first obtaining means for obtaining at least second data and third data from a storage medium, and calculating check data based on at least the first data and the second data A second acquiring means for performing the card and comparing the third data acquired by the first acquiring means with the check data acquired by the second acquiring means to determine whether the card is valid or not. .

Further, a card issuing device according to the present invention for achieving the above object has the following configuration. That is, a card issuing device for issuing a card, a reading unit for reading at least first data from an optical reading unit, and an input unit for inputting at least second data from a storage unit separate from the card Determining means for determining check data based on at least the first data and the second data; and recording means for recording at least the determined check data on a storage medium.

Further, the hologram reading apparatus of the present invention, which achieves the above object, comprises: an irradiating means for irradiating a hologram image with light from a predetermined direction; The apparatus includes a detecting unit for detecting a light intensity distribution of a reproduced image formed in space by light, and an output unit for outputting the light intensity distribution detected by the detecting unit.

Furthermore, a hologram reading apparatus according to another configuration of the present invention that achieves the above object has the following configuration.
That is, irradiation means for irradiating light from a predetermined direction on the hologram image, and interference means for causing a predetermined light wave to interfere with reflected light from the hologram image of light irradiated by the irradiation means, thereby forming a pattern image Detecting means for detecting the light intensity distribution of the pattern image formed by the interference means, and output means for outputting the light intensity distribution detected by the detecting means.

In the present invention, a card is a general term for various cards such as a so-called credit card and ID card. Furthermore, the card according to the present invention includes a book, a document, and the like that require security, such as a bank passbook.

[0029]

Preferred embodiments of the present invention will be described below with reference to the accompanying drawings.

FIG. 1 is a diagram showing an overview of an identification card used in the card security system of the present embodiment. Reference numeral 1 denotes an identification card, on which a hologram image 2 is recorded. A hologram code as a first optical recording portion is recorded on the whole or a part of the hologram image 2. Further, a bar code 3 as a second optical recording portion is printed on the back surface of the identification card 1. Further, a magnetic stripe 4 is provided on the back surface of the identification card 1. Although a one-dimensional barcode is illustrated as the barcode 3, a two-dimensional barcode may be used.

FIG. 2 is a block diagram showing the configuration of the card issuing device in the card security system of the present embodiment. In the figure, the identification card 1 is as described above,
The hologram image 2 is provided on the front surface, and the magnetic stripe 4 and the bar code 3 are provided on the back surface. In FIG. 1, the hologram image is recorded on the entire surface of the identification card 1, but may be recorded on a part of the card surface. The recording of the hologram code is also recorded as part or all of the hologram image. As the hologram code, for example, a three-dimensional barcode image is recorded, and can be read by a hologram reader 101 described later.

Reference numeral 100 denotes a card issuing device of the present embodiment. The card issuing device 100 is configured as follows. Reference numeral 101 denotes a hologram reader which irradiates a hologram recorded on the identification card 1 with light having a predetermined characteristic and converts a reproduced image (three-dimensional barcode image) reproduced by reflected light from the hologram image 2 into a hologram image 2 Read recorded data. Reference numeral 102 denotes a well-known bar code reader, which obtains data by reading a bar code 3 which is a one-dimensional bar code in this example. 1
A magnetic writer 03 records data on the magnetic stripe 4. Note that a signal obtained by the hologram reader 101 scanning a three-dimensional barcode image is converted into digital data and output as data D. Further, a signal obtained by scanning the barcode 3 by the barcode reader 102 is converted into digital data and output as data E.

Reference numeral 104 denotes an encryption unit, which is data D obtained by reading the hologram image 2 by the hologram reader 101, data E obtained by reading the bar code 3 by the bar code reader 102, and a computer 2 which is an external device.
00, a predetermined operation is performed using the data A, B, and C obtained via the interface 106 to generate check data EN (EN = f (A, B, C, D, E)). A write control unit 105 writes the check data EN obtained from the encryption unit 104 to the magnetic stripe 4 via the magnetic writer 103. Further, the write control unit 105
Writes the data A, B, and C input via the interface 106 to the magnetic stripe 4 via the magnetic writer 103.

An interface 106 performs communication between the external computer 200 and the card issuing device 100. The computer 200 is the card issuing device 10
0, and also connected to the card reader 300, so that the memory 201 is
00 and the card reader 300. The detailed configuration of the card reader 300 will be described later. Data A, B, and C are stored in the memory 201.
Is stored, and the computer 200 receiving the request from the card issuing device 100 outputs these data to the card issuing device 100.

Here, for example, the data D is money amount data indicating the value of the card, and the data E is an identification number (ID) indicating a unique number of the card. The data A, B, and C from the computer 200 input through the interface 106 include:
For example, it is data indicating a date, a store number, and a password, respectively. In the following description, it is assumed that these data are recorded on the identification card 1.

It is to be noted that a part or all of the data A, B, C written to the magnetic stripe 4 and the check data EN described above is stored in the memory 201 connected to the computer 200. However, this point will be described in detail in a modification of the present embodiment.

FIG. 3 is a block diagram showing the configuration of the card reader according to this embodiment. Hologram reader 30
The encryption unit 3 reads a hologram code on a hologram image 2 recorded on an identification card 1 to be processed and uses the hologram code as data Dr indicating the amount of the card.
04. The barcode reader 302 reads the barcode 3 and outputs it to the encryption unit 304 as data Er indicating the identification number of the card. The magnetic reader 303 reads the date,
Read store number and password, and read data Ar, Br, C
Output to the encryption unit 304 as r. Further, the magnetic reader 303 reads the check data recorded on the magnetic stripe 4 and outputs this as check data ENr to the determination unit 306.

Reference numeral 304 denotes an encryption unit that calculates check data ENr 'based on the input data Ar, Br, Cr, Dr, and Er. Here, the algorithm for calculating the check data in the encryption unit 304 (encryption operation)
Is the same as that of the encryption unit 104 (FIG. 2). 305
Is an interface, which controls communication between the computer 200 and the card reader 300. The interface according to the present embodiment transmits data Ar to Er obtained from the hologram reader 301, the barcode reader 302, and the magnetic reader 303 to the computer 200. The computer 200 compares the data Ar, Br, Cr received from the card reader 300 with the data A, B, C stored in the memory 201, and
Verify the validity of r, Br, Cr. Then, the interface 305 receives the result of verifying the validity of the data from the computer 200. The received validity verification result is input to the determination unit 306.

When the identification card 1 is issued by the card issuing device 100, the computer 200 inputs the ID number of the identification card to be issued, and the ID number and data A,
A table associating B and C may be stored in the memory 201. In this case, when verifying the validity of the card, the I
The table is searched based on the D number (data Er), and the corresponding data A, B, and C are extracted. Then, the validity of the data can be checked by comparing each of the data Ar, Br, and Cr input from the card reader. In this way, A, B, and C can be set for each card. For example, the password can be changed for each card.

The determination unit 306 checks the check data ENr read from the magnetic stripe 4 by the magnetic reader 303 and
The check data ENr ′ obtained by the encryption unit 304 is compared with the check data ENr ′. When the comparison result shows that the two match, and the verification result input from the interface 305 indicates that the card is valid, the determination unit 306 accepts the card and causes the processing unit 307 to execute a predetermined process. Instruct.
In this example, it is assumed that cash is paid based on the read amount data (data Dr) recorded as the hologram image 2 of the identification card 1.

The operation of the card issuing device 100 and the card reading device 300 according to the present embodiment having the above-described configuration will be described with reference to flowcharts.

FIG. 4 is a flowchart for explaining the operation procedure of the card issuing device 100 according to the first embodiment. In this example, a card on which a hologram image including a hologram code (money data) and a one-dimensional barcode indicating an ID number are supplied to the card issuing device 100, and predetermined data is written on the magnetic stripe. The issued identification card shall be issued.

In step S11, using the hologram reader 101, the supplied hologram image 2 of the identification card 1 is read, and data D (money amount data) is obtained. In step S12, the barcode 3 is read by the barcode reader 102 on the identification card 1 to obtain data E (ID number). Further, step S1
3, data A, B, and C (date, store number,
Password).

Subsequently, in step S14, the encryption unit 104 performs a predetermined operation (encryption) using the data A to E to generate check data EN. In step S15, under the control of the writing control unit 105, the data A, B, and C acquired in step S13 and the data in step S1
4 and the check data EN obtained in
To write to the magnetic stripe 4. The card on which the data is written on the magnetic stripe 4 as described above is ejected from a card ejection unit (not shown) of the card issuing device and issued as an identification card (step S16).

In the present embodiment, it is assumed that a card in which an optically recorded portion (hologram code and bar code) is recorded is supplied to issue the card. The printing may be performed in the card issuing device. In this case, the data D and the data E are generated (or input from the computer 200), and the hologram code and the bar code are recorded according to the data D and the data E. In this case, since the data D and the data E may use the data used for recording directly, the hologram reader 1 of the card issuing apparatus 100 may be used.
01, the barcode reader 102 becomes unnecessary.

FIG. 5 is a flowchart for explaining the operation procedure of the card reader 300 according to the present embodiment. In the card reader 300, authentication of the identification card issued in the above-described procedure is performed.

First, in step S21, the hologram image 2 included in the hologram image of the identification card 1 is read by the hologram reader 301, and this is set as data Dr (money amount data). Further, in step S22, the barcode 3 of the identification card 1 is read by the barcode reader 302, and this is read as data Er (ID number).
And Further, the magnetic stripe 4 is read by the magnetic reader 303 to obtain data Ar, Br, Cr (date, store number, password). Further, in step S24, the magnetic reader 303 reads the check data from the magnetic stripe 4, and sets this as check data ENr. Then, in step S25, the encryption unit 304 sets the data Ar, Br, C obtained in steps S21 to S23 above.
A predetermined calculation process (encryption) is performed using r, Dr, and Er to generate check data ENr '.

In step S26, the interface 3
The data Ar to Er acquired in steps S21 to S23 are transmitted to the computer 200 through the computer 05, and the computer 200 verifies the validity of the data. The result of the verification by the computer 200 is input to the card reader 300 via the interface 305. Here, the verification of the validity of the data includes, for example, that the date indicates that the date has expired, and that the store number and the password do not match. Furthermore,
When the card ID number (data E) read by the card issuing device 100 is registered in the memory 201, it is possible to determine whether the card number is correct or not. Of course, as described above, when the data A, B, and C are different for each card, the ID number and the data A,
A table that associates B and C will be used.

In step S27, the judgment unit 3306
Checks the verification result from the computer 200,
If this indicates fraud, the card is rejected in step S30. Here, it is needless to say that the fact that the card is illegal may be displayed. On the other hand, if the verification result from the computer 200 indicates that it is valid, the process proceeds from step S27 to step S27.
Proceed to 28. In step S28, the check data ENr read by the magnetic reader 303 is compared with the check data ENr 'calculated by the encryption unit 304, and it is determined whether or not the two match. If the two match, the card is determined to be valid, and the money amount data (data D) recorded on the hologram image 2 in step S29.
The amount according to r) is paid. On the other hand, if the two do not match, it is determined that the card is invalid, and the
Go to 0 and reject the card.

The above steps S11 to S1
3, or the acquisition of each data in steps S21 to S24 is not limited to the order shown in the flowcharts, and may be acquired substantially simultaneously.

In the above embodiment, the card reader 300 verifies the validity of the data Ar, Br, Cr and the like by communicating with the computer 200, but this configuration may be omitted. That is, the interface 305 is omitted from the configuration of the card reader 300 shown in FIG. 3, and steps S26 and S27 are performed from the flowchart of FIG.
May be omitted. In this case, the validity of the identification card is determined only by checking the match between the check data ENr obtained from the magnetic stripe and the check data ENr ′ generated by the encryption unit 304. Since the check data to be written on the magnetic stripe 4 changes depending on the data D, the security of the identification card can be effectively improved.

The card reader of the above embodiment may be provided with a configuration for erasing or invalidating the data recorded on the magnetic stripe 4 of the used card.

Next, a modified example of the security improvement system in the above embodiment will be described with reference to FIGS.

FIG. 6 is a diagram showing the configuration of a card reader according to a first modification of the security improvement system of the present embodiment. In FIG. 6, the same components as those in FIG. 2 are denoted by the same reference numerals, and description thereof will be omitted.
In the first modification, data A, B, and C are not written on the magnetic stripe 4. That is, in step S15 in FIG. 4, the write control device 105 in FIG. 2 uses the magnetic writer 103 to write only the check data EN input from the encryption unit 104 to the magnetic stripe.

Now, in FIG.
0 receives the data A, B, and C from the computer 200 and outputs them to the encryption unit 304. Encryption unit 304
Generates check data ENr ′ based on the input A, B, C, Dr, Er. Then, the judgment unit 311
Compares the check data ENr 'obtained from the encrypting unit 304 with the check data ENr obtained by reading the magnetic stripe 4 by the magnetic reader 303, and determines the validity of the card based on whether or not they match.

FIG. 7 is a flowchart showing a control procedure of the card reader 350 in the first modification. In the figure, steps for performing the same processing as in FIG. 5 are denoted by the same step numbers, and detailed description is omitted here. In step S41, data A, B, and C are obtained from the external computer 200 via the interface 310.
Then, in step S42, the acquired data A, B,
The encryption unit 304 calculates the check data ENr ′ based on C, Dr, and Er. Then, the check data ENr 'and the check data E obtained in step S24 are obtained.
The validity of the card is determined by comparing with Nr.

In the first modification, the check data EN is recorded on the magnetic stripe 4 and the data A, B,
Although the recording of C was not performed, various modifications are possible as storage destinations of the data A to C and the check data. For example, the check data EN and the data A may be recorded on the magnetic stripe 4. The write destination of the check data EN may be the memory 201. The second
As a modified example, the case where the write destination of the check data EN is the memory 201 and nothing is recorded on the magnetic stripe 4 will be described.

FIG. 8 is a block diagram showing the configuration of a card reader according to a second modification of the security improvement system of this embodiment. In the second modification, in the card issuing device 100 of FIG. 2, the write control unit 105 does not write the check data EN to the magnetic stripe 4 and does not write other data A to C. And Therefore, the magnetic stripe 4 can be omitted from the identification card 1. Instead, the writing control device 105 sends check data EN, data D (money amount data), data E (ID
Number).

The check data EN,
Computer 200 receiving data D and data E
Generates a check data table 202 (see FIG. 8) in which check data EN is associated with data D and data E, and records the check data table 202 in the memory 201. Since the data E has a unique number for each identification card, the check data may be registered using only the data E. In this case, the check data table 202 is a table in which only the data E and the check data EN are associated. In short, it suffices that only the check data in the check data table 202 can be specified based on the data obtained by reading the hologram image 2 or the bar code 3 of the identification card 1 'in the card reader 360.

The magnetic stripe is omitted from the identification card 1 'shown in FIG. 8, and the magnetic reader is omitted from the card reader 360.

As in the first modification, the encryption unit 3
04 is the computer 2 via the interface 320
The check data ENr ′ is calculated by using the data A, B, and C input from 00, the data Dr input from the hologram reader 301, and the data Er input from the barcode reader 302. The calculated check data E
Nr ′ is input to the determination unit 311.

On the other hand, the interface 320 transmits the data Dr obtained from the hologram reader 301 and the data Er obtained from the barcode reader 302 to the computer 2.
Output to 00. The computer 200 searches the check data table 202 using the data Dr and the data Er input from the card reader 360, and outputs the corresponding check data EN. The check data EN output from the computer 200 is transmitted to the interface 3
20 to the determination unit 311.

The determination unit 311 compares the check data ENr ′ input from the encryption unit 304 with the interface 320
The validity of the identification card 1 'is determined by comparing with the check data EN input via the. The control of the card validity check by the card reader in the second modification is almost the same as that in FIG. 7 described above. However, in step S24, check data E
When acquiring N (corresponding to ENr in FIG. 6), data Er and data Dr are sent to the computer 200, and check data EN is acquired as a response.

As described above, according to the card security improvement system of the above embodiment, the check data can be obtained by using the data A to C provided externally at the time of card issuance (in the embodiment, input from the computer 200). Is performed. Therefore, for example, data A to C
The security of the system can be further improved by periodically changing. Further, since the hologram image 2 is used for calculating the check data, the security of the system is improved.

It should be noted that the types of data and the recording method in the above embodiment are merely examples, and it is needless to say that various changes can be made. For example, ID of identification card
The number may be registered as a hologram code.

Further, in the above embodiment, when the check data or the like is written on the identification card 1, the write destination is a magnetic stripe, but it may be recorded on an optically read and recorded portion such as a hologram or a bar code. It is also possible to mount an IC memory on the identification card and record various data on it. Needless to say, a plurality of optical reading portions and magnetic reading portions may exist on the card.

Further, in the above embodiment, the computer 2
Although 00 is independent from both the card issuing device and the card reading device, the computer 200 may be built in either the card issuing device or the card reading device. In this case, one of the CPUs of the card issuing device and the card reading device may have the function of the computer 200.

In the card security system according to the above-described embodiment, the hologram image includes the hologram image 2, thereby further improving the security. Hereinafter, a detailed configuration of the hologram card that records the hologram code according to the present embodiment and a hologram reader that reads the hologram code will be described.

The hologram is recorded by using a holographic method or a direct pattern imaging method. The hologram may be a Fourier transform hologram or a Fresnel hologram.

Here, a Fourier transform hologram is employed, and its image pattern is a barcode image. Further, the hologram image pattern may be any of a random pattern, a moiré pattern, an inverse Fourier transform pattern, and the like, or a combination thereof. FIG. 9 is a diagram showing an example of a barcode-like pattern. Hereinafter, hologram recording and reading when a Fourier transform pattern for reproducing such a barcode pattern is recorded will be described.

FIGS. 10A and 10B are diagrams for explaining a method of recording and reproducing a hologram of a Fourier transform pattern. FIG. 10A shows a configuration of a typical hologram recording. The Fourier transform lens 52 is set at a position separated by a distance f (f is a forward focal length of the Fourier transform lens 52) from a predetermined pattern (a bar code pattern as shown in FIG. 9 in this example) 51. Note that a diffuser is connected to the pattern 51 as necessary. The recording medium 53 is disposed behind the Fourier transform lens 52 at a position separated by a rear focal length (= f) of the lens 52. Light source light 5
4 is applied to the pattern 51 as shown, and the reference light 55 is applied to the recording medium at a predetermined angle θ. Then, the pattern light arriving at the recording medium 53 via the Fourier transform lens 52 and the reference light 54 interfere on the surface of the recording medium 53, and the Fourier transform hologram pattern corresponding to the pattern 51 is placed on the entire or a part of the recording medium 53. Formed and recorded.

FIG. 10B shows a method of reproducing an image in a Fourier transform hologram. The recording medium 53 is irradiated with the collimated light 56 as the conjugate light of the reference light 55 at the irradiation angle θ of the reference light in the step of encoding the hologram, as shown in the figure. Then, through the Fourier transform lens 57, the real image 58
Is played. In the above description, a Fourier transform lens is used when recording a hologram, but a so-called Fourier transform hologram recording method without a lens can also be used.

The Fourier transform recording method as described above provides high security. This is because it is extremely difficult to recognize the hologram image without knowing not only the angle of the reference light but also its wavelength and the characteristics of the Fourier transform lens as optical specifications at the time of hologram recording.

FIG. 11 is a view for explaining the detailed configuration of the hologram reader of the card reader according to the present embodiment.

Reference numeral 71 denotes a hologram image formed on the identification card 1. Reference numeral 72 denotes a light source for irradiating the hologram. Reference numeral 73 denotes a reproduced image reproduced by light emitted from the light source 72. In the case of a Fourier transform hologram, a hologram image 71 and a reproduced image 73
At an appropriate position between the Fourier transform lens 57 (FIG. 10).
B), but is not shown. However, if the hologram is a so-called Fresnel hologram, such a conversion lens is unnecessary.

Reference numeral 74 denotes an optical processing unit which optically processes the reproduced image 73 to form a predetermined pattern 75 (in this example, a bar code pattern, hereinafter referred to as a bar code pattern 75), and outputs the pattern. I do. An optical sensor 76 scans the barcode pattern 75 and outputs a signal corresponding to the light intensity.

Note that the hologram reader of this embodiment is
Finally, a barcode image as shown in FIG. 9 is reproduced from the hologram image. However, in the hologram image of the present embodiment, an image in which a predetermined pattern interferes with the barcode image is recorded. Therefore, by irradiating the hologram image recorded by the Fourier transform type hologram method with light from an appropriate light source 72, a reproduced image 73 can be detected in space through a Fourier transform lens (not shown). By itself it makes no sense. However, when this is processed by the optical processing unit 74, it is reproduced in space as a barcode pattern 75.

FIG. 12 is a block diagram showing the configuration of the optical processing section 74. In the figure, the reproduction light corresponding to the reproduction image 73 passes through the beam splitter 741 and is
It is reflected at 42. The light reflected by the mirror 742 is reflected by the beam splitter 741 and changes its direction by 90 degrees.
On the other hand, light corresponding to the interference input pattern passes through the beam splitter 741. As a result, the reproduction light reflected by the mirror 742 and the pattern light corresponding to the interference input pattern 743 interfere with each other, and a new pattern image is generated.
This new pattern image is a barcode pattern 75 and is provided to the optical sensor 76 as a readable pattern.

The bar code pattern 75 reproduced by the optical processing unit 74 as described above is detected by the optical sensor 76. The optical sensor 76 outputs a signal corresponding to the light intensity distribution of the barcode pattern 75 to the signal processing unit 79. The signal processing unit 79 converts the signal input from the optical sensor 76 into a rectangular pulse train indicating binary data.
Here, the binarization is performed based on the relative light intensity distribution of the barcode pattern 75. For example, the threshold for binarization is determined based on the values of the maximum level (white part of the barcode pattern) and the minimum level (black part of the barcode pattern) of the optical sensor (for example, the average value of both). By doing so, the barcode pattern can be recognized better and more reliably.

As described above, if a well-designed random pattern is used as a pattern to be recorded as a hologram, it can be recognized only as a pattern having no meaning even on the Fourier transform plane. In this case, another separate pattern is prepared, and the reproduced random pattern is converted into a meaningful pattern, which is detected by the optical sensor 76. Here, the optical processing unit 74 converts the random pattern into a meaningful pattern. Then, the optical sensor 76 detects the light intensity of the meaningful pattern, and the signal processing unit 79 generates binary data based on the detection result. For example, when a moiré pattern is used for recording as a hologram image, a bar code pattern designed in advance can be obtained by causing interference with another moiré pattern.

The reproduced bar code pattern 75
The scanning by the optical sensor 76 may be configured such that the optical sensor 76 scans a bar code pattern, or the optical sensor 76 detects the light intensity at one point and reproduces the image by moving the identification card 1 at the time of reading. The barcode pattern 75 as an image may be moved, and the barcode pattern may be scanned by this movement.

A bar code pattern 7 as a reproduced image
The degree of the black and white pattern 5 may be slightly different from the original recorded image due to partial damage or distortion on the card surface. However, the light sensor 76
As described above, the signal processing unit 79 checks the relative intensity of light and outputs it as binary data. Therefore, even if there is such an obstacle, the barcode pattern can be correctly read.

The optical processing section 74 has a configuration necessary for reading a hologram code on which a random pattern, a moiré pattern, or an inverse Fourier transform pattern is recorded. However, when the reproduced image becomes a meaningful barcode pattern as it is, the optical processing unit 74 is unnecessary. FIG. 13 is a diagram showing a configuration of a hologram reader in which an optical processing unit is omitted. By irradiating the light from the light source 72 to the hologram image (hologram code),
Since the barcode image 77 is reproduced in the space, the light intensity can be directly read by the optical sensor 76. In the case of a Fourier transform hologram, it goes without saying that a Fourier transform lens exists between the reproduced image 77 and the hologram 71 in FIG.

The function of the optical processing unit 74 can be realized digitally. In this case, in the configuration shown in FIG. 11, the light intensity distribution of the reproduced image 73 is directly detected by the optical sensor 76 and sent to the signal processing unit 79 as digital data. The signal processing unit 79 performs a process equivalent to causing the interference input pattern 743 in FIG. The digital data of the light intensity distribution obtained as a result of this numerical operation is
5 corresponds to FIG.

Further, the optical processing section 74 may use interference of a light wavefront. For example, when a spherical wave and a plane wave are caused to interfere with each other, a circular stripe pattern is obtained. When a plane wave is caused to interfere with a plane wave, a barcode-shaped stripe pattern is obtained. Therefore, for example, if a configuration is adopted in which a spherical wave is obtained as reproduction light from a hologram image, and a plane wave is input as an interference input pattern in the optical processing unit 74, a barcode pattern 75 will be obtained.
It can be read by an optical sensor. Thus, it is also possible to detect information by the phase distribution of the reflected light from the hologram.

As described above, according to the above embodiment, in addition to using a special data check system,
The use of a special hologram and a hologram detection method dramatically improves card security. Further, the recognition of the reproduced hologram pattern is performed by checking the relative light intensity of the pattern, so that even if the card is partially damaged or the like, the recognition can be performed correctly.

Further, since a meaningful reproduced image is obtained as a hologram image only by interfering with another predetermined pattern, security is remarkably improved.

The conversion into binary data (rectangular signal) in the signal processing section 79 is performed based on a self-clocking method known in the art such as a bar code. In addition, reproduction of an image in a space near the surface of the identification card cannot be viewed with ordinary illumination light, and is suitable for an appropriate optical system (for example, an irradiation angle of light to a hologram image, a wavelength of irradiation light, hologram recording Reconstructed only by the Fourier inverse transform lens having appropriate characteristics corresponding to the Fourier transform lens at the time)
Reading can be performed by the optical sensor 76. For this reason, security is improved.

[0089]

As described above, according to the present invention,
The security of cards and the like is effectively and dramatically improved.

[0090]

[Brief description of the drawings]

FIG. 1 is a diagram illustrating an overview of an identification card used in a card security system according to an embodiment.

FIG. 2 is a block diagram showing a configuration of a card issuing device in the card security system of the embodiment.

FIG. 3 is a block diagram illustrating a configuration of a card reading device according to the embodiment.

FIG. 4 is a flowchart illustrating an operation procedure of the card issuing device 100 according to the first embodiment.

FIG. 5 is a flowchart illustrating an operation procedure of the card reading device 300 according to the present embodiment.

FIG. 6 is a diagram showing a configuration of a card reader according to a first modification of the security improvement system of the present embodiment.

FIG. 7 is a flowchart illustrating a control procedure of a card reader 350 according to a first modification.

FIG. 8 is a block diagram illustrating a configuration of a card reader according to a second modification of the security improvement system of the embodiment.

FIG. 9 is a diagram showing an example of a barcode pattern.

FIG. 10A is a diagram illustrating a method of recording a hologram of a Fourier transform pattern.

FIG. 10B is a diagram illustrating a method of reproducing a hologram of a Fourier transform pattern.

FIG. 11 is a diagram illustrating a detailed configuration of a hologram reader of the card reader according to the present embodiment.

FIG. 12 is a block diagram illustrating a configuration of an optical processing unit 74.

FIG. 13 is a diagram illustrating a configuration of a hologram reader in which an optical processing unit is omitted.

[Brief description of reference numerals]

 Reference Signs List 1 identification card 2 hologram image 3 barcode 4 magnetic stripe 100 card issuing device 101 hologram reader 102 barcode reader 103 magnetic writer 104 encryption unit 105 write control unit 106 interface 200 computer 201 memory 300 card reader

──────────────────────────────────────────────────続 き Continued on the front page (51) Int.Cl. ⁶ Identification code FI G06K 19/06 G06K 19/00 D

Claims (21)

[Claims] 1. A method for improving security in a card security system including a card issuing device and a card reading device, comprising: a first recording step of recording at least first data on an optically readable portion on the card; An input step of inputting at least second data to the issuing device; an obtaining step of obtaining check data based on at least the first data and the second data; Second recording on a storage medium accessible from
A recording step, a card obtained by the card reader based on at least data obtained by reading the optically read portion, data obtained from the storage medium, and the second data used in the input step. And a verification step of verifying the validity of the security. 2. The storage medium includes at least one of a magnetically read portion or an optically read portion on the card, a memory mounted on the card, and a memory separate from the card. The method for improving security according to claim 1, wherein: 3. The second recording step records the check data and the second data on the storage medium, and the verification step stores the check data and data as the second data on the storage medium. 2. The method for improving security according to claim 1, further comprising: 4. The storage medium includes a magnetically readable portion on the card and a memory separate from the card, and the second recording step stores all check data and the second data in the magnetic field. 4. The security improving method according to claim 3, wherein the data is separately recorded in a read portion and the memory. 5. The method according to claim 1, wherein the first recording step records the first data as a holographic image. 6. The method according to claim 1, wherein the obtaining step determines the check data by encrypting at least the first data and the second data. 7. A card security system comprising a card issuing device and a card reading device, wherein the card issuing device reads at least first data from an optically reading portion on the card, and the card issuing device includes at least second data. Input means for inputting the check data, acquisition means for acquiring check data based on at least the first data and the second data, and at least the check data recorded on a storage medium at least accessible from the card reader. A recording unit that reads at least the optically read portion, check data that is obtained from the storage medium, and the second data that is used by the input unit. Verification means for verifying the validity of the card by a reader. Security system. 8. A card reading device for reading a card including an optical reading portion, comprising: an optical reading means for reading at least a first data from the optical reading portion; and at least a second data and a second data. A first obtaining means for obtaining the data No. 3 from the storage medium; a second obtaining means for calculating check data based on at least the first data and the second data; 3. A card reading device, comprising: a determination unit that compares the data of No. 3 with the check data obtained by the second obtaining unit and determines whether the card is valid. 9. The storage medium is provided by at least one of a magnetic reading portion, an optical reading portion provided on the card, a memory mounted on the card, or a memory unit separate from the card. 9. The card reader according to claim 8, wherein the card reader is configured. 10. The apparatus according to claim 9, wherein the first acquisition unit acquires the second data from the memory unit and acquires the third data from the magnetically read portion. Card reader. 11. The storage medium according to claim 8, wherein the storage medium includes a magnetic stripe on the card, and further comprising invalidating means for invalidating data on the magnetic stripe after using the card. Card reader. 12. A card issuing device for issuing a card, comprising: reading means for reading at least first data from an optical reading portion; and at least second data from a storage unit separate from the card. Input means; determining means for determining check data based on at least the first data and the second data; and recording means for recording at least the determined check data on a storage medium. Card issuing device. 13. The storage medium includes at least one of a magnetic reading portion, an optical reading portion, a memory mounted on the card, and a memory unit separate from the card provided on the card. 13. The card issuance device according to claim 12, wherein the card is issued. 14. The card according to claim 13, wherein said recording means records said check data in a magnetically readable portion on said card, and records said second data in said memory unit. Issuing device. 15. An irradiating means for irradiating a hologram image with light from a predetermined direction; and a light intensity distribution of a reproduced image formed in space by reflected light of the irradiating light from the hologram image. A hologram reading apparatus comprising: a detecting unit for detecting; and an output unit for outputting a light intensity distribution detected by the detecting unit. 16. The light intensity distribution detected by the detecting means based on the relative light intensity of the reproduced image is defined as 2
16. The hologram reading device according to claim 15, further comprising a binarizing unit for binarizing, wherein the output unit outputs the binarized data obtained by the binarizing unit. 17. The apparatus according to claim 15, further comprising processing means for processing the reproduced image to form a different pattern image, wherein the detecting means detects a light intensity distribution of the pattern image. Hologram reader. 18. The hologram reader according to claim 17, wherein said processing means processes the reproduced image by causing a predetermined pattern image to interfere with the reproduced image. 19. The apparatus further comprises processing means for digitally processing pattern data corresponding to the light intensity distribution detected by the detection means to form another pattern data, and wherein the output means is formed by the processing means. The hologram reader according to claim 15, wherein the another pattern is output. 20. Irradiating means for irradiating light on the hologram image from a predetermined direction, and forming a pattern image by causing a predetermined light wave to interfere with reflected light from the hologram image of light irradiated by the irradiating means. A hologram reader comprising: an interference unit; a detection unit that detects a light intensity distribution of the pattern image formed by the interference unit; and an output unit that outputs the light intensity distribution detected by the detection unit. . 21. The hologram image is a Fourier transform pattern.
The hologram reader according to any one of the above.