JP6374454B2 - Module encryption / decryption program - Google Patents

Description

  The present invention relates to a technique for improving tamper resistance of software.

Some software, such as those containing authentication algorithms, do not want to know its contents. Nevertheless, not only source code but also executable software has a threat that the contents of software algorithms and the like are exposed by disassembly and debugging. Patent Document 1 discloses the following technique. This technique makes it difficult to analyze a branch condition by complicating a conditional branch instruction in the source code. This aims to increase the obfuscation of the code and avoid the threats described above. That is, even if disassembly or the like is possible, there is a need for analysis due to the obfuscation of the source code itself generated by the analysis. In this way, the tamper resistance of the software can be improved.
JP 2011-28506 A

  However, the problem is that even if the obfuscation of the source code itself is improved, the executable code itself generated from it is in plain text, so that it can be analyzed without delay. Therefore, a method of encrypting the executable code and decrypting it at the time of execution can be considered. As a result, the executable format file stored in the storage area is encrypted, and thus analysis is almost impossible. However, if only encryption is performed, it is necessary to decrypt in some form at the time of execution, and the code that is being decrypted and being executed can be analyzed by a debugger or the like. For example, if it is a method to execute after decrypting all codes at the time of execution, it is encrypted before execution, so analysis is almost impossible, but it is a method to decrypt all programs at the time of execution By analyzing the image in a state where the decrypted program is loaded on the memory, the contents can be grasped. Then, the subject of implementation | achievement of the program execution system which cannot analyze an encrypted module easily arises.

  In order to solve the above problems, first, the present invention provides the following program complex. The program complex is composed of a plurality of modules. Before execution, at least one module is held as encrypted data, and at the time of execution, the module executed before the encrypted module performs the decryption process, and the decrypted module is executed. It is a program complex.

  Specifically, there is a program main body composed of a set of modules, and at least one of the modules is in an encrypted state when not executed, and a next module which is a module to be executed next is And a decrypted program for causing the computer to execute a process for enabling the arithmetic unit to execute the decryption at the timing before the end of the currently executing module if encrypted. Is the body.

  The second is a program complex that performs the process of deleting the module from the storage area after calling the module to be executed next, based on the first program complex.

  Specifically, the program further comprises a deletion program for causing a computer to execute a process of deleting a caller module, which is a module that called the next module after the start of execution of the next module, from the storage medium for the arithmetic unit. It is a program complex.

  The third is a program complex that performs the process of re-encrypting the module after calling the module to be executed next, based on the first program complex.

  Specifically, the program complex according to claim 1, further comprising a re-encryption program for causing the computer to execute a process of re-encrypting the caller module in the storage medium for the arithmetic device after the execution of the next module is started. .

  According to the first aspect of the present invention configured as described above, it is possible to hold a module with encrypted data before execution, and to decrypt and execute the module encrypted at the time of execution. Then, it is possible to put a module to be kept secret until it is executed just before execution. For this reason, even when a program is analyzed by a debugger or the like, it takes more time for analysis than when all modules are readable at once. As a result, the tamper resistance of the program is improved.

  In addition, according to the second aspect of the present invention, it is possible to quickly delete a module desired to be concealed from a storage medium after executing the module. As a result, the plaintext module remaining in the storage area after execution can be erased, and the contents cannot be analyzed. As a result, an operation in which a plaintext module exists in the storage area only at the time of execution becomes possible, and the tamper resistance of the program is improved.

  Further, according to the third aspect of the present invention, it is possible to quickly re-encrypt after executing a module to be kept secret. This makes it impossible to encrypt the plaintext module remaining in the storage area after execution and analyze its contents. As a result, an operation in which a plaintext module exists in the storage area only at the time of execution becomes possible, and the tamper resistance of the program is improved.

  Hereinafter, embodiments of the present invention will be described with reference to the drawings. Note that the present invention is not limited to these embodiments, and can be implemented in various modes without departing from the spirit of the present invention.

Example 1
<Overview>
FIG. 1 is a conceptual diagram for explaining an example of the operation of the program complex of the present embodiment. As shown in this figure, the program complex designated as program A has P modules between address X and address Y in the storage area. Modules 2 to P are encrypted. The program is executed from module 1 to module P in order. Module 1 calls module 2 and module 2 calls module 3 in a hierarchical execution scheme.

  Here, it is assumed that the module to be protected is the module P. In the state before execution, the analyst does not know that the module P exists at the position of the address Y. The module P can be analyzed only after the module P-1 is actually executed and analyzed. On the other hand, if the encryption method is such that all modules are decrypted first at the time of execution, it is possible to overlook the flow of the entire program after decryption, so that the module P is an early module to be protected. The module P can be analyzed.

  FIG. 2 is a schematic diagram of the contents of FIG. 1 and is a diagram for explaining the operation of the program A. As shown in this figure, the rest of the module 1 is encrypted in the initial state (0201). When the execution is started, the module 1 is executed. Before the completion of the module 1, the module 1 decodes the module 2 and sequentially executes the next module while decoding. Then, the Pth module to be protected is executed while being decrypted, and the process ends (0202).

  As described above, the program complex according to the present embodiment can perform an operation of decoding the module to be executed next immediately before the execution and termination of the module when the program is executed. As a result, the module code becomes readable only at the time of execution. Therefore, when trying to analyze the P-th module to be protected in FIG. 2, the P-th module cannot be directly analyzed. Need to run and analyze. For this reason, when a program is analyzed with a debugger or the like, the analysis takes much longer than when all functions are readable at once. Furthermore, since the flow up to the protection target function P is concealed by encryption, the analyst cannot fully grasp the entire program.

<Functional configuration>
FIG. 3 is a diagram illustrating an example of functional blocks in the program complex of the present embodiment. As shown in this figure, the “program complex” (0300) of this embodiment includes a “program body” (0301), a “collection of modules” (0302), a “decryption program” (0303), and Have.

  The “program body” (0301) is composed of a collection of modules. There are a plurality of modules, and at least one module is to be protected. The module to be protected is encrypted.

  The “module aggregate” (0302) is composed of a plurality of modules. Here, the module includes a function, a subroutine, a method, and the like. When the next module to be executed next is encrypted, the module calls the decryption program (0303), decrypts the next module at the timing before the end of the module, and executes the next module. In FIG. 3, the module following the module 2 is a module to be protected. Therefore, the module 2 calls the decryption program (0303) at the timing before the end of the module 2, and decrypts and executes the module 3.

  Here, “execution” of a module is to change the internal state of the system by loading the module into a storage area such as a memory, sending data to the arithmetic device, and receiving the result. “Arithmetic device” refers to a device capable of computation, such as a CPU, MPU, or GPU. A device that incorporates these “arithmetic units” and can store the result of the calculation in a storage area is called a “computer”.

  The encrypted module is not necessarily the module to be protected. In order to deceive the analyst, the path to the function to be protected can be hidden by encrypting modules other than the module to be protected. As a result, the labor required for the analysis increases, and an improvement in tamper resistance can be expected.

  FIG. 4 is a diagram for explaining “timing before the end of the module”. The horizontal axis in the figure is the time axis, and indicates the timing when the module is executed. The module 1 is a plaintext module, and calls the decryption program and executes the module 2 in order to decrypt the module 2 that is the encryption module before the end. Module 2 executes module 3 before exiting. The execution of the module 4 is started at a timing before the end of the module 3, and at the same time, the execution is started at a timing before the end of the module 2. In this case, the module 2 may call the decryption program to decrypt the module 4 and execute it, or the module 3 may call the decryption program and decrypt and execute the module 4 before the end. Since the module 5 is executed after the end of the module 4, the module 2 is decoded and executed by calling the decoding program at a timing before the end of the module 2.

  As described above, “the next module to be executed next” refers to only the module to be executed next, such as the relationship between the module 2 and the module 4 or the relationship between the module 2 and the module 5. Not limited. As described above, by calling the decryption program at an appropriate position in the module and incorporating the execution instruction of the next module, the module is executed at the requested timing, and an appropriate program operation is obtained.

  The “decryption program” (0303) decrypts the next module. Specifically, address information in the storage area of the next module is received from the module being executed, and decryption is performed based on the information. As shown in FIG. 2, the decryption program exists as a separate and independent program, and may be called from a module, or may be directly embedded in each module. Further, a plurality of decryption programs may be present to correspond to a plurality of types of encryption methods. In this case, an execution instruction of a decryption program of an encryption method suitable for the next module can be included in the module being executed.

<Process flow>
FIG. 5 is a flowchart showing an example of the processing flow in the program complex of this embodiment. First, it is determined whether or not the next module is encrypted (step S0501). If it is encrypted, a process for decrypting is executed (step S0502). If not encrypted, step S0502 is skipped. Thereafter, the next module is executed (step S0503), and it is determined whether or not the program is finished (step S0504). If not finished, the process returns to step S0501. If finished, end the program.

<Hardware configuration>
FIG. 6 is a schematic diagram showing an example of a configuration in a program complex when the above functional components are realized as hardware. The operation of each hardware component in the application switching process will be described using this figure. As shown in this figure, the program complex of this embodiment includes a “CPU (central processing unit)” (0601), “volatile memory” (0602), and “nonvolatile memory” ( 0603). Also, it has an “input / output I / F” (0604) to which a mouse, a keyboard, etc. that accept operation input from the user and a display device are connected. These are connected to each other through a data communication path such as a “system bus” (0605), and transmit / receive information and process information.

  The “volatile memory” (0601) is a work area that is also a work area of the program at the same time it is read from the “nonvolatile memory” (0602) in order to cause the “CPU” (0601) to execute a program for performing various processes. I will provide a.

  Here, the program A is started by a command from the input / output I / F (0604). Then, the program A is loaded from the nonvolatile memory (0603) to the volatile memory (0602). The program A is processed by the CPU (0601). Program A consists of N modules and a decoding program. The modules are executed in order by the CPU (0601), and when it is determined that the next module is encrypted, the decryption program is executed by the CPU (0601) by the currently executing module and encrypted. The module is decoded to form a plaintext module, and the code is written in the volatile memory (0602). The written code is executed by the CPU (0601).

<Simple explanation of effect>
As described above, the encrypted module to be executed next can be decrypted by the calling module and executed by the program complex of this embodiment. As a result, the modules are executed hierarchically, and the module to be protected can be kept encrypted until immediately before the execution. As a result, more time is required for analysis than when all the modules are decrypted at once, and the tamper resistance of the program is improved.

<< Example 2 >>
<Overview>
FIG. 7 is a conceptual diagram for explaining an application example of the program complex of the present embodiment. As shown in this figure, modules other than module 1 are encrypted at the start of program execution (0801). The module 2 to be executed next is decoded before the completion of the execution of the module 1 by the decoding program. Then, after completion of module 1, module 1 is deleted from the storage area (0802).

  As described above, the program complex of this embodiment is a switching device that can delete the module that called the next module from the storage area when the module to be executed next is started. This makes it impossible to analyze the code of the module remaining in the storage area at the end of program execution, and the tamper resistance of the program is improved.

<Functional configuration>
FIG. 8 is a diagram illustrating an example of functional blocks in the program complex of the present embodiment. As shown in this figure, the “program complex” (0800) of this embodiment includes a “program body” (0801), a “collection of modules” (0802), a “decryption program” (0803), Have. Since these structural requirements have already been described in the above embodiment, the description thereof will be omitted. The feature point of the program complex of the present embodiment is that the “program complex” (0800) newly has a “delete program” (0804).

The “deletion program” (0804) performs a process for causing the computer to execute a process of deleting the caller module, which is the module that called the next module after the start of the execution of the next module, from the storage medium for the arithmetic unit. Referring to FIG. 7, the completion of the operation of the module 2 is detected by the module 2 or the module 3, and the storage area address of the module 2 is acquired from the module 2 or the module 3. Based on the acquired address, the deletion program executes deletion of module 2.
<Process flow>
FIG. 9 is a flowchart showing an example of the flow of processing in the program complex of this embodiment. First, it is determined whether or not the next module is encrypted (step S0901). If it is encrypted, a process for decrypting is executed (step S0902). If it is not encrypted, step S0902 is skipped. Thereafter, execution of the next module is started (step S0903). Next, the next module deletes the calling source module (step S0904). Thereafter, it is determined whether or not the program is finished (step S0905). If not finished, the process returns to step S0901. If finished, end the program.

<Hardware configuration>
FIG. 10 is a schematic diagram illustrating an example of a configuration in the program complex when the above functional components are realized as hardware. The operation of each hardware component in the application switching process will be described using this figure. As shown in this figure, the program complex of the present embodiment includes a “CPU (central processing unit)” (1001), a “volatile memory” (1002), and a “nonvolatile memory” ( 1003). In addition, it has an “input / output I / F” (1004) to which a mouse, a keyboard, etc. that accept operation input from the user, and a display device are connected. Then, they are connected to each other by a data communication path such as a “system bus” (1005) to transmit / receive information and process information.

  The “volatile memory” (1002) is a work area that is also a work area of the program at the same time that it is read from the “nonvolatile memory” (1003) in order to cause the “CPU” (1001) to execute a program for performing various processes. I will provide a.

  Here, the program A is activated by a command from the input / output I / F (1004). Then, the program A is loaded from the nonvolatile memory (1003) to the volatile memory (1002). The program A is processed by the CPU (1001). Program A consists of N modules and a decoding program. The modules are sequentially executed in the CPU (1001), and when it is determined that the next module is encrypted, the decryption program is executed in the CPU (1001) by the currently executing module and encrypted. The module is decoded to form a plaintext module, and the code is written in the volatile memory (1002). The written code is executed by the CPU (1001).

  When executing the plaintext module, the program A executes the deletion program by the CPU (1001). The deletion program deletes the previously executed module of the program A from the volatile memory (1002).

<Simple explanation of effect>
In this way, by deleting the module after execution, the plaintext code remaining in the storage area after execution can be removed. This makes it impossible to analyze the code of the module after execution. Therefore, it is possible to execute a program complex having high tamper resistance.

Example 3
<Overview>
FIG. 11 is a conceptual diagram for explaining an application example of the program complex of the present embodiment. As shown in this figure, modules other than module 1 are encrypted at the start of program execution (1101). The module 2 to be executed next is decoded before the completion of the execution of the module 1 by the decoding program. Then, after the end of module 1, module 1 is encrypted again (1102).

  As described above, the program complex according to the present embodiment can perform a process of re-encrypting the calling source module that called the module when the next module is executed. This makes it impossible to analyze the code of the module remaining in the storage area after the execution of the module or program body. Therefore, the tamper resistance of the program complex is improved.

<Functional configuration>
FIG. 12 is a diagram illustrating an example of functional blocks in the program complex of the present embodiment. As shown in this figure, the “program complex” (1200) of this embodiment includes a “program body” (1201), a “collection of modules” (1202), a “decryption program” (1203), Have. Since these structural requirements have already been described in the above embodiment, the description thereof will be omitted. The feature of the program complex of the present embodiment is that the “program complex” (1200) newly has a “re-encryption program” (1204).

  The “re-encryption program” (1204) performs a process for causing the computer to execute a process of re-encrypting the caller module in the storage medium for the arithmetic device after the execution of the next module is started. Specifically, after the execution of the next module is started, the re-encryption program acquires the address information of the caller module (module 2) from the caller module or the module being executed (module 3). The executing module executes the re-encryption program and encrypts the calling module.

<Process flow>
FIG. 13 is a flowchart showing an example of the processing flow in the program complex of the present embodiment. First, it is determined whether or not the next module is encrypted (step S1301). If it is encrypted, a process for decrypting is executed (step S1302). If not encrypted, step S1302 is skipped. Thereafter, execution of the next module is started (step S1303). Next, the next module re-encrypts the caller module (step S1304). Thereafter, it is determined whether or not the program is finished (step S1305), and if not finished, the process returns to step S1301. If finished, end the program.

<Hardware configuration>
FIG. 14 is a schematic diagram illustrating an example of a configuration in the program complex when the above functional components are realized as hardware. The operation of each hardware component in the application switching process will be described using this figure. As shown in this figure, the program complex of this embodiment includes a “CPU (central processing unit)” (1401), a “volatile memory” (1402), and a “nonvolatile memory” ( 1403). Also, it has an “input / output I / F” (1404) to which a mouse, a keyboard, etc. that accept operation input from the user, and a display device are connected. These are connected to each other through a data communication path such as a “system bus” (1405), and perform transmission / reception and processing of information.

  In addition, the “volatile memory” (1402) is a work area that is a work area of the program at the same time it is read from the “nonvolatile memory” (1403) in order to cause the “CPU” (1401) to execute a program for performing various processes. I will provide a.

Here, the program A is started by a command from the input / output I / F (1404). Then, the program A is loaded from the nonvolatile memory (1403) to the volatile memory (1402). The program A is processed by the CPU (1401). Program A consists of N modules and a decoding program. The modules are sequentially executed in the CPU (1401), and when it is determined that the next module is encrypted, the decryption program is executed in the CPU (1401) by the currently executing module and encrypted. The module is decoded to form a plaintext module, and the code is written in the volatile memory (1402). The written code is executed by the CPU (1401).

  When executing the module in plain text, the program A executes the re-encryption program on the CPU (1401). The re-encryption program encrypts the previously executed module of the program A again and holds it in a nonvolatile memory or a volatile memory.

<Simple explanation of effect>
In this way, the program complex of this embodiment can encrypt again the plaintext code remaining in the storage area after execution. This makes it impossible to analyze the code of the module after execution. Therefore, it is possible to execute a program complex having high tamper resistance.

The figure for demonstrating the outline | summary of the process by the program complex of Example 1. The figure for demonstrating an example of the process by the program complex of Example 1. The figure showing an example of the functional block of the program complex of Example 1 Timing chart for explaining an example of processing of the program complex of the first embodiment The flowchart showing an example of the flow of the process in the program complex of Example 1. Schematic showing an example of a hardware configuration in the program complex of the first embodiment The figure for demonstrating an example of the process by the program complex of Example 2. The figure showing an example of the functional block of the program complex of Example 2. The flowchart showing an example of the flow of the process in the program complex of Example 2. Schematic showing an example of a hardware configuration in the program complex of Example 2 The figure for demonstrating an example of the process by the program complex of Example 3. The figure showing an example of the functional block of the program complex of Example 3 The flowchart showing an example of the flow of processing in the program complex of Example 3 Schematic showing an example of a hardware configuration in the program complex of Example 3

0300 Program complex 0301 Program body 0302 Assembly of modules 0303 Decryption program

Claims (2)

A program body consisting of a collection of modules that are expanded in the execution memory area during execution,
Of each module, at least a module to be protected is in an encrypted state when not executed, and a module other than the module to be protected is also encrypted,
Processing for decoding the next module so that it can be executed by the arithmetic unit at the timing immediately before the next module to be executed next when the module currently being executed ends before the module currently being executed ends A decryption program for causing a computer to execute
A deletion program for causing the computer to execute a process of deleting the caller module that is the module that called the next module after the start of execution of the next module from the execution memory area,
In the module being executed, the decryption program call and the execution instruction of the next module are incorporated.
The decryption is performed by receiving address information in the encrypted storage area of the next module from the executing module,
A decryption program is a program complex that is incorporated directly into each module, and there are multiple decryption programs that correspond to multiple encryption methods.   2. The program complex according to claim 1, wherein the decryption program is called independently from the module.

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