JP4813875B2 - Automatic device authentication information setting method - Google Patents

Description

  The present invention relates to an inter-device authentication information automatic setting method for automatically setting authentication information between a first device and a second device that communicate with each other.

  Conventionally, for example, in a building such as a building, a collation device such as a fingerprint collation device is used as the first device, an electric lock controller is used as the second device, and an electric lock provided at the entrance of the room is unlocked. / An entrance / exit management system that controls locking is used.

  In this entry / exit management system, the verification device determines whether or not the person who wants to enter the room is an entry permitter, and sends the determination result (verification result) to the electric lock controller. The electric lock controller unlocks the electric lock when a verification result indicating that the person who wants to enter the room is a person who is allowed to enter the room is sent.

  Usually, the verification device is installed in the vicinity of an outdoor door in order to authenticate a person who tries to enter the room from outside. On the other hand, the electric lock controller is installed indoors. Therefore, the fingerprint collation device and the electric lock controller are at spatially separated positions, and the collation result from the collation device is sent to the electric lock controller by communication. In addition, information indicating that the electric lock has been unlocked is transmitted from the electric lock controller to the verification device by communication.

  In performing communication between the verification device and the electric lock controller, device verification information (device ID) is defined for each of the verification device and the electric lock controller. Thus, during communication, the transmission side attaches its own device ID and transmits data to the reception side, and the reception side identifies the transmission source of the received data by confirming the device ID attached to the reception data. be able to.

[Device ID setting]
Generally, the device ID is in an initial state (for example, “# 0”) at the time of shipment from the factory, and is set by the operator after the collation device and the electric lock controller are installed on the site. A device ID setting method at this time will be described with reference to FIG.

  In FIG. 13, 1 is a collation device (IDU), 2 is an electric lock controller (PCU), and 3 is an electric lock. FIG. 13A shows a state before the device ID is set, and the device IDs of the verification device 1 and the electric lock controller 2 are both in the initial state “# 0”.

  The operator manually sets (manually inputs), for example, “# 1” as the device ID in the verification device 1 after the verification device 1 and the electric lock controller 2 are installed on the site (FIG. 13B). Then, the manually set device ID “# 1” of the verification device 1 is sent to the electric lock controller 2 (FIG. 13C) and set in the electric lock controller 2. As a result, the device ID of the verification device 1 and the device ID of the electric lock controller 2 are set to the same device ID “# 1”.

[Unlocking after verification]
[Case 1: When device ID matches]
When the verification device 1 determines that the person who wants to enter the room is a person who is allowed to enter the room, the verification device 1 sends a communication message of “verification OK” including its own device ID “# 1” to the electric lock controller 2 (FIG. 14A). The electric lock controller 2 collates the device ID included in the communication message sent from the collation device 1 with its own device ID, and checks the validity of the collation device 1. In this case, since both the device IDs are “# 1” and the same, the electric lock controller 2 determines that the verification device 1 is a valid device, accepts the communication message “verification OK” from the verification device 1, The electric lock 3 is unlocked.

[Case 2: When device IDs do not match]
The verification device 1 is installed outdoors. For this reason, there exists a possibility that it may be replaced with another collation apparatus by a malicious third party. For example, as shown in FIG. 14 (b), an unauthorized collation device 1 ′ with a device ID “# 2” may be attached instead of the regular collation device 1 with the device ID “# 1”. .

  In this case, the verification device 1 ′ sends a communication message “verification OK” including its own device ID “# 2” to the electric lock controller 2. The electric lock controller 2 collates the device ID included in the communication message sent from the collation device 1 'with its own device ID, and checks the validity of the collation device 1'. In this case, since the device IDs are different, the electric lock controller 2 determines that the collation device 1 ′ is an unauthorized device, rejects the communication message “verification OK” from the collation device 1 ′, and releases the electric lock 3. Do not lock.

JP 2004-355396 A

  However, according to the conventional method for setting authentication information between devices, since the device ID is set manually, there is a problem that the setting work of the device ID is troublesome. In addition, the device ID setting operation may be forgotten. If you forget to set the device ID, the device IDs of the collation device 1 and electric lock controller 2 will remain in the initial state “# 0” at the time of shipment from the factory. Can be used.

  Further, in the conventional method for setting authentication information between devices, a paper or a sticker on which the device ID is described may be affixed to the verification device 1 in order to facilitate the manual setting of the device ID. In such a case, a malicious third party purchases a new collation device and sets the device ID described in the existing collation device 1 in the new collation device, thereby enabling unauthorized use.

  In Patent Document 1, a model-specific password is set for a home appliance, the model-specific password is transmitted to the home appliance authentication system, and the transmitted model-specific password is registered in advance on the home appliance authentication system side. Unique device authentication information is set from the home appliance authentication system side to the home appliance side when it matches the type-specific password. However, in this method, the model-specific password must be artificially set in advance, which is troublesome.

  The present invention has been made to solve such a problem, and the purpose of the present invention is to eliminate the need for manually setting authentication information, forgetting to set authentication information, and leaking authentication information to the outside. The object is to provide a device-to-device authentication information automatic setting method without fear.

In order to achieve such an object, the first invention (the invention according to claim 1) includes a first device installed outside a room and a second device installed indoors that communicate with each other. In the device-to-device authentication information automatic setting method for automatically setting authentication information between the first device and the second device, a step of supplying power to the first device and the second device at the same time, and a second device triggered by the start of power supply The self-authentication information is sent to the first device, and the first device reads out the self-authentication information triggered by the start of power supply, and is transmitted from the read self-authentication information and the second device. The authentication information is collated, and when both match with the value indicating the initial state, a random value is generated, and the random value generated in the first device is used as the first device authentication information as the first information. Automatically installed on The method comprising the steps of: transmitting a random value generated in the first device to the second device, automatic random value transmitted from the first device to the second device as the authentication information of the second device And a step for setting.
According to this invention, for example, when the first device is a verification device and the second device is an electric lock controller, the authentication information is transmitted from the electric lock controller to the verification device when the supply of power is started. In the verification device, the self-authentication information is read, and the read self-authentication information and the authentication information transmitted from the electric lock controller are verified. Here, if both values coincide with each other in a value indicating the initial state (for example, “# 0”) , a random value (A) is generated in the collation device, and this random value (A) is the authentication information (device). ID “#A”) is automatically set in the verification device. Further, the random value (A) generated in the verification device is sent to the electric lock controller, and this random value (A) is automatically set in the electric lock controller as its own authentication information (device ID “#A”). . Thereby, the authentication information of the collation device and the authentication information of the electric lock controller are set to the same authentication information (device ID “#A”).

According to a second invention (invention according to claim 2), in the first invention, when a predetermined operation is performed in the second device, the second device transmits its own authentication information to the first device. And a step of rewriting the authentication information transmitted from the second device by a predetermined operation as its own authentication information in the first device .
For example, in the second invention, the authentication information of the first device and the second device is a random value “#yy”, the first device is replaced with a new one due to a failure or the like, and the first device is authenticated. Assume that the information is in the initial state “# 0”. In this case, write to performs a predetermined operation (special operation) in the second device, the authentication information of the first device being the initial state "# 0" is the authentication information of the second device "#yy" Be replaced. Thereby, the authentication information of the first device and the authentication information of the second device become the same authentication information “#yy”.

According to a third invention (the invention according to claim 3), in the first invention, when a predetermined operation is performed on the second device, the second device sets the first device as the first device. A request for transmitting authentication information that has been sent, a step of returning self-authentication information from the first device in response to a transmission request transmitted from the second device, and a response from the first device And a step of rewriting the authentication information as the self-authentication information in the second device .
For example, in the third invention, the authentication information of the first device and the second device is a random value “#yy”, and the first device is replaced with a different product due to a failure or the like. It is assumed that the authentication information has a random value “#zz”. In this case, when a predetermined operation (special operation) in the second device, the authentication information of the second device "#yy" is rewritten to the authentication information of the first device "#zz". Accordingly, the authentication information of the first device and the authentication information of the second device become the same authentication information “#zz”.

In the second and third inventions, the predetermined operation (special operation) is, for example, an operation of turning on / off the power supply after short-circuiting some output contacts of the device. In the present invention, the first device and the second device are not limited to the collation device and the electric lock controller. However, in the system using the collation device and the electric lock controller, a special device is provided on the electric lock controller side provided in the room. to perform the operation. In this way, special operations cannot be performed without entering the room, and unauthorized operations from outside the room can be avoided.

According to the present invention, the authentication information is transmitted from the second device to the first device in response to the start of power supply, and the authentication information is read out in the first device in response to the start of power supply. The read self authentication information and the authentication information transmitted from the second device are collated, and when both match with a value indicating the initial state, a random value is generated, and the random value is set to the first value. Since the authentication information is automatically set as the own authentication information in each of the second device and the second device, setting of the authentication information by manual input becomes unnecessary, and the troublesomeness is eliminated. In addition, the setting of the authentication information is not forgotten, and there is no possibility that the authentication information leaks outside.

  Hereinafter, the present invention will be described in detail with reference to the drawings. FIG. 1 is a block diagram showing an example of an entrance / exit management system used in the implementation of the present invention. In the figure, 10 is a collating device (IDU) installed in the vicinity of an outdoor door, 20 is an electric lock controller (PCU) installed indoors, and 30 is an electric lock provided at the entrance of the room.

  The collation device 10 includes a CPU 10A, a RAM 10B, a flash memory 10C, a liquid crystal display unit (LCD) 10D, a fingerprint reading unit 10E, a red LED 10F, and interfaces 10G to 10I. The CPU 10A operates according to a program stored in the flash memory 10C. The flash memory 10C stores a device ID automatic setting program as a program unique to the present embodiment. The LED 10F illuminates the fingerprint collecting surface in the fingerprint reading unit 10E.

  The electric lock controller 20 includes a CPU 20A, a RAM 20B, a flash memory 20C, a power source 20D, a power switch 20E, and interfaces 20F and 20G. The CPU 20A operates according to a program stored in the flash memory 20C. The flash memory 20C stores a device ID automatic setting program as a program unique to the present embodiment.

In this entrance / exit management system, the verification device 10 and the electric lock controller 20 are connected to each other by a power line L1 and a signal line L2, and communication between the verification device 10 and the electric lock controller 20 is performed. The electric lock controller 20 supplies power to the verification device 10. That is, in the electric lock controller 20, when the power switch 20E is turned on, power is supplied to the CPU 20A and the like in the electric lock controller 20, and at the same time, power is supplied to the CPU 10A and the like in the verification device 10. Yes.

  FIG. 1 shows a state before the system is operated after the verification device 10 and the electric lock controller 20 are installed on the site. In this state, the initial state “# 0” at the time of factory shipment is stored as the device ID in both the flash memory 10C of the verification device 10 and the flash memory 20C of the electric lock controller 20. In the flash memory 10C, a registered fingerprint for authenticating a person who enters the room after the system is operated is separately stored by a predetermined operation.

[Automatic device ID setting]
Hereinafter, automatic setting of the device ID in the collation device 10 and the electric lock controller 20 will be described as a function unique to the present embodiment. The automatic setting of the device ID is performed by the CPU 10A of the verification device 10 and the CPU 20A of the electric lock controller 20 in cooperation with each other according to the device ID automatic setting program stored in the flash memories 10C and 20C.

  The operator turns on the power switch 20E of the electric lock controller 20 after the collation device 10 and the electric lock controller 20 are installed on the site (see FIG. 2A). Thereby, supply of power to the CPU 20A and the like in the electric lock controller 20 is started, and power from the electric lock controller 20 is sent to the verification device 10, and supply of power to the CPU 10A and the like in the verification device 10 is started. The

  When the supply of power is received, the CPU 20A of the electric lock controller 20 reads the device ID from the flash memory 20C and sends it to the verification device 10 (step 101 shown in FIG. 3). In this case, since the device ID of the flash memory 20C is in the initial state “# 0”, the device ID “# 0” is sent to the verification device 10 (see FIG. 2B).

  When the supply of power is received, the CPU 10A of the verification device 10 reads the device ID from the flash memory 10C (step 201 shown in FIG. 4). Then, the device ID sent from the electric lock controller 20 is read (step 202), and whether the device ID read from the flash memory 10C and the device ID sent from the electric lock controller 20 are both “# 0”. Is checked (step 203). In this case, the device ID read from the flash memory 10C is in the initial state “# 0”, and the device ID sent from the electric lock controller 20 is also in the initial state “# 0”. Proceed to step 204.

  In step 203, the CPU 10A of the verification device 10 generates a random value A using a random value generation function (step 204). The generated random value A is set in the flash memory 10C as its own device ID (initial state “# 0” is rewritten to “#A”) (step 205) and stored in the communication buffer of the RAM 10B (step 205). Step 206).

  On the other hand, after transmitting the device ID read from the flash memory 20C (FIG. 3: step 101), the CPU 20A of the electric lock controller 20 waits for a predetermined time to make an inquiry to the verification device 10 (step 102). ). In response to the inquiry from the electric lock controller 20 (FIG. 4: YES in step 207), the CPU 10A of the verification device 10 returns the content (random value A) stored in the communication buffer of the RAM 10B to the electric lock controller 20. (Step 208: See FIG. 2C).

  When the CPU 20A of the electric lock controller 20 receives the random value A from the verification device 10 (FIG. 3: YES in step 103), the CPU 20A sets the received random value A as its own device ID in the flash memory 20C (initial state). “# 0” is rewritten to “#A”: step 104). Accordingly, the device ID of the verification device 10 and the device ID of the electric lock controller 20 are set to the same device ID “#A”.

  In this way, in the present embodiment, when the power switch 20E is turned on in the electric lock controller 20, a random value is generated in the collation device 10, and this random value is sent to the collation device 10 and the electric lock controller 20 by its own device. Since it is automatically set as the ID, it is not necessary to manually set the device ID, and there is no troublesomeness. In addition, when the system is operated, the power switch 20E is always turned on, so that the device ID setting is not forgotten. Furthermore, since the automatic setting of the device ID is performed secretly inside the collation device 10 and the electric lock controller 20, there is no possibility that the device ID leaks outside.

[Unlocking after verification]
[Case 1: When device ID matches]
While the system is in operation, the CPU 10A of the verification device 10 reads the fingerprint (verification fingerprint) of the person who wants to enter the room via the fingerprint reading unit 10E (step 301 shown in FIG. 5), and compares the fingerprint with the registered fingerprint stored in the flash memory 10C. A match / mismatch is determined (step 302). If the verification fingerprint matches the registered fingerprint (YES in step 303), “verification OK” is stored in the communication buffer of the RAM 10B as the verification result (step 304). If the verification fingerprint and the registered fingerprint do not match (NO in step 303), a message to that effect is displayed on the LCD 10D (step 305).

  On the other hand, the CPU 20A of the electric lock controller 20 periodically inquires the verification device 10 (step 401 shown in FIG. 6). In response to the inquiry from the electric lock controller 20, the CPU 10A of the verification device 10 reads the contents stored in the communication buffer of the RAM 10B, and adds the communication message including its own device ID “#A” to the electric lock. Return to the controller 20. In this example, “verification OK” is stored in the communication buffer of the RAM 10B, and a communication message of “verification OK” including the device ID “#A” is returned to the electric lock controller 20 (FIG. 7A). )reference).

  When a communication message “verification OK” is sent from the verification device 10 (FIG. 6: YES in step 402), the CPU 20A of the electric lock controller 20 and the device ID included in the communication message and its own device ID. And the validity of the collation device 10 is checked (step 403). In this case, since both the device IDs are the same “#A”, the electric lock controller 20 determines that the verification device 10 is a valid device (YES in step 403), and “verification OK” from the verification device 10. And unlocks the electric lock 30 (step 404).

[Case 2: When device IDs do not match]
As illustrated in FIG. 7B, an unauthorized collating device 10 ′ with the device ID “#B” may be attached instead of the regular collating device 10 with the device ID “#A”. In this case, the CPU 10A of the verification device 10 ′ reads the content stored in the communication buffer of the RAM 10B in response to the inquiry from the electric lock controller 20, and performs communication including its own device ID “#B” in the content. The electronic message is returned to the electric lock controller 20. In this example, “verification OK” is stored in the communication buffer of the RAM 10B, and a communication message of “verification OK” including the device ID “#B” is returned to the electric lock controller 20.

  When a communication message “verification OK” is sent from the verification device 10 (FIG. 6: YES in step 402), the CPU 20A of the electric lock controller 20 and the device ID included in the communication message and its own device ID. And the validity of the collation device 10 is checked (step 403). In this case, since the device ID included in the communication message is “#B”, the own device ID is “#A”, and the device ID is different, the electric lock controller 20 determines that the verification device 10 ′ is an unauthorized device. Judgment is made (NO in step 403), the communication message “verification OK” from the verification device 10 ′ is rejected, and the electric lock 30 is not unlocked.

[Replacement of verification device due to failure, etc.]
The verification device 10 may be replaced due to a failure or the like. In this case, a case in which the verification device 10 is replaced with a new verification device and a case in which the verification device 10 is replaced (reused) with a verification device that has been used in another place are considered.

[Replace with a new verification device]
For example, it is assumed that the device IDs of the verification device 10 and the electric lock controller 20 are both “#yy” and the verification device 10 is replaced with a new verification device 10-1 (see FIG. 8A). . In this case, the device ID of the collation device 10 (10-1) after replacement is in the initial state “# 0” and does not match the device ID “#yy” of the electric lock controller 20.

  In this case, the operator performs a special operation on the electric lock controller 20 (see FIG. 8B). In this example, several contacts (not shown) of the electric lock controller 20 are short-circuited, and then the power switch 20E is turned OFF / ON. Then, the CPU 20A of the electric lock controller 20 reads out its own device ID “#yy” from the flash memory 20C and sends it to the exchanged verification device 10 (10-1).

  The replaced CPU 10A of the collation device 10 (10-1) sets “#yy” sent from the electric lock controller 20 in the flash memory 10A as its own device ID (the initial state is “# 0”). The device ID is rewritten to the device ID “#yy” of the electric lock controller 20 (see FIG. 8C). Accordingly, the device ID of the exchanged verification device 10 (10-1) and the device ID of the electric lock controller 20 are the same.

[Replacement with another verification device (reuse)]
For example, both the device IDs of the verification device 10 and the electric lock controller 20 are now “#yy”, and the verification device 10-2 of the device ID “#zz” that used the verification device 10 in another location. (See FIG. 9A). In this case, the device ID of the collation device 10 (10-2) after replacement is “#zz” and does not match the device ID “#yy” of the electric lock controller 20.

  In this case, the operator performs the above-described special operation on the electric lock controller 20 (see FIG. 9B). Then, the CPU 20A of the electric lock controller 20 reads out its own device ID “#yy” from the flash memory 20C and sends it to the exchanged verification device 10 (10-2).

  The replaced CPU 10A of the collation device 10 (10-2) sets “#yy” sent from the electric lock controller 20 as its own device ID in the flash memory 10C (the device designated as “#zz”). The ID is rewritten to the device ID “#yy” of the electric lock controller 20 (see FIG. 9C). As a result, the device ID of the exchanged verification device 10 (10-2) and the device ID of the electric lock controller 20 are the same.

[Replacing the electric lock controller due to a failure, etc.]
The electric lock controller 20 may be replaced due to a failure or the like. For example, it is assumed that the device IDs of the verification device 10 and the electric lock controller 20 are both “#xx”, and the electric lock controller 20 is replaced with a new electric lock controller 20-1 (FIG. 10A). reference). In this case, the device ID of the electric lock controller 20 (20-1) after replacement is in an initial state “# 0” and does not match the device ID “#xx” of the verification device 10.

  In this case, the operator performs the above-described special operation on the electric lock controller 20 (20-1) (see FIG. 10B). Then, the CPU 20 </ b> A of the electric lock controller 20 (20-1) sends a device ID transmission request to the verification device 10. In response to this, the collation device 10 returns its own device ID “#xx” to the electric lock controller 20 (20-1). The CPU 20A of the electric lock controller 20 (20-1) sets “#xx” sent from the collation device 10 as its own device ID in the flash memory 20C (the device ID in the initial state “# 0”). Is rewritten to the device ID “#xx” of the collation device 10 (see FIG. 9C). Accordingly, the device ID of the electric lock controller 20 (20-1) exchanged with the device ID of the verification device 10 becomes the same.

[Unauthorized exchange]
In the present embodiment, when the verification device 10 or the electric lock controller 20 is replaced, a special operation is performed on the electric lock controller 20 side, so that an unauthorized operation from outside the room can be avoided. That is, since the electric lock controller 20 is provided in the room, a special operation cannot be performed without entering the room. Therefore, a malicious third party cannot exchange the collation device 10 illegally and perform a special operation from the outside of the room to match the device ID of the collation device 10 with the device ID of the electric lock controller 20.

  Moreover, in this Embodiment, even if the collation apparatus 10 is changed improperly, it is said that device ID of the collation apparatus 10 and apparatus ID of the electric lock controller 20 correspond by turning ON the power switch 20E of the electric lock controller 20. There is nothing. For example, it is assumed that the device IDs of the collation device 10 and the electric lock controller 20 are both “#yy” and the device ID of the collation device 10 is “#xx” due to unauthorized replacement (FIG. 11A). )reference). In this case, when the power switch 20 of the electric lock controller 20 is turned ON, the device ID “#yy” of the electric lock controller 20 is sent to the verification device 10 (see FIG. 11B). In the collation device 10, since its own device ID is “#xx” and the device ID from the electric lock controller 20 is “#yy” (NO in step 202 shown in FIG. 4), a random value is not generated and the device The ID “#xx” is never rewritten (see FIG. 11C).

  The same applies to the case where the device ID of the verification device 10 is set to “# 0” by improper replacement. When the power switch 20E of the electric lock controller 20 is turned ON, the device ID of the verification device 10 becomes the device ID of the electric lock controller 20. Will not be rewritten. The same applies to the case where the electric lock controller 20 is illegally replaced, and the device ID of the electric lock controller 20 is rewritten to the device ID of the verification device 10 when the power switch 20E of the electric lock controller 20 is turned on. Absent. FIG. 12 shows the setting logic of the device ID of each case described above including automatic setting.

  In the above-described embodiment, for example, when the device ID of the collation device is “#zz” and the device ID of the electric lock controller is “#yy”, the device ID of the collation device is obtained when a special operation is performed. Although “#zz” is rewritten to the device ID “#yy” of the electric lock controller, the device ID “#yy” of the electric lock controller is rewritten to the device ID “#zz” of the verification device. Good. However, a device for performing a special operation needs to be installed in a room to prevent fraud.

  In the present invention, the first device and the second device are not limited to the collation device and the electric lock controller, and any devices may be used as long as they communicate with each other. Further, the collation device is not limited to the fingerprint collation device, and a face authentication device or an ID card reader may be used.

It is a block block diagram which shows an example of the entrance / exit management system used for implementation of this invention. It is a figure explaining the automatic setting of apparatus ID in the collation apparatus (IDU) and electric lock controller (PCU) in this entrance / exit management system. It is a flowchart which shows the operation | movement at the time of power-ON in the electric lock controller in this entrance / exit management system. It is a flowchart which shows the operation | movement at the time of the power supply ON in the collation apparatus in this entrance / exit management system. It is a flowchart which shows the fingerprint collation process in the collation apparatus in operation of a system. It is a flowchart which shows the unlocking process after the collation in the electric lock controller in operation of a system. It is a figure explaining the operation | movement at the time of apparatus ID coincidence and mismatching during system operation. It is a figure explaining the operation | work for making apparatus ID correspond in the case of replacing | exchanging with a new collation apparatus. It is a figure explaining the operation | work for making apparatus ID correspond when exchanging with another collation apparatus. It is a figure explaining the operation | work for making apparatus ID correspond in the case of replacing | exchanging an electric lock controller. It is a figure explaining operation | movement at the time of power-ON when a collation apparatus is exchanged illegally. It is a figure which shows the setting logic of the apparatus ID of each case including an automatic setting. It is a figure explaining the setting method of the conventional apparatus ID to the collation apparatus and electric lock controller in an entrance / exit management system. It is a figure explaining the operation | movement at the time of apparatus ID coincidence and mismatching during system operation.

Explanation of symbols

  10 (10-1, 10-2), 10 '... verification device, 20 (20-1) ... electric lock controller, 30 ... electric lock, 10A ... CPU, 10B ... RAM, 10C ... flash memory, 10D ... liquid crystal display (LCD), 10E ... fingerprint reading unit, 10F ... LED, 10G-10I ... interface, 20A ... CPU, 20B ... RAM, 20C ... flash memory, 20D ... power supply, 20E ... power switch, 20F, 20G ... interface.

Claims (3)

In a device-to-device authentication information automatic setting method for automatically setting authentication information between a first device installed outside a room that communicates with each other and a second device installed indoors,
Simultaneously supplying power to the first device and the second device;
Sending the authentication information from the second device to the first device when the supply of power is started;
In response to the start of power supply, the first device reads out its own authentication information, collates the read-out authentication information with the authentication information transmitted from the second device, and both are initial A step of generating a random value when there is a match in the value indicating the state ;
Automatically setting a random value generated in the first device to the first device as authentication information of the first device;
Transmitting a random value generated in the first device to the second device ;
A method for automatically setting inter-device authentication information, comprising: automatically setting a random value transmitted from the first device in the second device as authentication information of the second device. In the device-to-device authentication information automatic setting method according to claim 1,
When a predetermined operation is performed in the second device, transmitting the authentication information of the user from the second device to the first device;
And a step of rewriting the authentication information transmitted from the second device by the predetermined operation as self-authentication information in the first device . In the device-to-device authentication information automatic setting method according to claim 1,
When a predetermined operation is performed in the second device, the second device requests the first device to transmit the authentication information set in the first device;
Returning own authentication information from the first device in response to the transmission request transmitted from the second device;
And a step of rewriting the authentication information returned from the first device as its own authentication information in the second device .

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