JPH0548981B2 - - Google Patents

Info

Publication number
JPH0548981B2
JPH0548981B2 JP60060508A JP6050885A JPH0548981B2 JP H0548981 B2 JPH0548981 B2 JP H0548981B2 JP 60060508 A JP60060508 A JP 60060508A JP 6050885 A JP6050885 A JP 6050885A JP H0548981 B2 JPH0548981 B2 JP H0548981B2
Authority
JP
Japan
Prior art keywords
exchange
identification
subscriber station
subscriber
identification signal
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Expired - Lifetime
Application number
JP60060508A
Other languages
Japanese (ja)
Other versions
JPS60236537A (en
Inventor
Sheineruto Sutefuan
Guroeru Kurisutofu
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Koninklijke Philips NV
Original Assignee
Philips Gloeilampenfabrieken NV
Koninklijke Philips Electronics NV
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Philips Gloeilampenfabrieken NV, Koninklijke Philips Electronics NV filed Critical Philips Gloeilampenfabrieken NV
Publication of JPS60236537A publication Critical patent/JPS60236537A/en
Publication of JPH0548981B2 publication Critical patent/JPH0548981B2/ja
Granted legal-status Critical Current

Links

Classifications

    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L12/00—Data switching networks
    • H04L12/02—Details
    • H04L12/22—Arrangements for preventing the taking of data from a data transmission channel without authorisation
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07F—COIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
    • G07F7/00—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus
    • G07F7/08—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means
    • G07F7/10—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means together with a coded signal, e.g. in the form of personal identification information, like personal identification number [PIN] or biometric data
    • G07F7/1016—Devices or methods for securing the PIN and other transaction-data, e.g. by encryption
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
    • H04L63/0869—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities for achieving mutual authentication
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3226—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using a predetermined code, e.g. password, passphrase or PIN
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3271—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using challenge-response
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
    • H04L2209/80—Wireless

Landscapes

  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Signal Processing (AREA)
  • Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
  • Computing Systems (AREA)
  • General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Mobile Radio Communication Systems (AREA)
  • Data Exchanges In Wide-Area Networks (AREA)
  • Telephonic Communication Services (AREA)

Abstract

12 To differentiate between different subscriber stations of a message transmission system, so-called identifications can be used. By listening-in on the exchange of information between the subscriber station and an exchange over a message transmission channel a fraudulent user can overhear the identification and consequently utilize the services of the exchange by imitation of the external identification. To enable the detection in the exchange of an illegally copied identification of a subscriber station, the exchange transmits a continuously changing encoding rule for forming the identification of the subscriber station, or the identification of the subscriber station is based on combining fixed and variable data.

Description

【発明の詳細な説明】 本発明は、特許請求の範囲第１項の前文に規定
したような、メツセージ伝送システムの加入者局
に割当てられた識別信号の不認可使用を検出する
方法に関するものである。DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE INVENTION The invention relates to a method for detecting unauthorized use of an identification signal assigned to a subscriber station of a message transmission system, as defined in the preamble of claim 1. be.

メツセージ伝送システムの異なる加入者局間を
区別する為には、いわゆる識別信号を用いること
ができる。一般に呼出し料金は加入者局の識別符
号に基づいて計算される。 To distinguish between different subscriber stations of a message transmission system, so-called identification signals can be used. Generally, call charges are calculated based on the subscriber station's identification code.

無線伝送システムでは、移動無線局において開
始される通話の料金計算は無線交換機で行われ
る。ドイツ連邦共和国特許第2419615号明細書に
は、無線伝送システムにおける移動無線局の識別
信号（加入者番号および識別信号）の不認可使用
を検出しうる加入者局（移動無線局）識別方法が
記載されている。移動無線局では識別信号発生
器、例えば磁気カード内に識別信号が記憶されて
いる。移動無線局を動作させる為には、識別信号
発生器を移動無線局の制御ユニツトのスロツト内
に挿入し、制御ユニツトの読取り装置によりデー
タを読取り、このデータを制御ユニツト内の制御
装置に供給する。加入者番号が記憶されているテ
レフオンダイレクトリイ中のエントリに基づいて
磁気カードの非合法な複製を防止する為に、無線
伝送システムの各加入者に第２の“秘密”加入者
番号（符号）を与え、これを磁気カードに記憶し
ている。 In radio transmission systems, the charging of calls initiated at a mobile radio station takes place in a radio exchange. German Patent No. 2419615 describes a method for identifying a subscriber station (mobile radio station), which makes it possible to detect unauthorized use of the identification signal (subscriber number and identification signal) of a mobile radio station in a radio transmission system. has been done. In a mobile radio station, an identification signal is stored in an identification signal generator, for example in a magnetic card. In order to operate a mobile radio station, the identification signal generator is inserted into the slot of the control unit of the mobile radio station, the data is read by the reading device of the control unit, and this data is supplied to the control device in the control unit. . To prevent illegal copying of magnetic cards based on entries in the Telephone Directory where the subscriber number is stored, each subscriber of the wireless transmission system is given a second "secret" subscriber number (code number). ) is stored on a magnetic card.

ドイツ連邦共和国特許第2419615号明細書の場
合には、同一性の検査として加入者識別符号と加
入者番号との間が対応しているかどうかを検査し
ている。加入者には分かつていない暗号キーを用
いて形成した同一性検査用の識別符号が移動無線
局から無線交換機に伝送される。無線交換機にお
いては、移動無線局から与えられた識別符号を逆
の暗号化規則を用いて解読する。関連の移動局の
呼出し番号（加入者番号）は識別符号による解読
操作により得られる。 In the case of German Patent No. 2419615, identity is checked by checking whether the subscriber identification code and the subscriber number correspond. An identification code for identity checking formed using a cryptographic key unknown to the subscriber is transmitted from the mobile radio station to the radio exchange. In the radio exchange, the identification code given by the mobile radio station is decoded using the reverse encryption rule. The calling number (subscriber number) of the associated mobile station is obtained by a decoding operation using the identification code.

不正な識別信号、例えば加入者にとつて知られ
ていない暗号化規則を用いることなく形成された
識別信号も実際には無線交換機において解読さ
れ、移動無線局に識別符号として伝送される。し
かし、このようにして得た識別信号は移動無線局
の加入者番号と対応する識別信号に一致しない。
従つて、受信した識別符号を例えば識別符号受信
機で、磁気カードに記憶された加入者番号と比較
すれば、対応していないことが検知され、達成さ
れた接続が遮断される。 False identification signals, for example those generated without the use of encryption rules unknown to the subscriber, are actually decrypted in the radio exchange and transmitted as an identification code to the mobile radio station. However, the identification signal obtained in this way does not correspond to the identification signal corresponding to the subscriber number of the mobile radio station.
Therefore, if the received identification code is compared, for example in an identification code receiver, with the subscriber number stored on the magnetic card, a non-correspondence is detected and the established connection is interrupted.

しかし、固定の暗号化（符号化）規則を用いる
方法では、無線伝送チヤネルにおける情報の交換
を不認可で盗聴することにより得た不正の識別信
号に対して殆ど何の防護も行うことができない。
無線伝送チヤネルにおける情報の交換が聞き取ら
れると、移動無線局における識別信号発生器や更
には制御装置（識別符号受信機）を操作すること
によりこの移動無線局に対する呼出し料金を無線
伝送システムの他の加入者の料金としてしまうこ
とができる。 However, methods using fixed encryption (encoding) rules provide little protection against fraudulent identification signals obtained by unauthorized eavesdropping on the exchange of information in a wireless transmission channel.
Once the exchange of information in the radio transmission channel is overheard, the call charges for this mobile radio station can be transferred to other parts of the radio transmission system by manipulating the identification signal generator or even the control device (identification code receiver) in the mobile radio station. It can be charged to the subscriber.

他の公共のサービスはテレテキスト伝送システ
ムである。TE KA DE技術報告書（TE KA
DE Technische Mitteilungen）、1980年第21頁
第５章“中継方式図（Verbindungsaufbau）”に
は、加入者からの接続のセツト・アツプがテレビ
ジヨンセツトの遠隔制御を作動させることにより
開始させることが記載されている。加入者局から
テレテキスト交換機へのラインが空いている場
合、テレテキストモデム（変復調装置）に電流を
供給する為に必要なループを閉じた後に、交換機
に割当てられた呼出し番号の自動選択が開始され
る。交換機への接続を行いうる場合には、加入者
局に記憶された加入者番号（識別信号）を加入者
局に設けられた制御装置を経て、テレテキスト交
換機に伝送する。例えばISO（情報標準化機構）
の７ビツト符号の11位までと追加のチエツク・バ
イトとより成る識別信号がテレテキスト交換機に
おいて認可を検査したり、料金の正しい計算を検
査したりすのに用いられている。更に、テレテキ
スト交換機がこれに記憶された情報成分にアクセ
スする前にこのテレテキスト交換機がいわゆる合
言葉（識別符号）を要求する手段を講じうる。 Another public service is the teletext transmission system. TE KA DE Technical Report (TE KA
DE Technische Mitteilungen), 1980, p. 21, Chapter 5, "Relay System Diagram (Verbindungsaufbau)" states that the setup of the connection by the subscriber is initiated by activating the remote control of the television set. has been done. If the line from the subscriber station to the teletext exchange is free, automatic selection of the calling number assigned to the exchange begins after closing the loop necessary to supply current to the teletext modem (modulator/demodulator). be done. If a connection to an exchange is possible, the subscriber number (identification signal) stored in the subscriber station is transmitted to the teletext exchange via a control device installed in the subscriber station. For example, ISO (Information Standards Organization)
An identification signal consisting of the 11th digit of the 7-bit code plus an additional check byte is used in teletext exchanges to check authorization and to check correct calculation of tolls. Furthermore, provision can be made that the teletext exchange requires a so-called secret word (identification code) before it can access the information components stored on it.

この場合も、電話での会話を盗聴するのに用い
られる手法に類似する手法を用いて識別信号（加
入者番号および識別符号）が聞き取られるおそれ
があり、テレテキストモデムの識別信号発生器内
に記憶された識別信号が詐欺の目的で変更される
おそれがある。 In this case, too, the identification signals (subscriber number and identification code) can be overheard using techniques similar to those used to eavesdrop on telephone conversations; There is a risk that the stored identification signal may be altered for fraudulent purposes.

本発明の目的は、メツセージ伝送チヤネルを経
る情報の交換を盗聴することにより不認可で得ら
れるおそれのある識別信号を操作することにより
呼出し料金をメツセージ伝送システムの他の加入
者の料金に加えるのを防止することにある。 It is an object of the present invention to add call charges to the charges of other subscribers of a message transmission system by manipulating identification signals that may be obtained unauthorizedly by eavesdropping on the exchange of information over a message transmission channel. The goal is to prevent

この目的は特許請求の範囲第１項に記載した方
法により達成する。 This object is achieved by the method defined in claim 1.

特許請求の範囲第１項に記載の可変暗号化規則
（ランダム値Ｘ）を用いることにより、メツセー
ジ伝送チヤネルにおける情報の不認可使用を防止
しうる。不正なユーザが複数回の不成功な試みの
後に暗号化規則を不認可で得たとしても、暗号化
規則を異なる規則で置き換えることにより、不正
なユーザがメツセージ伝送システムのサービスを
他の加入者の費用で用いるのを防止することがで
きる。システムの安全性を高める為に、識別信号
の操作による試みが多数回不成功に終わつた後加
入者が交換機（例えばテレツクス交換機）のサー
ビスにアクセスするのを排除するようにすること
ができる。 By using the variable encryption rule (random value X) as claimed in claim 1, unauthorized use of information in the message transmission channel can be prevented. Even if an unauthorized user obtains an encryption rule unauthorized after several unsuccessful attempts, by replacing the encryption rule with a different rule, the unauthorized user can extend the services of the message transmission system to other subscribers. can be prevented from being used at a cost of In order to increase the security of the system, it can be provided that a subscriber is excluded from accessing the services of an exchange (for example a telex exchange) after a number of unsuccessful attempts at manipulating the identification signal.

図面につき本発明を説明する。 The invention will be explained with reference to the drawings.

第１図のブロツク回路は、メツセージ伝送シス
テムの加入者局Ｔおよび交換機Ｚにおいて本発明
による方法に用いる回路を示す。加入者局Ｔおよ
び交換機Ｚはそれぞれ制御装置STTおよびSTZ
を有し、これら制御装置により接続のセツト・ア
ツプを制御する。加入者局Ｔが交換機Ｚのサービ
スを利用したいと望む場合には、交換機Ｚが加入
者局Ｔにその識別信号を送ることを要求する。加
入者局Ｔはこれ自体を識別させる為に、送受（ト
ランシーバ）装置SETにより、識別信号発生器
KG、例えば磁気カード内に記憶された識別符号
をメツセージ伝送チヤネルＬを経て交換機Ｚに伝
送する。これにより伝送される識別信号は識別信
号発生器KGに記憶された加入者番号TNRおよ
び第１識別符号Ｋ１を有する。交換機Ｚにおいて
は、伝送された識別信号を送受装置SEZで受け、
これを制御装置STZに供給し、制御装置STZに
よりこの識別信号を識別信号データフアイルKD
内に記憶した識別信号（加入者番号TNRおよび
第１識別符号Ｋ１）と比較して評価する。 The block circuit of FIG. 1 shows the circuit used for the method according to the invention in a subscriber station T and an exchange Z of a message transmission system. The subscriber station T and the exchange Z have control devices STT and STZ, respectively.
and these controllers control the setup of the connection. When subscriber station T wishes to utilize the services of exchange Z, exchange Z requests subscriber station T to send its identification signal. In order to identify itself, the subscriber station T transmits an identification signal generator using a transceiver device SET.
KG, for example an identification code stored in a magnetic card, is transmitted via a message transmission channel L to an exchange Z. The identification signal thus transmitted has the subscriber number TNR and the first identification code K1 stored in the identification signal generator KG. In exchange Z, the transmitted identification signal is received by the transmitting/receiving device SEZ,
This is supplied to the control device STZ, and the control device STZ converts this identification signal into the identification signal data file KD.
The evaluation is made by comparing it with the identification signal (subscriber number TNR and first identification code K1) stored in the internal memory.

交換機Ｚは次にランダム値Ｘ、すなわちランダ
ムな可変暗号化規則を加入者局Ｔに伝送する。加
入者局Ｔでは、受けた値Ｘをこの加入者局Ｔにお
いて識別信号発生器KG中に記憶された第２識別
符号Ｋ２と一緒に解読装置DTに供給する。解読
装置DTは値Ｘおよび第２識別符号Ｋ２から新た
な値Y*を取出す。この新たな値Y*はメツセージ
伝送チヤネルＬを経て交換機Ｚに伝送され、交換
器Ｚの暗号化装置CE内で計算された新たな値Ｙ
と比較される。これら２つの値ＹおよびY*が一
致すると、加入者は交換機Ｚのサービスを利用し
うる。 The exchange Z then transmits the random value X, ie the random variable encryption rule, to the subscriber station T. In the subscriber station T, the received value X is fed to a decoding device DT together with a second identification code K2 stored in the identification signal generator KG in this subscriber station T. The decoding device DT takes a new value Y * from the value X and the second identification code K2. This new value Y * is transmitted via the message transmission channel L to the exchange Z and the new value Y calculated in the encryption device CE of the exchange Z
compared to If these two values Y and Y * match, the subscriber can utilize the services of exchange Z.

暗号化規則は絶えず変えられているという事
実、すなわち交換機Ｚにおける値Ｘがランダムに
選択されているという事実の為に、不正ユーザが
メツセージ伝送チヤネルＬを経る情報の交換を盗
聴している場合でもこの不正ユーザは加入者局Ｔ
の識別信号を検出しえない。 Due to the fact that the encryption rules are constantly changing, i.e. the value This unauthorized user is subscriber station T.
identification signal cannot be detected.

【図面の簡単な説明】[Brief explanation of the drawing]

第１図は、本発明方法の実施例に用いる回路を
示すブロツク線図である。 Ｔ……加入者局、Ｚ……交換機、STT，STZ
……制御装置、KG……識別信号発生器、SET，
SEZ……送受装置、Ｌ……メツセージ伝送チヤネ
ル、KD……識別信号データフアイル、DT……
解読装置、CE……暗号化装置。 FIG. 1 is a block diagram showing a circuit used in an embodiment of the method of the present invention. T...Subscriber station, Z...Switchboard, STT, STZ
...control device, KG ...identification signal generator, SET,
SEZ...transmitter/receiver, L...message transmission channel, KD...identification signal data file, DT...
Decryption device, CE...encryption device.

Claims (1)

【特許請求の範囲】 １ メツセージ伝送システムにおいて、接続のセ
ツト・アツプ中に、加入者局において記憶された
加入者番号、加入者局の識別符号のような固定デ
ータを交換機において記憶された固定データと比
較し、評価し、加入者局に割当てられた識別信号
の不認可使用を検出するに当たり、 交換機Ｚがランダム値Ｘを伝送し、加入者局Ｔ
において受けた前記のランダム値Ｘを第２識別符
号Ｋ２と一緒に解読装置DTに供給し、この解読
装置によりこれらランダム値および第２識別符号
から新たな値Y*を取出し、この新たな値Y*を交
換機Ｚに伝送し、この交換機において前記の新た
な値Y*を、この交換機で識別信号データフアイ
ルKD内に記憶され前記の加入者局Ｔに割当てら
れた第２識別符号Ｋ２とランダム値Ｘとを組合せ
ることにより解読装置CEの出力端子に形成され
る新たな値Ｙと比較することを特徴とする識別信
号不認可使用検出方法。[Claims] 1. In a message transmission system, during the setup of a connection, fixed data stored in a subscriber station, such as a subscriber number, an identification code of the subscriber station, etc. In comparing and evaluating and detecting unauthorized use of the identification signal assigned to the subscriber station, exchange Z transmits a random value X to subscriber station T.
The above-mentioned random value X received at * to the exchange Z, in which said new value Y * is combined with the second identification code K2 stored in the identification signal data file KD and assigned to said subscriber station T in this exchange and a random value. A method for detecting unauthorized use of an identification signal, characterized in that it is compared with a new value Y formed at the output terminal of a decoding device CE by combining X with X.
JP60060508A 1984-03-24 1985-03-25 Identification signal nonapproved use detecting method Granted JPS60236537A (en)

Applications Claiming Priority (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
DE3410937.4 1984-03-24
DE19843410937 DE3410937A1 (en) 1984-03-24 1984-03-24 Method for identifying the unauthorised use of an identifier

Related Child Applications (2)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
JP5012468A Division JP2759732B2 (en) 1984-03-24 1993-01-28 Identification signal unauthorized use detection method
JP8099331A Division JPH09154177A (en) 1984-03-24 1996-03-27 Mobile radio station

Publications (2)

Publication Number Publication Date
JPS60236537A JPS60236537A (en) 1985-11-25
JPH0548981B2 true JPH0548981B2 (en) 1993-07-23

Family

ID=6231544

Family Applications (3)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
JP60060508A Granted JPS60236537A (en) 1984-03-24 1985-03-25 Identification signal nonapproved use detecting method
JP5012468A Expired - Lifetime JP2759732B2 (en) 1984-03-24 1993-01-28 Identification signal unauthorized use detection method
JP8099331A Pending JPH09154177A (en) 1984-03-24 1996-03-27 Mobile radio station

Family Applications After (2)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
JP5012468A Expired - Lifetime JP2759732B2 (en) 1984-03-24 1993-01-28 Identification signal unauthorized use detection method
JP8099331A Pending JPH09154177A (en) 1984-03-24 1996-03-27 Mobile radio station

Country Status (5)

Country Link
JP (3) JPS60236537A (en)
CA (1) CA1242501A (en)
DE (1) DE3410937A1 (en)
DK (1) DK128585A (en)
FR (1) FR2561841B1 (en)

Families Citing this family (15)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
DE3420874A1 (en) * 1984-06-05 1985-12-05 Licentia Patent-Verwaltungs-Gmbh, 6000 Frankfurt Method and arrangement for monitoring network access in telecommunications networks
DE3619566A1 (en) * 1986-06-11 1987-12-17 Omikron Systemhaus Gesellschft Method and system for data transmission
FR2614162B1 (en) * 1987-04-17 1993-12-10 Flonic Sa ANALOGUE AUTHENTICATION SYSTEM RECIPROCED BETWEEN A TERMINAL AND A TRANSMISSION LINE
ATE85737T1 (en) * 1987-08-14 1993-02-15 Siemens Ag DATA TRANSFER METHOD.
US5239294A (en) * 1989-07-12 1993-08-24 Motorola, Inc. Method and apparatus for authenication and protection of subscribers in telecommunication systems
US5091942A (en) * 1990-07-23 1992-02-25 Ericsson Ge Mobile Communications Holding, Inc. Authentication system for digital cellular communications
DE4223258C3 (en) * 1992-07-15 2001-03-15 Telefunken Microelectron Method for verifiable transmission of data
DE4317143C2 (en) * 1993-05-24 1999-02-18 Deutsche Telekom Mobil Method and device for operating a mobile radio network
DE4335161A1 (en) * 1993-10-15 1995-04-20 Joachim Linz Method and installation for authenticating connections which can be set up via a telephone network
DE4336995A1 (en) * 1993-10-29 1995-05-04 Sel Alcatel Ag Method and device for determining the assignment of a mobile radio device to device lists
DE4416598A1 (en) * 1994-05-11 1995-11-16 Deutsche Bundespost Telekom Securing telecommunication connection against unauthorised use
US5539828A (en) * 1994-05-31 1996-07-23 Intel Corporation Apparatus and method for providing secured communications
DE4445615A1 (en) * 1994-12-21 1996-06-27 Sel Alcatel Ag Confidentiality protection system for communications network
DE19523654A1 (en) * 1995-06-29 1997-01-02 Sel Alcatel Ag Fraud-proof equipment identification method
JPH10281943A (en) * 1997-04-09 1998-10-23 Honda Motor Co Ltd Vehicle diagnosis device

Family Cites Families (22)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
CH516854A (en) * 1969-11-29 1971-12-15 Ciba Geigy Ag Method and device for encrypted transmission of information
DE2536452A1 (en) * 1975-08-16 1977-02-24 Licentia Gmbh Car radio telephone subscriber search system - enables calling subscriber to dial search code to examine memory of local exchange information units
DE2635795B2 (en) * 1975-09-09 1980-08-21 Dasy Inter S.A., Genf (Schweiz) Method and device for checking the authenticity of identification cards and similar documents
US4114139A (en) * 1977-01-25 1978-09-12 International Business Machines Corporation Security controlled information exchange system
US4214230A (en) * 1978-01-19 1980-07-22 Rolf Blom Personal identification system
US4310720A (en) 1978-03-31 1982-01-12 Pitney Bowes Inc. Computer accessing system
LU79726A1 (en) * 1978-05-29 1978-11-28 Eckert R TELESCOPIC FORK
DE3061088D1 (en) * 1979-04-02 1982-12-23 Motorola Inc Method of providing security of data on a communication path
DE2924325B2 (en) * 1979-06-15 1981-06-11 Hermann 7742 St. Georgen Stockburger Method and device for the secret identification and evaluation of machine-readable data carriers
US4349695A (en) * 1979-06-25 1982-09-14 Datotek, Inc. Recipient and message authentication method and system
JPS5829669B2 (en) * 1979-10-22 1983-06-24 日本電信電話株式会社 Mobile communication user-only method
FR2469760A1 (en) * 1979-11-09 1981-05-22 Cii Honeywell Bull METHOD AND SYSTEM FOR IDENTIFYING PEOPLE REQUESTING ACCESS TO CERTAIN MEDIA
US4304990A (en) * 1979-12-11 1981-12-08 Atalla Technovations Multilevel security apparatus and method
DE3000560C2 (en) * 1980-01-09 1986-10-09 Hermann 7742 St Georgen Stockburger Method for checking the authenticity of a data carrier and device for carrying out the method
JPS5915419B2 (en) * 1980-02-01 1984-04-09 日本電信電話株式会社 Method to prevent unauthorized use of mobile devices
DE3012231C2 (en) * 1980-03-28 1987-09-10 Siemens AG, 1000 Berlin und 8000 München Mobile radio network at national level
JPS5888472U (en) * 1981-12-11 1983-06-15 株式会社日立製作所 Terminal identification code verification device
IL64675A0 (en) * 1981-12-30 1982-03-31 Greenberg Avigdor Data verification system
NL8201077A (en) * 1982-03-16 1983-10-17 Philips Nv A COMMUNICATION SYSTEM, CONTAINING A CENTRAL DATA PROCESSING DEVICE, ACCESS STATIONS AND EXTERNAL STATIONS, WHICH A CRYPTOGRAPHIC CHECK IS FORDICULARIZING AN EXTERNAL STATION, AND EXTERNAL STATIONS FOR USE IN SUCH A COMMUNITY.
DE3360917D1 (en) * 1982-03-26 1985-11-07 Gretag Ag Method and apparatus for the enciphered transmission of information
DE3212023A1 (en) * 1982-03-31 1983-10-06 Siemens Ag Active-address-related information system for the administration of mobile communication subscribers
DE3223034C2 (en) * 1982-06-19 1986-12-11 Mico Datensysteme GmbH, 7252 Weil der Stadt Procedure for the detection of counterfeit data carriers

Non-Patent Citations (2)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Title
CRYPTOGRAPHY AND DATA SECURITY=1982 *
CRYPTOGRAPHY:A NEW DIMENSION IN COMPUTER DATA SECURITY=1982 *

Also Published As

Publication number Publication date
CA1242501A (en) 1988-09-27
FR2561841A1 (en) 1985-09-27
DE3410937A1 (en) 1985-10-03
FR2561841B1 (en) 1994-04-01
DE3410937C2 (en) 1991-08-14
JPH09154177A (en) 1997-06-10
DK128585A (en) 1985-09-25
JP2759732B2 (en) 1998-05-28
DK128585D0 (en) 1985-03-21
JPS60236537A (en) 1985-11-25
JPH0715429A (en) 1995-01-17

Similar Documents

Publication Publication Date Title
US4955049A (en) Method of supervising mobile telephone subscriptions in a mobile telephone system
US6173172B1 (en) System and method for preventing the unauthorized use of a mobile communication device
US5335278A (en) Fraud prevention system and process for cellular mobile telephone networks
US5822691A (en) Method and system for detection of fraudulent cellular telephone use
US5778313A (en) Pre-paid cellular telephone system
US5457737A (en) Methods and apparatus to verify the identity of a cellular mobile phone
US5301234A (en) Radiotelephone installation for prepayment operation with security protection
JPS6129294A (en) Method of unauthorized use detection of identified information aligned for mobile radio station in radio transmission system
JPH0548981B2 (en)
US5708710A (en) Method and apparatus for authentication in a communication system
US4531023A (en) Computer security system for a time shared computer accessed over telephone lines
US5809125A (en) Method and apparatus for intercepting potentially fraudulent telephone calls
EP0950230B1 (en) A communications system and method using vehicle identifications
CN101960738A (en) Method and system of providing personal information control service for mobile communication terminal
EP1157582B1 (en) Authentication method for cellular communications systems
US20020081179A1 (en) Smart card of a terminal, a terminal using a smart card, and an improved method for identifying a user by means of a smart card
AU675068B2 (en) Mobile communication terminal device and method of preventing fraudulent information rewriting
CA2432593C (en) Anti-cloning method
US20070142086A1 (en) Method of securing a mobile telephone identifier and corresponding mobile telephone
KR0145380B1 (en) Mobile telecommunication system
JPH10191457A (en) Illegal clone terminal radio equipment detecting method and equipment therefor
JPH05336109A (en) Radio communication system
US4757535A (en) System for encrypted information transmission
KR100258639B1 (en) Public telephone veriging system and the method therefor
JPH06164493A (en) Mobile communication system

Legal Events

Date Code Title Description
EXPY Cancellation because of completion of term