JP3987322B2 - Electronic certificate fee billing system - Google Patents

Description

[0001]
BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION
The present invention relates to an electronic certificate that a certificate authority sells to a subscriber. The electronic certificate is a fee for electronic certificate that allows a variation in the sales form of the electronic certificate and enables detection of compromise of the private key. It relates to a billing system.
[0002]
[Prior art]
In recent years, PKI (Public Key Infrastructure) using public key cryptography is being developed, and electronic certificates are used in various situations such as electronic application, electronic commerce, use of equipment and information, etc. Identity authentication is becoming necessary.
The public key cryptosystem used for this PKI uses two different keys for encryption and decryption, and data encrypted using one of the keys uses the other key. It is an encryption method that can only be decrypted with this.
[0003]
In this public key cryptosystem, the subscriber who is the owner of this pair of keys keeps one of them as a public key so that a third party other than the owner can obtain it. The other key is stored as a secret key so that it cannot be obtained by a third party. This public key can be used to send data to a dependent party who is a specific partner, or to confirm that the data sent from the relying party to the subscriber itself has not been tampered with. It has become.
In such public key cryptography, the Certification Authority confirms that the public key used as described above is surely the subscriber's own public key. It is provided for guaranteeing, and issues an electronic certificate to the subscriber.
[0004]
This electronic certificate contains the public key registered with the certificate authority, information about the owner (subscriber) of the key, information about the certificate authority that issued this electronic certificate, and the electronic signature of the issuing certificate authority. The electronic certificate is stored in a terminal (personal computer PC) or an IC card owned by the subscriber, and is used for the identity authentication of the subscriber. The detailed format of this electronic certificate is generally prepared in accordance with Recommendation X.509 of CCITT (The International Telegraph and Telephone Consultative Committee).
[0005]
[Problems to be solved by the invention]
Currently, various certificate service companies (certificate authorities) sell electronic certificates, but there are not many variations in the sales format, and the sales price per electronic certificate is determined and sold. It is normal.
Therefore, for users with high usage frequency of electronic certificates, the sales price is not a problem. However, for users with low usage frequency of electronic certificates, the sales price is expensive. This raises the threshold for obtaining certificates and hinders the use and dissemination of digital certificates.
In the PKI, it is assumed that the private key paired with the public key is strictly stored by the owner of the public key and kept secret so that it is not known to others.
However, with the current technology, it is very difficult to detect that the secret key has been known to others, and there are only systems or devices that store the secret key strictly.
[0006]
The present invention has been made in view of these problems. The first object of the present invention is to provide a variety of electronic certificate sales forms in selling electronic certificates and lower the threshold for obtaining electronic certificates. The purpose is to use and disseminate electronic certificates.
Next, the second purpose is to provide a means to manage the secret key that is assumed in PKI, and to provide a method of knowing the compromise of the secret key at an early timing, thereby reducing the damage caused by the compromise. The aim is to keep it to a minimum.
[0007]
[Means for Solving the Problems]
In order to achieve the above object, the present invention relates to the creation of a digitally signed message, and is a fee charging system for an electronic certificate issued from a certificate authority to a subscriber. A value generation means provided in the subscriber, and a certificate use frequency calculation means and a billing means provided in a billing administrator for managing the issue price of the subscriber's electronic certificate, wherein the value generation means , Each time a subscriber creates a digitally signed message using a private key in order to uniquely identify each of the multiple digitally signed messages created by the subscriber, Add a unique value to the signature The certificate usage count calculation means is based on a successful verification result of a verification authority that verifies an electronic signature applied to the message based on a verification request from a relying party that has received the message with the electronic signature. , Count the unique value added to the digital signature that has been verified And the claim means is the means The subscriber is charged for the usage amount of the electronic certificate according to the counting result of the unique value counted by the certificate usage count calculation means. Is a means It is characterized by that.
As a result, the certificate authority charges the subscriber for the certificate price, and the electronic certificate pay-as-you-go charging method according to the number of times the electronic certificate is used becomes possible.
[0008]
Further, in the electronic certificate fee billing system according to the present invention, the certificate usage count calculation means does not repeatedly count the unique value consisting of the same value when counting the unique value added to the verified electronic signature. It is characterized by.
Thereby, since the repeated verification from the same relying party for the same message is not counted as the number of uses, it is possible to count the number of valid digital signature verifications.
[0009]
In the electronic certificate fee billing system of the present invention, Compromise detection means provided for each subscriber is further provided, the value generation means is means for counting eigenvalues for each subscriber, and the compromise detection means is: Counted by the certificate usage count calculation means About the subscriber himself Eigenvalues and Provided to the subscriber Check the value of the eigenvalue added by the value generator, If the value of the unique value counted by the certificate usage count calculation means is not included in the value of the unique value added by the value generation means, the subscriber's private key may be compromised And if it is included in the value of the unique value added by the value generating means, it is determined that there is no possibility that the secret key of the subscriber is compromised. Detects compromise of a subscriber's private key Is a means It is characterized by that.
As a result, the compromise of the secret key can be known at an early timing, and the damage when the secret key is compromised is minimized.
[0010]
DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE INVENTION
Hereinafter, preferred embodiments of the present invention will be described in detail with reference to the accompanying drawings.
FIG. 1 is a configuration diagram of an electronic certificate pay-as-you-go billing system 1 according to an embodiment of the present invention.
[0011]
The electronic certificate pay-as-you-go billing system 1 according to the present embodiment includes a subscriber computer 100, a relying party computer 200, a verification authority computer 300, a billing management computer 400, which are connected to each other via a network Net so as to be able to transmit data. A certificate authority (certificate issuing authority) system 500 is provided.
[0012]
The subscriber computer 100 is a computer of the subscriber Me holding an electronic certificate Cf issued from the certificate authority CA and a private key Sk paired with the public key Pk described in the electronic certificate Cf.
The subscriber computer 100 includes a signature management device 110, a signature device 120, a value generation device 130, a storage device 140, and a communication device 150.
[0013]
In the signature management apparatus 110, for example, the subscriber Me receives the issuance of the electronic certificate Cf and the private key Sk registered by the subscriber Me from the certificate authority CA. Is used to manage the eigenvalue Va for each number of times the electronic signature Sg is applied, and the history of the electronic signature Sg in the past is managed.
[0014]
The signature device 120 is a device that creates an electronic signature-added message SM by applying an electronic signature Sg to the message MM using the electronic certificate Cf. For example, the signature device 120 calculates a hash value of the message MM to be sent, encrypts the hash value using the above-described secret key Sk, and creates signature data sd (see FIG. 3 described later) of the electronic signature Sg. .
The value generation device 130 generates a unique value Va for identifying another electronically signed message SM that has already been created when the signature device 120 generates a signature of the electronically signed message SM.
[0015]
FIG. 2 is a configuration diagram of a message SM with an electronic signature used in the electronic certificate pay-as-you-go billing system 1 according to the present embodiment.
The electronically signed message SM is composed of a message body MM and an electronic signature Sg.
[0016]
FIG. 3 is a configuration diagram of the electronic signature Sg used in the present embodiment.
In the present embodiment, the electronic signature Sg has an internal configuration in which the signature data sd generated by the signature device 120 and the unique value Va generated by the value generation device 130 are stored.
The internal configuration of the electronic signature Sg may be other than that shown in FIG. 2, and the unique value Va may be encrypted with the electronic signature, that is, the secret key Sk, or included in the signature data sd. Also good.
[0017]
Further, instead of adding the unique value Va to the signature data sd, a value calculated from an algorithm such as a hash value may be used. In this case, the calculated value is calculated every time the unique value Va is required. Therefore, it is not necessary to add the eigenvalue Va separately.
The storage device 140 includes a signature management database 141 and a subscriber certificate / private key storage unit 142.
[0018]
In the signature management database 141, the history of the sent message MM with the past electronic signature Sg managed by the signature management apparatus 110 is stored. For example, in the signature management database 141, the signature management device 110 applies the electronic signature Sg to the message MM to create a message SM with an electronic signature, and the unique value generated by the title and value generation device 130 of the message MM. Information such as Va and creation date and time is stored for each message MM.
The subscriber certificate / private key storage unit 142 has an electronic certificate Cf as a subscriber certificate issued from the above-mentioned certificate authority CA to the subscriber Me, and a public provided in the electronic certificate Cf. The secret key Sk paired with the key Pk is stored.
[0019]
The communication device 150 connects the subscriber computer 100 to other devices via a network Net so that data transmission is possible.
On the other hand, the relying party computer 200 is a computer to which the message SM with an electronic signature created by the subscriber computer 100 of the subscriber Me is transmitted, and depends on the electronic certificate Cf of the subscriber Me in the message body part MM. It is a computer that verifies the attached electronic signature Sg, that is, the relying party De.
The relying party computer 200 connects the relying party computer 200 to other apparatuses via a network Net so as to be able to transmit data to the storage apparatus 210 having an area 211 for storing the electronically signed message SM from the subscriber Me. A communication device 220.
[0020]
On the other hand, the verification station computer 300 verifies the electronic signature Sg of the message SM with the electronic signature transmitted from the subscriber Me to the dependent party De based on the request from the dependent party De. This is a computer provided in the PA.
The verification authority computer 300 of this embodiment is provided with an electronic certificate verification device 310, an electronic signature verification device 320, a communication device 330, and a storage device 340.
[0021]
The electronic certificate verification device 310 verifies the electronic certificate Cf of the subscriber Me used when verifying the electronic signature portion Sg of the message SM with the electronic signature.
The electronic signature verification apparatus 320 verifies the electronic signature Sg sent for verification from the relying party computer 200 based on the electronic certificate Cf verified by the electronic certificate verification apparatus 310.
[0022]
The storage device 340 includes a certificate temporary storage area 341 and another temporary storage area 342. The certificate temporary storage area 341 temporarily stores the electronic certificate Cf of the subscriber Me used for verification, Other temporary storage area 342 temporarily stores other data used for verification.
The charge management computer 400 manages the issue price of the electronic certificate Cf for each subscriber Me that has received the issue of the electronic certificate Cf from the certificate authority CA based on a pay-per-use charge system according to the number of uses.
[0023]
The charge management computer 400 counts (calculates) the usage count of the electronic certificate Cf for each subscriber Me, and a storage device 420 having a verification log 421 in which the status at the time of verification is recorded. And a communication device 430 for connecting the charge management computer 400 to other devices so as to be able to transmit data via the network Net.
510 is a communication device that is provided in the certificate authority system 500 and connects the certificate authority system 500 to other devices so that data transmission is possible. In place is there.
[0024]
Next, processing of the electronic certificate pay-as-you-go system 1 configured as described above will be described.
FIG. 4 is an explanatory diagram of a charging procedure when the electronic certificate pay-as-you-go charging system 1 according to the present embodiment is applied to a delivery process of a message SM with an electronic signature.
[0025]
When the user becomes a subscriber Me of the certificate authority CA, the certificate authority system 500 issues an electronic certificate Cf and a private key Sk that is paired with the public key Pk described in the electronic certificate Cf. It is sent from the certificate authority system 500 to the subscriber computer 100 (step S1) and stored in the subscriber certificate / private key storage unit 142 of the storage device 140 of the subscriber computer 100.
In the above description, both the public key Pk and the private key Sk are issued by the certification authority CA. However, the public key Pk and the private key Sk are created by the user, and the public key Pk is electronically generated by the certification authority CA. Credit guarantee may be performed by the certificate Cf.
[0026]
Thereafter, the subscriber Me operates the signature device 120 by the subscriber computer 100 to create a message SM with an electronic signature, and the electronic signature with the electronic signature created for a specific third party, that is, the relying party De. The message SM can be transmitted.
[0027]
In the electronic certificate pay-as-you-go billing system 1 according to the present embodiment, the signature device 120 includes the electronic certificate Cf and the private key stored in the subscriber certificate / private key storage unit 142 of the storage device 140. Using Sk, an electronic signature Sg is generated in conjunction with the value generation device 130 in accordance with the subscriber Me's electronic signature generation request for the message MM.
[0028]
That is, in association with the generation of the electronic signature Sg of the electronically signed message SM by the subscriber computer 100, the value generating device 130 distinguishes the electronically signed message SM from other already created electronically signed messages SM. In addition, a unique value Va for identifying the electronic signature Sg made this time with respect to the electronic signature Sg made previously is attached to the current electronic signature Sg.
[0029]
FIG. 5 is a flowchart showing processing by the value generation device 130 when generating the unique value Va when generating the signature.
As shown in FIG. 5, when the value generation device 130 receives a value generation request transmitted from the signature device 120 in accordance with the addition of the electronic signature Sg to the message body portion MM by the signature device 120 (step SV1), the unique value Va. Is generated (step SV2), and the generated eigenvalue Va is checked for overlap with the eigenvalue Va ′ generated in the past (step SV3). As a result of the duplication check (step SV3), if the eigenvalue Va generated this time overlaps with the eigenvalue Va ′ generated in the past, the value generating apparatus 130 returns to step SV2 and regenerates the eigenvalue Va. If not, it is checked whether or not the generation order of the eigenvalue Va can be specified in relation to the eigenvalue Va ′ generated this time and the eigenvalue Va ′ generated previously (step SV4). As a result of this investigation, if the eigenvalue Va generated this time cannot identify the generation order of the eigenvalue Va in relation to the eigenvalue Va ′ generated previously, the value generating device 130 returns to step SV2 and generates the eigenvalue Va again. On the other hand, if it can be specified, the generated unique value Va is sent to the signature device 120 (step SV4).
[0030]
If the value generation device 130 is configured to generate a value in response to a value generation request by using time information or continuous values at the time of generating the value, the unique value Va generated this time is duplicated. It is also possible to omit the check (step SV3) and the investigation (step SV4) as to whether the generation order can be specified.
As a result, the signature device 120 that has received the unique value Va from the value generation device 130 creates an electronic signature Sg having an internal configuration in which the signature data SD and the unique value Va are stored as shown in FIG. It is like that.
[0031]
At this time, the electronic signature Sg created this time manages the eigenvalue Va in the subscriber computer 100 that has been previously applied with the electronic signature Sg, and the signature management apparatus 110 that manages the history of applying the electronic signature Sg in the past. Thus, the history of the past electronic signature Sg is added to the stored signature management database 141 and stored.
[0032]
In this way, the electronically signed message SM (step S2 in FIG. 4) generated by the subscriber computer 100 is sent from the communication device 150 to the relying party computer 200 via the network Net. It is sent together with the document Cf (step S3).
When the relying party computer 200 receives the electronically signed message SM (see FIG. 2) and the electronic certificate Cf from the subscriber Me at the communication device 220, the relying party computer 200 stores them in the message storage area from the subscriber Me in the storage device 210. 211 is stored.
[0033]
Then, when the relying party computer 200 opens the electronically signed message SM from the subscriber Me, the relying party computer 200 sends a verification request and communicates the electronically signed message SM and the electronic certificate Cf from the subscriber Me. The data is sent from the device 220 to the verification station computer 300 via the network Net (step S4).
[0034]
When the verification station computer 300 receives the message SM with the electronic signature and the electronic certificate Cf to which the verification request from the relying party De is attached, the communication device 330 receives the electronic certificate Cf and the temporary certificate of the storage device 340. The message SM with the electronic signature is stored in the storage area 341, the temporary storage area 342 of the storage device 340 is stored, the electronic certificate verification device 310 performs verification of the electronic certificate Cf, and the electronic signature verification device 320 The electronic signature Sg is verified.
[0035]
FIG. 6 is a flowchart showing verification work by the verification station computer 300 at this time.
In FIG. 6, as described above, when the verification authority computer 300 receives the electronically signed message SM and the electronic certificate Cf to which the verification request is attached from the relying party computer 200 (step S501), the electronic certificate of the subscriber Me is received. The certificate Cf is stored in the certificate temporary storage area 341 of the storage device 340, and the message SM with the electronic signature is stored in the other temporary storage area 342 of the storage device 340 (step S502).
[0036]
Then, the verification authority computer 300 uses the electronic signature verification device 320 to verify the electronic signature Sg using the subscriber's electronic certificate Cf (step S503). This verification work is performed by decrypting the electronic signature data sd encoded by the private key Sk using the public key Pk of the subscriber Me included in the electronic certificate Cf, and the decrypted data is predetermined data in the message MM. It is confirmed that it matches.
As a result, when verification of the electronic signature Sg fails (step S504), the failed information is registered in the accounting management computer 400 (step S505), and the verification failure is transmitted to the relying party computer 200 (step S506).
[0037]
On the other hand, if the verification authority computer 300 succeeds in verifying the electronic signature Sg, the verification authority computer 310 uses the electronic certificate verification apparatus 310 to verify the subscriber Me's electronic certificate Cf (not shown). The electronic certificate Cfh (not shown) and the certificate revocation list CRL (not shown) are obtained from the higher-level certificate authority CAh via the network Net and stored in the electronic certificate temporary storage area 341 (step S505). ) Using the public key Pkh of the electronic certificate Cfh, the electronic signature Sgk of the subscriber Me's electronic certificate Cf is verified (step S506). If the verification fails (step S507), the failure has occurred. The verification information registration of the verification failure is sent to the charge management computer 400 via the network Net by the communication device 330 (S -Up S508), the communication device 330 a verification result report of the verification failure dependent user computer 200 via the network Net (step S509).
[0038]
If all the above verifications are successful (step S507), the verification station computer 300 sends a verification information registration of the verification success to the charge management computer 400 via the network Net by the communication device 330 ( In step S510), a verification result report indicating successful verification is sent to the relying party computer 200 via the network Net by the communication device 330 (step S511).
[0039]
In FIG. 4, the verification operation by the verification authority computer 300 (step S5) is completed, and verification information registration of successful verification is sent from the verification authority computer 300 to the charge management computer 400 (step S6). When the verification result report indicating that the verification is successful is sent to the relying party computer 200 (step S7), the billing management computer 400 performs the following processing.
[0040]
In the billing management computer 400, when the communication device 430 receives the verification success registration from the verification station computer 300, the eigenvalue Va, the verified dependent user De identification information de, the verification date and time information dt, etc. as registration information of the verification success Is stored in the verification log 421 in the storage device 420 in correspondence with the identification information dm of the subscriber Me described in the electronic certificate Cf that has been verified, which is also included in the registration information (step S8). ).
[0041]
FIG. 7 is a configuration diagram of the verification log 421 in the storage device 420 in the charge management computer 400.
Further, as shown in FIG. 4, the billing management computer 400 analyzes the verification log 421 periodically, that is, at a predetermined time interval, and bills each subscriber computer 100, that is, for each subscriber Me. (Step S9), and the description 800 for each subscriber Me obtained by this billing process is sent to each subscriber Me with the electronic certificate Cf of the verification authority PA attached (step S10).
[0042]
FIG. 8 is a diagram showing an example of a description 800 sent from the charge management computer 400 to the subscriber computer 100.
For example, in the case of the present embodiment, the billing management computer 400 creates a description 800 for each subscriber computer 100 by the certificate usage count calculation device 410 based on the stored contents of the verification log 421. The usage count C of the electronic certificate Cf is counted corresponding to the number of unique values Va issued within the period, and the usage amount YEN is calculated based on a predetermined rate corresponding to the usage count C. ing.
[0043]
Thereby, in the electronic certificate pay-as-you-go billing system 1 of the present embodiment, for the subscriber Me who uses the electronic certificate Cf less frequently, the usage amount YEN of the electronic certificate Cf is thus changed to the electronic certificate Cf. Since it is determined in accordance with the number of times of use C, it is not charged for an expensive use amount YEN as before.
In the electronic certificate pay-as-you-go system 1 according to the present embodiment, the usage count C of the electronic certificate Cf can be used for calculating the usage amount YEN of the electronic certificate Cf. It is possible to diversify the variations of sales forms.
[0044]
On the other hand, in the subscriber computer 100 to which the specification 800 is sent from the billing management computer 400, the signature management apparatus 110 analyzes the specification 800, and each unique value Va in the specification 800 is stored in the signature management database 141. It is verified whether or not each of the described eigenvalues Va matches without any abnormality.
[0045]
At this time, as a result of the collation, for example, the eigenvalue Va included in the specification 800 is an eigenvalue Va that is not included in the electronic signature management database 141 in the storage device 140 of the subscriber computer 100, or the eigenvalue Va. When an abnormality is found, such as when there is a contradiction between the date and time when the date is generated and the verification date and time dt (when the date and time when the eigenvalue Va is generated is after the verification date and time dt), the signature management apparatus 110 It is determined that the private key Sk of the subscriber Me may be compromised, and the subscriber computer 100 alerts the subscriber Me by displaying the determination result on the display.
[0046]
On the other hand, when the signature management apparatus 110 confirms that the unique values Va in the specification 800 match the unique values Va described in the signature management database 141 without any abnormality. The subscriber computer 100 determines that the secret key Sk of the subscriber Me is not compromised, and the subscriber computer 100 notifies the subscriber Me of that fact (step S11).
[0047]
Further, when the specification 800 is sent from the billing management computer 400, the signature management apparatus 110 of the subscriber computer 100 receives the verified relying party information de included in the specification 800 in addition to the above-described compromise detection processing. By analyzing, the name of the relying party De who opened the electronically signed message SM is analyzed, and the opened confirmation process of the sent electronically signed message SM is also performed.
[0048]
When the compromise detection process and the unsealing confirmation process are completed and the subscriber computer 100 confirms that the information in the specification 800 is normal, that is, there is no abnormality, the subscriber Me Confirmation of the specification 800 and payment of the usage fee are notified to the verification station computer 300 via the network Net (step S12).
[0049]
The verification authority PA that has received the payment permission notification from the subscriber Me by the verification authority computer 300 collects the usage fee of the electronic certificate Cf from the account of the subscriber Me and sends it to the certification authority CA (step). S13).
[0050]
The electronic certificate pay-as-you-go billing system 1 according to the present embodiment is as described above, but the electronic certificate fee billing system according to the present invention is not limited to the above embodiment.
For example, in the present embodiment, the accounting management computer 400 is independent of the certification authority CA and the verification authority PA in FIG. 500 or the verification station computer 300 may be provided. Furthermore, the configuration may be such that the certification authority CA itself also serves as the verification authority PA.
[0051]
In the present embodiment, the relying party computer 200 sends the message SM with the electronic signature and the electronic certificate Cf from the subscriber Me to the verification authority PA, and the verification authority PA transmits the electronic signature Sg and the electronic certificate Cf. Although the system configuration is to be verified, for example, only the value data Va of the electronic certificate Cf and the electronic signature Sg is sent to the verification authority PA, and the verification of the electronic certificate Cf and the count of the number of uses C are verified. Regarding the verification of the signature data sd of the electronic signature Sg, which is performed by the station PA, the detailed system configuration such as the system configuration performed by the relying party computer 200 based on the verification result of the electronic certificate Cf by the verification station PA Various modifications can be considered.
[0052]
In the present embodiment, the number of uses C of the electronic certificate Cf is calculated corresponding to the number of eigenvalues Va issued within a predetermined period, but the number of uses C is the same as the number of eigenvalues Va issued. Rather than applying, various modifications are possible, such as determining by a combination of the number of eigenvalues Va issued and the number of dependents De who requested verification for each eigenvalue Va. In any case, any number of verifications by the same relying party De on the same electronic signature-added message SM using the eigenvalue Va may be used so as not to be counted twice in the usage count C. .
[0053]
In the present embodiment, the value generation device 130 is provided in the subscriber computer 100. However, if the system environment is such that the electronic signature Sg and the unique value Va can be uniquely associated, authentication is performed. It may be provided in the station system 500 or the verification station computer 300.
Further, in the present embodiment, the specification 800 is issued at regular intervals, that is, a predetermined time interval. However, the specification 800 may be made available at any time according to a request from the subscriber computer 100. According to this, the subscriber Me can obtain the specification 800 at any time as necessary, so that the compromise of the secret key Sk can be detected at a desired time.
[0054]
In addition, the correspondence between one unique value Va in the specification 800 and the message SM with the electronic signature corresponding thereto, and the correspondence relationship between the unique value Va in the subscriber computer 100 and the message SM with the electronic signature corresponding thereto. In order to verify, the hash value of the message MM to which the electronic signature Sg to be verified is applied may be obtained in the verification, and the obtained hash value may be stored in the verification log 421 and placed in the specification 800. . In this way, it is possible to detect an abnormal replacement in the middle of a message SM with an electronic signature that should uniquely correspond to one eigenvalue Va.
[0055]
【The invention's effect】
As described above, according to the electronic certificate fee billing system of the present invention, in selling electronic certificates, it is possible to give variations to the sales form of electronic certificates, lowering the threshold for obtaining electronic certificates, Use and dissemination of electronic certificates.
In addition, it is possible to provide a means for managing the secret key that is assumed in PKI, so that the compromise of the secret key can be known at an early timing, and the damage when the secret key is compromised is minimized. Can do.
[Brief description of the drawings]
FIG. 1 is a configuration diagram of an electronic certificate pay-as-you-go billing system according to an embodiment of the present invention.
FIG. 2 is a configuration diagram of a message SM with an electronic signature used in the electronic certificate pay-as-you-go billing system according to the present embodiment.
FIG. 3 is a configuration diagram of an electronic signature Sg used in the present embodiment.
FIG. 4 is an explanatory diagram of a charging procedure when the electronic certificate pay-as-you-go charging system according to the present embodiment is applied to a delivery process of a message with an electronic signature.
FIG. 5 is a flowchart showing processing by a value generation device when generating a unique value at the time of signature generation.
FIG. 6 is a flowchart showing verification work by the verification station computer at this time.
FIG. 7 is a configuration diagram of a verification log in a storage device in the charge management computer.
FIG. 8 is a diagram showing an example of a specification sent from a charge management computer to a subscriber computer.
[Explanation of symbols]
100 subscriber computers
110 Signature management device
120 Signature device
130 Value generator
141 Signature management database
200 Relying computer
300 Verification Bureau Computer
310 Electronic certificate verification device
320 Electronic signature verification device
341 Certificate temporary storage area
342 Other temporary storage area
400 Billing management computer
410 Certificate usage count calculation device
421 Verification log
500 Certificate Authority system
800 description
Me subscribers
De Dependent
CA Verification Authority
Sg Electronic signature
Va value

Claims (3)

A system for charging electronic certificates issued by a certificate authority to subscribers in creating a message with an electronic signature,
A value generating means provided to the subscriber;
A certificate usage count calculation means and a billing means provided in a billing administrator for managing the issue price of the subscriber's electronic certificate;
Have
The value generating means is generated each time a subscriber creates a digitally signed message using a private key in order to uniquely identify each of the plurality of digitally signed messages created by the subscriber. A means for adding a unique value to an electronic signature applied to a message ,
The certificate usage count calculation means is configured to perform verification based on a verification success result of a verification authority that verifies the electronic signature applied to the message based on a verification request from a relying party that has received the message with the electronic signature. A means for counting unique values added to a digital signature performed ;
The billing unit is a unit that bills the subscriber for the usage amount of the electronic certificate in accordance with the counting result of the unique value counted by the certificate usage count calculation unit. Electronic certificate fee billing system. The certificate usage count calculation means includes:
2. The electronic certificate fee billing system according to claim 1, wherein when counting the unique value added to the verified electronic signature, the unique value consisting of the same value is not counted repeatedly. Compromise detection means provided for each subscriber
Further comprising
The value generating means is means for counting the eigenvalues by subscriber;
The compromise detection means collates the eigenvalue value for the subscriber itself counted by the certificate usage count calculation means with the eigenvalue value added by the value generation means provided for the subscriber. When the value of the unique value counted by the certificate usage count calculating means is not included in the value of the unique value added by the value generating means, the subscriber's private key may be compromised If it is included in the value of the unique value added by the value generation means, it is determined that there is no possibility that the subscriber's private key is compromised. The electronic certificate fee billing system according to claim 1, characterized in that it is a means for detecting a compromise of a private key of a user.

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