JP5622668B2 - Application authentication system, application authentication method - Google Patents

Description

  The present invention relates to a technique for authenticating an application running on an information terminal.

  Information terminals such as smartphones and tablet PCs (personal computers) on which various application software (hereinafter referred to as applications) operate are widespread, and it is desired to use these information terminals effectively in various situations. For example, when these information terminals are used in a business situation, confidential information such as various customer information, personal information, trade secrets, or the like is stored in the information terminal. Sufficient security is desired because access to an external server may occur. For example, Non-Patent Document 1 describes that the validity of an application running on an information terminal is verified. Here, a hash value of a valid application is calculated and stored in advance. When the application is operated, the hash value of the application is calculated, and the calculated hash value is compared with the previously stored hash value. If the calculated hash value matches the pre-stored hash value, the application is determined to be valid, and the operation is permitted. If the calculated hash value does not match the pre-stored hash value, the application Is not valid and does not allow the operation.

Kenji Uematsu, Yuki Kanno, Keisuke Fujita, Masataka Tada, Mitsuyuki Takatsuka, Ryoichi Sasaki, “Proposal of a fraud detection system for structural calculations”, July 2008, Transactions of Information Processing Society, Vol. 49, no. 9, pp. 3199-3208

  However, the authentication using the hash value as described above verifies the validity of the application itself, but does not verify whether the application is installed and operated on an appropriate information terminal. . Here, when such an information terminal is used in a scene where higher security is required, it is possible to verify whether or not the application is a legitimate application that is installed in an appropriate information terminal and operates. desirable.

  The present invention has been made in view of such a situation, and an application authentication system and an application authentication method for verifying whether an application running on an information terminal is a legitimate application installed on an appropriate information terminal I will provide a.

In order to solve the above-described problem, the present invention provides an application authentication system including an information terminal having a tamper resistant device, and an authentication server connected to the information terminal via a network. An apparatus includes a tamper-resistant key information storage unit that stores pre-hardcoded key information in application software that is operated on an information terminal, a signature key storage unit that stores a predetermined signature key, and application software A tamper-resistant decryption unit that decrypts a message encrypted using the key information input using the key information stored in the tamper-resistant key information storage unit, and a message decrypted by the tamper-resistant decryption unit, And an encryption unit that generates and outputs a first authenticator based on the signature key. Application software based on the coded source code, wherein a message transmitted from the authentication server is encrypted using key information and input to the tamper resistant device, and the tamper resistant device is selected according to the message input to the tamper resistant device. Application software for generating a second authenticator based on the first authenticator output from the device and the key information hard-coded in the apparatus and transmitting it to the authentication server is stored. An AP storage unit and a control unit that operates application software stored in the AP storage unit, and the authentication server stores the authentication server key information storage unit in which the key information is stored and the tamper resistant device. A verification key storage unit that stores a verification key corresponding to the signed signature key, and a message that generates information. A transmitter that transmits to the terminal, a receiver that receives the second authenticator transmitted from the information terminal in response to the message transmitted by the transmitter to the information terminal, and a second authenticator received by the receiver. Verifying using the key information stored in the authentication server key information storage unit, and verifying the first authenticator included in the second authenticator using the verification key stored in the verification key storage unit And a verification unit.

In the present invention, the authentication server is connected to a plurality of information terminals via a network, and both the verification of the second authenticator and the verification of the first authenticator are successfully verified by the verification unit. If it is determined, the unique APID generator for generating the unique APID for identifying the application software stored in the information terminal that has transmitted the second authenticator, and the application software stored in the plurality of information terminals are identified. A unique key storage unit for storing a unique key corresponding to the application software in association with each unique APID, and the receiving unit of the authentication server receives the unique key transmitted from the information terminal, In association with the unique APID that identifies the application software stored in the If it is determined that the verification is successful by generating a unique key, characterized in that it comprises a unique key transmission unit that transmits to the authentication server.

Further, according to the present invention, the application software stored in the AP storage unit is application software based on a source code in which a plurality of key information is hard-coded, and is in accordance with a predetermined condition among the plurality of key information. the key information to execute the processing of encrypting using, in the tamper resistant key information storing unit of the tamper resistant device, a plurality of key information is stored, the tamper-resistant decoder of the tamper resistant device, tamper resistant key information storage unit Is decrypted using key information according to the condition, and a plurality of key information is stored in the authentication server key information storage unit of the authentication server. Verification is performed using key information corresponding to a condition among a plurality of pieces of key information stored in the authentication server key information storage unit.

In addition, the present invention provides an application authentication system including a business AP server that communicates with an information terminal by application software that operates on the information terminal, and the authentication server generates a session key and encrypts it using the key information. It is shared with the information terminal, and a session key is transmitted to the business AP server, and the business AP server and the information terminal perform encrypted communication based on the session key.

  Further, in the present invention, the message transmitted from the authentication server to the information terminal is a challenge in the challenge response method, and the second authenticator that the information terminal transmits to the authentication server in response to the challenge corresponds to the challenge. Response.

The present invention also provides a tamper-resistant key information storage unit in which key information hard-coded in advance is stored in application software that is operated by the control unit in the information terminal, and a signature key in which a predetermined signature key is stored. A tamper-resistant device including a storage unit, and application software based on a hard-coded source code, wherein a message transmitted from an authentication server connected via a network is generated using the key information The second authentication is performed based on the first authenticator output from the tamper-proof device according to the message input to the tamper-proof device after being encrypted and input to the tamper-proof device and the key information hard-coded in itself. application software storage of for executing a process to create a child, to the authentication server An information terminal including an AP storage unit, an authentication server key information storage unit storing key information, and a verification key storage unit storing a verification key corresponding to a signature key stored in the tamper resistant device An authentication server comprising: an authentication method for an application authentication system comprising: an authentication server that generates a message and transmits the message to the information terminal; and the control unit of the information terminal stores the message in the AP storage unit. By operating the stored application software, a message transmitted from the authentication server is encrypted using key information and input to the tamper resistant device, and the tamper resistant device of the information terminal is input from the application software. The key stored in the tamper-resistant key information storage unit is encrypted using the key information. A step of decrypting using information, a step of generating and outputting a first authenticator based on the decrypted message and the signature key, and an application in which the control unit of the information terminal is stored in the AP storage unit By operating the software, a second authenticator is generated based on the first authenticator output from the tamper resistant device in response to the message input to the tamper resistant device and the key information hard-coded in itself. A step of transmitting to the authentication server, a step of receiving a second authenticator transmitted from the information terminal in response to a message transmitted by the authentication server to the information terminal, and a step of receiving the second authenticator, Verification is performed using the key information stored in the authentication server key information storage unit, and the first authenticator included in the second authenticator is used using the verification key stored in the verification key storage unit. And a step of verifying.

  As described above, according to the present invention, the authentication server transmits a message to the information terminal, and the information terminal encrypts the transmitted message using the key information and inputs the message to the tamper-resistant device. The tamper resistant device of the terminal decrypts the encrypted message, generates and outputs a first authenticator based on the decrypted message and the signature key, and the information terminal converts the message input to the tamper resistant device to In response to the first authenticator output from the tamper resistant device and the key information, a second authenticator is generated and transmitted to the authentication server, and the authentication server responds to the message transmitted to the information terminal. The second authenticator transmitted from the information terminal is received, the received second authenticator is verified using the key information, and the first authenticator included in the second authenticator is determined as the signature key. Verify using the verification key corresponding to Since the application operating in the information terminal, it is possible to verify whether or not this is a legitimate application that is installed in the appropriate information terminal.

It is a block diagram which shows the structural example of the application authentication system by one Embodiment of this invention. It is a figure which shows the outline | summary of the application authentication system by one Embodiment of this invention. It is a sequence diagram which shows the operation example of the validation process of the application authentication system by one Embodiment of this invention. It is a sequence diagram which shows the operation example of the validation process of the application authentication system by one Embodiment of this invention. It is a sequence diagram which shows the operation example of the validation process of the application authentication system by one Embodiment of this invention. It is a sequence diagram which shows the operation example of the validation process of the application authentication system by one Embodiment of this invention. It is a sequence diagram which shows the operation example of the validation process of the application authentication system by one Embodiment of this invention. It is a sequence diagram which shows the operation example of AP verification process of the application authentication system by one Embodiment of this invention. It is a sequence diagram which shows the operation example of AP verification process of the application authentication system by one Embodiment of this invention. It is a sequence diagram which shows the operation example of AP verification process of the application authentication system by one Embodiment of this invention. It is a sequence diagram which shows the operation example of AP verification process of the application authentication system by one Embodiment of this invention.

Hereinafter, an embodiment of the present invention will be described with reference to the drawings.
FIG. 1 is a block diagram showing a configuration of an application authentication system 1 according to the present embodiment. The application authentication system 1 includes an authentication server 100, a business AP server 200, and an information terminal 300. Here, an outline of the present embodiment will be described with reference to FIG. In the present embodiment, an example is shown in which an application (hereinafter also referred to as an AP) is installed in an information terminal 300 such as a smartphone or a tablet PC and used to handle information in the company, for example. Therefore, security is ensured by verifying the validity of the information terminal 300 itself and the AP operating in the information terminal 300 with the authentication server 100. Here, the validity of the AP indicates whether the AP operating in the information terminal 300 is an AP installed by the AP administrator, and is valid if the AP is installed by the AP administrator. It is not valid unless the AP is installed by the user.

  First, the AP developer indicated by symbol a hard-codes key information defined in the AP source code, and creates source code for performing encryption processing based on the hard-coded key information. In this embodiment, the key information is a common key using a common key cryptosystem, and is a pseudo-random number generated by a computer. Then, compiling based on the created source code is performed by the computer device, and AP as object code is generated. From the object code generated in this way, it is very difficult to decipher the key information hard-coded in the source code as the source code. Here, the key information hard-coded in the source code is referred to as HCP (hard code parameter). For example, the AP has a function of accessing confidential information such as personal information and customer information stored in an in-house database via a network.

  The AP developer delivers the HCP and the AP in which the HCP is embedded to the project manager indicated by symbol b by storing it in a physical medium. The project manager manages the operation of the AP and distributes the information terminal 300 on which the AP is installed to AP users who use the AP using the information terminal 300 in the company. Here, the computer device of the project manager generates a signature key, and stores the signature key and the HCP in a tamper resistant device (secure element) included in the information terminal 300. Further, the verification key corresponding to the signature key and the HCP are stored in the authentication server 100 of the certificate authority, which is a reliable third party, as indicated by reference symbol c. Here, since the description is given on the assumption that the signature key generated by the computer device of the project manager is key information based on the common key cryptosystem, the signature key and the common key are the same key information. However, as will be described later, a secret key and a public key of a public key cryptosystem can be used as the key information. The project manager installs the AP in the information terminal 300 and distributes the information terminal 300 to the AP user indicated by the symbol d.

  The AP user uses the information terminal 300 distributed from the project manager to input an activation request for the installed AP. The AP stored in the information terminal 300 communicates with the authentication server 100 to perform the AP validation process. The enabling process is a process for sharing with the authentication server 100 that the AP communicates with the authentication server 100 and the AP installed in the information terminal 300 operates. When the authentication server 100 verifies the information terminal 300 and the AP installed in the information terminal 300 by such validation processing, and determines that the verification is successful, the information terminal 300 indicates the symbol e through the network. Connect to a business AP server 200 that provides in-house services. Here, although one information terminal 300 is illustrated and described, the application authentication system 1 can include a plurality of information terminals 300 distributed to each of a plurality of AP users who use the in-house service.

  Returning to FIG. 1, the authentication server 100 is a computer device of an authentication station that verifies the validity of the information terminal 300 and the AP stored in the information terminal 300, and includes an HCP storage unit 101, a verification key storage unit 102, The C & R processing unit 103, the reception unit 104, the decryption unit 105, the verification unit 106, the second session key generation unit 107, and the unique APID generation unit 108 are provided.

  In the HCP storage unit 101, for each APID for identifying an AP, an HCP embedded in the AP is associated with the AP and stored in advance. Here, the HCP is shared in an appropriate manner between the project manager and the certificate authority. Examples of HCP sharing methods include sharing methods such as (1) face-to-face sharing, (2) sharing by a key distribution center, and (3) sharing by public key.

  In the method (1), the certificate authority verifies the identity of the project manager. In the method (2), a common key for encrypting the communication path between the computer device of the project manager and the computer device of the certificate authority is registered in advance in the key distribution center. The key distribution center generates a session key, encrypts the session key with the project manager's common key, and transmits it to the project manager's computer device. Then, the session key is encrypted using the common key of the certificate authority and transmitted to the computer device of the certificate authority. The computer device of the project manager and the computer device of the certificate authority perform encrypted communication using the session key transmitted from the key distribution center and share the HCP. The method (3) is sharing by a hybrid key method, and a public key certificate may be used separately.

  The verification key storage unit 102 stores a verification key corresponding to a signature key stored in advance in the tamper resistant device 320 of the information terminal 300. Such a signature key is generated by the computer device of the project manager, and is shared by the sharing methods (1) to (3) described above and (4) the sharing method based on the DH (Diffie Hellman) method. The method (4) is a method in which the project manager and the certificate authority create a secret number and create an HCP therefrom.

  A C & R (challenge and response) processing unit 103 generates a message that is a challenge for verifying the validity of the information terminal 300, transmits the message to the information terminal, receives a response that is a response to the transmitted challenge, and performs a verification process I do. A pseudo-random number generator can be used for the challenge generation. As described above, in the present embodiment, when communication is performed between the authentication server 100 and the information terminal 300, authentication by the challenge response method is performed, so that the contents of messages flowing through the network are different each time. can do. That is, even if a message is eavesdropped, a message having a different value can be used for re-communication, and the threat of eavesdropping is reduced.

  The receiving unit 104 receives an authenticator (second authenticator) transmitted from the information terminal 300 in response to the challenge transmitted by the C & R processing unit 103 to the information terminal 300. The authenticator is information generated based on key information and a message to be authenticated. For example, as an authenticator, a MAC (Message Authentication) generated based on a result of encrypting a message itself by an algorithm such as AES (Advanced Encryption Standard), a message to be authenticated, key information, and the message. Code) etc. can be applied. The receiving unit 104 receives the unique key transmitted from the information terminal 300 and stores it in the storage area of the unique APID generation unit 108 in association with the unique APID that identifies the AP stored in the information terminal 300. Let The unique key is unique key information given to an AP that operates in a plurality of information terminals 300, and the unique APID is unique identification information of an AP that operates in each of the plurality of information terminals 300. That is, even if they are the same AP, if the stored information terminals 300 are different, different unique keys and different unique APIDs are assigned.

  The decryption unit 105 reads the HCP stored in the HCP storage unit 101, and decrypts the encrypted information transmitted from the information terminal 300 using the read HCP. Further, the decryption unit 105 reads the second session key stored in the second session key generation unit 107, and uses the read second session key to convert the encrypted information transmitted from the information terminal 300. Decrypt.

  The verification unit 106 reads the HCP stored in the HCP storage unit 101, and verifies the authenticator transmitted from the information terminal 300 using the read HCP. The verification process is performed, for example, by decrypting an authenticator that is a response to the transmitted challenge and determining whether the decrypted result matches the transmitted challenge. If they match, it is determined that the verification is successful, and if they do not match, it is determined that the verification fails. Further, the verification unit 106 reads the second session key stored in the second session key generation unit 107, and verifies the authenticator transmitted from the information terminal 300 using the read second session key. To do. For example, the verification unit 106 verifies the second authenticator received by the receiving unit 104 using the HCP stored in the HCP storage unit 101, and determines the first authenticator included in the second authenticator. Verification is performed using the verification key stored in the verification key storage unit 102.

  The second session key generation unit 107 generates a second session key that is key information by generating a pseudo-random number. The second session key is shared between the authentication server 100 and the information terminal 300 and also shared with the business AP server 200 because the information terminal 300 and the business AP server 200 perform encrypted communication. Is done. As a method of sharing the session key between the authentication server 100 and the business AP server 200, the methods (1) to (3) described above can be applied.

  When the verification unit 106 determines that the verification is successful, the unique APID generation unit 108 generates a unique APID for identifying the AP stored in the information terminal 300 that has transmitted the second authenticator, and stores the unique APID in its own storage area. Remember. The unique APID generation unit 108 stores a corresponding APID and a corresponding unique key in association with each unique APID.

  The business AP server 200 is a computer device that communicates with an AP operating on the information terminal 300. Here, the business AP server 200 and the information terminal 300 perform encrypted communication using the second session key generated by the authentication server 100.

The information terminal 300 is a computer device such as a smartphone or a tablet PC. The information terminal 300 includes an AP storage unit 310, a tamper resistant device 320, and a control unit 330.
The AP storage unit 310 stores an AP that is compiled and generated based on a source code in which HCP is hard-coded. The AP stored in the AP storage unit 310 has functions such as business applications in a company, for example, and also has a function of performing AP authentication by communicating with the tamper resistant device 320 and the authentication server 100. For example, the AP encrypts a challenge transmitted from the information terminal 300 using the HCP and inputs the encrypted challenge to the tamper resistant device 320, and outputs the first challenge output from the tamper resistant device 320 according to the challenge input to the tamper resistant device 320. The second authenticator (response) is generated based on the first authenticator (response) and the HCP, and is transmitted to the authentication server 100. The AP stored in the AP storage unit 310 is read and executed by the control unit 330.

  The tamper resistant device 320 includes an HCP storage unit 321, a signature key storage unit 322, an encryption processing unit 323, an activation flag storage unit 324, a C & R processing unit 325, a first session key generation unit 326, A key generation unit 327, an activation flag control unit 328, and a request transmission unit 329 are provided.

  The HCP storage unit 321 stores an HCP that is hard-coded in advance in an AP that operates in the information terminal 300. Here, the HCP appropriately received by the project manager from the AP developer is stored in advance in the HCP storage unit 321 via the computer apparatus of the project manager.

  The signature key storage unit 322 stores a predetermined signature key. The signature key is key information corresponding to the verification key stored in the verification key storage unit 102 of the authentication server 100, and is shared by, for example, any one of the above-described methods (1) to (4) and stored in advance. .

  The encryption processing unit 323 decrypts the challenge, which is input from the AP operating in the control unit 330 and encrypted using the HCP, using the HCP stored in the HCP storage unit 321. Also, the cryptographic processing unit 323 generates and outputs a first authenticator based on the challenge decrypted in this way and the signature key read from the signature key storage unit 322.

  For each of a plurality of APs stored in the AP storage unit 310, the validation flag storage unit 324 is uniquely assigned to the information terminal 300 among the plurality of information terminals 300. A unique APID and an activation flag indicating whether or not the AP is activated are stored in association with each other. “Valid” means that the AP is verified by the tamper resistant device 320 and the authentication server 100 and determined to be valid. For example, if the validation flag is valid, the value of ON (1) is associated with the value of OFF (0). The validation flag is represented by 1 bit, for example, and is stored in an EF (elementary file) defined by ISO / IEC7816-4.

  The C & R processing unit 325 generates a message that is a challenge for verifying the validity of the AP operating in the control unit 330, outputs the message to the AP, receives a response that is a response to the output challenge, and performs a verification process .

The first session key generation unit 326 generates a first session key that is key information by generating a pseudo-random number. The first session key is shared between the tamper resistant device 320 and the control unit 330.
The unique key generation unit 327 is a key that is unique among the APs stored in the plurality of information terminals 300 when the authenticity of the AP operating in the control unit 330 is verified by the authentication server 100 and it is determined that the verification is successful. A unique key that is information is generated.

The validation flag control unit 328 reads and updates the validation flag stored in the validation flag storage unit 324 in accordance with an application that operates in the control unit 330 and information transmitted from the authentication server 100.
The request transmission unit 329 generates and transmits a connection request command to the business AP server 200 and an AP activation request command.

In response to an AP activation request input from an AP user, the controller 330 reads the AP corresponding to the activation request from the AP storage unit 310 and operates it. Here, the control unit 330, based on the AP read from the AP storage unit 310, the HCP storage unit 331, the authentication request unit 332, the encryption processing unit 333, the session key reception unit 334, the validation flag confirmation request The function part of the part 335 and the request | requirement transmission part 336 is comprised.
In the HCP storage unit 331, a predetermined HCP is stored in association with each APID.

The authentication request unit 332 makes an authentication request by C & R to the tamper resistant device 320 and the authentication server 100. The encryption processing unit 333 reads the HCP read from the HCP storage unit 331 and the first read from the session key reception unit 334. An encryption process or a decryption process is performed using the session key or the second session key.

  The session key reception unit 334 receives the first session key generated by the first session key generation unit 326 of the tamper resistant apparatus 320 and stores it in its own storage area. Similarly, the second session key generated by the second session key generation unit 107 of the authentication server 100 is received and stored in its own storage area.

The validation flag confirmation request unit 335 inputs a validation flag confirmation request to the tamper resistant apparatus 320 when the AP is activated. The confirmation request that the validation flag confirmation request unit 335 inputs to the tamper resistant device 320 includes an APID that identifies its own AP.
The request transmission unit 336 transmits each request transmitted from the tamper resistant device 320 to the authentication server 100.

Next, an operation example of the application authentication system 1 according to the present embodiment will be described. FIG. 3 to FIG. 7 are sequence diagrams showing AP validation processing by the application authentication system 1.
As shown in FIG. 3, first, when an activation request is input to the information terminal 300 by the AP user, the control unit 330 accepts an input of the activation request (step S1). The control unit 330 reads the AP corresponding to the activation request from the AP storage unit 310 and develops it, and configures each functional unit included in the control unit 330. The authentication request unit 332 inputs an authentication request including its own APID to the tamper resistant device 320 (step S2). The C & R processing unit 325 generates a challenge (step S3) and outputs the challenge to the control unit 330 (step S4). The encryption processing unit 333 of the control unit 330 reads the HCP stored in the HCP storage unit 331, and generates an authenticator based on the read HCP and the challenge output from the tamper resistant device 320 (step S5). .

  The cryptographic processing unit 333 inputs the generated authenticator to the tamper resistant device 320 (step S6). The C & R processing unit 325 reads the HCP stored in the HCP storage unit 321 and verifies the authenticator input from the control unit 330 using the read HCP (step S7). If the C & R processing unit 325 determines that the verification has failed (step S8: NO), the process ends as an error (step S9). On the other hand, if the C & R processing unit 325 determines that the verification is successful (step S8: YES), the first session key generation unit 326 generates the first session key and stores it in its own storage area (step S10). ). The encryption processing unit 323 reads the HCP stored in the HCP storage unit 321 and encrypts the first session key generated by the first session key generation unit 326 using the read HCP (step S11).

The encryption processing unit 323 outputs the encrypted first session key (step S12). The session key receiving unit 334 reads the HCP stored in the HCP storage unit 331, decrypts the first session key output by the encryption processing unit 323 using the read HCP, and stores the decrypted first session key in its own storage area (step S31). S13).
Proceeding to FIG. 4, the validation flag confirmation requesting unit 335 inputs a validation flag confirmation request corresponding to its own APID to the tamper resistant apparatus 320 (step S14). The confirmation request for the validation flag includes the APID of the AP that inputs the confirmation request. The activation flag control unit 328 of the tamper resistant apparatus 320 responds to the validation flag confirmation request input from the validation flag confirmation request unit 335 and is associated with the APID included in the confirmation request. The validation flag stored in 324 is read (step S15).

  If the validation flag control unit 328 determines that the readout validation flag indicates invalidity (step S16: NO), the validation flag control unit 328 generates an validation request command (step S17). The cryptographic processing unit 323 reads the signature key stored in the signature key storage unit 322, and generates an authenticator based on the read signature key and the validation request command generated by the validation flag control unit 328 (step S18). The encryption processing unit 323 encrypts the generated authenticator using the first session key generated by the first session key generation unit 326 (step S19). The encryption processing unit 323 outputs the encrypted authenticator (Step S20).

  When the encrypted authenticator is output from the encryption processing unit 323, the request transmission unit 336 transmits an authentication request including its own APID to the authentication server 100 (step S21). When the authentication server 100 receives the authentication request transmitted from the information terminal 300, the C & R processing unit 103 generates a challenge (step S22) and transmits the challenge to the information terminal 300 (step S23). When the information terminal 300 receives the challenge transmitted from the authentication server 100, the encryption processing unit 333 reads the HCP stored in the HCP storage unit 331, and transmits the read HCP as key information from the authentication server 100. A challenge authenticator is generated (step S24). The cryptographic processing unit 333 transmits the generated authenticator to the authentication server 100 (step S25). When receiving the authenticator transmitted from the information terminal 300, the C & R processing unit 103 of the authentication server 100 reads the HCP stored in the HCP storage unit 101, and verifies the authenticator using the read HCP (step S26). ).

  Proceeding to FIG. 5, if the C & R processing unit 103 determines that the verification has failed (step S27: NO), the process ends as an error (step S28). On the other hand, if the C & R processing unit 103 determines that the verification is successful (step S27: YES), the second session key generation unit 107 generates a second session key and stores it in its own storage area (step S29). ). The dictionary data generation unit 107 reads the HCP stored in the HCP storage unit 101, and encrypts the second session key using the read HCP (step S30). The dictionary data generation unit 107 transmits the encrypted second session key to the information terminal 300 (step S31). The session key receiving unit 334 of the information terminal 300 reads the HCP stored in the HCP storage unit 331, decrypts the second session key transmitted from the authentication server 100 using the read HCP, and stores it in its storage area. Store (step S32).

  The cryptographic processing unit 333 reads the first session key stored in the session key receiving unit 334, decrypts the authenticator output from the tamper resistant device 320 in step S20 with the read first session key, and decrypts it. The authenticated authenticator is encrypted using the second session key stored in the session key receiving unit 334 (step S33). The encryption processing unit 333 transmits the encrypted authenticator to the authentication server 100 (step S34). The receiving unit 104 of the authentication server 100 receives the encrypted authenticator transmitted from the information terminal 300. The decryption unit 105 verifies the authenticator received by the reception unit 104 using the second session key stored in the second session key generation unit 107. If it is determined that the verification has failed, the process ends as an error. If it is determined that the verification is successful, the validation request command included in the authenticator is read (step S35).

  Then, when the C & R processing unit 103 of the authentication server 100 generates a challenge and transmits the challenge to the information terminal 300, the encryption processing unit 333 of the information terminal 300 receives the challenge transmitted from the authentication server 100. The encryption processing unit 333 reads the HCP stored in the HCP storage unit 331, and encrypts the challenge using the read HCP (step S38). The encryption processing unit 333 inputs the encrypted challenge to the tamper resistant device 320 (step S39).

  Proceeding to FIG. 6, the encryption processing unit 323 of the tamper resistant apparatus 320 reads the HCP stored in the HCP storage unit 321 and decrypts the challenge input from the control unit 330 using the read HCP (step S40). And the signature key memorize | stored in the signature key memory | storage part 322 is read, and an authenticator is produced | generated based on the read signature key and the decrypted challenge (step S41). The cryptographic processing unit 323 outputs the generated authenticator (step S42). The encryption processing unit 333 of the control unit 330 reads the HCP from the HCP storage unit 331, and generates a second authenticator based on the read HCP and the authenticator output from the tamper resistant apparatus 320 (step S43). . The cryptographic processing unit 333 transmits the generated second authenticator to the authentication server 100 (step S44).

  When the receiving unit 104 of the authentication server 100 receives the second authenticator transmitted from the information terminal 300, the verifying unit 106 reads the HCP stored in the HCP storage unit 101 and verifies the second authenticator. (Step S45). If it is determined that the verification has failed, the process ends as an error. If it is determined that the verification is successful, the verification key stored in the verification key storage unit 102 is read, and the authenticator included in the second authenticator is verified using the read verification key (step S46). If it is determined that the verification has failed, the process ends as an error. If it is determined that the verification is successful, the unique APID generation unit 108 generates a unique APID for identifying the AP of the information terminal 300 and stores it in its own storage area (step S47).

  The unique APID generation unit 108 generates an activation permission command, and encrypts the generated activation permission command and the unique APID using the second session key read from the second session key generation unit 107. (Step S48). The unique APID generation unit 108 transmits the encrypted valid permission command and the unique APID to the information terminal 300 (step S49). The encryption processing unit 333 of the information terminal 300 decrypts the encrypted enable permission command and the unique APID transmitted from the authentication server 100 with the second session key read from the session key receiving unit 334, and Encryption is performed using the first session key read from the key receiving unit 334 (step S50). The encryption processing unit 333 inputs the activation permission command encrypted with the first session key and the unique APID to the tamper resistant apparatus 320 (step S51).

  Proceeding to FIG. 7, the encryption processing unit 323 of the tamper resistant apparatus 320 decrypts the encrypted enable permission command and the unique APID using the first session key read from the first session key generation unit 326. (Step S52). The validation flag control unit 328 executes the validation permission command decrypted by the encryption processing unit 323, and turns on the validation flag stored in the validation flag storage unit 324 in association with the APID of the control unit 330. (Step S53). Also, the decrypted unique APID is stored in the validation flag storage unit 324 (step S54). Then, when the unique key generation unit 327 generates a unique key (step S55), the encryption processing unit 323 encrypts the unique key using the first session key read from the first session key generation unit 326. (Step S56), the encrypted unique key is output (Step S57).

  The encryption processing unit 333 of the control unit 330 uses the first session key read from the session key receiving unit 334 to decrypt the unique key output from the tamper resistant apparatus 320 and reads the first key read from the session key receiving unit 334. 2 is used for encryption (step S58). The encryption processing unit 333 transmits the encrypted unique key to the authentication server 100 (step S59). When the reception unit 104 of the authentication server 100 receives the encrypted unique key transmitted from the information terminal 300, the unique APID generation unit 108 reads the second session key read from the second session key generation unit 107. Is used to decrypt the unique key and store it in its own storage area in association with the unique APID generated in step S47 (step S60). Then, the process returns to step S14, and the AP verification process is performed in a state where the validation flag is ON.

8 to 11 are sequence diagrams showing the AP verification processing by the application authentication system 1.
In step S16 of FIG. 4, if the activation flag control unit 328 determines that the read activation flag indicates validity (step S16: YES), the process proceeds to FIG. 8, and the request transmission unit 329 determines that the connection request command and AP An activation request command is generated (step S61). The encryption processing unit 323 reads the unique key stored in the unique key generation unit 327, and generates an authenticator for the connection request command generated by the request transmission unit 329. Further, the first session key stored in the first session key generation unit 326 is read, and the authenticator is encrypted (step S62). In addition, the encryption processing unit 323 encrypts the AP activation request command generated by the request transmission unit 329 using the first session key (step S63).

  The encryption processing unit 323 outputs the encrypted connection request command authenticator, the encrypted AP activation request command, and the unique APID (step S64). The encryption processing unit 333 of the control unit 330 reads the first session key stored in the session key reception unit 334, and decrypts the AP activation request command output from the encryption processing unit 323 (step S65). In response to the decrypted AP activation request command, the request transmission unit 336 transmits an authentication request including its own unique APID to the business AP server 200 (step S66). The business AP server 200 transfers the authentication request transmitted from the information terminal 300 to the authentication server 100 (step S67). When the receiving unit 104 of the authentication server 100 receives the authentication request transferred from the business AP server 200, the C & R processing unit 103 generates a challenge (step S68) and transmits it to the business AP server 200 (step S69). The business AP server 200 transfers the challenge transmitted from the authentication server 100 to the information terminal 300 (step S70).

  Proceeding to FIG. 9, the encryption processing unit 333 of the information terminal 300 reads the HCP stored in the HCP storage unit 331, and generates an authenticator based on the read HCP and the challenge (step S71). The cryptographic processing unit 333 transmits the generated authenticator to the business AP server 200 (step S72). The business AP server 200 transfers the authenticator transmitted from the information terminal 300 to the authentication server 100 (step S73). When the receiving unit 104 of the authentication server 100 receives the authenticator transferred from the business AP server 200, the verifying unit 106 reads the HCP stored in the HCP storage unit 101 and verifies the authenticator (step S74). . If the verification unit 106 determines that the verification is unsuccessful, the process ends as an error. If the verification unit 106 determines that the verification is successful, the second session key generation unit 107 generates a second session key (step S75).

  The second session key generation unit 107 reads the HCP stored in the HCP storage unit 101, and encrypts the second session key using the read HCP (step S76). The second session key generation unit 107 transmits the encrypted second session key to the business AP server 200 (step S77). The business AP server 200 transfers the second session key transferred from the authentication server 100 to the information terminal 300 (step S78). The encryption processing unit 333 of the control unit 330 reads out the HCP stored in the HCP storage unit 331 and decrypts the second session key transmitted from the business AP server 200 (step S79).

  The encryption processing unit 333 uses the first session key read from the session key receiving unit 334 to decrypt the connection request command output in step S64, and uses the second session key read from the session key receiving unit 334 as the second session key. And encrypting it (step S80). Then, the encryption processing unit 333 transmits the encrypted connection request command to the business AP server 200 (step S81). The business AP server 200 transfers the encrypted connection request command transmitted from the information terminal 300 to the authentication server 100 (step S82).

  Proceeding to FIG. 10, when the receiving unit 104 of the authentication server 100 receives the encrypted connection request command transferred from the business AP server 200, the decrypting unit 105 reads it from the second session key generating unit 107. The connection request command is decrypted using the session key 2 (step S83). The C & R processing unit 103 of the authentication server 100 generates a challenge in response to the decrypted connection request command (step S84). The C & R processing unit 103 transmits the generated challenge to the business AP server 200 (step S85).

  The business AP server 200 transfers the challenge transmitted from the authentication server 100 to the information terminal 300 (step S86). Upon receiving the challenge transferred from the business AP server 200, the encryption processing unit 333 of the information terminal 300 encrypts using the HCP read from the HCP storage unit 331 (step S87). The encryption processing unit 333 inputs the encrypted challenge to the tamper resistant device 320 (step S88). The encryption processing unit 323 of the tamper resistant apparatus 320 decrypts the received challenge using the HCP read from the HCP storage unit 321, and authenticates based on the decrypted challenge and the unique key read from the unique key generation unit 327. A child is generated (step S89). The cryptographic processing unit 323 outputs the generated authenticator (step S90).

The cryptographic processing unit 333 of the control unit 330 generates a second authenticator based on the authenticator output from the tamper resistant device 320 and the HCP read from the HCP storage unit 331 (step S91). The cryptographic processing unit 333 transmits the generated second authenticator to the business AP server 200 (step S92). The business AP server 200 transfers the second authenticator transmitted from the information terminal 300 to the authentication server 100 (step S93). Authentication server 100
When the receiving unit 104 receives the second authenticator transmitted from the business AP server 200, the verifying unit 106 verifies the second authenticator using the HCP read from the HCP storage unit 101 (step S94). .

  If the verification unit 106 determines that the verification is unsuccessful, the process ends as an error. If the verification unit 106 determines that the authentication is successful, the verification unit 106 reads the unique key stored in the unique APID generation unit 108 and uses the read unique key to obtain an authenticator. Verification is performed (step S95). If it is determined that the verification is unsuccessful, the process ends as an error. If it is determined that the authentication is successful, the process proceeds to FIG. 11, and the authentication server 100 generates a connection permission command and reads it from the second session key generation unit 107. It is encrypted using the session key (step S96) and transmitted to the business AP server 200 (step S97).

  The business AP server 200 transfers the encrypted connection permission command transmitted from the authentication server 100 to the information terminal 300 (step S98). The encryption processing unit 333 of the control unit 330 decrypts the connection permission command transferred from the business AP server 200 using the second session key read from the session key receiving unit 334 (step S99). When the authentication server 100 transmits the second session key stored in the second session key generation unit 107 to the business AP server 200 (step S100), the business AP server 200 transmits the second session key transmitted from the authentication server 100. The second session key is stored in its own storage area. Thereafter, the business AP server 200 and the information terminal 300 can perform encrypted communication using the second session key (step S101).

  As described above, according to the present embodiment, the AP, the tamper resistant device 320, and the authentication server 100 communicate with each other using the HCP which is key information hard-coded in the AP source code, and The validity of the tamper device 320 and the AP is verified between the three parties including the authentication server 100. As a result, when a third party who is not a project manager is not valid and tries to install and start an AP that does not include a predetermined HCP in the information terminal 300, verification fails and an error occurs. Can do. For this reason, for example, when an AP impersonating a legitimate AP is installed, it is possible to prevent the AP from operating and accessing confidential information or the like.

  Alternatively, for example, even if a legitimate AP is installed in an information terminal that is not managed by the project manager by some method, if an appropriate HCP is not stored in the tamper resistant device of the information terminal, verification is performed. Can be an error. Thus, according to the present embodiment, it is possible to verify whether or not a valid AP is operating in the valid information terminal 300. Thereby, for example, even when an information terminal such as a smartphone or a tablet PC is used in a company that handles confidential information such as personal information and customer information, the processing can be performed safely.

  Further, according to the present embodiment, when information is transmitted and received between the tamper resistant device 320 and the AP operating in the control unit 330 and between the information terminal 300 and the authentication server 100, a temporary response by a challenge response is performed. Information that was encrypted or encrypted using a key. As a result, even if the information is wiretapped, it is possible to reduce threats such as leakage of information content or a replay attack.

  Further, in the AP validation process, a unique key corresponding to each AP stored in the plurality of information terminals 300 is generated, and authentication is performed each time the AP is activated using this unique key. Thereby, for example, even when the same AP is used in a plurality of information terminals 300, it is possible to manage information such as which AP stored in which information terminal 300 is operating. AP usage management can be performed.

  Thus, according to the present embodiment, when accessing the business AP server 200 from the information terminal 300, it is possible to confirm the validity of the AP installed in the information terminal 300 from the business AP server 200 side. In addition, when the AP is installed and distributed in the information terminal 300, the setting information stored in the information terminal 300 can be the same. For example, an AP in which the same signature key and the same HCP are embedded can be similarly installed and distributed to a plurality of information terminals 300 of a plurality of AP users. However, since the unique APID and unique key unique to the AP of each information terminal 300 are given by the activation process, when the AP user accesses the business AP server 200 using the information terminal 300, Among a plurality of information terminals 300, the AP of the information terminal 300 can be identified.

  In the above example, the example in which the key information of the common key cryptosystem is applied as the HCP embedded in the AP and the signature key to be stored in the tamper resistant device 320 is shown. However, the HCP and the signature key may be public key cryptography. A secret key may be applied. In this case, when the authenticator is verified using the public key corresponding to the secret key, authentication using the public key included in the public key certificate can be performed. The public key certificate includes, for example, X.I., which is a public key infrastructure standard by ITU-T (International Telecommunication Union Telecommunication Standardization Sector). A public key certificate defined in 509 can be applied. Such a public key certificate includes, for example, information such as an issuer, an owner, an expiration date, a public key certificate version, a signature algorithm, and key information (public key). Further, the extended area of the public key certificate can include information such as the device ID of the information terminal 300, the hash value of the AP, the unique APID, and the AP name. The device ID is, for example, a serial number unique to the information terminal 300. The hash value of the AP is, for example, the hash value of the “.apk” file itself if the information terminal 300 is Android (registered trademark). At the time of verification, using such information, for example, by providing a valid period for each AP or controlling validity / invalidity for each device ID of the information terminal 300, more flexible and diverse authentication can be performed. It can be carried out. In this case, the authentication process can be performed by the business AP server 200, for example.

In the present embodiment, either or both of the HCP embedded in the AP in the information terminal 300 and the signature key stored in the signature key storage unit 322 is used as a secret key in the public key cryptosystem, and the authentication server 100 stores the HCP. Either or both of the HCP stored in the unit 101 and the verification key stored in the verification key storage unit 102 can be replaced with a public key certificate corresponding to the private key.
When the pair of the HCP embedded in the AP of the information terminal 300 and the HCP stored in the HCP storage unit 101 of the authentication server 100 is replaced with such a pair of a private key and a public key certificate, The verification processing in step S45 and step S94 in the present embodiment can be performed using a public key certificate.
When the pair of the signature key stored in the signature key storage unit 322 and the verification key stored in the verification key storage unit 102 is replaced with such a pair of a private key and a public key certificate, the present embodiment The verification processing of step S46 and step S95 in the embodiment can be performed using a public key certificate.

Alternatively, a public key certificate of a public key cryptosystem can be applied as the validation flag stored in the validation flag storage unit 324. In this case, for example, the signature key storage unit 322 of the tamper resistant apparatus 320 stores the signature key of the public key cryptosystem and the public key certificate corresponding to the signature key. Then, in the validation flag check processing in step S15 shown in FIG. 4, verification according to the public key certificate is performed. That is, in the present embodiment, either the ON (1) value or the OFF (0) value is stored in the activation flag storage unit 324 of the tamper resistant apparatus 320 as the activation flag. In addition to such a flag, a public key certificate may be stored. In this case, in the validation flag check process (step S15), information on the owner, expiration date, and public key certificate version included in the public key certificate can be used as additional check information. Specifically, for example, even when the validation flag is ON (1) in step S15, if the validity period of the public key certificate is older than the current time, the AP's It becomes possible to determine that the validation flag is invalid.
Here, it is possible not only to use the public key certificate in addition to the validation flag, but also to validate by including the validation flag in the extension area of the public key certificate.

  Further, by storing a plurality of HCPs in advance in the AP, the tamper resistant device 320, and the authentication server 100 in the present embodiment, and selecting and using the HCPs according to the conditions, it is possible to further increase the security. . For example, as an AP stored in the AP storage unit 310 of the information terminal 300, an AP based on a source code in which a plurality of HCPs are hard-coded is stored, and an HCP corresponding to a predetermined condition among the plurality of HCPs is stored. The encryption process can be performed by using. In this case, the HCP storage unit 321 of the tamper resistant device 320 similarly stores a plurality of HCPs in advance, and the encryption processing unit 323 selects the HCP corresponding to the condition from among the plurality of HCPs stored in the HCP storage unit 321. Is used to perform the decoding process. Similarly, a plurality of HCPs are stored in the HCP storage unit 101 of the authentication server 100, and the verification unit 106 of the authentication server 100 selects an HCP corresponding to a condition from among the plurality of HCPs stored in the HCP storage unit 101. Use it to perform verification processing.

Here, as the conditions, for example, processing execution time, a carrier (communication carrier) that performs communication by the information terminal 300, and the like can be applied. Alternatively, when performing verification using a public key certificate of a public key cryptosystem as described above, various information included in the public key certificate can be used as a condition.
In the present embodiment, an example in which a smartphone or a tablet PC is applied as the information terminal 300 has been described. However, similar AP verification can also be performed on a PC or the like.

  The program for realizing the function of the processing unit in the present invention is recorded on a computer-readable recording medium, and the verification process is performed by causing the computer system to read and execute the program recorded on the recording medium. May be. Here, the “computer system” includes an OS and hardware such as peripheral devices. The “computer system” includes a WWW system having a homepage providing environment (or display environment). The “computer-readable recording medium” refers to a storage device such as a flexible medium, a magneto-optical disk, a portable medium such as a ROM and a CD-ROM, and a hard disk incorporated in a computer system. Further, the “computer-readable recording medium” refers to a volatile memory (RAM) in a computer system that becomes a server or a client when a program is transmitted via a network such as the Internet or a communication line such as a telephone line. In addition, those holding programs for a certain period of time are also included.

  The program may be transmitted from a computer system storing the program in a storage device or the like to another computer system via a transmission medium or by a transmission wave in the transmission medium. Here, the “transmission medium” for transmitting the program refers to a medium having a function of transmitting information, such as a network (communication network) such as the Internet or a communication line (communication line) such as a telephone line. The program may be for realizing a part of the functions described above. Furthermore, what can implement | achieve the function mentioned above in combination with the program already recorded on the computer system, and what is called a difference file (difference program) may be sufficient.

DESCRIPTION OF SYMBOLS 1 Application authentication system 100 Authentication server 101 HCP memory | storage part 102 Verification key memory | storage part 103 C & R process part 104 Receiving part 105 Decoding part 106 Verification part 107 2nd session key generation part 108 Unique APID generation part 200 Business AP server 300 Information terminal 310 AP storage unit 320 tamper resistant device 321 HCP storage unit 322 signature key storage unit 323 encryption processing unit 324 validation flag storage unit 325 C & R processing unit 326 first session key generation unit 327 unique key generation unit 328 validation flag control unit 329 Request transmission unit 330 Control unit 331 HCP storage unit 332 Authentication request unit 333 Cryptographic processing unit 334 Session key reception unit 335 Validation flag confirmation request unit 336 Request transmission unit

Claims (6)

An application authentication system comprising an information terminal having a tamper resistant device and an authentication server connected to the information terminal via a network,
The tamper resistant device of the information terminal is
A tamper-resistant key information storage unit in which key information hard-coded in advance is stored in application software that operates in the information terminal;
A signature key storage unit in which a predetermined signature key is stored;
A tamper resistant decryption unit that decrypts a message that is input from the application software and is encrypted using the key information, using the key information stored in the tamper resistant key information storage unit;
An encryption unit that generates and outputs a first authenticator based on the message decrypted by the tamper-resistant decryption unit and the signature key;
The information terminal
The key information is the application software based on a hard-coded source code, and a message transmitted from the authentication server is encrypted using the key information and is input to the tamper resistant device. A second authenticator is generated based on the first authenticator output from the tamper resistant apparatus in response to the message input to the key and the key information hard-coded in itself, and the authentication server An AP storage unit that stores application software for executing a process to be transmitted;
A control unit for operating the application software stored in the AP storage unit,
The authentication server is
An authentication server key information storage unit storing the key information;
A verification key storage unit storing a verification key corresponding to the signature key stored in the tamper resistant device;
A transmitter that generates the message and transmits the message to the information terminal;
A receiver that receives the second authenticator transmitted from the information terminal in response to the message transmitted by the transmitter to the information terminal;
The second authenticator received by the receiving unit is verified using the key information stored in the authentication server key information storage unit, and the first authenticator included in the second authenticator Verifying unit using the verification key stored in the verification key storage unit,
An application authentication system comprising: The authentication server is connected to the plurality of information terminals via the network,
If the verification unit determines that both the verification of the second authenticator and the verification of the first authenticator are successful, the verification unit stores the second authenticator in the information terminal that has transmitted the second authenticator. A unique APID generating unit for generating a unique APID for identifying the application software;
A unique key storage unit that stores a unique key corresponding to the application software in association with each unique APID that identifies the application software stored in the plurality of information terminals,
The receiving unit of the authentication server receives the unique key transmitted from the information terminal and stores it in the unique key storage unit in association with the unique APID for identifying the application software stored in the information terminal. Let
The information terminal
If the verification unit determines that the verification is successful, the unique key is generated and transmitted to the authentication server;
The application authentication system according to claim 1, further comprising: The application software stored in the AP storage unit is the application software based on a source code in which a plurality of key information is hard-coded, and a key corresponding to a predetermined condition among the plurality of key information Execute processing to encrypt using information,
The tamper resistant key information storage unit of the tamper resistant device stores the plurality of key information,
The tamper resistant decryption unit of the tamper resistant device decrypts the key information stored in the tamper resistant key information storage unit using the key information corresponding to the condition,
The authentication server key information storage unit of the authentication server stores the plurality of key information,
The verification of the authentication server, the authentication of the server key information a plurality of key information stored in the storage unit, according to claim 1 or claim, characterized in that the verifying using the key information according to the prior Symbol Conditions Item 3. The application authentication system according to Item 2. The application authentication system includes a business AP server that communicates with the information terminal by the application software that operates on the information terminal .
The authentication server generates a session key, encrypts it using the key information, shares it with the information terminal, sends the session key to the business AP server,
The application authentication system according to any one of claims 1 to 3, wherein the business AP server and the information terminal perform encrypted communication based on the session key. The message transmitted by the transmission unit of the authentication server to the information terminal is a challenge in a challenge response method,
The said 2nd authenticator which the said information terminal transmits to the said authentication server according to the said challenge is a response corresponding to the said challenge. Any one of Claim 1 to 4 characterized by the above-mentioned. The application authentication system described. A tamper-resistant key information storage unit that stores key information hard-coded in advance in application software that is operated by the control unit in the information terminal, and a signature key storage unit that stores a predetermined signature key. A tamper device, wherein the key information is the application software based on the hard-coded source code, and a message transmitted from the authentication server connected via the network is encrypted using the key information. Based on the first authenticator that is input to the tamper resistant device and output from the tamper resistant device in response to the message input to the tamper resistant device, and the key information that is hard-coded to itself. application for and the generating the authenticator, to execute a process of transmitting to the authentication server An information terminal having an AP storage unit storing software, an authentication server key information storage unit storing the key information, and a verification key corresponding to the signature key stored in the tamper resistant device are stored. An application authentication method for an application authentication system comprising: the authentication server comprising a verification key storage unit,
The authentication server is
Generating a message and sending it to the information terminal;
The control unit of the information terminal is
By operating the application software stored in the AP storage unit, encrypting a message transmitted from an authentication server using the key information and inputting the message to the tamper resistant device;
The tamper resistant device of the information terminal is
Decrypting, using the key information stored in the tamper-resistant key information storage unit, a message that is input from the application software and encrypted using the key information;
Generating and outputting the first authenticator based on the decrypted message and the signature key;
The control unit of the information terminal is
By operating the application software stored in the AP storage unit, the first authenticator output from the tamper resistant device in response to the message input to the tamper resistant device, and hard-coded to itself Generating a second authenticator based on the generated key information and transmitting the second authenticator to the authentication server;
The authentication server is
Receiving the second authenticator transmitted from the information terminal in response to the message transmitted to the information terminal;
The received second authenticator is verified using the key information stored in the authentication server key information storage unit, and the first authenticator included in the second authenticator is verified. Verifying using the verification key stored in the key storage unit;
An application authentication method comprising:

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