JPH08263578A - Password setting system for ic card - Google Patents

Abstract

PURPOSE: To prevent an IC card from illegally being issued or used even if the IC card is stolen during transfer from a manufacturer to an issuer or from the issuer to a user and held by an illegal bearer. CONSTITUTION: When the IC card is manufactured, a temporary password of the card issuer is stored in an EEPROM 4 and when a CPU compares this password with an externally inputted password and outputs a coincidence signal, a main password of the issuer inputted by an IC card issuing device is supplied to the IC card; and the CPU 3 stores the main password of the issuer in the EEPROM 4 and disables the temporary password to be used. Further, a temporary password of the user is stored in the EEPROM 4 and when a coincidence signal is outputted by comparing the temporary password of the user with an externally inputted password when using, main password of the user is inputted to the IC card; and the CPU 3 stores the main password of the user in the EEPROM 4 and makes the temporary password of the user unusable.

Description

Detailed Description of the Invention

[0001]

BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION 1. Field of the Invention The present invention relates to a password setting method for an IC card having an IC chip.

[0002]

2. Description of the Related Art Conventionally, in magnetic cards used in financial institutions and the like, since reading / writing of data of a magnetic stripe is not restricted at all, the issued magnetic card has low security and a secret code. Since reading and tampering can be performed relatively easily, card crimes are occurring frequently.

On the other hand, in recent years, an IC card that stores a personal identification number and collates the personal identification number internally and cannot be read from the outside has been developed. The IC card has a feature that it is more secure than a magnetic card. There is.

An example of such an IC card is Japanese Patent Laid-Open No.
As disclosed in Japanese Patent Laid-Open No. 46447/1992, a key No. 1 for identifying a bank as an issuer of an IC card and a key No. 2 for a customer as a user are stored in an identification memory. What has been developed is one that can be used by the owner by increasing the capacity (setting the amount of money) and using key No2.

In this IC card, the identification memory storing the two keys is arranged in a portion where reading and writing can be performed only internally and access from the outside is prohibited, and writing the personal identification number from the outside. / Reading is prohibited and the PIN code is prevented from being output to the outside by making the reading possible only internally.

By the way, the conventional magnetic card has no value at the time of manufacture and has the value as an ID card because data is recorded.

Therefore, the manufacturer of the magnetic card cannot know what data is recorded on the magnetic card, and need not know it.

On the other hand, in the IC card disclosed in Japanese Unexamined Patent Publication No. 54-46447, it is necessary to identify the bank by the key No. 1 even when performing the above-mentioned banking business of increasing the purchasing ability of credits. The key No. 1 of the bank is stored at the time of manufacturing the card, and the key No. 1 is used when the bank sets the purchasing ability on the card and issues it.

Further, considering that the identification memory storing the two keys is prohibited from writing from the outside,
In the IC card of JP-A-54-46447, the key No. 1 and the key No. 2 are stored in the memory at the time of manufacturing.

In order to store the personal identification number of the user in the memory at the manufacturing stage, the personal identification number must be communicated from the user to the manufacturer through the issuer. Further, in order to store the personal identification number of the issuer in the memory at the manufacturing stage, it is necessary for the user to contact the issuer with the personal identification number.

Unlike the magnetic card manufacturer, the IC card manufacturer knows how the card operates according to the program in the IC card, and if he knows the issuer's personal identification number, the IC card There is a risk that it will be possible to issue.

Further, the issuer of the IC card knows how the IC card is issued, and it is possible to illegally issue the IC card twice by using the personal identification number of the user. It is dangerous.

In order to prevent these dangers, it may be considered not to store the personal identification number at the time of manufacture, or not to store the personal identification number of the user at the time of issuance.

However, since the IC card uses the password as a key and protects the writing to the memory by the password, the IC card which does not store the password becomes a card which has lost the write protection function and is manufactured. Issued an IC card (store the secret code of a fake issuer or set the amount if it is stolen during the transfer from the issuer to the issuer or from the issuer to the user There is a problem in that it is not possible to prevent unauthorized use of the user's personal identification number after that by storing the personal identification number of the user without permission.

[0015]

SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION The present invention has been made based on the background described above, and an IC card is stolen during the transfer from the manufacturer to the issuer or during the transfer from the issuer to the user. Even if you get caught and go to the wrong owner,
The secret code is stored in an IC card to prevent unauthorized issuance.

Furthermore, the manufacturer cannot know the secret code of the issuer, and the issuer cannot know the secret code of the user.

[0017]

In order to solve the above-mentioned problems, the present invention has a built-in IC composed of a memory and a CPU for comparing a secret code stored in this memory with a secret code inputted from the outside. In the IC card password setting method in which the password is set in the IC card in which the temporary password of the card issuer is stored in advance in the memory of the IC card when the IC card is issued in the IC card issuing device. Supply the password to the above IC card,
The IC card compares the personal identification entered in the IC card issuing device with the issuer's provisional personal identification stored in the storage means by the comparing means, and outputs the result to the IC card issuing apparatus. When a result is obtained, the issuer's original secret code input in the IC card issuing device is supplied to the IC card, and the IC card stores the supplied issuer's original secret code in the storage means internally. Moreover, the first provisional personal identification code cannot be used.

Further, the present invention is an IC card having a built-in IC composed of a memory and a CPU for comparing a secret code stored in the memory with a secret code inputted from the outside, when the card is issued to the memory. In the IC card password setting method of setting the password to the IC card in which the user's temporary password is stored in advance, the user's password input at the terminal device when the IC card is used is supplied to the IC card. When the IC card compares the personal identification of the user with the second provisional personal identification stored in the storage means by the comparison means, outputs the result to the terminal device, and when the result of the comparison is coincidence, The terminal device guides the user to input the user's main secret code, and when the user's main secret code is input to the terminal device in accordance with the guidance, the input main secret code is input to the IC card. Feeding, and the IC card is intended to disable stored internally to the storage means of this password supplied and the second temporary secret.

In the present invention, the manufacturer can know only the temporary secret code of the issuer, not the genuine secret code of the issuer, and the genuine secret code of the issuer is set by the issuer.

Further, in the present invention, the issuer can know only the provisional personal identification number of the user, not the real identification of the user, and the real identification of the user is set by the user.

[0021]

BEST MODE FOR CARRYING OUT THE INVENTION An embodiment of the present invention will be described below with reference to the drawings.

In FIG. 1, 1 is an IC card,
The C chip 2 is built in. The IC chip 2 is shown in FIG.
As shown in FIG. 3, it comprises a control CPU (central processing unit) 3, an EEPROM 4 in which a control program, a personal identification number and data are stored, a RAM used during data processing, an interface circuit 6 and a connecting section 7. .

3 and 4 show the structure of the IC card manufacturing machine 10 according to the present invention. 11 is a CPU (central processing unit) for controlling the whole, 12 is an input means for inputting data, for example, a keyboard, 13 is a CRT display, 14 is a ROM (read only memory) storing a control program,
Reference numeral 15 is a RAM (fundament access memory) for storing data, 16 is a dot printer for outputting various print data, and 17 is storage and reproduction of data in a floppy disk 19 inserted from a floppy disk insertion slot 18. Floppy disk device, 20 is IC
This is a card reading / writing unit.

The IC card reading / writing unit 20 reads data in the memory in the IC chip 2 of the IC card 1 inserted from the card insertion slot 21 or writes data in the memory. The main body and the cable 22 are connected. That is, as shown in the figure, a transport path 31 for transporting the IC card 1 inserted from the card insertion slot 21 is provided. The transport path 31 is provided with a plurality of rotatable transport rollers 32 which are positioned so as to sandwich the IC card from above and below when the IC card is transported. The conveying rollers 32 provided as a pair are provided at equal intervals along the conveying path 31. The distance from the center of each of the carrying rollers 32 to the center of the adjacent carrying roller 32 has a width dimension in the carrying direction of the card. Therefore, the transport path 31 of the IC card 1 is defined by the transport guide 33.

An IC chip reader / writer 34 for reading the data of the IC chip 2 on the IC card 1 is arranged on the transport guide 33. The IC chip reading / writing device 34 reads the contents of the EEPROM 4 in the IC chip 2 by electrically connecting it to the connecting section 7 of the IC chip 2.

The IC card issuing machine and IC card handling machine also have the same structure as the IC IC card manufacturing machine 10. However, the control program in the ROM 14 is completely different.

Next, the manufacturing of the IC card having such a structure will be described. For example, now the operator (manufacturer)
Is set to the IC card issuing mode with the keyboard 12 of the IC card manufacturing machine 10 and the new IC card 1
Is inserted into the card insertion slot 21. Then, IC card 1
Is the I in the IC card reader / writer 34 and the IC card 1.
The connecting portion 7 of the C chip 2 is electrically connected. As a result, the CPU 11 guides the CRT display device 13 such as "Enter the manufacturer's personal identification number." By this guidance, the operator inputs the personal identification number using the keyboard 12. The signal corresponding to this input is the CPU 11
From the IC chip reader / writer 34, the connection unit 7, and the interface circuit 6 to the CPU 3. Then, the CPU 3 sets the supplied manufacturer's personal identification number to EEPR.
Store it in OM4.

Next, the CPU 11 causes the CRT display device 13 to "Enter the issuer's temporary PIN."
I will guide you. In response to this guidance, the operator inputs the personal identification number using the keyboard 12. A signal corresponding to this input is supplied from the CPU 11 to the CPU 3. Then
The CPU 3 stores the provisional personal identification number in the EEPROM 4. Further, other data and the like are also stored in the EEPROM 4 in the same manner as the personal identification number.

Next, a case where the issuer handles the IC card 1 issued as described above will be described. That is, the operator (issuer) sets the IC card issuing mode using the keyboard 12 of the IC card issuing machine (not shown) and inserts the IC card 1 into the card insertion slot 21. Then, the IC card 1 becomes the IC card reading / writing device 3
4 and the connecting portion 7 of the IC chip 2 in the IC card 1
And are electrically connected. As a result, the CPU 11
The RT display device 13 guides the user to "Enter the issuer's temporary personal identification number." By this guide,
The operator inputs a temporary personal identification number using the keyboard 12. The signal corresponding to this input and the signal indicating the issuing machine are the CPU
11 is supplied to the CPU 3 via the IC chip read / write device 34, the connection unit 7 and the interface circuit 6. Then, the CPU 3 stores the supplied personal identification number in the RAM 5. Then, the CPU 3 compares the provisional personal identification number of the RAM 5 with the provisional personal identification number of the issuer stored in the EEPROM 4, and outputs the comparison result to the CPU 11. As a result, when the coincidence signal is supplied, the CPU 1
1 judges that the true secret code of the issuer can be set, and guides on the CRT display device 13 "Please register the genuine secret code of the issuer. Please enter it." In response to this guidance, the operator inputs this personal identification code. A signal corresponding to this input is supplied from the CPU 11 to the CPU 3. Then C
PU3 is the EEPROM of the PIN code of the supplied issuer.
Remember in 4. At this time, the CPU 3 is the EEPROM
The flag for prohibiting the use of the temporary PIN code of the issuer stored in is set.

Next, the CPU 11 causes the CRT display device 13 to "insert the user's temporary personal identification number."
I will guide you. In response to this guidance, the operator inputs a temporary personal identification number. The input signal is supplied from the CPU 11 to the CPU 3. As a result, the CPU 3 stores the provisional personal identification number in the EEPROM 4.
Further, other transaction data and the like are also stored in the EEPROM 4 as in the case of the above-mentioned personal identification number. Then, the IC card 1 storing the temporary personal identification number and the like is issued from the card insertion slot 20.

Next, a case where the user handles the IC card 1 issued as described above will be described. That is, the customer inserts the card into the card insertion slot 21 of the IC card transaction machine (not shown). Then, IC card 1 becomes IC
The card reading / writing device 34 and the connecting portion 7 of the IC chip 2 of the IC card 1 are electrically connected. As a result, the CPU 11 determines whether or not the IC card is set in the transaction machine for the first time according to the signal from the CPU 3. If the result of this determination is not the first use, the transaction processing according to the IC card 1 is executed.

In addition, when using for the first time, the CPU 11 guides the CRT display device 13 such as "Please insert a temporary password". In response to this guidance, the customer inputs a temporary personal identification number using the keyboard 12. A signal corresponding to this input and a signal indicating the transaction machine are supplied from the CPU 11 to the CPU 3. Then, the CPU 3 stores the supplied personal identification number in the RAM 5. Then CPU3 is RA
The M5 input personal identification number is compared with the temporary personal identification number stored in the EEPROM 4, and the comparison result is stored in the CPU.
Output to 11. As a result, when the coincidence signal is supplied, C
PU11 judges that the true password of the customer can be set, and C
The RT display device 13 displays a guide saying "Please register your PIN. Please enter it." According to this guidance, the customer inputs his or her personal identification number using the keyboard 12. Signals corresponding to this input are sent from the CPU 11 to the CPU 3
Is supplied to. Then, the CPU 3 stores the supplied personal identification number of the customer in the EEPROM 4. At this time, the CPU 3 sets a flag for prohibiting the use of the temporary personal identification number stored in the EEPROM.

After the registration of the above personal identification number, the transaction may be carried out as it is, or the IC card 1 may be returned to the customer.

Further, at the time of checking the coincidence of the temporary personal identification numbers, when the number of times of disagreement reaches a predetermined number, the IC card cannot be used.

After that, when making a transaction with the transaction machine, the transaction can be performed with the above personal identification number.

As described above, the manufacturer can know only the temporary secret code of the issuer, and the issuer can know only the temporary secret code of the user. Therefore, the genuine secret code of the issuer and the genuine secret code of the user. Has been known only to the registered person, and is extremely excellent in crime prevention.

[0037]

As described above, according to the present invention, an illegal owner of an IC card is stolen during the transfer from the manufacturer to the issuer or during the transfer from the issuer to the user. Even if the password is passed to the IC card, the password is stored in the IC card to prevent it from being illegally issued, and the password of the issuer can be set by the issuer, and the password of the user can be set by the user. Is.

[Brief description of drawings]

FIG. 1 is a perspective view showing the appearance of an IC card.

FIG. 2 is a block diagram showing the configuration of an IC chip.

[Figure 3] External view of the card manufacturing machine

FIG. 4 is a block diagram showing a configuration of a card manufacturing machine.

FIG. 5 is a sectional view of an IC card reading / writing unit.

[Explanation of symbols]

 1 IC Card 2 IC Chip 3 CPU 4 EEPROM 7 Connect Section 10 IC Card Making Machine 11 CPU 12 Keyboard 13 CRT Display Device

Claims (6)

[Claims] 1. An IC card having a built-in IC composed of a memory and a CPU for comparing a secret code stored in the memory with a secret code inputted from the outside, and an IC card having a built-in IC in the memory. In an IC card password setting method for setting a password to an IC card in which a temporary password is stored in advance, the password input in an IC card issuing device when the IC card is issued is supplied to the IC card, and the IC card is the IC card. The secret code entered in the issuing device and the provisional secret code of the issuer stored in the storage means are compared by the comparing means, and the result is output to the IC card issuing device. As a result of this comparison, coincidence is obtained. In this case, the issuer's secret code input in the IC card issuing device is supplied to the IC card, and the IC card is supplied with the issuer's secret code. The stored internally to the storage means and IC card PIN setting method, characterized in that the unusable first temporary password. 2. A password setting method for an IC card according to claim 1, wherein the password setting is disabled by setting a flag of temporary password use prohibition in the storage means. 3. The password setting method for an IC card according to claim 1, wherein the IC card has a built-in CPU, which compares the temporary password and stores the password in a storage means. method. 4. An IC card having an IC, which is composed of a memory and a CPU for comparing a password stored in the memory with a password input from the outside, and an IC card having a built-in IC. I with secret code stored in advance
In the password setting method of the IC card for setting the password to the C card, the user's password input at the terminal device when using the IC card is supplied to the IC card, and the IC card is the password of the user and the password. The second provisional personal identification code stored in the storage means is compared by the comparison means, the result is output to the terminal device, and if the result of this comparison is a match, the real personal identification code of the user is input. The terminal device guides the user, and when the user inputs the personal identification code in the terminal device according to the guidance, the input personal identification code is supplied to the IC card, and the IC card internally supplies the supplied personal identification code. A password setting method for an IC card, characterized in that it is stored in a storage means and the second temporary password is disabled. 5. The password setting method for an IC card according to claim 4, wherein the password setting is disabled by setting a temporary password prohibition flag in the storage means. 6. The password setting method for an IC card according to claim 4, wherein a CPU is built in the IC card, and the CPU compares the temporary password and stores the password in the storage means. method.