JP4313999B2 - Transportation management system - Google Patents

Description

[0001]
BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION
The present invention relates to a transportation management system. More particularly, the present invention relates to a system for managing transportation of an object using a storage box with an electronic lock.
[0002]
[Prior art]
Industrial waste discharge / collection / disposal methods and management methods are strictly defined by the Waste Disposal Law. For the management of industrial waste, it is stipulated that an industrial waste management slip (manifest) be used. The manifest describes the name, quantity, collection carrier name, disposal trader name, etc. of the industrial waste when the business that discharges the industrial waste (discharge company) entrusts the disposal of the waste. It is used to grasp and manage the flow by itself. By using the manifest each time the waste is delivered, the date when the discharge company listed in the manifest discharges the waste, the type / quantity of the waste, the location / name of the collection carrier, and the processing company You can check the location, name, etc. As a result, it is possible to prevent environmental pollution caused by improper processing and illegal dumping that is a social problem to some extent.
[0003]
However, there may be illegal activities (illegal dumping) in which the collection carrier falsifies the manifest to make it appear as if it was properly transported to the intermediate treatment site or the collection storage site, and in fact, dumps it elsewhere. Assumed. In addition, it is assumed that there may be illegal activities (illegal dumping) such as dumping to other places in the same way when transporting waste disposed at the intermediate treatment site or collection storage site to the final disposal site. Yes.
[0004]
There are the following two prior arts that can prevent illegal dumping.
[0005]
The first is a technique described in Japanese Patent Laid-Open No. 2001-163405. This technology combines a third-party organization that manages electronic manifest data with a monitoring device provided on a road network or a load weight sensor and a position sensor provided on a transportation vehicle, so that the position and loading of a traveling waste transportation vehicle are combined. Integrate contents and monitor them centrally.
[0006]
The second is “Industrial Waste Image Tracking Service” announced on the homepage by NTT ME and Earth Design International on March 6, 2001. In this service, each stage from acceptance of industrial waste to bringing it to the final disposal site is tracked with GPS, and the process is recorded with digital images, which can be sequentially confirmed on the Internet. According to this service, it becomes possible to confirm remotely whether or not illegal disposal by the disposal company when industrial waste is entrusted for disposal, and the illegal dumping can be completely prevented.
[0007]
In financial institutions, for example, in cash collection and delivery operations between branches and head offices, management bills subtotaled for each denomination and totaled at each branch are handled in the same way as the above-mentioned manifest, and illegal acts such as theft during transportation. Was managing.
[0008]
[Patent Document 1]
JP 2001-163405 A
[0009]
[Problems to be solved by the invention]
However, in the above-described prior art, since the driver of the vehicle or another person can open the management box in the middle of transportation, there has been no need to prevent so-called illegal dumping in which waste is illegally discarded.
[0010]
An object of the present invention is to provide a transportation management system that can prevent an illegal act during transportation.
[0011]
[Means for Solving the Problems and Effects of the Invention]
A transportation management system according to the present invention is a system for managing transportation of an object using a storage box with an electronic lock, The storage box with the electronic lock stores the secret information of the electronic key data in an area that cannot be accessed from the outside of the electronic lock, A first terminal device, a second terminal device, a server device, a first storage device, and a second storage device; And a third storage device Is provided. The first terminal device transmits application data for applying for permission to transport the object to the server device via the network. The server device uses the first electronic key data for locking the storage box based on the application data from the first terminal device. Secret information Is transmitted to the first terminal device via the network. The application data includes information indicating the name and quantity of the object, information indicating the transportation destination of the object, and image data of the contents of the object photographed with a digital camera. The first terminal device is the first electronic key data from the server device Secret information Is stored in the first storage device. The storage box is the first electronic key data stored in the first storage device. Secret information Using When it is confirmed that the first storage device and the electronic lock have the same secret information Locked. In the third storage device, information indicating the actual transportation route of the object by the transportation means is recorded by the GPS mounted on the transportation means, The second terminal device transmits report data for reporting the transportation result of the object to the server device via the network. The report data includes transport route information recorded in the third storage device and read out to the second terminal device. The server device has electronic key data for unlocking the storage box based on the report data from the second terminal device. Secret information And the first electronic key data Secret information Second electronic key data different from Secret information Is transmitted to the second terminal device via the network. The second terminal device receives the second electronic key data from the server device Secret information Is stored in the second storage device. The storage box is the second electronic key data stored in the second storage device. Secret information Using When it is confirmed that the second storage device and the electronic lock have the same secret information It is unlocked.
[0012]
In the above transportation management system, the first electronic key data and the second electronic key data are different from each other, so that the act of unlocking the storage box locked with the first electronic key data during transportation is prevented. Can do. Therefore, illegal dumping of industrial waste can be prevented.
[0013]
Preferably, the communication data between the first storage device and the electronic lock is different each time.
[0014]
Preferably, the communication data between the second storage device and the electronic lock is not determined from the communication data between the first storage device and the electronic lock.
[0015]
Preferably, the communication data between the first storage device and the electronic lock and the communication data between the second storage device and the electronic lock depend on the secret information held by the electronic lock.
[0016]
Preferably, the engine of the means for transporting the object is started using the first electronic key data.
[0017]
DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE INVENTION
Hereinafter, embodiments of the present invention will be described in detail with reference to the drawings. In the drawings, the same or corresponding parts are denoted by the same reference numerals, and description thereof will not be repeated.
[0018]
(First embodiment)
<Outline of transportation management system>
FIG. 1 shows the overall configuration of the transportation management system according to the first embodiment. This system manages the transport of industrial waste. Industrial waste here includes medical waste, infectious waste, radiation waste, etc., and also includes oversized garbage, second-hand goods, and recyclable resources. Persons involved in the transport of industrial waste are discharge companies, collection and transportation companies, (intermediate processing companies), (final) disposal companies, and management organizations. Under this system, industrial waste is transported as follows.
[0019]
The management organization (here, the local government or a third party organization under local government control) issues the IC card 2 and the electronic lock 4 to the discharge company in advance. The electronic lock 4 is attached to the storage box 3.
[0020]
The discharge company entrusts the disposal of the industrial waste discharged by itself to a disposal company, and entrusts the collection and transportation company to transport the industrial waste to the disposal company. The discharge company accesses the server 11 of the management organization via the Internet 1 using the terminal 21. A Web page is opened on the server 11 of the management organization. On this Web page, a screen that prompts input of items necessary for application for transportation and processing of industrial waste is displayed. Here you will be prompted to enter:
・ Manifest data (names and quantities of waste, names of collection and transportation companies, names of disposal companies, etc. that should be described in the manifest)
・ Identification data of electronic lock 4 issued
・ Image data taken with a digital camera (such as the contents of industrial waste, the face of the driver in charge of transportation at a collection and transportation company)
・ Data indicating the planned transportation route (map data, departure / intermediary / destination, etc.)
The discharge company transmits these items (application data) from the terminal 21 to the server 11 of the management organization via the Internet 1.
[0021]
Based on the content of the application data received by the server 11, the management organization determines whether to permit the requested transportation / processing. When it is determined that the permission is permitted, the management organization transmits data (manifest number, etc.) indicating permission and the electronic key data d1 for locking from the server 11 to the terminal 21 of the discharging company via the Internet 1. .
[0022]
When the terminal 21 receives data indicating permission, the discharge company puts the applied industrial waste into the storage box 3. Further, the discharge company writes the electronic key data d1 received by the terminal 21 to the IC card 2 and communicates between the IC card 2 and the electronic lock 4 to thereby store the storage box 3 containing industrial waste electronically. Lock using the key data d1.
[0023]
The collection and transportation company transports the storage box 3 and the IC card 2 locked by the electronic key data d1 from the discharge company to the disposal company by using a transportation means. At this time, information on the route actually transported is recorded on the IC card 2 by the GPS 31 mounted on the transport means. Any transportation means may be used as long as it can transport an object (in this case, industrial waste) such as an automobile such as a truck, a train, and an airplane.
[0024]
When the storage box 3 and the IC card 2 arrive at the disposal contractor, the disposal contractor uses the terminal 41 to access the server 11 of the management organization via the Internet 1. On the Web page of the server 11, a screen for prompting input of matters necessary for reporting the result of transporting industrial waste is displayed. Here you will be prompted to enter:
・ Registered vehicle number
・ Image data taken with a digital camera (such as the current packaging of industrial waste)
-Data indicating the actual transport route (data recorded on the IC card 2)
・ Manifest data (names and quantities of waste, names of collection carriers, names of disposal companies, manifest numbers, etc. that should be described in the manifest)
・ Identification data of electronic lock 4
The disposal company transmits these items (report data) from the terminal 41 to the server 11 of the management organization via the Internet 1. Note that data indicating the route actually transported is read from the IC card 2 to the terminal 41 and transmitted.
[0025]
Based on the content of the report data received by the server 11, the management organization determines whether or not to permit distribution of the electronic key data d2 for unlocking the storage box 3. When it is determined that the permission can be granted, the management organization transmits the unlocking electronic key data d2 from the server 11 to the terminal 41 of the disposal company via the Internet 1.
[0026]
The disposal contractor writes the electronic key data d2 received by the terminal 41 to the IC card 2 and communicates between the IC card 2 and the electronic lock 4 to store the storage box 3 containing industrial waste in the electronic key data. Unlock using d2.
[0027]
The above is an outline of transportation of industrial waste under this system. If there is an intermediate treatment company between the discharge company and the disposal company, transportation from the discharge company to the intermediate treatment company, and (final) disposal from the intermediate treatment company Locking / unlocking processing is performed by the same steps as described above in the transportation to the vendor.
[0028]
Next, the distribution of the electronic key data d1 and d2 and the locking / unlocking of the storage box 3 will be described in detail.
[0029]
<Distribution of electronic key data d1 and locking of storage box 3>
The management organization prepares the electronic locks 4a, 4b, and 4c in advance, and generates 100 one-time passwords (secret information) ka1 to ka100, kb1 to kb100, and kc1 to kc100 for the prepared electronic locks 4a, 4b, and 4c, respectively. . The one-time password is generated using random numbers as follows. Therefore, each password is random and not related to each other.
Ka1 = random number a1, ka2 = random number a2,..., Ka100 = random number a100
Kb1 = random number b1, kb2 = random number b2,..., Kb100 = random number b100
Kc1 = random number c1, kc2 = random number c2,..., Kc100 = random number c100
The generated passwords ka1 to ka100, kb1 to kb100, and kc1 to kc100 are stored in the electronic locks 4a, 4b, and 4c, respectively. The electronic locks 4a, 4b, and 4c include a CPU and a memory, and an area that cannot be accessed from the outside is provided in the memory. Passwords ka1 to ka100, kb1 to kb100, and kc1 to kc100 are stored in an area that cannot be accessed from the outside. The electronic locks 4a, 4b, 4c are provided with slots (interfaces) for communicating with the IC card 2.
[0030]
The generated passwords ka1 to ka100, kb1 to kb100, and kc1 to kc100 are also stored in the database 12 (FIG. 1) of the management organization. As shown in FIG. 2, passwords ka1 to ka100, kb1 to kb100, and kc1 to kc100 are data 4a, 4b, 4c for identifying stored electronic locks (here, they are the same as the symbols attached to the electronic locks). And stored in the database 12. As shown in FIG. 2, it is assumed that the management organization issues the electronic lock 4a among the electronic locks 4a, 4b, and 4c in which the passwords are stored in this way to the discharging company.
[0031]
The discharge company transmits application data including identification data of the issued electronic lock 4a from the terminal 21 to the server 11 of the management organization via the Internet 1. It is assumed that the management organization determines that transportation / processing for this application may be permitted.
[0032]
As shown in FIG. 3 (a), the server 11 reads one of the one-time passwords (here, password ka1) associated with the data for identifying the electronic lock 4a from the database 12, and uses this as the locking key. Data d1 is transmitted to the terminal 21 of the discharge company via the Internet 1. The server 11 deletes the transmitted password ka1 from the database 12. The terminal 21 of the discharging company writes the received password ka1 into the IC card 2. The server 11 also stores the manifest number m1 for the permitted transportation / processing in the database 12 in association with the data for identifying the electronic lock 4a and transmits it to the terminal 21 of the discharging company via the Internet 1.
[0033]
After the industrial waste to be transported is put in the storage box 3, the IC card 2 is inserted into the slot of the electronic lock 4a by the discharging company. Communication is performed between the IC card 2 and the electronic lock 4a, and it is confirmed whether or not they have the same password. When it is confirmed that the passwords are the same, the electronic lock 4a locks the storage box 3. If it is not confirmed that they have the same password, the electronic lock 4a does not lock the storage box 3. Here, as shown in FIG. 3B, since the same password ka1 is stored in both the IC card 2 and the electronic lock 4a, the electronic lock 4 locks the storage box 3. Once locked, the electronic lock 4a deletes the used password ka1 from the memory.
[0034]
<Distribution of electronic key data d2 and unlocking of storage box 3>
When the storage box 3 and the IC card 2 arrive at the disposal company, the disposal company sends the identification data of the electronic lock 4a and the report data including the manifest number m1 from the terminal 41 to the server 11 of the management organization via the Internet 1. Send. It is assumed that the management organization determines that the distribution of the unlocking electronic key data d2 may be permitted for this report.
[0035]
As shown in FIG. 4A, the server 11 stores one of the data for identifying the electronic lock 4a and one-time passwords ka2 to ka100 associated with the manifest number m1 (here, password ka2) in the database 12. And is transmitted as unlocking key data d2 to the terminal 41 of the disposal company via the Internet 1. The server 11 deletes the transmitted password ka2 from the database 12. The terminal 41 of the disposal contractor writes the received password ka2 in the IC card 2.
[0036]
The IC card 2 is inserted into the slot of the electronic lock 4a by the disposal contractor. Communication is performed between the IC card 2 and the electronic lock 4a, and it is confirmed whether or not they have the same password. When it is confirmed that they have the same password, the electronic lock 4a unlocks the storage box 3. If it is not confirmed that they have the same password, the electronic lock 4a does not unlock the storage box 3. Here, as shown in FIG. 4B, since the same password ka2 is stored in both the IC card 2 and the electronic lock 4a, the electronic lock 4 unlocks the storage box 3. Once unlocked, the electronic lock 4a erases the used password ka2 from the memory.
[0037]
Further, when the same electronic lock 4a is reused, the processing described in the above-mentioned <Distribution of electronic key data d1 and locking of storage box 3> and <Distribution of electronic key data d2 and unlocking of storage box 3> Is repeated.
[0038]
<Effect>
In the first embodiment, a plurality of passwords (here, 100) are generated for one electronic lock 4 using random numbers. Thereby, each of a plurality of passwords (here, 100) stored in the electronic lock 4 can be made different from each other. Further, a different password generated for the electronic lock 4 each time can be used as the electronic key data for locking or the electronic key data for unlocking. Thereby, the locking electronic key data d1 and the unlocking electronic key data d2 can be made different. As a result, the act of unlocking the storage box 3 locked with the electronic key data d1 during transportation can be prevented. Therefore, illegal dumping of industrial waste can be prevented. Further, the communication data between the IC card 2 and the electronic lock 4 can be different every time. Therefore, even if communication data between the IC card 2 and the electronic lock 4 is wiretapped, the storage box 3 cannot be locked / unlocked by wiretapping data. (Note that if the storage box 3 is locked / unlocked by sending a lock / unlock signal (fixed signal) from the IC card 2 to the electronic lock 4, the locked / unlocked signal If sent to the electronic lock 4, all electronic locks can be locked / unlocked without applying / reporting to the management organization.)
Further, since a plurality of passwords are generated for one electronic lock 4 using random numbers, the passwords are not related to each other. Therefore, the communication data (unlocking electronic key data d2) at the unlocking time cannot be determined from the communication data (unlocking electronic key data d1) between the IC card 2 and the electronic lock 4 (cannot be calculated). . Thereby, the act of unlocking the storage box 3 locked with the electronic key data d1 during transportation can be prevented. Therefore, illegal dumping of industrial waste can be prevented. (Temporarily, communication data (unlocking electronic key data d2) for unlocking is determined from communication data (locking electronic key data d1) for locking between the IC card 2 and the electronic lock 4 (calculation). In this case, the storage box 3 can be unlocked using the unlocked communication data without reporting to the management organization, that is, the storage box can be unlocked during transportation. )
The generated passwords are different for each electronic lock 4. That is, communication data between the IC card 2 and the electronic lock 4 at the time of locking / unlocking depends on the electronic lock 4. Therefore, it is possible to prevent the act of locking / unlocking another electronic lock by using wiretapped communication data at the time of unlocking / unlocking.
[0039]
Also, once used passwords are deleted so that they can no longer be used. Therefore, when the same electronic lock is reused, it cannot be locked / unlocked with communication data at the time of previous locking / unlocking. As a result, it is possible to prevent the act of recording the wiretapping / unlocking communication data that has been wiretapped and freely locking / unlocking using this data when reusing the same electronic lock.
[0040]
<Modification>
Here, the system for managing the transport of industrial waste has been described. This system can be applied not only to management of industrial waste transportation but also to management of cash transportation in financial institutions, for example.
[0041]
Further, the terminal 21 of the discharge company and the terminal 41 of the disposal contractor may be shared as one mobile terminal. This portable terminal is transported together with the storage box 3. Furthermore, you may mount GPS31 in this portable terminal. According to this, when a driver is inspected by the police on the route during transportation, the contents of the object to be transported (industrial waste), the contents of the driver, the vehicle, etc. You can display or present permission data from the management organization. Furthermore, it is possible to manage the vehicle identification, the transport route, and the like in cooperation with a vehicle number reading system installed by an organization such as a police station.
[0042]
Further, the memory in the terminals 21 and 41 may be used in place of the IC card 2, and the communication between the terminals 21 and 41 and the electronic lock 4 may be performed wirelessly.
[0043]
When the transportation means is an automobile, the start key of the automobile may be activated in conjunction with the permission data from the server 11 and / or the electronic key data d1.
[0044]
(Second Embodiment)
The transport management system according to the second embodiment is different from the first embodiment in the process of distributing the electronic key data d1, d2 and locking / unlocking the storage box 3. Hereinafter, the distribution of the electronic key data d1 and d2 and the locking / unlocking of the storage box 3 according to the second embodiment will be described in detail.
[0045]
<Distribution of electronic key data d1 and locking of storage box 3>
The management organization prepares the electronic locks 4a, 4b, and 4c in advance, and generates 100 one-time passwords (secret information) ka1 to ka100, kb1 to kb100, and kc1 to kc100 for the prepared electronic locks 4a, 4b, and 4c, respectively. . The one-time password is generated using a random number and a one-way function H as follows. Since H is a one-way function (inverse operation cannot be performed), ka (i + 1) cannot be calculated from ka (i). The same applies to kbi and kci.
Ka100 = random number a, ka99 = H (ka100),..., Ka1 = H (ka2)
Kb100 = random number b, kb99 = H (kb100),..., Kb1 = H (kb2)
Kc100 = random number c, kc99 = H (kc100),..., Kc1 = H (kc2)
Of the generated passwords ka1 to ka100, kb1 to kb100, and kc1 to kc100, only ka1, kb1, and kc1 are stored in the electronic locks 4a, 4b, and 4c, respectively.
[0046]
Similarly to the first embodiment, the generated passwords ka1 to ka100, kb1 to kb100, and kc1 to kc100 are stored in the database 12 of the management organization. However, the passwords ka1, kb1, and kc1 stored in the electronic locks 4a, 4b, and 4c are deleted from the database 12. It is assumed that the management organization issues the electronic lock 4a among the electronic locks 4a, 4b, and 4c in which the password is stored in this manner to the discharge company.
[0047]
The discharge company transmits application data including identification data of the issued electronic lock 4a from the terminal 21 to the server 11 of the management organization via the Internet 1. It is assumed that the management organization determines that transportation / processing for this application may be permitted.
[0048]
As shown in FIG. 5A, the server 11 reads the password ka2 from the database 12 among the one-time passwords associated with the data for identifying the electronic lock 4a from the database 12, and uses it as the lock key data d1. To the terminal 21 via the Internet 1. The server 11 deletes the transmitted password ka2 from the database 12. The terminal 21 of the discharge company writes the received password ka2 in the IC card 2. The server 11 also stores the manifest number m1 for the permitted transportation / processing in the database 12 in association with the data for identifying the electronic lock 4a and transmits it to the terminal 21 of the discharging company via the Internet 1.
[0049]
After the industrial waste to be transported is put in the storage box 3, the IC card 2 is inserted into the slot of the electronic lock 4a by the discharging company. As shown in FIG. 5B, the password ka2 stored in the IC card 2 is transmitted to the electronic lock 4a. The electronic lock 4a performs the calculation H (ka2) using the password ka2 from the IC card 2. The electronic lock 4a compares the result of the calculation H (ka2) with the password ka1 stored in the memory. When the two match, the electronic lock 4a locks the storage box 3. When they do not match, the electronic lock 4a does not lock the storage box 3. Here, since the password ka1 is stored in the memory of the electronic lock 4a, they match, and the electronic lock 4 locks the storage box 3. Once locked, the electronic lock 4a updates the password ka1 stored in the memory with the password ka2 from the IC card 2, as shown in FIG. In this way, by updating the password kai stored in the electronic lock 4a to ka (i + 1), the same password cannot be used again.
[0050]
<Distribution of electronic key data d2 and unlocking of storage box 3>
When the storage box 3 and the IC card 2 arrive at the disposal company, the disposal company sends the identification data of the electronic lock 4a and the report data including the manifest number m1 from the terminal 41 to the server 11 of the management organization via the Internet 1. Send. It is assumed that the management organization determines that the distribution of the unlocking electronic key data d2 may be permitted for this report.
[0051]
As shown in FIG. 6A, the server 11 reads the password ka3 from the database 12 among the one-time passwords ka3 to ka100 associated with the data for identifying the electronic lock 4a and the manifest number m1, and unlocks it. The key data d2 is transmitted to the terminal 41 of the disposal company via the Internet 1. The server 11 deletes the transmitted password ka3 from the database 12. The terminal 41 of the disposal company writes the received password ka3 into the IC card 2.
[0052]
The IC card 2 is inserted into the slot of the electronic lock 4a by the disposal contractor. As shown in FIG. 6B, the password ka3 stored in the IC card 2 is transmitted to the electronic lock 4a. The electronic lock 4a performs the calculation H (ka3) using the password ka3 from the IC card 2. The electronic lock 4a compares the result of the calculation H (ka3) with the password ka2 stored in the memory. When the two match, the electronic lock 4a unlocks the storage box 3. When they do not match, the electronic lock 4a does not unlock the storage box 3. Here, since the password ka <b> 2 is stored in the memory of the electronic lock 4 a, the two match, and the electronic lock 4 unlocks the storage box 3. Once unlocked, the electronic lock 4a updates the password ka2 stored in the memory with the password ka3 from the IC card 2, as shown in FIG. In this way, by updating the password kai stored in the electronic lock 4a to ka (i + 1), the same password cannot be used again.
[0053]
Further, when the same electronic lock 4a is reused, the processing described in the above-mentioned <Distribution of electronic key data d1 and locking of storage box 3> and <Distribution of electronic key data d2 and unlocking of storage box 3> Is repeated.
[0054]
<Effect>
As described above, according to the second embodiment, the number of passwords stored in the electronic lock 4 can be reduced as compared with the first embodiment. Needless to say, the same effects as those of the first embodiment can be obtained.
[0055]
(Third embodiment)
The transport management system according to the third embodiment differs from the first embodiment in the process of distributing the electronic key data d1, d2 and locking / unlocking the storage box 3. Hereinafter, the electronic key according to the third embodiment will be described. The distribution of the data d1 and d2 and the locking / unlocking of the storage box 3 will be described in detail.
[0056]
<Distribution of electronic key data d1 and locking of storage box 3>
The management organization prepares electronic locks 4a, 4b, and 4c in advance. As shown in FIG. 7, areas X, Y, and Z are provided in the memory area of the electronic lock 4a. The area X is an area where only data can be read from the outside. The area X stores ID data LIDa for identifying the electronic lock 4a. The area Y is an area where data can be read and written from the outside. Region Y is further divided into region 1 and region 2. The area Z is an area where data cannot be read and written from the outside. The area Z is further divided into an area for storing the secret information LSa of the electronic lock 4a and a history recording area. Note that the history recording area may only be able to read data from the outside unless the data can be erased / rewritten from the outside. The management organization associates the ID data LIDa stored in the area X with the secret information LSa stored in the area Z and stores them in the database 12. The same applies to the electronic locks 4b and 4c.
[0057]
Here, it is assumed that the management organization issues the electronic lock 4a among the electronic locks 4a, 4b, and 4c to the discharging company.
[0058]
The discharging company reads the issued ID data LIDa of the electronic lock 4a, includes the ID data LIDa in the application data, and transmits it from the terminal 21 to the server 11 of the management organization via the Internet 1. It is assumed that the management organization determines that transportation / processing for this application may be permitted.
[0059]
As shown in FIG. 8, the server 11 reads out from the database 12 the secret information LSa associated with the ID data LIDa of the electronic lock 4a. The server 11 also generates a random number Rka. Then, the server 11 performs a calculation H (LSa, Rka) using the secret information LSa and the random number Rka, and sets the calculation result as the lock electronic key data d1. Here, H (Lsa, Rka) indicates a one-way function based on the secret information LSa. As the calculation H (LSa, Rka), AES (LSa, Rka), SHA (LSa‖Rka), SHA (LSa * Rka), or the like can be used. AES is the US government's next generation standard encryption method selected by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). AES is a common key encryption algorithm, and its details are defined in FIPS-197 at http://csrc.nist.gov/encryption/aes/. Here, the result of encrypting plaintext M with the AES encryption using the encryption key K is denoted as AES (K, M). SHA is a commonly used one-way function and is called a hash function. The specific algorithm is described in “Tatsuaki Okamoto, Hiroshi Yamamoto,“ Contemporary Cryptography ”, Series / Mathematics of Information Science, Industrial Books, 1997, p.189-195”. * Indicates an arbitrary calculation, and the server 11 uses the random number Rka as the unlocking electronic key data d2, and associates the locking electronic key data d1 and the unlocking electronic key data d2 with the ID data LIDa. The data is stored in the database 12. Further, the server 11 transmits the lock key data d1 to the terminal 21 of the discharging company via the Internet 1.
[0060]
As shown in FIG. 9, the terminal 21 of the discharging company writes the received electronic key data d1 into the IC card 2. After the industrial waste to be transported is put in the storage box 3, the IC card 2 is inserted into the slot of the electronic lock 4a by the discharging company. The electronic key data d1 stored in the IC card 2 is written in the area 1 of the area Y in the memory of the electronic lock 4a. When the electronic key data d1 is written in the area 1, the electronic lock 4a locks the storage box 3.
[0061]
<Distribution of electronic key data d2 and unlocking of storage box 3>
When the storage box 3 and the IC card 2 arrive at the disposal company, the disposal company reads the ID data LIDa of the electronic lock 4a and includes this ID data LIDa in the report data from the terminal 41 to the server 11 of the management organization. Send via the Internet 1 It is assumed that the management organization determines that the distribution of the unlocking electronic key data d2 may be permitted for this report.
[0062]
The server 11 reads the unlocking electronic key data d2 (= Rka) associated with the received ID data LIDa from the database 12, and transmits it to the terminal 41 of the disposal company via the Internet 1.
[0063]
As shown in FIG. 10, the terminal 41 of the disposal contractor writes the received electronic key data d2 to the IC card 2. Then, the IC card 2 is inserted into the slot of the electronic lock 4a by the disposal contractor. The electronic key data d2 stored in the IC card 2 is written in the area 2 of the area Y in the memory of the electronic lock 4a. The electronic lock 4a performs the calculation H (LSa, d2) using the secret information LSa stored in the area Z of the memory and the electronic key data d2 stored in the area 2. The electronic lock 4a compares the result of this calculation with the electronic key data d1 stored in the area 1. When the two match, the electronic lock 4a unlocks the storage box 3. When they do not match, the electronic lock 4a does not unlock the storage box 3. After unlocking the storage box 3, the electronic lock 4a records the electronic key data d1 stored in the area 1 and / or the electronic key data d2 stored in the area 2 in the history recording area. Area 2 is erased. Thereafter, when the data recorded in the history recording area matches the electronic key data recorded in the area 1 and / or the area 2, the electronic lock 4a does not unlock the storage box 3.
[0064]
<Effect>
As described above, according to the third embodiment, the locking electronic key data d1 and the unlocking electronic key data d2 can be made different. As a result, the act of unlocking the storage box 3 locked with the electronic key data d1 during transportation can be prevented. Therefore, illegal dumping of industrial waste can be prevented. Further, since the electronic key data d1 and d2 are generated based on the random number Rka, the communication data between the IC card 2 and the electronic lock 4 can be made different each time. Therefore, even if communication data between the IC card 2 and the electronic lock 4 is wiretapped, the storage box 3 cannot be locked / unlocked by wiretapping data.
[0065]
Since H is a one-way function, communication data (unlocking electronic key for unlocking) from communication data (unlocking electronic key data d1) for locking between the IC card 2 and the electronic lock 4 is locked. Data d2) is not known (cannot be calculated). Thereby, the act of unlocking the storage box 3 locked with the electronic key data d1 during transportation can be prevented. Therefore, illegal dumping of industrial waste can be prevented.
[0066]
The communication data between the IC card 2 and the electronic lock 4 at the time of locking / unlocking depends on the secret information of the electronic lock 4. Therefore, it is possible to prevent the act of locking / unlocking another electronic lock by using wiretapped communication data at the time of unlocking / unlocking.
[0067]
When the data recorded in the history recording area matches the electronic key data recorded in the area 1 and / or the area 2, the electronic lock 4a does not unlock the storage box 3. Therefore, when the same electronic lock is reused, it cannot be locked / unlocked with communication data at the time of previous locking / unlocking. As a result, it is possible to prevent the act of recording the wiretapping / unlocking communication data that has been wiretapped and freely locking / unlocking using this data when reusing the same electronic lock.
[0068]
Further, even if the storage box 3 with the electronic lock 4 is illegally dumped, the ID data of the electronic lock 4 is read, and this is collated with the ID data transmitted to the server 11 at the time of application to determine the illegal dumping culprit. be able to.
[0069]
<Modification>
A number that does not overlap each other such as an application permission ID (for example, a manifest number for permitted transportation / processing) may be stored in the database 12 in association with the ID data of the electronic lock 4. At this time, the management organization transmits the lock key data d1 and the application permission ID corresponding thereto to the terminal 21 of the discharging company, and writes the application permission ID in the memory of the IC card 2 or the electronic lock 4. Then, the disposal company reads the application permission ID from the memory of the IC card 2 or the electronic lock 4 and includes it in the report data and transmits it to the server 11 of the management organization. As a result, the management organization can manage the database 12 in association with the application permission ID. Further, the disposal contractor does not need to read the ID data from the electronic lock 4.
[0070]
In addition, after transmitting the unlocking electronic key data d2 in the server 11 of the management organization, the secret information LSj corresponding to the data d2 is converted into LSj ′, and the same applies to the electronic lock 4 after the electronic lock 4 is unlocked. Alternatively, the internal secret information LSj may be converted into LSj ′. As a result, the previous unlocking electronic key data d2 cannot be unlocked. As a result, even if data is not recorded in the history recording area, when the same electronic lock is reused, it is possible to prevent locking / unlocking with communication data at the time of previous locking / unlocking.
[0071]
Further, when the electronic key data for unlocking d2 is sent, the secret information LSj is updated to LSj ′ in the server 11 of the management organization, and the new secret information LSj ′ is converted into the common key cipher conversion using the original secret information LSj as the encryption key. E (LSj, LSj ′) is generated, and E (LSj, LSj ′) is transmitted together with the unlocking electronic key data d2. In the disposal contractor, E (LSj, LSj ′) is written in the electronic lock together with the electronic key data d2. After unlocking, in the electronic lock, the internal secret information LSj may be updated to LSj ′ by decrypting LSj ′ from E (LSj, LSj ′) using the internal secret information LSj. Thereby, since the secret information LSj inside the electronic lock is updated to LSj ′, the previous unlocking electronic key data d2 cannot be unlocked. As a result, even if data is not recorded in the history recording area, when the same electronic lock is reused, it is possible to prevent locking / unlocking with communication data at the time of previous locking / unlocking.
[0072]
Further, the random number Rkj used when the electronic key data d1 and d2 are created in the server 11 may be set to Rkj = (application permission ID) ‖R using a number that does not overlap each other such as an application permission ID. Here, R is a random number. As a result, it is possible to ensure that the unlocking communication data d2 (= Rk) does not overlap with another unlocking communication data.
[0073]
(Fourth embodiment)
The transportation management system according to the fourth embodiment is different from the third embodiment in the process of distributing the electronic key data d1, d2 and locking / unlocking the storage box 3. Hereinafter, the electronic key according to the fourth embodiment will be described. Distribution of data d1, d2 and locking / unlocking of the storage box 3 will be described focusing on differences from the third embodiment.
[0074]
<Distribution of electronic key data d1 and locking of storage box 3>
As in the third embodiment, the management organization prepares the electronic locks 4a, 4b, 4c in advance. The management organization stores ID data CIDi for identifying the card and card secret information CSi in each IC card prepared in advance. The ID data CIDi can be read from the outside, and the secret information CSi cannot be accessed from the outside. The management organization associates the ID data CIDi of each card with the secret information CSi and stores them in the database 12. Of the cards prepared in advance, the IC card 2a is shown in FIG. Here, it is assumed that the management organization issues the electronic lock 4a and the IC card 2a to the discharge company. The management organization associates the issued ID data LIDa and secret information LSa of the electronic lock 4a with the ID data CIda and secret information CSa of the IC card 2a.
[0075]
The discharging company reads the issued ID data LIDa of the electronic lock 4a and the ID data CIda of the IC card 2a, includes these ID data LIDa and CIDe in the application data, and sends them from the terminal 21 to the server 11 of the management organization. Send via the Internet 1 It is assumed that the management organization determines that transportation / processing for this application may be permitted.
[0076]
As shown in FIG. 12, the server 11 reads out from the database 12 the secret information LSa associated with the ID data LIDa of the electronic lock 4a and the secret information CSa associated with the ID data CIda of the IC card 2a. The server 11 also generates a random number Rka. Then, the server 11 performs a calculation E (CSa, H (LSa, Rka)) using the secret information LSa, CSa and the random number Rka, and sets the calculation result as the lock electronic key data d1. Here, E (CSa, X) indicates common key encryption conversion using the secret information CSa as an encryption key. As the operation E (CSa, X), CSi xor X, AES (CSa, X), or the like can be used. The operator xor indicates exclusive OR. Further, the server 11 performs a calculation E (CSa, Rk) using the secret information CSa and the random number Rka, and sets the calculation result as the unlocking electronic key data d2. Then, the locking electronic key data d1 and the unlocking electronic key data d2 are stored in the database 12 in association with the ID data LIDa and CIda. Further, the server 11 transmits the locking key data d1 to the terminal 21 of the discharging company via the Internet 1.
[0077]
The terminal 21 of the discharging company gives the received electronic key data d1 to the IC card 2a. As shown in FIG. 13A, the IC card 2a decrypts the electronic key data d1 using the secret information CSa, and stores the decryption result H (LSa, Rka) as D1. And after the industrial waste which should be transported is put into the storage box 3, IC card 2a is inserted in the slot of the electronic lock 4a by the discharge | emission company. As shown in FIG. 13B, the decryption result D1 stored in the IC card 2a is written into the area 1 of the area Y in the memory of the electronic lock 4a. When the data D1 is written in the area 1, the electronic lock 4a locks the storage box 3.
[0078]
<Distribution of electronic key data d2 and unlocking of storage box 3>
When the storage box 3 and the IC card 2 arrive at the disposal company, the disposal company reads the ID data LIDa of the electronic lock 4a and the ID data CIda of the IC card 2a, and uses these ID data LIDa and CIda as report data. The data is transmitted from the terminal 41 to the server 11 of the management organization via the Internet 1. It is assumed that the management organization determines that the distribution of the unlocking electronic key data d2 may be permitted for this report.
[0079]
The server 11 reads the unlocking electronic key data d2 (= E (CSa, Rka)) associated with the received ID data LIDa and CIDi from the database 12 and sends it to the terminal 41 of the disposal company via the Internet 1. To send.
[0080]
The terminal 41 of the disposal company gives the received electronic key data d2 to the IC card 2a. As shown in FIG. 14A, the IC card 2a decrypts the electronic key data d2 using the secret information CSa, and stores the decryption result Rka as D2. Then, the IC card 2a is inserted into the slot of the electronic lock 4a by the disposal contractor. As shown in FIG. 14B, the decryption result D2 stored in the IC card 2a is written in the area 2 of the area Y in the memory of the electronic lock 4a. The electronic lock 4a performs the calculation H (Lsa, D2) using the secret information LSa stored in the area Z of the memory and the data D2 stored in the area 2. The electronic lock 4a compares the result of this calculation with the data D1 stored in the area 1. When the two match, the electronic lock 4a unlocks the storage box 3. When they do not match, the electronic lock 4a does not unlock the storage box 3. After unlocking the storage box 3, the electronic lock 4a records the data D1 stored in the area 1 and / or the data D2 stored in the area 2 in the history recording area, and erases the areas 1 and 2 To do. Thereafter, when the data recorded in the history recording area matches the data recorded in the area 1 and / or the area 2, the electronic lock 4a does not unlock the storage box 3.
[0081]
<Effect>
In the fourth embodiment, the locking electronic key data d1 and the unlocking electronic key data d2 are sent after being encrypted with the secret information CSi of the IC card 2, so that the IC card used for locking and the IC card used for unlocking are used. If they are not the same, unlocking is not possible.
[0082]
The effect obtained in the third embodiment can be obtained in the same manner. Furthermore, the same modification as in the third embodiment can be applied.
[0083]
(Fifth embodiment)
The transportation management system according to the fifth embodiment differs from the fourth embodiment in the process of distributing the electronic key data d1, d2 and locking / unlocking the storage box 3. Hereinafter, the electronic key according to the fifth embodiment will be described. Distribution of data d1 and d2 and locking / unlocking of the storage box 3 will be described focusing on differences from the fourth embodiment.
[0084]
<Distribution of electronic key data d1 and locking of storage box 3>
As in the fourth embodiment, the management institution prepares the electronic locks 4a, 4b, 4c in advance. The management organization creates public key certificates Cert_a, Cert_b, and Cert_c for the electronic locks 4a, 4b, and 4c in advance using its own private key sk and stores them in each. Furthermore, the public keys pk of the management organization are also stored in the electronic locks 4a, 4b, 4c. The concept of the public key certificate, CRL described later, and operation method are described in “Translated by Shinichiro Yamada,“ Digital Signature and Cryptographic Technology ”, Pearson Education, 1997, p.159-214. The management organization stores the ID data CIDi for identifying the card and the secret information CSi of the card in each IC card prepared in advance.The management organization uses the public key of each IC card using its own secret key sk. A certificate Cert_Ci is created and stored in each card, and each card also stores the public key pk of the management institution, which manages the ID data LIDj of the electronic lock 4 and the secret information (secret (Key) LSj and public key LPj are managed in association with each other, and ID data CIDi of IC card 2 and secret information (secret key) CSi and public key CPi of IC card 2 In association to manage. Here, management agencies, shall be issued an electronic lock 4a and the IC card 2a for the emissions business.
[0085]
The discharging company reads the issued ID data LIDa of the electronic lock 4a, includes the ID data LIDa in the application data, and transmits it from the terminal 21 to the server 11 of the management organization via the Internet 1. It is assumed that the management organization determines that transportation / processing for this application may be permitted.
[0086]
The server 11 reads from the database 12 the secret information LSa associated with the ID data LIDa of the electronic lock 4a and the secret information CSa associated with the ID data CIda of the IC card 2a. The server 11 generates a random number Rka, performs a calculation H (Rka) using the random number Rka, and sets the calculation result as locking electronic key data d1. The server 11 uses the random number Rka as the unlocking electronic key data d2. Then, the locking electronic key data d1 and the unlocking electronic key data d2 are stored in the database 12 in association with the ID data LIDa. Further, the server 11 transmits the locking key data d1 to the terminal 21 of the discharging company via the Internet 1.
[0087]
The terminal 21 of the discharging company stores the received electronic key data d1 in the IC card 2a. After the industrial waste to be transported is put in the storage box 3, the IC card 2a is inserted into the slot of the electronic lock 4a by the discharging company. Then, as shown in FIG. 15A, the IC card 2a executes a later-described SAC (Secure Authentication Channel) protocol with the electronic lock 4a. Thereby, the shared key CK is derived. The shared key CK is shared by the IC card 2a and the electronic lock 4a. As shown in FIG. 15B, the IC card 2a performs a calculation E (CK, d1) using the shared information CK, and transmits the calculation result as D1 to the electronic lock 4a. The electronic lock 4a decrypts the data D1 using the shared key CK and writes the decryption result d1 in the area 1 of the area Y. When the data d1 is written in the area 1, the electronic lock 4a locks the storage box 3.
[0088]
<SAC protocol>
The SAC protocol is a protocol in which two parties authenticate each other and share a temporary key after authentication. The SAC protocol is performed in order to realize encryption communication between two parties by secret key encryption using a temporary key. Here, the SAC protocol is executed between the electronic lock 4a and the IC card 2a. Hereinafter, an example of the SAC protocol will be described with reference to FIG.
(1) First, the electronic lock 4a generates a random number b.
(2) The electronic lock 4a sends the public key certificate Cert_La and the random number b of the electronic lock 4a to the IC card 2a.
(3) Next, the IC card 2a checks whether or not the electronic lock 4a is invalidated by using the CRL. Then, the IC card 2a verifies the public key certificate Cert_La of the electronic lock 4a using the public key pk of the management organization. Further, the IC card 2a generates a random number a.
(4) The IC card 2a sends the public key certificate Cert_Ca of the IC card 2a and the random number a to the electronic lock 4a.
(5) Next, the electronic lock 4a checks whether or not the IC card 2a is invalidated using the CRL. The electronic lock 4a verifies the public key certificate Cert_Ca of the IC card 2a using the public key pk of the management organization. Further, the electronic lock 4a generates a random number b ′, and generates S1: = Sign (LSa, b′G‖a) using the random number b ′. Here, sign (sk, D) means a digital signature using the secret key sk for the data D. The concepts and algorithms of digital signatures are described in “Tatsuaki Okamoto, Hiroshi Yamamoto,“ Contemporary Cryptography ”, Series / Mathematics of Information Science, Industrial Books, 1997, p.171-183. G is a value unique to the system.
(6) The electronic lock 4a sends b′G and S1 to the IC card 2a.
(7) Next, the IC card 2a uses the public key LPa of the electronic lock 4a obtained from the public key certificate Cert_La of the electronic lock 4a to confirm that S1 is the signature of the electronic lock 4a on b′G‖a. Validate. Further, the IC card 2a generates a random number a ′, and generates S0: = Sign (CSa, a′G‖b) using the random number a ′.
(8) The IC card 2a sends a′G and S0 to the electronic lock 4a.
(9) Next, the electronic lock 4a uses the public key CPa of the IC card 2a obtained from the public key certificate Cert_Ca of the IC card 2a to confirm that S0 is the signature of the IC card 2a with respect to a′G‖b. Validate. The electronic lock 4a calculates CK1: = b ′ (a′G).
(10) The IC card 2a calculates CK0: = a ′ (b′G).
[0089]
Thereafter, encryption communication is performed using CK: = CK0 (= CK1) as a session key.
[0090]
<Distribution of electronic key data d2 and unlocking of storage box 3>
When the storage box 3 and the IC card 2 arrive at the disposal company, the disposal company reads the ID data LIDa of the electronic lock 4a and includes this ID data LIDa in the report data from the terminal 41 to the server 11 of the management organization. Send via the Internet 1 It is assumed that the management organization determines that the distribution of the unlocking electronic key data d2 may be permitted for this report.
[0091]
The server 11 reads the unlocking electronic key data d2 (= Rka) associated with the received ID data LIDa from the database 12, and transmits it to the terminal 41 of the disposal company via the Internet 1.
[0092]
The terminal 41 of the disposal company stores the received electronic key data d2 in the IC card 2a. Then, the IC card 2a is inserted into the slot of the electronic lock 4a by the disposal contractor. As shown in FIG. 17A, the IC card 2a executes the SAC protocol with the electronic lock 4a. Details of the SAC protocol are the same as described above. As a result, the shared key CK ′ is derived. The shared key CK ′ is shared by the IC card 2a and the electronic lock 4a. As shown in FIG. 17B, the IC card 2a performs a calculation E (CK ′, d2) using the shared information CK ′, and transmits the calculation result as D2 to the electronic lock 4a. The electronic lock 4a decrypts the data D2 using the shared key CK ′ and writes the decryption result d2 in the area 2 of the area Y. The electronic lock 4a performs the calculation H (d2) using the data d2 stored in the area 2. The electronic lock 4a compares the result of this calculation with the data d1 stored in the area 1. When the two match, the electronic lock 4a unlocks the storage box 3. When they do not match, the electronic lock 4a does not unlock the storage box 3. After unlocking the storage box 3, the electronic lock 4a records the data d1 stored in the area 1 and / or the data d2 stored in the area 2 in the history recording area, and erases the areas 1 and 2 To do. Thereafter, when the data recorded in the history recording area matches the data recorded in the area 1 and / or the area 2, the electronic lock 4a does not unlock the storage box 3.
[0093]
<Effect>
In the fifth embodiment, the shared key CK (or CK ′) obtained by the SAC protocol cannot be obtained correctly unless the electronic lock / IC card is valid (if the secret information held by the electronic lock is not valid), and data is not stored in the electronic lock. The electronic key data d1 and d2 cannot be calculated correctly from D1 and D2. Therefore, the communication data at the time of locking / unlocking between the IC card 2 and the electronic lock 4 depends on the secret information of the electronic lock 4.
[0094]
The effect obtained in the third embodiment can be obtained in the same manner.
[0095]
<Modification>
Similarly to the third embodiment, d1 = H (LSj, Rk) may be set, and if d1 = H (LSj, d2), unlocking may be performed.
[0096]
Similarly to the fourth embodiment, the electronic key data d1 and d2 may be transmitted after being encrypted with the card secret information CSi.
[0097]
In the first to fifth embodiments, when the lock / unlock signal (fixed signal) is sent to the electronic lock and the lock / unlock is permitted, the lock function may be transferred to the IC card. That is, as shown in FIG. 18, the IC card has an IC card function unit and a lock function unit, and may communicate within the IC card and finally send a lock / unlock signal to the lock. .
[Brief description of the drawings]
FIG. 1 is a diagram showing an overall configuration of a transportation management system according to a first embodiment of the present invention.
FIG. 2 is a diagram showing a state in which a generated one-time password is stored in an electronic lock and a database.
FIG. 3A is a diagram showing a state in which one of one-time passwords stored in a database is stored in an IC card as electronic key data for locking. (B) is a figure which shows the mode of the communication performed at the time of locking between an IC card and an electronic lock.
FIG. 4A is a diagram showing a state in which one of one-time passwords stored in a database is stored in an IC card as unlocking electronic key data. (B) is a figure which shows the mode of the communication performed at the time of unlocking between an IC card and an electronic lock.
FIG. 5A is a diagram showing a state in which a password is read from the database 12 and recorded on the IC card as electronic key data for locking. (B) is a figure for demonstrating the process performed at the time of locking between an IC card and an electronic lock. (C) is a figure which shows a mode that the password in the memory of an electronic lock is updated.
FIG. 6A is a diagram showing a state in which a password is read from the database 12 and recorded on the IC card as electronic key data for unlocking. (B) is a figure for demonstrating the process performed at the time of unlocking between an IC card and an electronic lock. (C) is a figure which shows a mode that the password in the memory of an electronic lock is updated.
FIG. 7 is a diagram illustrating an area inside a memory of an electronic lock according to a third embodiment.
FIG. 8 is a diagram for explaining a generation procedure of locking electronic key data and unlocking electronic key data.
FIG. 9 is a diagram for explaining processing performed at the time of locking between the IC card and the electronic lock.
FIG. 10 is a diagram for explaining processing performed when unlocking between an IC card and an electronic lock;
FIG. 11 is a diagram showing one of IC cards prepared in advance in a management organization.
FIG. 12 is a diagram for explaining a generation procedure of locking electronic key data and unlocking electronic key data.
FIG. 13A is a diagram for explaining a decryption process performed in the IC card at the time of locking. (B) is a figure for demonstrating the process performed at the time of locking between an IC card and an electronic lock.
FIG. 14A is a diagram for explaining a decryption process performed in the IC card at the time of unlocking; (B) is a figure for demonstrating the process performed at the time of unlocking between an IC card and an electronic lock.
FIGS. 15A and 15B are diagrams for explaining processing performed during locking between the IC card and the electronic lock. FIGS.
FIG. 16 is a diagram illustrating a procedure of a SAC protocol.
FIGS. 17A and 17B are diagrams for explaining processing performed when unlocking between an IC card and an electronic lock; FIGS.
FIG. 18 is a diagram showing a configuration of an IC card and a lock when a lock / unlock signal (fixed signal) is sent to the electronic lock to permit the lock / unlock.
[Explanation of symbols]
1 Internet, 2 IC card, 3 storage box, 4 electronic lock, d1 electronic key data for locking, d2 electronic key data for unlocking.

Claims (1)

A system for managing transportation of an object using a storage box with an electronic lock, wherein the storage box with an electronic lock stores secret information of electronic key data in an area that cannot be accessed from the outside of the electronic lock,
A first terminal device, a second terminal device, a server device, a first storage device, a second storage device, and a third storage device;
The first terminal device is:
Sending application data for applying for permission to transport the object to the server device via a network,
The application data is
Including information indicating the name and quantity of the object, information indicating a transportation destination of the object, and image data of contents of the object photographed by a digital camera,
The server device
Based on the application data from the first terminal device, the secret information of the first electronic key data for locking the storage box is transmitted to the first terminal device via the network,
The first terminal device is:
Storing the secret information of the first electronic key data from the server device in the first storage device;
The storage box is
Locked when it is confirmed that the first storage device and the electronic lock have the same secret information using the secret information of the first electronic key data stored in the first storage device ,
In the third storage device,
Information indicating the actual transportation route of the object by the transportation means is recorded by the GPS mounted on the transportation means ,
The second terminal device is:
Sending report data for reporting the transport result of the object to the server device via the network,
The report data is
Including transport route information recorded in the third storage device and read out to the second terminal device ;
The server device
A second electronic key that is secret information of the electronic key data for unlocking the storage box and is different from the secret information of the first electronic key data based on the report data from the second terminal device Sending data secret information to the second terminal device via the network;
The second terminal device is:
The secret information of the second electronic key data from the server device is stored in the second storage device, and the storage box is
It is unlocked when it is confirmed that the second storage device and the electronic lock have the same secret information using the secret information of the second electronic key data stored in the second storage device. The
Transportation management system characterized by that.

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