JP7438469B1 - Power information management device, power information management system, power information management method, and program - Google Patents

Abstract

an information storage unit that stores resource identification information that identifies distributed power sources connected to the power distribution system in association with operator identification information that identifies electric power companies or aggregation operators; a tampering determination unit that determines the presence or absence of tampering by comparing the measured value of the distributed power source obtained from the device corresponding to the identification information and stored in the own device with the measured value obtained from the device corresponding to the operator identification information; A power information management device comprising:

Description

The present disclosure relates to a power information management device, a power information management system, a power information management method, and a program.

Current headend systems collect measured values from smart meters, but with the implementation of the "Guidelines for Specified Metering System," the next generation headend system will collect measured values from distributed power sources as well as smart meter values through a dedicated network ( It is expected that the acquisition will be made through Route A (commonly known as Route A).

In Patent Document 1, an aggregator system that remotely and integratedly controls distributed power sources to form a VPP (Virtual Power Plant) compares the measured value of a smart meter on route A with the measured value of a smart meter on route B. discloses a technique for determining whether or not the measured value of a smart meter on Route B has been tampered with.

Japanese Patent Application Publication No. 2018-164244

However, the system described in Patent Document 1 has a problem in that it is not possible to detect tampering with measured values of distributed power sources.

The present disclosure has been made in view of such circumstances, and provides a power information management device, a power information management system, a power information management method, and a program that can detect tampering with measured values of distributed power sources.

This disclosure was made to solve the above-mentioned problems, and one aspect of the present disclosure provides resource identification information that identifies distributed power sources connected to a power distribution system, and resource identification information that identifies distributed power sources connected to a power distribution system, and resource identification information that identifies a power company or aggregation business. an information storage unit that stores identification information in association with each other; an information storage unit that acquires the measured value of the distributed power source from a device corresponding to the aforementioned vendor identification information; and stores the measured value of the distributed power source stored in the own device; The power information management device includes a tampering determination unit that compares a measured value obtained from a device corresponding to vendor identification information to determine whether or not tampering has occurred.

Another aspect of the present disclosure is the power information management device described above, in which the tampering determination unit uses a value obtained by interpolating the measured value obtained from the device corresponding to the vendor identification information. Determine whether or not there has been tampering.

Another aspect of the present disclosure is the power information management device described above, in which when a missing measurement is detected in the measured value of the distributed power source stored in the power information management device, the measured value of the period corresponding to the missing measurement is provided. The apparatus includes a missing measurement complementing unit that acquires the measured value of the distributed power source from the device corresponding to the vendor identification information and complements the measured value of the distributed power source stored in the own device.

Further, another aspect of the present disclosure is the power information management device described above, in which the missing measurement complementing unit uses a value obtained by interpolating the measured value obtained from the device corresponding to the vendor identification information. , complements the measured value of the distributed power source stored in the own device.

Another aspect of the present disclosure is the power information management device described above, in which the information storage unit stores demand information corresponding to the distributed power source in addition to the resource identification information and the vendor identification information. Consumer identification information that identifies the house is stored in association with the customer identification information.

Further, another aspect of the present disclosure is the power information management device described above, in which the information storage unit stores smart information corresponding to the distributed power source in addition to the resource identification information and the vendor identification information. The resource identification information of the meter is associated and stored.

Another aspect of the present disclosure is a power information management system including a power management device and a VPP (Virtual Power Plant) control terminal, wherein the power management device controls distributed power sources connected to a power distribution system. an information storage unit that stores resource identification information to be identified and operator identification information that identifies an electric power company or an aggregation operator in association with each other; a tampering determination unit that determines whether or not tampering has occurred by comparing the measured value of the distributed power source that is acquired and stored in the own device with the measured value acquired from the device corresponding to the vendor identification information; The control terminal transmits the measured value of the distributed power source to the power management device.

Another aspect of the present disclosure is the above-mentioned power information management system, which includes a device corresponding to the aforementioned vendor identification information, a smart meter, and an IoT route terminal, and is compatible with the aforementioned vendor identification information. The device acquires the measured value of the distributed power source from a device that controls the distributed power source via the IoT route terminal and the smart meter.

Another aspect of the present disclosure is a power information management system including a power management device, a smart meter, and an IoT route terminal, wherein the power management device identifies distributed power sources connected to a power distribution system. an information storage unit that stores resource identification information in association with operator identification information that identifies an electric power company or an aggregation operator, and acquires the measured value of the distributed power source from a device corresponding to the operator identification information. and a tampering determination unit that compares the measured value of the distributed power source stored in its own device with the measured value acquired from the device corresponding to the vendor identification information to determine whether or not it has been tampered with. The measured value is transmitted from the device that controls the distributed power source to the power management device via the IoT route terminal and the smart meter.

Another aspect of the present disclosure is the power information management system described above, which includes a device corresponding to the vendor identification information and a VPP (Virtual Power Plant) control terminal, the VPP control terminal comprising: A measured value of the distributed power source is transmitted to a device corresponding to the vendor identification information.

Another aspect of the present disclosure is a step of storing resource identification information that identifies a distributed power source connected to a power distribution system in association with operator identification information that identifies an electric power company or an aggregation operator; A measured value of the distributed power source is obtained from a device corresponding to the aforementioned vendor identification information, and a measured value of the distributed power source stored in the own device is compared with a measured value obtained from the device corresponding to the aforementioned vendor identification information. The power information management method includes a step of determining whether or not the information has been tampered with.

Further, another aspect of the present disclosure is to cause the computer to associate and store resource identification information that identifies distributed power sources connected to a power distribution system and operator identification information that identifies an electric power company or an aggregation operator. an information storage unit, acquiring the measured value of the distributed power source from the device corresponding to the aforementioned vendor identification information, and acquiring the measured value of the distributed power source stored in its own device from the device corresponding to the aforementioned vendor identification information; This is a program for functioning as a tampering determination unit that compares with measured values and determines whether or not tampering has occurred.

The power information management device, power information management system, power information management method, and program of the present disclosure can detect tampering with measured values of distributed power sources.

1 is a schematic block diagram showing the configuration of a power information management system 10 according to a first embodiment of this disclosure. It is a schematic block diagram showing the composition of HES server 500 in the same embodiment. FIG. 2 is a schematic block diagram showing the configuration of an aggregation server 700 in the same embodiment. It is a schematic diagram which shows the relationship example of the resource, the HES server 500, and the aggregation server 700 in the same embodiment. It is an ER diagram explaining the relationship of the information which the measured value storage part 512 and the master storage part 513 in the same embodiment store. It is a table showing an example of metric value information stored in the metric value storage unit 512 in the same embodiment. It is a table showing an example of resource information stored by the master storage unit 513 in the same embodiment. It is a table showing an example of B route provider information stored in the master storage unit 513 in the same embodiment. It is a table showing an example of authentication information stored in the master storage unit 513 in the same embodiment. It is a table showing an example of collation information stored in the master storage unit 513 in the same embodiment. FIG. 7 is a sequence diagram illustrating an example of authentication processing when the HES server 500 connects for communication to the aggregation server 700 in the same embodiment. It is a sequence diagram explaining the processing example of resource information update in the same embodiment. FIG. 6 is a sequence diagram illustrating a processing example of tampering determination by the HES server 500 in the same embodiment. It is a sequence diagram which shows the processing example of the missing data completion of the HES server 500 in the same embodiment. It is a flowchart explaining the process of the update request part 508 in the same embodiment. 5 is a flowchart illustrating the processing of the tampering determination unit 504 in the same embodiment. It is a flowchart explaining the process of the missing measurement complementation part 509 in the same embodiment. It is an ER (Entity Relation) diagram explaining the relationship of information stored in a measured value storage unit 712 and a master storage unit 713 in the same embodiment. It is a table showing an example of metric value information stored in the metric value storage unit 712 in the same embodiment. It is a table showing an example of resource information by customer stored in the master storage unit 713 in the same embodiment. It is a table showing an example of B route application company information stored in the master storage unit 713 in the same embodiment. It is a table showing an example of authentication information stored in the master storage unit 713 in the same embodiment. It is a table showing an example of collation information stored in the master storage unit 713 in the same embodiment. FIG. 7 is a sequence diagram illustrating an example of authentication processing when the aggregation server 700 connects for communication to the HES server 500 in the same embodiment. FIG. 3 is a sequence diagram illustrating an example of processing for updating resource information by consumer in the same embodiment. FIG. 7 is a sequence diagram illustrating a processing example of tampering determination by the aggregation server 700 in the same embodiment. FIG. 7 is a sequence diagram illustrating a processing example of missing data completion by the aggregation server 700 in the same embodiment. It is a flowchart explaining the process of the update request part 708 in the same embodiment. 7 is a flowchart illustrating the processing of the tampering determination unit 704 in the same embodiment. It is a flowchart explaining the process of the missing measurement complementation part 709 in the same embodiment. It is a figure which shows the example of an output screen by the determination result output part 705 in the same embodiment. FIG. 2 is an explanatory diagram illustrating the hardware configuration of each device according to the embodiment.

Hereinafter, a first embodiment of the present disclosure will be described with reference to the drawings. FIG. 1 is a schematic block diagram showing the configuration of a power information management system 10 according to a first embodiment of this disclosure. The power information management system 10 includes a distributed power source 100, a PCS (Power Conditioning System) 200, an IoT route terminal 300, a smart meter 400, a HES (Head End System) server 500 (power information management device), and a VPP (Virtual Power Plant) control. It includes a terminal 600 and an aggregation server 700 (power information management device). Although FIG. 1 shows one distributed power supply 100, one PCS 200, one IoT route terminal 300, one smart meter 400, one HES server 500, one VPP control terminal 600, and one aggregation server 700, there may be a plurality of each.

The distributed power sources 100 are small-scale power generation facilities that are distributed and arranged adjacent to customer areas. The distributed power source 100 may be any power source such as solar power generation, wind power generation, hydroelectric power generation, geothermal power generation, fuel cell, gas turbine, storage battery, electric vehicle, etc. The plurality of distributed power sources 100 are remotely and integratedly controlled by an aggregation company and are used to adjust the supply and demand balance of power.

The PCS 200 controls the distributed power source 100. The PCS 200 provides measured values (for example, the amount of power supplied and the amount of power consumed) of the distributed power source 100. The IoT route terminal 300 acquires the measured value of the distributed power source 100 from the PCS 200 and provides it to the HES server 500 via the smart meter 400. Further, the VPP control terminal 600 acquires the measured value of the distributed power source 100 from the PCS 200 and provides it to the aggregation server 700.

The IoT route terminal 300 relays communication between the PCS 200 and the smart meter 400 using a protocol such as ECHONET Lite (registered trademark). The route from the IoT route terminal 300 to the smart meter 400 is a so-called IoT route.

The smart meter 400 supplies the measured value of the consumer (for example, the amount of power consumed) and the measured value of the distributed power source 100 to the HES server 500. This supply route is the so-called A route. Furthermore, the smart meter 400 can also supply the metered value of the consumer to the aggregation server 700 via the VPP control terminal 600. This supply route is the so-called B route.

The HES server 500 is a server operated by an electric power company, and collects and stores the measured values of consumers and the measured values of the distributed power source 100.

The VPP control terminal 600 is a terminal installed on the consumer side in order for the aggregation company to perform integrated control of the distributed power supply 100, and controls the PCS 200 using a protocol such as ECHONET Lite (registered trademark).

The aggregation server 700 is a server operated by an aggregation company, and collects and stores the measured values of the consumers and the measured values of the distributed power source 100. Note that the aggregation business provides power transmission and distribution businesses with the same functions as power plants by remotely and integratedly controlling the plurality of distributed power sources 100.

FIG. 2 is a schematic block diagram showing the configuration of the HES server 500 in this embodiment. The HES server 500 includes a communication section 501, a measured value collection section 502, an authentication section 503, a tampering determination section 504, a determination result output section 505, an authentication information comparison section 506, an update section 507, an update request section 508, and a missing measurement complement section 509. , a measured value request response generation section 510, a master information update section 511, a measured value storage section 512, and a master storage section 513 (information storage section).

The communication unit 501 communicates with other devices such as the smart meter 400 and the aggregation server 700. Each unit constituting the HES server 500 communicates with other devices via the communication unit 501.

The measured value collection unit 502 acquires the measured values of the consumer and the measured values of the distributed power source 100 from the smart meter 400 and stores them in the measured value storage unit 512. Hereinafter, the combination of PCS 200 and distributed power source 100 that provide measured values, and smart meter 400 will be referred to as a resource.

The authentication unit 503 transmits authentication information to the aggregation server 700 and requests authentication.

The tampering determination unit 504 acquires the metric value of the resource from the aggregation server 700, compares the metric value stored in its own device with the metric value acquired from the aggregation server 700, and determines whether or not it has been tampered with. The metric value of the resource at this time is acquired from the aggregation server 700 corresponding to the aggregation company name (company identification information) that is stored in association with the resource identification information that identifies the resource.

The determination result output unit 505 outputs the determination result by the tampering determination unit 504 to, for example, the operation screen, notification screen, etc. of the HES server 500. The output destination may be a screen of an operation terminal or a maintenance terminal that can communicate with the HES server 500, or may be an audio output.

The authentication information verification unit 506 compares the authentication information received from the aggregation server 700 with verification information stored in the master storage unit 513 to authenticate the aggregation server 700. Authentication information collation unit 506 transmits the authentication result to aggregation server 700.

The update unit 507 receives a resource information update request received from the aggregation server 700 and updates the resource information stored in the master storage unit 513.

The update request unit 508 transmits a request to update customer resource information to the aggregation server 700 when there is a change in the resource information stored in the master storage unit 513.

When the missing measurement compensation unit 509 detects a missing measurement value in the measured value of the distributed power source stored in the measured value storage unit 512, the missing measurement complement unit 509 acquires the measured value for the period corresponding to the missing measurement from the aggregation server 700, and the own device Complement the measured value to be stored. The metric value of the resource at this time is acquired from the aggregation server 700 corresponding to the aggregation business name that is stored in association with resource identification information that identifies the resource.

The metric value request response generation unit 510 reads the metric value information requested by the aggregation server 700 from the metric value storage unit 512 and transmits it to the aggregation server 700.

The master information update unit 511 updates the resource information, B route subscriber information, authentication information, and verification information stored in the master storage unit 513 based on input operations by the operator of the HES server 500 and the like.

The metric value storage unit 512 stores metric value information. The metric value information is information including a resource identification number, a metric time, and a metric value. The resource identification number is information that identifies each of the PCS 200 and the smart meter 400, and may be, for example, an ECHONETLite (registered trademark) protocol number, or a number that combines the manufacturer and product serial number. or other information.

The master storage unit 513 stores resource information, B route provider information, authentication information, and verification information. The resource information is information regarding each resource, and includes a resource identification number (resource identification information), resource type, and aggregation operator name (operator identification information). Furthermore, if the resource type is not a smart meter, the resource information may include the resource identification number of the smart meter 400 to which the resource is connected via the IoT route. The B route provider information is information regarding each smart meter 400, and includes a resource identification number and the name of an aggregation provider through which the smart meter 400 provides measured values on the B route. The authentication information is information regarding each aggregation provider, and includes the aggregation provider name, the IP address of the aggregation server 700, the authentication ID, and the authentication password. The verification information is information that is verified against authentication information during authentication for communication connection with the HES server 500, and includes an authentication ID and an authentication password. The verification information may differ depending on the device communicatively connected to the HES server 500.

FIG. 3 is a schematic block diagram showing the configuration of the aggregation server 700 in this embodiment. The aggregation server 700 includes a communication section 701 , a measurement value collection section 702 , an authentication section 703 , a tampering determination section 704 , a determination result output section 705 , an authentication information comparison section 706 , an update section 707 , an update request section 708 , and a missing measurement complement section 709 , a measured value request response generation section 710, a master information update section 711, a measured value storage section 712, and a master storage section 713 (information storage section).

The communication unit 701 communicates with other devices such as the VPP control terminal 600 and the HES server 500. Each unit configuring the aggregation server 700 communicates with other devices via the communication unit 701.

The measured value collection unit 702 acquires the measured value of the consumer and the measured value of the distributed power source 100 via the VPP control terminal 600, and stores the obtained measured value in the measured value storage unit 712.

The authentication unit 703 transmits authentication information to the HES server 500 and requests authentication.

The tampering determination unit 704 acquires the metric value of the resource from the HES server 500, compares the metric value stored in its own device with the metric value acquired from the HES server 500, and determines whether or not it has been tampered with. The measured value of the resource at this time is acquired from the HES server 500 of the electric power company name (company identification information) that is stored in association with resource identification information that identifies the resource.

The determination result output unit 705 outputs the determination result by the tampering determination unit 704 to, for example, the operation screen or notification screen of the aggregation server 700. The output destination may be a screen of an operation terminal or a maintenance terminal that can communicate with the aggregation server 700, or may be an audio output.

The authentication information verification unit 706 compares the authentication information received from the HES server 500 with verification information stored in the master storage unit 713 to authenticate the HES server 500. Authentication information collation unit 706 transmits the authentication result to HES server 500.

The update unit 707 receives a request to update the resource information by customer received from the HES server 500, and updates the resource information by customer stored in the master storage unit 713.

The update request unit 708 transmits a resource information update request to the HES server 500 when there is a change in the resource information stored in the master storage unit 713.

When the missing measurement complementing unit 709 detects a missing measurement value in the measured value of the distributed power source stored in the measured value storage unit 712, the missing measurement complementing unit 709 acquires the measured value for the period corresponding to the missing measurement from the HES server 500, and the own device Complement the measured value to be stored. The metric value of the resource at this time is acquired from the HES server 500 corresponding to the electric power company name stored in association with resource identification information for identifying the resource.

The metric value request response generation unit 710 reads the metric value information requested by the HES server 500 from the metric value storage unit 712 and transmits it to the HES server 500.

The master information update unit 711 updates the consumer-specific resource information, the B route applicant information, the authentication information, and the collation information stored in the master storage unit 713 based on input operations by the operator of the aggregation server 700 and the like.

The metric value storage section 712 stores metric value information.

The master storage unit 713 stores resource information by consumer, B route application company information, authentication information, and verification information. The consumer-specific resource information is information regarding each resource, and includes a resource identification number, resource type, consumer name, and power company name (company identification information). The B route application company information is information regarding each smart meter 400 that has applied for the B route, and includes a resource identification number and a power company name. The authentication information is information regarding each electric power company, and includes the electric power company name, the IP address of the HES server 500, the authentication ID, and the authentication password. The verification information is information that is verified against the authentication information during authentication for communication connection with the aggregation server 700, and includes an authentication ID and an authentication password. The verification information may differ depending on the device communicatively connected to the aggregation server 700.

FIG. 4 is a schematic diagram showing an example of the relationship between resources, the HES server 500, and the aggregation server 700 in this embodiment. The relationship shown in FIG. 4 is a diagram showing which HES server 500 and aggregation server 700 collects the metric value of each resource. Note that the measured value by the smart meter 400 is the measured value of the consumer, and the measured value by the PCS 200 is the measured value of the distributed power source.

In the example shown in FIG. 4, the measured value by the smart meter 400-1 of the consumer D1 is collected by the HES server 500-A of the electric power company PA and the aggregation server 700-A of the aggregation company AA. Further, the measured value by the PCS 200-1 of the consumer D1 is collected by the HES server 500-A of the power company PA and the aggregation server 700-A of the aggregation company AA.

The measured value by the smart meter 400-2 of the consumer D2 is collected by the HES server 500-A of the power company PA and the aggregation server 700-A of the aggregation company AA. Furthermore, the measured value by the PCS 200-1 of the consumer D2 is collected by the aggregation server 700 -A of the aggregation company AA.

The measured values from the smart meter 400-3 of the consumer D3 are collected by the HES server 500-A of the electric power company PA. Furthermore, the measured value by the PCS 200-3 of the consumer D3 is collected by the HES server 500-A of the electric power company PA and the aggregation server 700-A of the aggregation company AA.

The measured value by smart meter 400-4 of consumer D4 is collected by HES server 500-B of electric power company PB and aggregation server 700-A of aggregation company AA.

The measured value by the smart meter 400-5 of the consumer D5 is collected by the HES server 500-A of the electric power company PA and the aggregation server 700-B of the aggregation company AB. Furthermore, the measured value by PCS 200-5 of consumer D5 is collected by -B of aggregation server 700 of aggregation company AB.

In this way, the measured value by the PCS 200 is not necessarily collected by the HES server 500, but when it is collected by the HES server 500, the measured value by the smart meter 400 of the same consumer as the PCS 200 is collected. The information is collected by the HES server 500 that is currently in use. Furthermore, the aggregation server 700 that collects the measured values from the PCS 200 also collects the measured values from the smart meters 400 of the same consumer as the PCS 200.

FIG. 5 is an ER (Entity Relationship) diagram illustrating the relationship between information stored in the measured value storage unit 512 and the master storage unit 513 in this embodiment. One element of resource information 513-1 includes a key resource identification number, resource type, aggregation provider name, and resource identification number (smart meter 400 connected to IoT route). One element of resource information 513-1 is associated with multiple elements of metric value information 512-1. One element of metric value information 512-1 includes a key resource identification number, a metric time, and a metric value.

Further, one element of resource information 513-1 is associated with zero or one element of B route provider information 513-2. One element, the B route provider information 513-2, includes key resource identification information and an aggregation provider name. One-factor authentication information 513-3 is associated with one-factor or multiple-factor B route provider information 513-2. One factor of authentication information 513-3 includes a key aggregation company name, an IP address, an authentication ID, and an authentication password.

Further, one element of verification information 513-4 includes an authentication ID and an authentication password, which are keys.

FIG. 6 is a table showing an example of metric value information stored in the metric value storage unit 512 in this embodiment. In the example of FIG. 6, the measured value storage unit 512 associates the resource identification number "0xFE99999901", the measured time "2023/1/16 10:00", and the measured value "100" as the measured value information. Remember. Similarly, the metric value storage unit 512 stores the resource identification number "0xFE99999901", the metric time "2023/1/16 10:30", and the metric value "150" in association with each other. The metric value storage unit 512 stores the resource identification number "0xFE99999911", the metric time "2023/1/16 10:00", and the metric value "200" in association with each other. The metric value storage unit 512 stores the resource identification number “0xFE99999902,” the metric time “2023/1/16 10:00,” and the metric value “50” in association with each other.

The metric value storage unit 512 stores the resource identification number "0xFE99999903", the metric time "2023/1/16 10:00", and the metric value "60" in association with each other. The metric value storage unit 512 stores the resource identification number "0xFE99999913", the metric time "2023/1/16 10:00", and the metric value "120" in association with each other. The metric value storage unit 512 stores the resource identification number "0xFE99999905", the metric time "2023/1/16 10:00", and the metric value "20" in association with each other.

FIG. 7 is a table showing an example of resource information stored in the master storage unit 513 in this embodiment. In the example of FIG. 7, the master storage unit 513 stores, as resource information, the resource identification number "0xFE99999901", the resource type "SM", the aggregation provider name "aggregation provider AA", and the resource identification number (IoT route connection smart meter 400) is stored in association with "-". Note that the resource identification number (smart meter 400 connected to the IoT route) "-" indicates that there is no corresponding smart meter 400. In addition, the master storage unit 513 similarly stores the resource identification number "0xFE99999911", the resource type "storage battery", the aggregation company name "aggregation company AA", and the resource identification number (smart meter 400 connected to the IoT route). It is stored in association with "0xFE99999901".

The master storage unit 513 stores the resource identification number "0xFE99999902", the resource type "SM", the aggregation provider name "aggregation provider AA", and the resource identification number (smart meter 400 connected to IoT route) "-". Correlate and memorize. The master storage unit 513 associates the resource identification number "0xFE99999903", the resource type "SM", the aggregation provider name "-", and the resource identification number (smart meter 400 connected to the IoT route) "-". Remember. The aggregation company name "-" indicates that there is no aggregation company (aggregation server 700) that collects the metric values of the corresponding resource.

The master storage unit 513 stores the resource identification number "0xFE99999913", the resource type "storage battery", the aggregation provider name "aggregation provider AA", and the resource identification number (smart meter 400 connected to the IoT route) "0xFE99999903". Correlate and memorize. The master storage unit 513 stores the resource identification number "0xFE99999905", the resource type "SM", the aggregation provider name "aggregation provider AB", and the resource identification number (smart meter 400 connected to the IoT route) "-". Correlate and memorize.

FIG. 8 is a table showing an example of B route provider information stored in the master storage unit 513 in this embodiment. In the example of FIG. 8, the master storage unit 513 stores the resource identification number "0xFE99999901" and the aggregation provider name "aggregation provider AA" in association with each other as B route provider information. Similarly, the master storage unit 513 stores the resource identification number "0xFE99999902" and the aggregation company name "aggregation company AA" in association with each other. The master storage unit 513 stores the resource identification number "0xFE99999905" and the aggregation company name "aggregation company AB" in association with each other.

FIG. 9 is a table showing an example of authentication information stored in the master storage unit 513 in this embodiment. In the example of FIG. 9, the master storage unit 513 stores the aggregation company name "Aggregation company AA", the IP address "222.111.111.111", and the authentication ID "AGG-A" as authentication information. The authentication password "AGG-A-PASSWORD" is stored in association with the authentication password "AGG-A-PASSWORD". Similarly, the master storage unit 513 stores the aggregation business name "Aggregation business AB", the IP address "222.222.222.222", the authentication ID "AGG-B", and the authentication password "AGG-B-". PASSWORD" are stored in association with each other.

FIG. 10 is a table showing an example of collation information stored in the master storage unit 513 in this embodiment. In the example of FIG. 10, the master storage unit 513 stores an authentication ID "HES-A" and an authentication password "HES-A-PASSWORD" in association with each other as verification information.

FIG. 11 is a sequence diagram illustrating an example of authentication processing when the HES server 500 connects for communication to the aggregation server 700 in this embodiment. The communication unit 501 transmits HTTP Get() to the communication unit 701 (sequence Sh1). When the communication unit 701 receives Get( ) of sequence Sh1, since the HES server 500 is not authenticated, it returns 401 Unauthorized indicating authentication failure to the communication unit 501 (sequence Sh2).

In response to 401 Unauthorized in sequence Sh2, the communication unit 501 requests the authentication unit 503 to obtain authentication information including the IP address of the aggregation server 700 (sequence Sh3). The authentication unit 503 receives the authentication information acquisition request in sequence Sh3, refers to the authentication information 513-3 in the master storage unit 513 (sequence Sh4), and determines the IP address included in the authentication information acquisition request. Authentication information (authentication ID, authentication password) is acquired (sequence Sh5). The authentication unit 503 returns the acquired authentication information to the communication unit 501 as a response to sequence Sh3 (sequence Sh6).

When the communication unit 501 receives the authentication information in sequence Sh6, it transmits Get( ) including the authentication information to the communication unit 701 (sequence Sh7). When the communication unit 701 receives Get() including the authentication information in sequence Sh7, it passes a verification request including the authentication information to the authentication information verification unit 706 (sequence Sh8). Upon receiving the verification request in sequence Sh8, authentication information verification section 706 refers to verification information 713-4 in master storage section 713 (sequence Sh9) and acquires verification information (sequence Sh10).

Next, the authentication information matching unit 706 calls a process for matching the authentication information received in sequence Sh8 with the matching information obtained in sequence Sh10 (sequence Sh11), and obtains the matching result (sequence Sh12). Here, since the authentication information and the collation information match, the authentication information collation unit 706 returns the matching result of the collation to the communication unit 701 as a response to sequence Sh8 (sequence Sh13). Upon receiving the matching result of the sequence Sh13, the communication unit 701 transmits 200 OK indicating authentication to the communication unit 501 as a response to the sequence Sh7 (sequence Sh14).

FIG. 12 is a sequence diagram illustrating an example of resource information update processing in this embodiment. When the distributed power source 100 to be aggregated is added, the measured value collection unit 502 or the master information update unit 511 adds a resource (addition of resource information of one element) to the resource information 513-1 of the master storage unit 513. request (sequence Si1). Master storage unit 513 receives the resource addition request in sequence Si1, adds the resource to resource information 513-1, and then notifies update request unit 508 of the resource addition (sequence Si2). At this time, the information added to the resource information 513-1 includes the resource identification number, resource type, and resource identification number (IoT route connection SM), but does not include the aggregation provider name. Note that the aggregation provider name is included in the resource addition request.

Upon receiving the notification of sequence Si2, the update request unit 508 acquires the resource identification number (smart meter 400 connected to the IoT route) of the added resource information (hereinafter referred to as update information) for the resource information 513-1. (sequence Si3). The master storage unit 513 acquires the resource identification number requested in sequence Sbi from the resource information 513-1 and returns it to the update request unit 508 (sequence Si4).

Upon receiving the resource identification number of sequence Si4, the update requesting unit 508 updates the authentication information 513-3 of the master storage unit 513 with the IP address associated with the aggregation operator name included in the added resource information. Request for acquisition (sequence Si5). The master storage unit 513 acquires the IP address requested in sequence Si5 from the authentication information 513-3 and returns it to the update request unit 508 (sequence Si6). Note that in sequence Si6, in addition to the IP address, the authentication ID and authentication password are also passed to the update request unit 508.

The update request unit 508 requests the communication unit 501 to update the update information (sequence Si7). At this time, the IP address, authentication ID, and authentication password passed to the update request unit 508 in sequence Si6 are also passed to the communication unit 501, and the update information includes the resource identification number received in sequence Si4, that is, the information of the smart meter 400. Include the resource identification number. The communication unit 501 receives the update request in sequence Si7 and requests authentication from the communication unit 701 (sequence Si8). At this time, the communication unit 501 uses the passed IP address, authentication ID, and authentication password. The communication unit 701 authenticates the HES server 500 in the same manner as the authentication process shown in FIG. 11 (sequence Si9), and returns 200 OK to the communication unit 501 (sequence Si10).

When the communication unit 501 receives 200 OK in sequence Si10, it transmits update information to the communication unit 701 using HTTP Put() (sequence Si11). Upon receiving the update information of sequence Si11, the communication unit 701 issues an update request including the update information to the update unit 707 (sequence Si12). When the update unit 707 receives an update request including the update information of sequence Si12, it issues an update request including the update information to the customer-specific resource information 713-1 of the master storage unit 713 (sequence Si13). When the master storage unit 713 has consumer-specific resource information 713-1 whose resource identification number matches the update information, the master storage unit 713 stores the power company name of the HES server 500 that has transmitted the update information as the consumer-specific resource. Add to information 713-1. Note that, when the master storage unit 713 does not have the customer-specific resource information 713-1 whose resource identification number matches the update information, it does not perform additional writing to the customer-specific resource information 713-1.

When the master storage unit 713 updates the consumer resource information 713-1 by adding the electric power company name in response to the update request of sequence Si13, the master storage unit 713 sends the update result (in this case, update success) to the update unit 707. return (sequence Si14). When the update unit 707 receives the update result of the sequence Si14, it returns the update result to the communication unit 701 as a response to the update request of the sequence Si12 (sequence Si15). When the communication unit 701 receives the update result of sequence Si15, it returns the update result to the communication unit 501 as a response to the Put of sequence Si11 (sequence Si16).

When the communication unit 501 receives the update result of sequence Si16, it returns the update result to the update request unit 508 as a response to the update request of sequence Si7 (sequence Si17). When the update request unit 508 receives the update result of sequence Si17, since the update result is a successful update, it adds the aggregation provider name to the resource information 513-1 of the master storage unit 513 (sequence Si18). The master storage unit 513 returns the update result of the additional writing to the update request unit 508 (sequence Si19). Note that if the update result is a successful update, it means that the aggregation server 700 with the aggregation company name has stored the same resource identification number, that is, the aggregation server 700 has collected the measured values of the same distributed power source 100 via route B. Therefore, the update request unit 508 adds the aggregation provider name in the resource information requested to be added to the resource information 513-1. If the update result is not a successful update (update failure), the aggregation server 700 with the aggregation provider name does not store the same resource identification number, that is, the aggregation server 700 stores the measured value of the same distributed power source 100 in route B. Since this is a case where it cannot be confirmed that the resource information is being collected, the update requesting unit 508 does not add the aggregation provider name in the resource information requested to be added to the resource information 513-1.

FIG. 13 is a sequence diagram showing a processing example of tampering determination by the HES server 500 in this embodiment. First, the tampering determination unit 504 specifies the resource identification number of the PCS 200 of the distributed power source 100 for which tampering is to be determined, and stores the aggregation operator name associated with the resource identification number in the resource information 513- of the master storage unit 513. 1 (sequence Sk1, Sk2). Next, the tampering determination unit 504 acquires the IP address, authentication ID, and authentication password associated with the acquired aggregation company name from the authentication information 513-3 of the master storage unit 513 (sequences Sk3 and Sk4).

The tampering determination unit 504 requests the communication unit 501 for a resource identification number for which tampering determination is to be made and measurement value information for the target period (sequence Sk5). At this time, the tampering determination unit 504 also passes the IP address, authentication ID, and authentication password acquired in sequences Sk3 and Sk4 to the communication unit 501. Thereafter, sequences Sk6 to Sk14 are the same as sequences Sj10 to Sj18 in FIG. 26, if the missing period is replaced with the target period.

The communication unit 501 returns the metric value information returned in sequence Sk14 to the tampering determination unit 504 as a response to the request in sequence Sk5 (sequence Sk15). When the tampering determination unit 504 receives the measurement value information in sequence Sk15, it calls determination processing (sequence Sk16). In the determination process, the tampering determination unit 504 acquires the resource identification number for which tampering determination is to be made and the metric value of the target period from the metric value information 512-1 of the metric value storage unit 512 (sequences Sk17 and Sk18), and uses the acquired metric value. The value information is compared with the measured value information returned in sequence Sk15 to determine whether it has been tampered with (sequence Sk19).

Note that when determining tampering in sequence Sk19, the tampering determination unit 504 determines whether the measurement time of the measurement value information acquired from the aggregation server 700 is the collection cycle of the measurement value information stored in the measurement value storage unit 512. If it does not match the collection starting point timing, tampering may be determined using a value obtained by interpolating the measured value obtained from the aggregation server 700. Specifically, the tampering determination unit 504 may perform the determination as follows.

a) When the collection period is the same but the collection start point timing is different - The measured value of the aggregation server 700 is interpolated (linear interpolation etc.) in accordance with the collection start point timing of the HES server 500 and used for tampering determination.
b) When the collection periods are different and the collection starting point timing is the same - The metric value at the timing of the least common multiple of the collection periods is used for tampering determination.
・Interpolate the long-period measurement value to match the cycle of the short-period measurement value (linear interpolation, etc.) and use it for falsification determination.
c) When the collection period is different and the collection starting point timing is also different - The measured values collected at the same time are used for tampering determination.
・Interpolate short-cycle measurement values (linear interpolation, etc.) to match the long-cycle collection timing and use it for tampering detection.

FIG. 14 is a sequence diagram showing a processing example of missing data completion by the HES server 500 in this embodiment. The missing data complementing unit 509 specifies the resource identification number and period and calls the missing data confirmation process (sequence Sj1). In the missing measurement confirmation process, the missing measurement complementing unit 509 acquires the specified resource identification number and period metric information from the metric information 512-1 of the metric value storage unit 512 (sequences Sj2 and Sj3), and calculates the metric value. Check whether the measurement time of the information is in a predetermined cycle. If the predetermined cycle does not occur even in part, the missing measurement complementing unit 509 sets the period where the predetermined cycle does not occur as a missing period (sequence Sj4).

When the missing data period is determined, the missing data complementing unit 509 acquires the aggregation operator name to be stored in association with the specified resource identification number from the resource information 513-1 of the master storage unit 513 (sequences Sj5 and Sj6). ). Next, the missing data completion unit 509 acquires the IP address, authentication ID, and authentication password that are stored in association with the acquired aggregation company name from the authentication information 513-3 of the master storage unit 513 (sequences Sj7 and Sj8). ).

The missing measurement complementing unit 509 requests the communication unit 501 for the specified resource identification number and measurement value information for the missing measurement period (sequence Sj9). At this time, the missing measurement complementing unit 509 also passes the IP address, authentication ID, and authentication password acquired in sequences Sj7 and Sj8 to the communication unit 501. The communication unit 501 performs authentication processing with the communication unit 701 using the passed IP address, authentication ID, and authentication password in the same manner as in FIG. 11 (sequences Sj10, Sj11, and Sj12).

When the authentication process is completed, the communication unit 501 transmits Get( ) including the resource identification number and missing period requested in sequence Sj9 to the communication unit 701 (sequence Sj13). When the communication unit 701 receives Get( ) in sequence Sj13, it requests the metric value request response generation unit 710 for the resource identification number and metric value information of the missing period that were included in Get() (sequence Sj14 ). The metric value request response generation unit 710 acquires metric value information from the metric value storage unit 712 in accordance with the request (sequences Sj15 and Sj16).

The metric value request response generation unit 710 returns the acquired metric value information to the communication unit 701 as a response to sequence Sj14 (sequence Sj17). The communication unit 701 returns the measurement value information returned in sequence Sj17 to the communication unit 501 as a response to Get( ) in sequence Sj13 (sequence Sj18). The communication unit 501 returns the measurement value information returned in sequence Sj18 to the missing measurement complementation unit 509 as a response to the request in sequence Sj9 (sequence Sj19).

When the measurement value information is returned in sequence Sj19, the missing measurement complementation unit 509 calls a missing measurement completion process (sequence Sj20), and uses the measurement value information to complement the missing part of the measurement value information 512-1. (sequences Sj21, Sj22), and the missing data completion process ends (sequence Sj23).

In addition, when the missing measurement part 509 complements the missing part in sequence Sj21, the measurement time of the measurement value information acquired from the aggregation server 500 is the collection of measurement value information stored in the measurement value storage unit 512. When the period and the collection starting point timing do not match, the metric value may be complemented using a value obtained by interpolating the metric value obtained from the aggregation server 500. Specifically, the missing measurement complementing unit 509 may perform complementation as follows. Note that the collection cycle is the interval between measurement times of the measurement value information. The collection starting point timing indicates which time the measurement time of the metric value information is the starting point of the collection cycle.

a) When the collection period is the same but the collection start point timing is different - The measurement value of the aggregation server 700 is interpolated (linear interpolation etc.) in accordance with the collection start point timing of the HES server 500 and used for missing measurement compensation.
b) When the collection periods are different and the collection starting point timing is the same - The metric value at the timing of the least common multiple of the collection periods is used to compensate for missing measurements.
・Use short-period measurement values to fill in missing measurements for long-period measurement values.
・Interpolate long-period measured values according to the period of short-period measured values (linear interpolation, etc.) and use it to fill in missing measurements.
c) When the collection period is different and the collection starting point timing is also different - Use the measured value of the timing of collection at the same time and use it to compensate for missing data.
・Interpolate short-cycle measurement values (linear interpolation, etc.) according to the long-cycle collection timing and use them to fill in missing measurements.

FIG. 15 is a flowchart illustrating the processing of the update request unit 508 in this embodiment. First, the update requesting unit 508 obtains the resource identification number of the smart meter 400 connected to the distributed power source 100 to be updated via the IoT route from the resource information 513-1 (resource table) (step Sl1). Next, the update requesting unit 508 obtains, from the resource table, the name of the aggregation company that the smart meter 400 with the resource identification number obtained in step Sl1 provides route B (step Se2). Next, the update requesting unit 508 determines whether or not the aggregation provider name that was acquired in step Sl2 is present in the resource table (step Sl3). Note that the update requesting unit 708 determines that the aggregation operator name is present when the aggregation operator name can be acquired in step Sl2, and determines that the aggregation operator name does not exist when the aggregation operator name cannot be acquired. Good too.

If it is determined that the aggregation company name exists (step Sl3-Yes), the update request unit 508 updates the IP address (destination IP address) associated with the electric power company name from the authentication information 513-3 (authentication information table). ) is obtained (step Sl4). Next, the update request unit 508 transmits the update information of the distributed power source 100 to the aggregation server 700 of the IP address acquired in step Sl4 (step Sl5). Note that the update information for the distributed power source 100 may be information for adding the distributed power source 100, or may be information for updating information regarding the distributed power source.

Next, the update request unit 508 obtains the update result from the aggregation server 700 (step Sl6). Next, the update request unit 508 refers to the obtained update result and determines whether the information on the distributed power source 100 has been updated in the aggregation server 700 (step Sl7). Note that the update request unit 508 determines that the information on the distributed power source 100 has been updated if the update result is a success, and determines that the information on the distributed power source 100 has not been updated if the update result is a failure. You can.

If it is determined that the information on the distributed power source 100 has been updated (Step Sl7-Yes), the update request unit 508 updates the aggregation provider name of the resource to be updated in the resource table to the aggregation provider name obtained in Step Sl2. (Step Sl8). If it is determined in Step Sl3 that there is no aggregation operator name (Step Sl3-No), or if it is determined in Step Sl7 that the information on the distributed power source 100 has not been updated (Step Sl7-No), the update request unit 508 , ends the process.

FIG. 16 is a flowchart illustrating the processing of the missing data complementing unit 509 in this embodiment. First, the missing measurement complementing unit 509 refers to the metric information 512-1 (metric value table), calculates the missing period in the target resource and period, and determines whether there is a missing period (step Sm1). If it is determined that there is a missing period (step Sm1 - Yes), the missing data completion unit 509 refers to the resource table and acquires the aggregation provider name corresponding to the target resource, thereby determining the aggregation provider name. The presence or absence of is determined (step Sm2).

If it is determined that the aggregation company name exists (Step Sm2-Yes), the missing data completion unit 509 determines the IP address (destination IP address) associated with the electric power company name obtained in Step Sm2 from the authentication information table. (Step Sm3). Next, the missing data complementing unit 509 requests the aggregation server 700 of the IP address obtained in step Sm3 to obtain the measured value (missing value) of the missing data period (step Sm4). Next, the missing measurement complementing unit 509 obtains the result of the request in step Sm4 (step Sm5).

Next, the missing measurement complementing unit 509 determines whether or not the result obtained in step Sm5 includes a metric value that complements the missing measurement (step Sm6). If it is determined that there is a metric value (missing complement value) that complements the missing measurement (step Sm6-Yes), the missing measurement complementing unit 509 registers the missing measurement complement value in the metric value table (step Sm7).

On the other hand, if it is determined in step Sm1 that there is no missing period (step Sm1-none), if it is determined in step Sm2 that there is no aggregation operator name (step Sm2-none), there is no missing complemented value in step Sm6. If it is determined that (step Sm6-No), the missing measurement complementing unit 509 ends the process.

FIG. 17 is a flowchart illustrating the processing of the tampering determination unit 504 in this embodiment. First, the tampering determination unit 504 determines the presence or absence of the aggregation operator name by acquiring the aggregation operator name corresponding to the target resource for tampering determination from the resource table (step Sn1). If it is determined that the aggregation provider name exists (step Sn1 - Yes), the tampering determination unit 504 determines the IP address (destination IP address) associated with the aggregation provider name obtained in step Sn1 from the authentication information table. Acquire (step Sn2).

Next, the tampering determination unit 504 requests the aggregation server 700 of the IP address acquired in step Sn2 for metric value information for the period covered by the tampering determination (step Sn3). Next, the tampering determination unit 504 obtains the request result of step Sn3 (step Sn4). Next, the tampering determination unit 504 determines the presence or absence of the measurement value information included in the request result obtained in step Sn4 (step Sn5). If it is determined that there is metric value information included in the request result (step Sn5 - present), the tampering determination unit 504 acquires metric value information for the target period from the metric value table (step Sn6).

Next, the tampering determination unit 504 determines whether or not the metric value information for the target period was acquired in step Sn6, that is, the presence or absence of the metric value information for the target period (step Sn7). If it is determined that there is measurement value information for the target period (step Sn7 - present), the tampering determination unit 504 compares the measurement value information determined to be present in step Sn5 and the measurement value information determined to be present in step Sn7. Then, it is determined whether there is a difference between them (step Sn8). Note that, for example, in a case where one of the measurement values is calculated by interpolation, the tampering determination unit 504 determines whether the difference is within a predetermined range even if these measurement value information do not completely match. If there is, it may be determined that there is no difference.

If it is determined that there is no difference (step Sn8 - none), the tampering determination unit 504 determines that there is no tampering (step Sn9). Further, when it is determined that there is a difference (step Sn8--present), the tampering determination unit 504 determines that there is falsification (step Sn11).

Furthermore, if it is determined in step Sn5 that there is no measurement value information (step Sn5-absent), and if it is determined that there is no measurement value information in step Sn7 (step Sn7-absent), the tampering determination unit 504 determines the target period. Update and return to step Sn3. Further, if it is determined in step Sn1 that there is no aggregation provider name (step Sn1-none), the tampering determination unit 504 ends the process.

FIG. 18 is an ER diagram illustrating the relationship between the information stored in the measured value storage section 712 and the master storage section 713 in this embodiment. One element of consumer-specific resource information 713-1 includes a key resource identification number, resource type, consumer name, and electric power company name. A plurality of elements of metric value information 712-1 are associated with one element of consumer-specific resource information 713-1. One element of metric value information 712-1 includes a key resource identification number, a metric time, and a metric value.

Furthermore, zero or one element of B route application business operator information 713-2 is associated with one element of consumer-specific resource information 713-1. The B route applicant information 713-2, which is one element, includes key resource identification information and a power company name. One-factor authentication information 713-3 is associated with one-factor or multiple-factor B route applicant information 713-2. The one-factor authentication information 713-3 includes a key power company name, an IP address, an authentication ID, and an authentication password.

Further, one element of verification information 713-4 includes an authentication ID and an authentication password, which are keys.

FIG. 19 is a table showing an example of metric value information stored in the metric value storage section 712 in this embodiment. In the example of FIG. 19, the metric value storage unit 712 associates the resource identification number "0xFE99999901", the metric time "2023/1/16 10:00", and the metric value "100" as the metric value information. Remember. Similarly, the metric value storage unit 712 stores the resource identification number "0xFE99999901", the metric time "2023/1/16 10:30", and the metric value "150" in association with each other. The metric value storage unit 712 stores the resource identification number "0xFE99999911", the metric time "2023/1/16 10:00", and the metric value "200" in association with each other. The metric value storage unit 712 stores the resource identification number "0xFE99999902", the metric time "2023/1/16 10:00", and the metric value "110" in association with each other.

The metric value storage unit 712 stores the resource identification number "0xFE99999912", the metric time "2023/1/16 10:00", and the metric value "50" in association with each other. The metric value storage unit 712 stores the resource identification number "0xFE99999913", the metric time "2023/1/16 10:00", and the metric value "40" in association with each other. The metric value storage unit 712 stores the resource identification number "0xFE99999904", the metric time "2023/1/16 10:00", and the metric value "30" in association with each other.

FIG. 20 is a table showing an example of customer-specific resource information stored in the master storage unit 713 in this embodiment. In the example of FIG. 20, the master storage unit 713 stores the resource identification number "0xFE99999901", the resource type "SM", the consumer name "consumer D1", and the power company name "power company" as resource information for each consumer. PA'' are stored in association with each other. Note that the resource type "SM" represents a smart meter. In addition, the master storage unit 713 similarly stores the resource identification number "0xFE99999911", the resource type "storage battery", the consumer name "consumer D1", and the power company name "power company PA" in association with each other. do. Note that the resource type "storage battery" indicates that the distributed power source 100 controlled by the PCS 200 is a storage battery.

The master storage unit 713 stores a resource identification number "0xFE99999902", a resource type "SM", a consumer name "consumer D2", and a power company name "power company PA" in association with each other. The master storage unit 713 stores a resource identification number "0xFE99999912", a resource type "storage battery", a consumer name "consumer D2", and a power company name "-" in association with each other. The electric power company name "-" indicates that there is no electric power company (HES server 500) that collects the measured values of the corresponding resource.

The master storage unit 713 stores a resource identification number "0xFE99999913", a resource type "storage battery", a consumer name "consumer D3", and a power company name "power company PA" in association with each other. The master storage unit 713 stores a resource identification number "0xFE99999904", a resource type "SM", a consumer name "consumer D4", and a power company name "power company PB" in association with each other.

FIG. 21 is a table showing an example of route B application company information stored in the master storage unit 713 in this embodiment. In the example of FIG. 21, the master storage unit 713 stores the resource identification number "0xFE99999901" and the power company name "power company PA" in association with each other as the B route applicant information. Similarly, the master storage unit 713 stores the resource identification number "0xFE99999902" and the power company name "power company PA" in association with each other. The master storage unit 713 stores the resource identification number "0xFE99999904" and the power company name "power company PB" in association with each other.

FIG. 22 is a table showing an example of authentication information stored in the master storage unit 713 in this embodiment. In the example of FIG. 22, the master storage unit 713 stores, as authentication information, the power company name "power company PA", the IP address "111.111.111.111", the authentication ID "HES-A", and the authentication password. It is stored in association with "HES-A-PASSWORD". Similarly, the master storage unit 713 stores the power company name "power company PB", the IP address "111.222.222.222", the authentication ID "HES-B", and the authentication password "HES-B-PASSWORD". and stored in association with each other.

FIG. 23 is a table showing an example of collation information stored in the master storage unit 713 in this embodiment. In the example of FIG. 23, the master storage unit 713 stores an authentication ID "AGG-A" and an authentication password "AGG-A-PASSWORD" in association with each other as verification information.

FIG. 24 is a sequence diagram illustrating an example of authentication processing when the aggregation server 700 connects for communication to the HES server 500 in this embodiment. The communication unit 701 transmits Get() of HTTP (Hypertext Transfer Protocol) to the communication unit 501 (sequence Sa1). When the communication unit 501 receives Get() of sequence Sa1, since the aggregation server 700 is not authenticated, it returns 401 Unauthorized indicating authentication failure to the communication unit 701 (sequence Sa2).

In response to 401 Unauthorized in sequence Sa2, communication unit 701 requests authentication unit 703 to obtain authentication information including the IP address of HES server 500 (sequence Sa3). Upon receiving the request for obtaining authentication information in sequence Sa3, the authentication section 703 refers to the authentication information 713-3 in the master storage section 713 (sequence Sa4) and determines the IP address included in the request for obtaining authentication information. Authentication information (authentication ID, authentication password) is acquired (sequence Sa5). The authentication unit 703 returns the acquired authentication information to the communication unit 701 as a response to sequence Sa3 (sequence Sa6).

When the communication unit 701 receives the authentication information of sequence Sa6, it transmits Get( ) including the authentication information to the communication unit 501 (sequence Sa7). When the communication unit 501 receives Get() including the authentication information in sequence Sa7, it passes a verification request including the authentication information to the authentication information verification unit 506 (sequence Sa8). Upon receiving the verification request of sequence Sa8, authentication information verification section 506 refers to verification information 513-4 in master storage section 513 (sequence Sa9) and acquires verification information (sequence Sa10).

Next, the authentication information collation unit 506 calls a process for collating the authentication information received in sequence Sa8 with the collation information obtained in sequence Sa10 (sequence Sa11), and obtains a collation result (sequence Sa12). Here, since the authentication information and the collation information match, the authentication information collation unit 506 returns a matching result of the collation to the communication unit 501 as a response to sequence Sa8 (sequence Sa13). Upon receiving the matching result of sequence Sa13, communication unit 501 transmits 200 OK indicating authentication to communication unit 701 as a response to sequence Sa7 (sequence Sa14).

FIG. 25 is a sequence diagram illustrating an example of processing for updating resource information by customer in this embodiment. When a distributed power source 100 to be aggregated is added, the measured value collection unit 702 or the master information update unit 711 adds resources to the consumer-specific resource information 713-1 in the master storage unit 713 (one element (addition of resource information) (sequence Sb1). Master storage unit 713 receives the request for resource addition in sequence Sb1, adds consumer-specific resource information, and then notifies update request unit 708 of the resource addition (sequence Sb2). Note that the items to be additionally recorded by the master storage unit 713 are the resource identification number, resource type, and consumer name, and the electric power company name is not included at this timing. Note that the power company name is included in the resource addition request.

Upon receiving the notification of sequence Sb2, the update requesting unit 708 updates the customer-specific resource information 713-1 with the same demand as the customer name of the added customer-specific resource information (hereinafter referred to as update information). A request is made to acquire the power company name and resource identification number associated with the family name and resource type "SM" (sequence Sb3). The master storage unit 713 acquires the power company name and resource identification number requested in sequence Sb3 from the customer-specific resource information 713-1, and returns them to the update request unit 708 (sequence Sb4).

For example, if the content of the customer-specific resource information 713-1 is the example shown in FIG. refers to the resource identification number "0xFE99999904", the resource type "SM", the consumer name "consumer D4", and the power company name "power company PB" in the resource information 713-1 for each customer. PB and 0xFE99999904 are returned to the update request unit 708.

Upon receiving the power company name and resource identification number in sequence Sb4, the update requesting unit 708 requests the authentication information 713-3 of the master storage unit 713 to acquire the IP address associated with the power company name. (Sequence Sb5). The master storage unit 713 acquires the IP address requested in sequence Sb5 from the authentication information 713-3 and returns it to the update request unit 708 (sequence Sb6). Note that in sequence Sb6, in addition to the IP address, the authentication ID and authentication password are also passed to the update request unit 708.

The update request unit 708 requests the communication unit 701 to update the update information (sequence Sb7). At this time, the IP address, authentication ID, and authentication password passed to the update request unit 708 in sequence Sb6 are also passed to the communication unit 701, and the update information includes the resource identification number received in sequence Sb4, that is, the smart meter 400. Include the resource identification number. The communication unit 701 receives the update request of sequence Sb7 and requests authentication from the communication unit 501 (sequence Sb8). At this time, the communication unit 701 uses the passed IP address, authentication ID, and authentication password. The communication unit 501 authenticates the aggregation server 700 in the same manner as the authentication process shown in FIG. 24 (sequence Sb9), and returns 200 OK to the communication unit 701 (sequence Sb10).

When the communication unit 701 receives 200 OK in sequence Sb10, it transmits update information to the communication unit 501 using HTTP Put() (sequence Sb11). Upon receiving the update information of sequence Sb11, the communication unit 501 issues an update request including the update information to the update unit 507 (sequence Sb12). When the update unit 507 receives an update request including the update information of sequence Sb12, it issues an update request including the update information to the resource information 513-1 of the master storage unit 513 (sequence Sb13). When the master storage unit 513 has resource information 513-1 whose resource identification number matches the update information, the master storage unit 513 stores the aggregation provider name of the aggregation server 700 that has transmitted the update information in the resource information 513-1. Append. Note that when the master storage unit 513 does not have resource information 513-1 whose resource identification number matches the update information, it does not perform additional writing to the resource information 513-1.

When the master storage unit 513 updates the resource information 513-1 by adding the aggregation provider name in response to the update request of sequence Sb13, it returns the update result (in this case, update success) to the update unit 507 ( Sequence Sb14). Upon receiving the update result of sequence Sb14, the update unit 507 returns the update result to the communication unit 501 as a response to the update request of sequence Sb12 (sequence Sb15). When the communication unit 501 receives the update result of sequence Sb15, it returns the update result to the communication unit 701 as a response to the Put of sequence Sb11 (sequence Sb16).

When the communication unit 701 receives the update result of sequence Sb16, it returns the update result to the update request unit 708 as a response to the update request of sequence Sb7 (sequence Sb17). Upon receiving the update result of sequence Sb17, the update request unit 708 adds the electric power company name to the customer-specific resource information 713-1 of the master storage unit 713 since the update result is a successful update (sequence Sb18). . The master storage unit 713 returns the update result of the additional writing to the update request unit 708 (sequence Sb19). Note that if the update result is a successful update, it means that the HES server 500 with the power company name has stored the same resource identification number, that is, the HES server 500 has collected the measured values of the same distributed power source 100 via the IoT route. Therefore, the update requesting unit 708 adds the electric power company name in the customer-specific resource information whose addition is requested to the customer-specific resource information 713-1. If the update result is not a successful update (update failure), the HES server 500 with the power company name does not store the same resource identification number. Since this is a case where it cannot be confirmed that the information has been collected, the update requesting unit 708 does not add the electric power company name in the customer-specific resource information that has been requested to be added to the customer-specific resource information 713-1.

FIG. 26 is a sequence diagram illustrating a processing example of tampering determination by the aggregation server 700 in this embodiment. First, the tampering determination unit 704 specifies the resource identification number of the PCS 200 of the distributed power source 100 for which tampering determination is to be made, and stores the power company name associated with the resource identification number in the customer-specific resource information in the master storage unit 713. 713-1 (sequences Sd1, Sd2). Next, the tampering determination unit 704 acquires the IP address, authentication ID, and authentication password associated with the acquired power company name from the authentication information 713-3 of the master storage unit 713 (sequences Sd3 and Sd4).

The tampering determination unit 704 requests the communication unit 701 for a resource identification number for which tampering determination is to be made and measurement value information for the target period (sequence Sd5). At this time, the tampering determination unit 704 also passes the IP address, authentication ID, and authentication password acquired in sequences Sd3 and Sd4 to the communication unit 701. Thereafter, sequences Sd6 to Sd14 are the same as sequences Sc10 to Sc18 in FIG. 13, if the missing period is replaced with the target period.

The communication unit 701 returns the measurement value information returned in sequence Sd14 to the tampering determination unit 704 as a response to the request in sequence Sd5 (sequence Sd15). When the tampering determination unit 704 receives the measurement value information in sequence Sd15, it calls determination processing (sequence Sd16). In the determination process, the tampering determination unit 704 acquires the resource identification number for which tampering determination is to be made and the metric value of the target period from the metric value information 712-1 of the metric value storage unit 712 (sequences Sd17 and Sd18), and uses the acquired metric value. The value information is compared with the measured value information returned in sequence Sd15 to determine whether it has been tampered with (sequence Sd19).

Note that when determining tampering in sequence Sd19, the tampering determination unit 704 determines whether the measurement time of the measurement value information acquired from the HES server 500 is equal to the collection cycle of the measurement value information stored in the measurement value storage unit 712. When it does not match the collection starting point timing, tampering may be determined using a value obtained by interpolating the measured value obtained from the HES server 500. Specifically, the tampering determination unit 704 may perform the determination as follows.

a) When the collection period is the same but the collection start point timing is different - The measured value of the HES server 500 is interpolated (linear interpolation etc.) in accordance with the collection start point timing of the aggregation server 700 and used for tampering determination.
b) When the collection periods are different and the collection starting point timing is the same - The metric value at the timing of the least common multiple of the collection periods is used for tampering determination.
・Interpolate the long-period measurement value to match the cycle of the short-period measurement value (linear interpolation, etc.) and use it for falsification detection.
c) When the collection period is different and the collection starting point timing is also different - The measured values collected at the same time are used for tampering determination.
・Interpolate short-cycle measurement values (linear interpolation, etc.) to match the long-cycle collection timing and use it for tampering detection.

FIG. 27 is a sequence diagram illustrating an example of processing for missing data completion by the aggregation server 700 in this embodiment. The missing data complementing unit 709 specifies the resource identification number and period and calls the missing data confirmation process (sequence Sc1). In the missing measurement confirmation process, the missing measurement complementing unit 709 acquires the specified resource identification number and period metric information from the metric information 712-1 of the metric value storage unit 712 (sequences Sc2 and Sc3), and calculates the metric value. Check whether the measurement time of the information is in a predetermined cycle. If the predetermined cycle is not present even in part, the missing measurement complementing unit 709 sets the period for which the predetermined cycle is not equal to the missing period (sequence Sc4).

When the missing period is determined, the missing data complementing unit 709 acquires the electric power company name to be stored in association with the specified resource identification number from the consumer-specific resource information 713-1 in the master storage unit 713 (sequence Sc5). , Sc6). Next, the missing measurement complementing unit 709 acquires the IP address, authentication ID, and authentication password that are stored in association with the acquired power company name from the authentication information 713-3 of the master storage unit 713 (sequences Sc7 and Sc8). .

The missing measurement complementing unit 709 requests the communication unit 701 for the specified resource identification number and measurement value information for the missing measurement period (sequence Sc9). At this time, the missing measurement complementing unit 709 also passes the IP address, authentication ID, and authentication password acquired in sequences Sc7 and Sc8 to the communication unit 701. The communication unit 701 performs authentication processing with the communication unit 501 using the passed IP address, authentication ID, and authentication password in the same manner as in FIG. 24 (sequences Sc10, Sc11, and Sc12).

When the authentication process is completed, the communication unit 701 transmits Get( ) including the resource identification number and missing period requested in sequence Sc9 to the communication unit 501 (sequence Sc13). When the communication unit 501 receives Get() in sequence Sc13, it requests the metric value request response generation unit 510 for the resource identification number included in Get() and the metric value information for the missing period (sequence Sc14). ). The metric value request response generation unit 510 acquires metric value information from the metric value storage unit 512 in accordance with the request (sequences Sc15 and Sc16).

The metric value request response generation unit 510 returns the acquired metric value information to the communication unit 501 as a response to sequence Sc14 (sequence Sc17). The communication unit 501 returns the measurement value information returned in sequence Sc17 to the communication unit 701 as a response to Get() in sequence Sc13 (sequence Sc18). The communication unit 701 returns the measurement value information returned in sequence Sc18 to the missing measurement complementation unit 709 as a response to the request in sequence Sc9 (sequence Sc19).

When the measurement value information is returned in sequence Sc19, the missing measurement complementation unit 709 calls a missing measurement compensation process (sequence Sc20), and uses the measurement value information to complement the missing part of the measurement value information 712-1. (Sequences Sc21, Sc22), and the missing measurement completion process is ended (Sequence Sc23).

Note that when complementing the missing part in sequence Sc21, the missing measurement complementing unit 709 determines that the measurement time of the measurement value information acquired from the HES server 500 is the collection of measurement value information stored in the measurement value storage unit 712. When the period and the collection starting point timing do not match, the measured value may be supplemented using a value obtained by interpolating the measured value obtained from the HES server 500. Specifically, the missing measurement complementing unit 709 may perform complementation as follows. Note that the collection cycle is the interval between measurement times of the measurement value information. The collection starting point timing indicates which time the measurement time of the metric value information is the starting point of the collection cycle. Note that the interpolation process refers to calculating the metric value at the metric time T3 by linear interpolation or the like using at least the metric value at the metric time T1 and the metric value at the measurement time T2.

a) When the collection period is the same but the collection start point timing is different - The measured value of the HES server 500 is interpolated (linear interpolation etc.) in accordance with the collection start point timing of the aggregation server 700 and used for missing measurement compensation.
b) When the collection periods are different and the collection starting point timing is the same - The metric value at the timing of the least common multiple of the collection periods is used to compensate for missing measurements.
・Use short-period measurement values to fill in missing measurements for long-period measurement values.
・Interpolate long-period measured values according to the period of short-period measured values (linear interpolation, etc.) and use it to fill in missing measurements.
c) When the collection period is different and the collection starting point timing is also different - Use the measured value of the timing of collection at the same time and use it to compensate for missing data.
・Interpolate short-cycle measurement values (linear interpolation, etc.) according to the long-cycle collection timing and use them to fill in missing measurements.

FIG. 28 is a flowchart illustrating the processing of the update request unit 708 in this embodiment. First, the update requesting unit 708 obtains the customer name of the distributed power source 100 to be updated from the customer-specific resource information 713-1 (consumer-specific resource table) (step Se1). Next, the update requesting unit 708 obtains the power company name of the resource type "SM" linked to the same consumer name in the consumer resource table (step Se2). Next, the update requesting unit 708 determines whether or not the electric power company name that was acquired in step Se2 is present in the consumer resource table (step Se3). Note that in step Se2, the update requesting unit 708 may determine that the electric power company name is present when the electric power company name can be acquired, and may determine that the electric power company name is not present when the electric power company name cannot be acquired.

If it is determined that the electric power company name exists (step Se3-Yes), the update request unit 708 updates the IP address (destination IP address) associated with the electric power company name from the authentication information 713-3 (authentication information table). (Step Se4). Next, the update requesting unit 708 transmits the update information of the distributed power source 100 to the HES server 500 at the IP address obtained in step Se4 (step Se5). Note that the update information for the distributed power source 100 may be information for adding the distributed power source 100, or may be information for updating information regarding the distributed power source.

Next, the update request unit 708 obtains the update result from the HES server 500 (step Se6). Next, the update request unit 708 refers to the obtained update result and determines whether the information on the distributed power source 100 has been updated in the HES server 500 (step Se7). Note that if the update result is a success, the update request unit 708 determines that the information on the distributed power source 100 has been updated, and if the update result is a failure, it determines that the information on the distributed power source 100 has not been updated. You can.

If it is determined that the information on the distributed power source 100 has been updated (Step Se7-Yes), the update request unit 708 changes the power company name of the resource to be updated in the consumer resource table to the power company name obtained in Step Se2. Update (step Se8). If it is determined in step Se3 that there is no electric power company name (step Se3-No), or if it is determined in step Se7 that the information on the distributed power source 100 has not been updated (step Se7-No), the update request unit 708: Finish the process.

FIG. 29 is a flowchart illustrating the processing of the tampering determination unit 704 in this embodiment. First, the tampering determination unit 704 determines the presence or absence of the power company name by acquiring the name of the power company corresponding to the target resource for tampering determination from the consumer resource table (step Sg1). If it is determined that the electric power company name is present (step Sg1 - present), the tampering determination unit 704 acquires the IP address (destination IP address) associated with the electric power company name acquired in step Sg1 from the authentication information table. (Step Sg2).

Next, the tampering determination unit 704 requests the HES server 500 of the IP address acquired in step Sg2 for metric value information for the period covered by the tampering determination (step Sg3). Next, the tampering determination unit 704 obtains the request result of step Sg3 (step Sg4). Next, the tampering determination unit 704 determines the presence or absence of the measurement value information included in the request result obtained in step Sg4 (step Sg5). If it is determined that there is metric value information included in the request result (step Sg5 - present), the tampering determination unit 704 acquires metric value information for the target period from the metric value table (step Sg6).

Next, the tampering determination unit 704 determines whether or not the metric value information for the target period was acquired in step Sg6, that is, the presence or absence of the metric value information for the target period (step Sg7). If it is determined that there is measurement value information for the target period (step Sg7 - present), the tampering determination unit 704 compares the measurement value information determined to be present in step Sg5 and the measurement value information determined to be present in step Sg7. Then, it is determined whether there is a difference between them (step Sg8). Note that, for example, in the case where one of the measurement values is calculated by interpolation, the tampering determination unit 704 determines whether the difference is within a predetermined range even if these measurement value information do not completely match. If there is, it may be determined that there is no difference.

If it is determined that there is no difference (step Sg8 - none), the tampering determination unit 704 determines that there is no tampering (step Sg9). Further, if it is determined that there is a difference (step Sg8 - present), the tampering determination unit 704 determines that there is tampering (step Sg11).

Further, if it is determined in step Sg5 that there is no measurement value information (step Sg5-absent) and if it is determined that there is no measurement value information in step Sg7 (step Sg7-absent), the tampering determination unit 704 determines the target period. Update and return to step Sg3. Further, if it is determined in step Sg1 that there is no electric power company name (step Sg1-absent), the tampering determination unit 704 ends the process.

FIG. 30 is a flowchart illustrating the processing of the missing data complementing unit 709 in this embodiment. First, the missing measurement complementing unit 709 refers to the metric information 712-1 (metric value table), calculates the missing period in the target resource and period, and determines whether there is a missing period (step Sf1). If it is determined that there is a missing period (step Sf1 - Yes), the missing data complementing unit 709 refers to the customer-specific resource table and obtains the name of the power company corresponding to the target resource. The presence or absence of the name is determined (step Sf2).

If it is determined that the electric power company name exists (step Sf2-Yes), the missing data completion unit 709 acquires the IP address (destination address) associated with the electric power company name acquired in step Sf2 from the authentication information table. (Step Sf3). Next, the missing data complementing unit 709 requests the HES server 500 of the IP address obtained in step Sf3 to obtain the measured value (missing value) of the missing data period (step Sf4). Next, the missing measurement complementing unit 709 obtains the result of the request in step Sf4 (step Sf5).

Next, the missing measurement complementing unit 709 determines whether or not there is a metric value that complements the missing measurement in the result obtained in step Sf5 (step Sf6). If it is determined that there is a metric value (missing complement value) that complements the missing measurement (step Sf6-Yes), the missing measurement complementing unit 709 registers the missing measurement complement value in the metric value table (step Sf7).

On the other hand, if it is determined in step Sf1 that there is no missing period (step Sf1-none), if it is determined in step Sf2 that there is no electric power company name (step Sf2-none), if there is no missing value complemented value in step Sf6, If determined (step Sf6-No), the missing measurement complementing unit 709 ends the process.

FIG. 31 is a diagram showing an example of an output screen by the determination result output unit 705 in this embodiment. The example in FIG. 31 is an output screen when the tampering determining unit 704 determines that tampering has occurred. The output screen in Figure 31 displays "Notification time: yyyy:mm:dd hh:mm:ss", which is the year, month, day, hour, minute, and second of notification of tampering detection, and "Resource identification", which indicates the resource of the measured value for which tampering was detected. number: 0xFE99999911", "resource type: storage battery" indicating the type of the resource, and "consumer name: consumer D1" indicating the consumer corresponding to the resource. The output screen of the determination result output unit 505 may also be similar to that shown in FIG. 31.

FIG. 32 is an explanatory diagram illustrating the hardware configuration of each device according to this embodiment.
Each device is a PCS 200, an IoT route terminal 300, a smart meter 400, a HES server 500, a VPP control terminal 600, and an aggregation server 700. Each device is configured to include an input/output module I, a storage module M, and a control module P. The input/output module I is realized by including some or all of a communication module H11, a connection module H12, a pointing device H21, a keyboard H22, a display H23, a button H3, a microphone H41, a speaker H42, a camera H51, or a sensor H52. . The storage module M is implemented including a drive H7. The storage module M may further include part or all of the memory H8. The control module P is implemented including a memory H8 and a processor H9. These hardware components are communicably connected to each other via a bus, and are supplied with power from a power source H6.

The connection module H12 is a digital input/output port such as a USB (Universal Serial Bus). In the case of a mobile device, the pointing device H21, keyboard H22, and display H23 are touch panels. The sensor H52 is an acceleration sensor, a gyro sensor, a GPS receiving module, a proximity sensor, or the like. The power supply H6 is a power supply unit that supplies electricity necessary to operate each device. In the case of a portable device, the power source H6 is a battery. The drive H7 is an auxiliary storage medium such as a hard disk drive or solid state drive. The drive H7 may be a nonvolatile memory such as an EEPROM or a flash memory, or a magneto-optical disk drive or a flexible disk drive. Further, the drive H7 is not limited to one built into each device, and may be an external storage device connected to a connector of the connection module H12, for example. Memory H8 is a main storage medium such as random access memory. Note that the memory H8 may be a cache memory. Memory H8 stores instructions as they are executed by one or more processors H9. Processor H9 is a CPU (central processing unit). Processor H9 may be an MPU (microprocessing unit) or a GPU (graphics processing unit). The processor H9 executes instructions stored in one or more memories H8 by reading programs and various data from the drive H7 via the memory H8 and performing calculations.

Input/output module I includes PCS 200, IoT route terminal 300, smart meter 400, HES server 500, VPP control terminal 600, aggregation server 700 PCS 200, IoT route terminal 300, smart meter 400, HES server 500, VPP control terminal 600, aggregation server 700 etc. The storage module M realizes the measured value storage sections 512 and 712 and the master storage sections 513 and 713. The control module P is used to implement each part of the HES server 500 and the aggregation server 700. In addition, in this specification etc., PCS200, IoT route terminal 300, smart meter 400, HES server 500, VPP control terminal 600, aggregation server 700PCS200, IoT route terminal 300, smart meter 400, HES server 500, VPP control terminal 600, The description of the aggregation server 700 may be replaced with the description of the control module P.

In addition, in the above-mentioned embodiment, although it was explained that the measured value is the amount of electricity, it may also include the amount of gas or water used. The smart meter 400 may transmit the usage amount of gas or water to the aggregation server 700 using route B. Alternatively, the VPP control terminal 600 may transmit the usage amount of gas or water to the aggregation server 700 without using route B.
Further, although the power company name is used as the information for identifying the power company, other information such as the power company identification number may be used. Although the aggregation company name is used as the information for identifying the aggregation company, other information such as the identification number of the aggregation company may be used. Although the customer name was used as the information for identifying the customer, other information such as the customer's identification number may be used.

Further, the following embodiments may be used.
(1) One embodiment includes an information storage unit that stores resource identification information for identifying distributed power sources connected to a power distribution system and operator identification information for identifying an electric power company or an aggregation operator in association with each other; The measured value of the distributed power source is obtained from the device corresponding to the aforementioned vendor identification information, and the measured value of the distributed power source stored in the own device is compared with the measured value obtained from the device corresponding to the aforementioned vendor identification information. The power information management device includes a tampering determination unit that determines whether or not tampering has occurred.

(2) Further, another embodiment is the power management device according to (1), in which the tampering determination unit is configured to interpolate the measured value obtained from the device corresponding to the vendor identification information. The presence or absence of tampering is determined using .

(3) Further, in another embodiment, in the power management device according to (1) or (2), when a missing measurement value is detected in the measured value of the distributed power source stored in the own device, the power management device The apparatus further includes a missing measurement complementing unit that acquires a measured value for a period corresponding to the measurement from the device corresponding to the vendor identification information and complements the measured value of the distributed power source stored in the own device.

(4) Further, another embodiment is the power management device according to any one of (1) to (3), in which the missing measurement complementing unit acquires information from a device corresponding to the vendor identification information. The measured value of the distributed power source stored in the own device is complemented using the value obtained by interpolating the measured value.

(5) Another embodiment is the power management device according to any one of (1) to (4), in which the information storage unit stores the resource identification information and the vendor identification information. In addition, customer identification information for identifying a customer corresponding to the distributed power source is stored in association with the customer identification information.

(6) Another embodiment is the power management device according to any one of (1) to (4), in which the information storage unit stores the resource identification information and the vendor identification information. In addition, resource identification information of smart meters corresponding to the distributed power sources is stored in association with each other.

(7) Another embodiment is a power information management system including a power management device and a VPP (Virtual Power Plant) control terminal, wherein the power management device is a distributed power source connected to a power distribution system. an information storage unit that stores resource identification information that identifies the power company and operator identification information that identifies the electric power company or aggregation operator; and a device that stores the measured values of the distributed power source in correspondence with the operator identification information. a tampering determination unit that determines whether or not tampering has occurred by comparing the measured value of the distributed power source obtained from the device and stored in the own device with the measured value obtained from the device corresponding to the vendor identification information, The VPP control terminal is a power information management system that transmits measured values of the distributed power sources to the power management device.

(8) Another embodiment is the power information management system described in (7), which includes a device corresponding to the vendor identification information described above, a smart meter, and an IoT route terminal. A device corresponding to the vendor identification information acquires the measured value of the distributed power source from a device that controls the distributed power source via the IoT route terminal and the smart meter.

(9) Another embodiment is a power information management system including a power management device, a smart meter, and an IoT route terminal, wherein the power management device controls distributed power sources connected to a power distribution system. an information storage unit that stores resource identification information to be identified and operator identification information that identifies an electric power company or an aggregation operator in association with each other; a tampering determination unit that determines whether or not there has been tampering by comparing the measured value of the distributed power source obtained and stored in the own device with the measured value obtained from the device corresponding to the vendor identification information; In the power information management system, the measured value of the power source is transmitted from the device that controls the distributed power source to the power management device via the IoT route terminal and the smart meter.

(10) Another embodiment is the power information management system according to (9), which includes a device corresponding to the vendor identification information and a VPP (Virtual Power Plant) control terminal, The VPP control terminal transmits the measured value of the distributed power source to the device corresponding to the vendor identification information.

(11) Another embodiment includes the step of storing resource identification information for identifying distributed power sources connected to a power distribution system in association with operator identification information for identifying an electric power company or an aggregation operator. , the measured value of the distributed power source is acquired from the device corresponding to the aforementioned vendor identification information, and the measured value of the distributed power source is stored in the own device, and the measured value obtained from the device corresponding to the aforementioned vendor identification information. This power information management method includes a step of comparing the information and determining whether or not there has been tampering.

(12) In another embodiment, the computer stores resource identification information that identifies a distributed power source connected to a power distribution system and business identification information that identifies a power company or an aggregation business in association with each other. an information storage unit that acquires the measured value of the distributed power source from the device corresponding to the vendor identification information, and acquires the measured value of the distributed power source stored in its own device from the device corresponding to the vendor identification information; This is a program that functions as a tampering determination unit that compares the measured value with the measured value and determines whether or not it has been tampered with.

Furthermore, a program for realizing the functions of the HES server 500 and the aggregation server 700 in FIG. 1 may be recorded on a computer-readable recording medium, and the program recorded on the recording medium may be read into a computer system and executed. The HES server 500 and the aggregation server 700 may be realized by this. Note that the "computer system" herein includes hardware such as an OS and peripheral devices.

Furthermore, the term "computer-readable recording medium" refers to portable media such as flexible disks, magneto-optical disks, ROMs, and CD-ROMs, and storage devices such as hard disks built into computer systems. Furthermore, a "computer-readable recording medium" refers to a storage medium that dynamically stores a program for a short period of time, such as a communication line when transmitting a program via a network such as the Internet or a communication line such as a telephone line. It also includes devices that retain programs for a certain period of time, such as volatile memory inside a computer system that serves as a server or client. Further, the above-mentioned program may be one for realizing a part of the above-mentioned functions, or may be one that can realize the above-mentioned functions in combination with a program already recorded in the computer system.

Although the embodiment of this disclosure has been described above in detail with reference to the drawings, the specific configuration is not limited to this embodiment, and includes design changes within the scope of the gist of this disclosure.

10 Power information management system 100 Distributed power source 200 PCS
300 IoT route terminal 400 Smart meter 500 HES server 501 Communication unit 502 Measured value collection unit 503 Authentication unit 504 Tampering determination unit 505 Judgment result output unit 506 Authentication information collation unit 507 Update unit 508 Update request unit 509 Missing measurement complement unit 510 Measured value Request response generation unit 511 Master information update unit 512 Measured value storage unit 513 Master storage unit 600 VPP control terminal 700 Aggregation server 701 Communication unit 702 Measured value collection unit 703 Authentication unit 704 Tampering determination unit 705 Judgment result output unit 706 Authentication information collation unit 707 Update unit 708 Update request unit 709 Missing measurement complement unit 710 Measured value request response generation unit 711 Master information update unit 712 Measured value storage unit 713 Master storage unit

Claims (11)

an information storage unit that stores resource identification information that identifies a distributed power source connected to a power distribution system and operator identification information that identifies an electric power company or an aggregation operator in association with each other;
A measured value of the distributed power source is obtained from a device corresponding to the aforementioned vendor identification information, and a measured value of the distributed power source stored in the own device is compared with a measured value obtained from the device corresponding to the aforementioned vendor identification information. and a tampering determination unit that determines whether or not there has been tampering ,
The tampering determination unit is a power information management device that determines whether or not tampering has occurred using a value obtained by interpolating the measured value obtained from the device corresponding to the vendor identification information. If a missing measurement is detected in the measured value of the distributed power source stored in the own device, the measured value for the period corresponding to the missing measurement is acquired from the device corresponding to the vendor identification information, and the measured value stored in the own device is The power information management device according to claim 1, further comprising a missing measurement complement unit that complements measured values of the distributed power sources. The missing measurement complementing unit complements the measured value of the distributed power source stored in the own device using a value obtained by interpolating the measured value obtained from the device corresponding to the vendor identification information . power information management device. The information storage unit stores, in addition to the resource identification information and the vendor identification information, customer identification information for identifying a customer corresponding to the distributed power source in association with each other. 3. The power information management device according to any one of 3 . 4. The information storage unit stores resource identification information of a smart meter corresponding to the distributed power source in association with each other in addition to the resource identification information and the vendor identification information. The power information management device described in the above item. A power information management system comprising a power information management device and a VPP (Virtual Power Plant) control terminal,
The power information management device includes:
an information storage unit that stores resource identification information that identifies a distributed power source connected to a power distribution system and operator identification information that identifies an electric power company or an aggregation operator in association with each other;
A measured value of the distributed power source is obtained from a device corresponding to the aforementioned vendor identification information, and a measured value of the distributed power source stored in the own device is compared with a measured value obtained from the device corresponding to the aforementioned vendor identification information. and a tampering determination unit that determines whether or not there has been tampering,
The VPP control terminal transmits the measured value of the distributed power source to the power information management device ,
The tampering determination unit determines the presence or absence of tampering using a value obtained by interpolating the measured value obtained from the device corresponding to the vendor identification information.
Power information management system. Equipped with a device corresponding to the aforementioned vendor identification information, a smart meter, and an IoT route terminal,
The device corresponding to the vendor identification information obtains the measured value of the distributed power source from the device that controls the distributed power source via the IoT route terminal and the smart meter.
The power information management system according to claim 6 . A power information management system comprising a power information management device, a smart meter, and an IoT route terminal,
The power information management device includes:
an information storage unit that stores resource identification information that identifies a distributed power source connected to a power distribution system and operator identification information that identifies an electric power company or an aggregation operator in association with each other;
A measured value of the distributed power source is obtained from a device corresponding to the aforementioned vendor identification information, and a measured value of the distributed power source stored in the own device is compared with a measured value obtained from the device corresponding to the aforementioned vendor identification information. and a tampering determination unit that determines whether or not there has been tampering,
The tampering determination unit determines the presence or absence of tampering using a value obtained by interpolating the measured value obtained from the device corresponding to the vendor identification information,
The measured value of the distributed power source is transmitted from a device that controls the distributed power source to the power information management device via the IoT route terminal and the smart meter.
Power information management system. Equipped with a device corresponding to the aforementioned vendor identification information and a VPP (Virtual Power Plant) control terminal,
The VPP control terminal transmits the measured value of the distributed power source to a device corresponding to the vendor identification information.
The power information management system according to claim 8 . storing resource identification information that identifies distributed power sources connected to the power distribution system in association with operator identification information that identifies an electric power company or an aggregation operator;
A measured value of the distributed power source is obtained from a device corresponding to the aforementioned vendor identification information, and a measured value of the distributed power source stored in the own device is compared with a measured value obtained from the device corresponding to the aforementioned vendor identification information. and determining whether or not there is tampering ,
In the determining step, the presence or absence of falsification is determined using a value obtained by interpolating the measured value obtained from the device corresponding to the vendor identification information.
Power information management method. computer,
an information storage unit that stores resource identification information for identifying distributed power sources connected to the power distribution system and operator identification information for identifying electric power companies or aggregation operators in association with each other;
A measured value of the distributed power source is obtained from a device corresponding to the aforementioned vendor identification information, and a measured value of the distributed power source stored in the own device is compared with a measured value obtained from the device corresponding to the aforementioned vendor identification information. A program for functioning as a tampering determination unit that determines whether or not tampering has occurred .
The tampering determination unit determines the presence or absence of tampering using a value obtained by interpolating the measured value obtained from the device corresponding to the vendor identification information.
program .

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