JP7360306B2 - Communication system for automatic train operation - Google Patents

Description

The present invention relates to a communication system for automatic train operation, and particularly to a technique useful for use in a communication system for automatic train operation using a public wireless communication network.

In the field of railway signal safety systems, advances in information network technology have led to improvements in signal control and operation management using commercial communication networks, which have been followed for a long time, and in train driving support systems. However, since commercial communication networks are mainly used for signal security systems, wireless communication using licensed frequency bands uses a modulation method that lowers the coding rate and prioritizes connectivity. The communication speed was limited to several Mbps. Therefore, in the conventional method, when expanding to new uses such as automatic train operation, which has been actively researched for practical use in recent years, it is necessary to obtain permission to use a new commercial radio frequency each time. In addition to prolonging the development period, it is also necessary to rebuild the system from the communication infrastructure, which requires a lot of time and cost for application development.

Therefore, it is conceivable to use a public wireless network capable of large-capacity transmission as a communication network to realize autonomous driving, but a public wireless communication network is a closed area network with equipment used for secure data communication. Management (security measures) is complex. In addition, area quality control of wireless base stations and recovery in the event of an abnormality are outsourced to external operators, making the system vulnerable. There is an issue of risk for business operators. Note that, as a technique for improving security performance in a communication system, there is an invention described in Patent Document 1, for example.

JP2008-252567A

The invention of the communication system described in Patent Document 1 includes a communication terminal having communication path establishment means for establishing a communication path on a network, and one or more relay devices that relay the communication path, and the communication terminal , comprising: an authentication information requesting means for requesting the relay device to transmit authentication information; and an establishment permission means for permitting the communication path establishment means to establish a communication path when the authentication information from the relay device is appropriate; The communication terminal is equipped with authentication information transmitting means for transmitting authentication information in response to a transmission request from a communication terminal.

However, in the communication system of Patent Document 1, communication safety deteriorates if the authentication information is not properly managed, and when the invention of Patent Document 1 is applied to a railway automatic train driving system, the authentication information is Since management, that is, security measures, depends on the management ability of an external network administrator, there is a problem in that risks regarding security measures cannot be completely avoided.

The present invention was made with attention to the above-mentioned problems, and an object of the present invention is to provide a technology that can construct a highly reliable communication system for automatic train operation at low cost and in a short period of time. .
Another object of the present invention is to ensure the safety of data communication and avoid security risks even when data communication between a train and ground equipment is performed using a public wireless communication network. The objective is to provide a communication system for automatic train operation that allows for automatic train operation.

In order to solve the above problems, the invention according to the present application:
an on-board device for automated driving that performs information processing related to automated train driving; a first mobile station connected to the on-board device for automated driving for wireless communication with a closed network outside the vehicle; and the automated driving vehicle. an on-vehicle system having a second mobile station connected to the above device for wireless communication with a public wireless communication network;
A track location management device that collects and provides information related to train location, a first closed network connected to the track location management device, an automated driving ground device that performs control related to automated train operation, and the automated driving area. a second closed network connected to the above device, a route connecting the first closed network and the second closed network, and a route connecting the second closed network to the public wireless network on the self-driving vehicle. A train operation system having an authentication device that authenticates a connection between the device and the ground device;
A communication system for automatic train operation, comprising:
The track location management device repeatedly acquires train location information via the first closed network,
On the condition that the automatic driving ground device has been authenticated by the authentication device, the automatic driving ground device identifies a communication partner using the train location information acquired from the track location management device, and communicates via the public wireless communication network. The system is configured to be able to communicate with the on-board device for automatic operation of the train.

According to the communication system for automatic train operation configured as described above, in order to use the public wireless communication network for communication between the onboard equipment for automatic operation (ATO onboard server) and the ATO ground equipment, new Compared to the method of constructing a closed network, a communication system can be constructed at lower cost and in a shorter period of time. In addition, on the condition that authentication is performed by an authentication device (authentication server), communication is performed by identifying the communication partner using the train's location information, making it possible to build a highly reliable communication system. can. Furthermore, even if data communication is performed between the train (onboard equipment) and ground equipment using a public wireless communication network, there is no need to outsource security measures to an external operator, and the safety of data communication can be improved. security risks associated with the use of public wireless communication networks can be avoided.

Here, desirably, the onboard device for automatic driving generates an authentication code for communication with the ground device for automatic driving using a value unique to the own train, and sends it to the authentication device. ,
The automatic driving ground device is configured to communicate with the automatic driving on-board device using an authentication code approved by the authentication device.
According to this configuration, communication is performed by generating an authentication code for network connection using vehicle-specific information such as line location information that is difficult to know from the outside, so a highly reliable communication system is required. Can be built.

Furthermore, desirably, the on-vehicle system includes speed detection means,
The value unique to the train is the position information of the train,
The on-board system includes a device that calculates a track position based on a signal from the speed detection means, and transmits the calculated track position information to the track management device via the first closed network. Configure.
According to this configuration, the track location management device (track location management server) obtains highly accurate track location information that changes frequently, compared to the case where the track location of each train is acquired based on signals from the track circuit. Therefore, it is possible to prevent communication reliability from decreasing due to the same authentication code being used for a long time as a network connection authentication code generated using line location information.

Further, the on-vehicle system includes a vehicle information control device that provides vehicle-specific information,
The on-board device for automatic driving uses the vehicle-specific information acquired from the vehicle information control device to generate an authentication code for communication with the ground device for automatic driving, and transmits it to the authentication device. It may be configured as follows.
According to this configuration, communication is performed by generating an authentication code for network connection using vehicle-specific information that is difficult to know from the outside, so it is possible to construct a highly reliable communication system. . Note that the vehicle-specific information includes, for example, the load and power consumption of the vehicle or the formation, and if the information changes over time, the reliability of communication can be further improved.

Further, desirably, the on-board system includes an ATC on-board device having an automatic train control function,
The first closed network is configured to be connected to an ATC ground device and a proxy server that transmit ATC control information to a running train.

According to this configuration, the train location information used for ATC control and the train location information used for ATO control can be managed by a common track location management device (track location management server), thereby simplifying the system. Can be done. In addition, by placing a proxy server in the first closed network that connects the ATC ground equipment and the on-line management device (on-line management server) and requires a secure communication environment, the first closed network includes the public wireless network. Unauthorized access from outside, such as the ATO-based second network, can be prevented.

According to the communication system for automatic train operation according to the present invention, a highly reliable system can be constructed at low cost and in a short period of time. In addition, even if data communication is carried out between trains and ground equipment using a public wireless communication network, there is no need to outsource security measures to external operators, and it is possible to ensure the safety of data communication and This has the effect of avoiding security risks associated with the use of wireless communication networks.

1 is a system configuration diagram showing an embodiment of a communication system for automatic train operation according to the present invention. It is a flowchart which shows the outline of the procedure of establishing a communication route in the communication system for train automatic operation of an embodiment. It is a flow chart which shows an example of the procedure of processing by the ATC on-board device which constitutes the communication system for automatic train operation of an embodiment. It is a flowchart which shows an example of the procedure of a process by an ATO on-board server. 3 is a flowchart illustrating an example of a procedure of processing by a network authentication server. 2 is a flowchart illustrating an example of a processing procedure by an ATO ground device.

EMBODIMENT OF THE INVENTION Hereinafter, one embodiment of the communication system for automatic train operation according to the present invention will be described with reference to the drawings. FIG. 1 is a system configuration diagram showing one embodiment of the entire communication system for automatic train operation according to the present invention, and FIG. 2 is a flowchart showing an example of a procedure for establishing a communication route in the system. Note that in the following description, a server is an information processing device having a configuration similar to a computer device including a microprocessor and memory such as ROM or RAM.

As shown in FIG. 1, the communication system for automatic train operation according to the present embodiment includes an ATC on-board device 11 having an automatic train control function mounted on a train T, and an ATO device that stores various data necessary for automatic operation control. An on-board server 12, an in-train closed network 13, a vehicle information control device 14 that provides vehicle-specific information to the ATO on-board server 12 via the network 13, and a train radio mobile station 15A connected to the in-train closed network 13. and a public wireless communication mobile station 15B, etc., and provides communication between the ATO onboard server 12 and ATO ground equipment 23 via business closed networks 21 and 22 and a public wireless communication network. It is configured to enable communication between the ATO on-board server 12 used and the ATO ground device 23. Here, the frequency band used by the mobile station 15A for wireless communication is a different frequency band from the frequency band used by the mobile station 15B. A traffic control central device 27 is connected to the closed network 22, and trains are operated by the commercial closed networks 21, 22, ATO ground equipment 23, traffic control central device 27, and ATC ground equipment (not shown) connected to the closed network 21. A system 20 is configured.

In this embodiment, the ATO on-board server 12 has an automatic driving function that controls the travel motor and brakes according to the inter-station driving pattern, but it is separate from the server and has a control device (ATO on-board device) that has the automatic driving function. ) may be provided.
The automatic train control function included in the ATC onboard device 11 checks whether the traveling speed is below the speed limit indicated by the ATC pattern, and if the speed is exceeded, it automatically operates the brakes to keep the speed below the speed limit. It is a function. The ATO on-board server 12 stores inter-station driving pattern information, and the ATO on-board server 12 reads the inter-station driving pattern information from the storage device and performs automatic driving control that controls the driving motor and brake device according to the driving pattern. Execute. For the in-train closed network 13, a transmission line used in a train information management system installed in an existing train can be used.

The commercial closed network 21 is an existing network used in a conventional signal security system such as a signal security network, and includes a train radio base station 24 and a track management server that communicate with the train radio mobile station 15A. 25, an ATC network proxy server 26 equipped with a firewall function and a filtering function is connected. Existing digital train radios such as leaky coaxial cable system (LCX system) and space wave radio system can be used for train radio, and the ATC onboard device 11 uses the train radio to determine the location of the own train. The information is sent to the line management server 25 along with the vehicle ID (identification information).

The business closed network 22 is a network dedicated to ATO control, and is connected to an ATO ground device 23 that generates control information for the ATO onboard server 12 and an operation management central device 27 that provides implementation schedule information to the ATO ground device 23. has been done.

In this embodiment, the business closed network 22 to which the ATO ground equipment 23 is connected connects the on-vehicle system via an existing public wireless communication network 31 such as a general-purpose mobile communication network and a wireless communication base station 32. It is configured to be able to communicate with ten public radio communication mobile stations 15B. In addition, between the business closed networks 21 and 22, while preventing unauthorized access from the public wireless communication network 31 side to the on-line management server 25, etc., the ATO ground equipment 23 uses the public wireless communication network 31 to connect the ATO vehicle to the public wireless communication network 31. A network authentication server (hereinafter referred to as an authentication server) 28 is connected to enable communication with the server 12. As the authentication server 28, for example, a server (Radius server) capable of performing authentication processing using Radius, which is one of the user authentication protocols on the network, is used.

Although not shown, the on-board system 10 is equipped with a speed generator installed on the axle of the train and detects the rotational speed of the travel drive motor, and the ATC on-board device 11 operates based on the signal from the speed generator. The track position of the train is calculated based on the travel distance from the starting point and the travel distance and the position information of the starting point, and the track position information is generated and passed to the ATO on-board server 12.
The ATO on-board server 12 stores travel patterns between stations on a predetermined route. The ATO on-board server 12 reads out the inter-station running pattern at the time of departure from the station based on the track position information of the train in question, and compares the running speed calculated based on the signal from the speed generator with the running pattern, and performs running drive. It has the function of making the train run according to a running pattern by controlling the device (motor) and brake equipment.

The ATC on-board device 11 also has a function of transmitting the generated on-track position information of the train to the on-track management server 25 via wireless communication via the train radio mobile station 15A together with the vehicle ID, which is a unique value for each formation. The track location management server 25 grasps the position of each train (track location) in real time based on the received information, and stores the track location information in association with the vehicle ID (identification information).
Although not shown, the onboard system 10 includes an ATC transponder onboard device, and the ATC onboard device 11 is configured to correct the calculated on-track position based on information received from the transponder onboard device. ing.

Next, the outline of the procedure for establishing a communication route in the communication system for automatic train operation of this embodiment will be explained using the flowchart of FIG. 2.
When the onboard system 10 is powered on and the ATC onboard device 11 is activated, the ATC onboard device 11 calculates the distance traveled based on the signal from the speed generator, and calculates the distance traveled and the starting point. A process is started to obtain the location (km, etc.) of the train based on the location of the train (step S1). Here, the on-line position may be, for example, the on-line block number and the distance within the block.

Next, the ATC onboard device 11 stores the acquired track position information, the time information at the time of position calculation, and the vehicle ID of the own train, and transmits this information via train radio to the track position management server 25 on the ground side. The process of transmitting the data to is started (step S2). At the same time, the ATC onboard device 11 sends the same information as the information sent to the track management server 25 to the ATO onboard server 12 via the in-train closed network 13. The track location management server 25 receives and stores the track location information, time information, and vehicle ID transmitted from the ATC onboard device 11 (step S3). Note that the processes in steps S2 and S3 are executed periodically or every time the line location information is updated.

On the other hand, the ATO onboard server 12 requests the on-track location information from the ATC on-board device 11 via the in-train closed network 13 (step S4), and receives the on-track location information sent from the ATC on-board device 11. Receive (step S5).
When the track location management server 25 receives a request for vehicle ID and track location information from the ATO ground device 23 (step S6), the track location management server 25 transmits the stored track location information, time information, and vehicle ID to the closed network 21, 22 and the authentication server. 28 to the ATO ground equipment 23. Further, the authentication server 28 requests the vehicle ID and track position information from the ATO ground device 23 via the closed network 22 (step S7), and receives response information sent from the ATO ground device 23. This allows both the ATO onboard server 12 and the authentication server 28 to generate secure IDs (tokens) based on common information. In addition, since the ATO ground equipment 23 acquires the vehicle ID and track position information of the running train in real time from the track management server 25, it can identify the communication partner using the latest acquired train track position information. , it becomes possible to communicate with the ATO onboard server 12 of the train via the public wireless communication network 31.

In addition, in parallel with the above processing (steps S4 and S5), the ATO onboard server 12 processes an authentication request to the authentication server 28, which corresponds to the gateway between the closed network 21 and the ATO ground equipment 23, via the public wireless communication network 31. (Step S8) is started. At this time, the ATO on-board server 12 makes the request by adding a secure ID generated based on the vehicle ID and its own line location information as a verification ID (authentication code).
The authentication server 28 that receives the authentication request from the ATO onboard server 12 generates a verification ID using the on-track position information of the vehicle acquired from the track management server 25, and generates a verification ID received from the ATO onboard server 12. If the ID matches the ID, the ATO ground device 23 is permitted to communicate (step S9), and a response is sent to the ATO onboard server 12 indicating the completion of authentication. This enables bidirectional data communication between the ATO onboard server 12 and the ATO ground device 23 using the public wireless communication network 31 and the closed network 22.

Next, when executing the process according to the flowchart of FIG. This will be explained in detail using FIGS. 3 to 6.
The ATC on-board device 11 is started by turning on the power of the on-board system 10, and as shown in FIG. The position information is read (step S11), and it is determined whether the line position is determined (step S12). Specifically, for example, if the read position information is outside the normal range (the line is in an impossible position), it is determined that the position is not fixed (undefined position), and if it is within the normal range. If there is, it is determined that the position is fixed. If it is determined in step S12 that the position has not been determined, that is, the position is indefinite, the process moves to step S13, and it is determined whether a position correction message has been received from the ATC ground transducer. If it is determined that the position correction message has been received (Yes), the process proceeds to step S14, where the on-line position is corrected based on the information of the received position correction message, and the process returns to step S11.

On the other hand, if it is determined in step S12 that the position has been determined, the process proceeds to step S15, where vehicle information unique to the own train such as the vehicle ID and time information are acquired from the vehicle information control device 14, and the acquired unique vehicle information and time information are acquired from the vehicle information control device 14. The track location information is transmitted to the track location management server 25 via the closed network 21 using train radio (step S16).
Next, it is determined whether or not there is a request for track location information from the ATO onboard server 12 via the in-train closed network 13 (step S17), and if there is a request for track location information, the request is sent to the ATO onboard server 12. The line location information and vehicle ID are transmitted (step S18). Thereafter, the process returns to step S11, and when the line position changes, the above process is repeatedly executed.

Next, the procedure of processing by the ATO on-board server 12 will be explained using FIG. 4.
When the ATO onboard server 12 is started by turning on the power of the onboard system 10, first, because communication with the ATO ground equipment 23 via the public wireless communication network 31 and the closed network 22 is not connected. The device enters a state of waiting for authentication (step S21), and starts network connection authentication preparation processing (step S22).
In the network connection authentication preparation process of step S22, vehicle information specific to the own train, such as time information and vehicle ID, is acquired from the vehicle information control device 14 via the in-train closed network 13, and the on-track location is sent to the ATC onboard device 11. Request information and obtain track location information. Furthermore, the state of the vehicle (stopped/running) is detected based on the signal from the speed sensor (speed generator).

Next, the ATO onboard server 12 determines whether there is any information received from the ATC onboard device 11 (step S23). If it is determined that there is no received information (No), the process returns to step S22. If it is determined in step S23 that there is received information (Yes), the process proceeds to step S24, searches the token conversion table using the line location information acquired in step S22, and generates an authentication token (verification ID). generate.
Subsequently, the ATO onboard server 12 transmits the token generated in step S24 to the authentication server 28 via the public wireless communication network 31 and the closed network 22 , and executes a network connection authentication request process (step S25).

At this time, the authentication server 28 acquires the train location information from the track management server 25 via the closed networks 21 and 22 and the ATO ground equipment 23, and uses the track location information to create a token for authentication. Therefore, when there is an authentication request, it is compared with the token received from the ATO on-board server 12 to determine whether or not it is possible, and the authentication result is responded. Then, the ATO onboard server 12 receives the authentication result from the authentication server 28 and makes a determination (step S26), and if the authentication is not possible (NG), waits for a predetermined period of time (for example, 10 seconds) to elapse. Returning to step S24, a token is generated again and an authentication request is made to the authentication server 28.

Further, if the ATO onboard server 12 determines that the authentication has been successful (OK) in step S26, the process proceeds to step S27, and uses the authenticated token to establish a communication path via the public wireless communication network 31 and the closed network 22. (ATO-NW connection) and start data communication with the ATO ground equipment 23.
After that, the ATO onboard server 12 determines whether network disconnection conditions such as being out of range of public wireless communication or power off are met (step S28), and if the conditions are not met, the process returns to step S27. If it is determined that the disconnection condition is satisfied, the process advances to step S29, where a network (NW) disconnection process is executed, and then the process returns to step S21.

Next, the procedure of processing by the network authentication server 28 will be explained using FIG. 5.
When the authentication server 28 is started by turning on the power, it first executes a process of acquiring authentication ID creation information (step S31). Specifically, time information, vehicle specific information, vehicle ID, and track position information are acquired from the track management server 25 via the ATO ground device 23. Next, the authentication server 28 searches the token conversion table using the acquired line location information and generates an authentication token (step S32).

Subsequently, the authentication server 28 determines whether there is a network authentication request from the ATO on-board server 12 (step S33). Here, if it is determined that an authentication request has been made, the token sent along with the authentication request is compared with the token generated in step S32 to determine whether or not authentication is possible (step S34). If authentication is not possible (NG), the process waits for a predetermined period of time (for example, 10 seconds) to elapse, and then returns to step S32 to again generate a token and determine whether or not authentication is possible.
Further, when the authentication server 28 determines in step S34 that authentication is possible (OK), that is, the tokens match and there is no duplicate authentication request, the process proceeds to step S35, and connects the network (NW) to the ATO ground equipment 23. Allow.

Next, the procedure of processing by the ATO ground device 23 will be explained using FIG. 6.
When the ATO ground device 23 is started by turning on the power, first, communication with the ATO onboard server 12 via the public wireless communication network 31 and the closed network 22 is not connected, and it enters a state of waiting for authentication ( Step S41), a request for authentication ID creation information is made to the line management server 25 (step S42). Here, "authentication ID creation information" is the same information that the authentication server 28 acquires from the track management server 25 in step S31 of FIG. 5, and includes time information, vehicle unique information, vehicle ID, and track location information. included. Therefore, a request for authentication ID creation information may be made to the authentication server 28.

Subsequently, the ATO ground device 23 transmits the authentication ID creation information received in step S42 to the authentication server 28 in response to a request from the authentication server 28 (step S43). As a result, the authentication ID creation information acquired from the line management server 25 is passed to the authentication server 28. That is, here, the ATO ground device 23 functions as a relay device for authentication ID creation information.
Thereafter, the ATO ground device 23 makes an inquiry to confirm network connection, that is, waits for authentication permission (step S44). Then, in the next step S45, if it is determined that the authentication permission has been granted, the network connection state is established with the ATO onboard server 12 of the train for which the authentication permission has been granted via the closed network 22 and the public wireless communication network 31 (step S46). Using the latest track location information of the train acquired from the track management server 25, a train that has the same information as the latest track location information is identified as the communication partner, and the closed network 22 and public Communication with the ATO onboard device 12 of the train can be performed via the wireless communication network 31. Further, the ATO ground device 23 starts tracing (receiving) information from the ATO onboard server 12 of the train. Tracing of such information is executed for each train for all running trains.

After that, the ATO ground equipment 23 compares the track location information received from the ATO onboard server 12 of each train with the track location information acquired and held from the track management server 25 (step S47), and determines whether there is a difference. It is determined whether or not (step S48). If it is determined that there is a difference, the process moves to step S50 and the network connection with the ATO onboard server 12 of the train is cut off.
On the other hand, while tracing the information from the ATO onboard server 12 in step S46, it is determined whether there is a disconnection request from the ATO onboard server 12 (step S49), and if it is determined that there is a disconnection request, the process moves to step S50. Then, the network connection with the ATO onboard server 12 of the train is disconnected.

As mentioned above, in the communication system for automatic train operation of this embodiment, a new closed network is constructed in order to use the public wireless communication network for communication between the ATO onboard device (server) and the ground device. It is possible to construct a communication system at a lower cost and in a shorter period of time than with other methods. In addition, on the condition that authentication is performed by an authentication device (authentication server), a secure ID (authentication code) such as a token is generated using information on the train's location on the train, which is difficult to know from the outside. Since the communication partner is identified and communication is performed, a highly reliable communication system can be constructed.

Although the embodiments of the present invention have been described above, the present invention is not limited to the above embodiments, and various modifications and changes are possible. For example, in the embodiment described above, the ATC on-board device 11 calculates its own position on the track from the travel distance calculated based on the signal from the speed generator that detects the rotation speed of the travel drive motor, and uses it as position information. Alternatively, information (latitude and longitude information) from a GPS (Global Positioning System) signal receiving device mounted on the train may be used as the position information of the own train.

In addition, in the above embodiment, the vehicle's on-line position information is used as a pseudo-random number to generate the secure ID (token), but the position correction information, formation weight, overhead wire voltage, air The secure ID may be generated using vehicle-specific information such as a value unique to each train formation, such as brake air pressure, or a value that changes during running (including while stopping at a station), as a pseudo-random number. In this case, the vehicle specific information can be configured to be provided from the vehicle information control device 14.
Further, in the above embodiments, a case has been described in which the present invention is applied to wireless communication in an automatic driving system for a train, but the present invention can also be applied to wireless communication in an automatic driving system for a bus or the like.

10 On-board system 11 ATC on-board device 12 ATO on-board server (on-board device for automatic driving)
13 In-train closed network 14 Vehicle information control device 15A Train radio mobile station (first mobile station)
15B Mobile station for public wireless communication (second mobile station)
20 Train operation system 21 Business closed network (first closed network)
22 Business closed network (second closed network)
23 ATO ground equipment (automatic driving ground equipment)
24 Train radio base station 25 Track location management server (track location management device)
27 Traffic management central device 28 Authentication server (authentication device)
31 Public wireless communication network 32 Wireless communication base station

Claims (4)

an on-board device for automated driving that performs information processing related to automated train driving; a first mobile station connected to the on-board device for automated driving for wireless communication with a closed network outside the vehicle; and the automated driving vehicle. an on-vehicle system having a second mobile station connected to the above device for wireless communication with a public wireless communication network;
A track location management device that collects and provides information related to train location, a first closed network connected to the track location management device, an automated driving ground device that performs control related to automated train operation, and the automated driving area. a second closed network connected to the above device, a route connecting the first closed network and the second closed network, and a route connecting the second closed network to the public wireless network on the self-driving vehicle. A train operation system having an authentication device that authenticates the connection between the device and the ground device;
A communication system for automatic train operation, comprising:
The track location management device repeatedly acquires the latest track location information of the train from the automatic driving on-board device via the first closed network,
The on-board device for automatic driving generates an authentication code for communication with the ground device for automatic driving using the latest track location information of the own train, and transmits it to the authentication device,
The authentication device acquires the train location information from the track management device, generates an authentication code for the train by itself, and compares the generated authentication code with the authentication code received from the onboard device for automatic driving. and if they match, approve the authentication code and permit communication to the autonomous driving ground device,
The automatic driving ground device uses the latest on-track location information of the train acquired from the track location management device to communicate with a train that has the same information as the latest on-track location information as the latest on-track location information. on the self-driving vehicle using the authentication code approved by the authentication device via the second closed network and the public wireless communication network, on the condition that the authentication code has been identified and authenticated by the authentication device. A communication system for automatic train operation characterized by communicating with a device . The on-board system includes speed detection means,
The on - board system includes a device that calculates a track location based on a signal from the speed detection means, and transmits the calculated track location information to the track location management device via the first closed network. The communication system for automatic train operation according to claim 1 , characterized in that: The on-vehicle system includes a vehicle information control device that provides vehicle-specific information,
The on-board device for automatic driving generates an authentication code for communication with the ground device for automatic driving using the vehicle-specific information acquired from the vehicle information control device and the position information of the own train. sending it to the authentication device ;
The authentication device acquires vehicle specific information and track location information of the train from the track management device, generates an authentication code for the train by itself, and uses the generated authentication code and the authentication code received from the onboard device for automatic driving. 3. The communication system for automatic train operation according to claim 1 or 2 , wherein the authentication code is verified and, if a match is found, the authentication code is approved and communication is permitted to the ground equipment for automatic operation. The on-board system includes an ATC on-board device having an automatic train control function,
The automatic train operation according to any one of claims 1 to 3 , wherein an ATC ground device and a proxy server that transmit ATC control information to a running train are connected to the first closed network. communication system.

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