JP3701156B2 - Data backup device - Google Patents

Description

[0001]
BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION
  The present invention uses a portable card such as an IC card that can freely read and write data.Data backIn detail, the security has been improved.dataThe present invention relates to a backup device.
[0002]
[Prior art]
In a data backup device for confidential data, the data is encrypted and recorded in the storage device as backup data, and only a predetermined administrator is involved in operations such as decryption of the backup data for data recovery. I can't do it.
[0003]
In a conventional data backup device, the administrator authentication is only software authentication in a format that requires operation authentication for an operating system or application installed in the data backup device.
[0004]
[Problems to be solved by the invention]
For personal authentication, a method is generally used in which a password is entered into an authentication program built with software and compared with password information registered in advance. In this case, even third parties obtain password information. This makes it easy to authenticate, and there is a problem with security. In addition, in order to solve this problem, fingerprint authentication that identifies individuals was devised, but since judgment is left to the software, it cannot prevent skilled people from logging on by unauthorized operations. It was.
[0005]
  The object of the present invention is to overcome the above-mentioned problemsdataIt is to provide a backup device.
[0006]
[Means for Solving the Problems]
  Authentication deviceAccording to
  Security card side authentication unique data S1 recorded on the security card (11) attached to the computer device, and administrator mobile card side authentication recorded on the administrator mobile card (12) owned by the administrator There is data M1,
  Encryption data obtained by encrypting the administrator mobile card side authentication data M1 using the security card side authentication unique data S1 as an encryption key is stored in advance in the computer apparatus as a verification value V,
  At the time of authentication, the authentication subject mobile card side authentication data Mc read from the authentication subject mobile card (12) is encrypted based on the security card side authentication unique data S1 as an encryption key,
  Collating the encrypted data relating to the person to be authenticated with the verification value V;
  If the two match, the person to be authenticated is authenticated as an administrator of the computer device.
[0007]
The computer device includes, for example, a data backup device (10). The portable card (12) is composed of, for example, an IC card that can freely read and write a predetermined amount of data. The security card (11) is sometimes called a board and can be inserted into, for example, an empty slot of a general-purpose computer.
[0008]
The authentication routine is performed by, for example, an encryption application. In that case, it is complicated or almost difficult for a third party to analyze the application with a disassembler and to decrypt the encryption algorithm, and the cracker (data unauthorized user) uses the administrator mobile card side authentication data M1 and the security card. Even if the side authentication specific data S1 is acquired, it is difficult to derive the encrypted verification value V from them. Moreover, since the administrator mobile card side authentication data M1 exists in the administrator mobile card (12), as long as the administrator holds the administrator mobile card (12) by himself without lending it to others, It is difficult for the cracker to know the administrator mobile card side authentication data M1. The administrator mobile card side authentication data M1 is usually different from the password and is usually not even known by the administrator. In such a case, unlike the password, the administrator is the administrator. It is possible to avoid a situation where the mobile card side authentication data M1 is inadvertently leaked to another person. ,
[0009]
In the password authentication, if it is another mobile card (12) issued in the same system as the administrator mobile card (12), when the authorized user of the other mobile card (12) is authenticated, it is usually Since the password verification value is stored in the mobile card (12) and the verification value is read from the mobile card (12), the authentication may be cleared. On the other hand, in this authentication apparatus, since the verification value V is stored in the computer apparatus and encrypted, even if the administrator is away from the computer apparatus that requires authentication, the administrator mobile card As long as the side authentication data M1 is retained in the computer device without being forgotten, it is possible to avoid the risk that a person other than the administrator is authenticated as the administrator while the administrator is absent. Thus, even if the administrator is away from the computer device, security can be maintained and the computer device can be operated unattended.
[0010]
  Cryptographic processing deviceAccording to
  Security card side encryption key generation unique data S2 recorded on the security card (11) attached to the computer device and the administrator mobile phone recorded in the administrator mobile card (12) owned by the administrator There is card side encryption key generation data M2,
  An encryption key is generated based on the encryption of the security card side encryption key generation unique data S2 and the administrator mobile card side encryption key generation data M2,
  Record the generated encryption key in the erasable encryption key recording memory (33) in the computer device,
  At the time of data backup, the data to be backed up is encrypted based on the encryption key read from the encryption key recording memory (33), and stored in the storage device as encrypted backup data,
  At the time of data recovery, the encrypted backup data is decrypted based on the encryption key read from the encryption key recording memory (33).
[0011]
In normal encryption, the encryption key also serves as the decryption key. However, whether the encryption key is the same as the decryption key or not, if the encryption key is unknown, the decryption key is also unknown and the encrypted data cannot be decrypted.
[0012]
A specific example in which the encryption key is generated based on the encryption of the security card side encryption key generation unique data S2 and the administrator mobile card side encryption key generation data M2 is as follows. That is, for example, a 16-byte unique (unique) character string Ls is prepared in a predetermined ROM of the security card (11), and is used for generating an encryption key written in the ROM of the administrator mobile card (12). The 16-byte character string Li is encrypted with a predetermined encryption algorithm, and is used as a target encryption key.
[0013]
In the method in which the encryption key is set by the administrator, the encryption key cannot be easily deleted, and since the encryption key is always stored in the encryption key recording memory, the risk of finding the encryption key by a cracker increases. . In contrast, in this cryptographic processing apparatus, the cryptographic key does not originally exist in the computer apparatus (computer apparatus in which the security card (11) is incorporated) and the administrator mobile card (12). ) Security card side encryption key generation unique data S2 and the administrator mobile card side encryption key generation data M2 encrypted of the administrator mobile card (12). Therefore, if there is a security problem, such as when a computer device is about to be stolen, it is necessary to erase the encryption key from the encryption key recording memory (33) immediately or to use the encryption key. In such a case, the erased encryption key can be regenerated by appropriately requesting the administrator mobile card (12) to be presented. In this way, it is possible to improve the data security by appropriately generating and deleting the encryption key without seriously affecting the computer device.
[0014]
  Cryptographic processing deviceAlso has the following:
  Detection means (40, 41) for detecting the computer device being moved from the set location
  Encryption key erasure means for immediately erasing the encryption key from the encryption key recording memory (33) when the detection means (40, 41) detects the movement of the computer device
[0015]
The detection means (40, 41) is composed of, for example, an angular velocity sensor that detects angular velocities in the two-dimensional or three-dimensional coordinate axis directions. The detection of the movement itself by the angular velocity sensor is applied in various technical fields, for example, when detecting a camera shake of a video camera. If there is an authentic administrator mobile card (12), the encryption key can be generated as appropriate, and even if it is deleted from the encryption key recording memory (33), the backup data cannot be decrypted thereafter. That is not to say.
[0016]
As described above, when the computer device is stolen, the computer device is moved from the set place, and the movement is detected by the detection means (40, 41). When the movement of the computer device is detected by the detection means (40, 41), the encryption key is erased from the encryption key recording memory (33). Therefore, even if the computer device is moved to another location, the encryption key is deleted. In order to generate the encryption key without holding the key, the administrator mobile card side encryption key generation data M2 of the administrator mobile card (12) is necessary. Security can be ensured.
[0017]
It is assumed that the thief turns off the computer device before moving the computer device. As a countermeasure, the computer device is equipped with a backup power source that can guarantee operation for a predetermined time after a power failure. In addition, by providing a power failure detection sensor, it is conceivable to guarantee the processing for deleting the encryption key from the encryption key recording memory (33) even in the event of a power failure before the start of unauthorized movement.
[0018]
  According to the data backup device (10) of the present invention, the encrypted data obtained by encrypting the plain data is stored in the storage device as the backup data for the plain data, and the encrypted data read from the storage device is decrypted when the backup is necessary. Thus, the flat data is recovered, and at least the operator who is authenticated as the administrator is involved in at least the flat data recovery instruction by decrypting the encrypted data from the operator. And in this data backup device (10),
  Security card side authentication specific data S1 recorded on the security card (11) equipped in the data backup device (10) and the administrator mobile phone recorded on the administrator mobile card (12) owned by the administrator There is card-side authentication data M1,
  Encryption data obtained by encrypting the administrator mobile card side authentication data M1 using the security card side authentication unique data S1 as an encryption key is used as a verification value V.Data backup device (Ten)In advance,
  At the time of authentication (hereinafter, this authentication is referred to as “pairing authentication”), the authentication-subject mobile card side authentication data read from the authentication subject's mobile card (12) via the card data reader (15) Mc is encrypted based on the security card side authentication specific data S1 as an encryption key,
  The encrypted data relating to the person to be authenticated is checked against the verification value V,
  If they match, the person to be authenticated is authenticated as the administrator of the data backup device (10).
[0019]
“Backup data” refers to data generated by backing up data to be backed up (= data stored for data recovery). The normal data backup device (10) is operated for 24 hours, and regularly stores each data to be backed up from a predetermined backup target host (for example, a personal computer) according to a schedule. In order to prevent the backup data from being stolen from the data backup device (10), the administrator always stands by the data backup device (10) and monitors the backup data to prevent it from being stolen. It is necessary, but it is impossible and inefficient. In this data backup device (10), when the administrator leaves the data backup device (10), if the administrator carries the administrator's mobile card (12) away, the data recovery, which is critical for data security, will occur. Is required to authenticate the administrator, and the administrator mobile card (12) is required for the authentication, so data security can be guaranteed.
[0020]
According to the data backup device (10) of the present invention, in the pairing authentication, the person to be authenticated presents the password for the portable card (12) owned by the person to be authenticated, and the presented password relates to the portable card (12). It is implemented after password authentication to confirm that it matches the password.
[0021]
The administrator is away from the data backup device (10) and without knowing that the administrator mobile card (12) has been stolen, and the thief clears the pairing authentication in the data backup device (10) Sometimes. However, if password authentication is performed prior to pairing authentication, the thief cannot steal the administrator mobile card (12) but does not know the password, and therefore cannot clear the password authentication.
[0022]
According to the data backup device (10) of the present invention,
The security card side encryption key generation unique data S2 recorded in the security card (11) attached to the data backup device (10), and the administrator mobile card (12 ), The administrator mobile card side encryption key generation data M2 is recorded in an encrypted manner,
An encryption key is generated based on the encryption of the security card side encryption key generation unique data S2 and the administrator mobile card side encryption key generation data M2,
Record the generated encryption key in the erasable encryption key recording memory (33) in the data backup device (10),
At the time of data recovery, the encrypted backup data is decrypted based on the encryption key read from the encryption key recording memory (33).
[0023]
The generation of the encryption key is performed after the mobile card (12) presented by the person to be authenticated is authenticated as the authentic administrator mobile card (12). Therefore, the decryption of the backup data encrypted in the data backup device (10) is performed only in the case of an instruction from the true administrator, and the data security is improved. The encryption key does not always exist in the data backup device (10), and if the data backup device (10) determines that there is a problem in terms of data security, it is appropriately deleted and the data backup device in the erased state (10) and the administrator mobile card (12) are not present, and the encryption key is read from the administrator mobile card side encryption key generation data M2 by presenting the authentic administrator mobile card (12), Since data can be regenerated, data security can be ensured without causing operational problems of the data backup device (10).
[0024]
  The data backup device (10) of the present invention further includes the following elements.
  Data backup device (Ten)Detecting means (40, 41) for detecting the movement of the vehicle from its predetermined installation location,as well as
  Detection means (40, 41)Data backup device (Ten)Key eraser that immediately erases the encryption key from the encryption key recording memory (33) when the movement of the key is detected.
[0025]
Even if it is erased from the encryption key recording memory (33), if there is an authentic administrator mobile card (12), the encryption key can be generated as appropriate, ensuring that the true administrator decrypts the backup data. However, for theft of the data backup device (10), the encryption key can be erased to ensure data security.
[0026]
DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE INVENTION
Embodiments of the present invention will be described below with reference to the drawings.
1 and 2 show the respective parts of the data backup device 10 (denoted as DSU in the drawing; DSU: Data Backup Unit) divided into two parts. The data backup device 10 includes a general-purpose computer and hardware and software portions additionally incorporated in the general-purpose computer. Among the elements of the data backup device 10, the security card 11 and the IC card reader / writer 15 and the like are composed of hardware, and the block designated by the reference symbol with B first represents software processing. . The basic specifications of the data backup device 10 are the following (a) to (c).
(A) Each data to be backed up from the backup target host (personal computer) is periodically saved according to the schedule.
(B) When storing data, the data is encrypted and stored in a recording medium (eg, hard disk).
(C) When the data of the target host is deleted due to an accident, the encrypted data stored for data recovery is decrypted and returned to restore the data.
[0027]
The data backup device 10 further has the following additional specifications (d) to (f).
(D) It is necessary to operate according to the schedule determined by the user, and it is necessary to construct a mechanism that is not operated unnecessarily.
(E) After setting the backup schedule, continuous operation is performed for 24 hours.
(F) Enable unattended operation [← specialized operator does not need to constantly monitor the device].
[0028]
In order to realize the above specifications (a) to (f), the data backup device 10 specifically performs the following processing.
(1) At start-up, the operator is authenticated by the dedicated IC card 12 [password authentication].
(2) Identification of data backup device [Pairing authentication: Pair comparison between data backup device 10 and IC card 12]
(3) After completion of authentication, encryption key generation, and backup schedule setting, the administrator removes his / her IC card 12 from the IC card reader / writer 15 even if he / she leaves the data backup device 10. If you have one, you can drive unattended while ensuring data security.
(4) During automatic operation of the data backup device, if the administrator's IC card 12 is once removed from the IC card reader / writer 15 and an operation such as data recovery is attempted, the operator is asked for authentication. Even if the operator tries to operate without the IC card 12 or authentication (in the case of an unauthorized operation), the operation is not accepted [← protection from unauthorized operation].
(5) Data backup device When a computer with a built-in data is moved for the purpose of theft, the information on the encryption key is erased from the temporary storage memory, making it impossible to decrypt the encrypted data.
[0029]
FIG. 3 is an explanatory diagram of password authentication in the data backup device 10. A predetermined amount of data is read-only on the IC card 12, and a predetermined amount of data is written in a freely readable and writable manner. The administrator of the data backup device 10 has a dedicated IC card 12. The portable IC card reader / writer 15 in the sense of portable hardware is hardware that reads data from the IC card 12 and writes data to the IC card 12. The card service B13 is authentication-specific software independent of the software of the data backup device 10, and is installed in parallel as separate software when the software of the main body of the data backup device 10 is installed in the OS. When the administrator inputs a password for registration from the keyboard 14 at the time of prior setting registration or password change, the password is encrypted based on the unique (unique) data S3 in the IC card service B13. It is stored in the IC card 12 (hereinafter, this stored data is referred to as “M3”). As password authentication (= person authentication), when the data backup device 10 is started and when the data backup device 10 asks for identity verification, the administrator inserts the IC card 12 into the IC card reader / writer 15, Enter your password from the keyboard 14. This input password is encrypted based on the unique data S3 of the IC card service B13, and is compared with the above-mentioned M3. If they match, the administrator is authenticated.
[0030]
FIG. 4 is an explanatory diagram of pairing authentication between the IC card 12 and the data backup device 10. In the password authentication of FIG. 3, if the IC card is issued in the same system as the administrator's IC card 12, the password authentication may be cleared even if it is not the administrator's IC card. Therefore, this pairing authentication (a pair of authentications between the data backup device 10 and its administrator, which is described as “DBU identification” in FIG. 1) is performed. Prior to pairing authentication, the data backup device 10 generates a verification value V for the IC card 12 of the authentic administrator in advance and records it in the memory (RAM) of the computer with the built-in data backup device. That is, when the IC card 12 owned by the authentic administrator is inserted into the slot of the IC card reader / writer 15 at the stage of initial setting of the data backup device 10 or change of the set value by the administrator, the IC card 12 The identification code (hereinafter referred to as “identification code M1”) of the IC card 12 is read from the data, and the identification code M1 is recorded in the first ROM 17 of the data backup device 10 in B20. The unique (unique) data (hereinafter referred to as “first unique data S1”) is converted into encrypted data using the encryption key. Note that the unique data is data that only each security card 11 has, and it is not absolute, but it is data in which almost no security card 11 having the same unique data exists. The encrypted data is recorded as a verification value V in a readable / writable memory (RAM equipped as a memory in a general-purpose computer) of the data backup device 10. After such setting recording has already been completed, in this pairing authentication, the identification code M1 is read from the IC card 12 for the IC card 12 inserted into the slot of the IC card reader / writer 15 by the person to be authenticated. The read identification code M1 is converted into encrypted data C using the first unique data S1 of the first ROM 17 as an encryption key. On the other hand, in B22, the verification value V is read from the RAM of the data backup device 10, and in B21, the encrypted data C of B20 is compared with the verification value V of B22, and the result is output (B21). If the result is “match”, the person to be authenticated clears the pairing authentication.
[0031]
FIG. 5 is an explanatory diagram of processing for generating an encryption key. The encryption key generation process is performed only when the two-step authentication in FIGS. 3 and 4 is cleared. A predetermined encryption key generation data M2 is read from the IC card 12 inserted in the slot of the IC card reader / writer 15. On the other hand, the second unique data S2 is read from the second ROM 27 of the data backup device 10. Then, the data M2 and the data S2 are encrypted using an encryption algorithm (this encryption algorithm may be the same as or different from the encryption algorithm used when converting plain data to be backed up into encrypted data. ) (B30), and an encryption key is generated based on the encrypted data (B31). The encryption key generated in B31 is stored in the RAM 33 of the data backup device embedded computer. The encryption key recorded in the RAM 33 is referred to and used at the time of encryption / decryption (B34). If there is no encryption key (the presence / absence of the encryption key is determined based on whether it is null, for example). ), Encryption and decryption become difficult.
[0032]
FIG. 6 is an explanatory diagram of a protection process for unauthorized operations during automatic operation of a computer with a built-in data backup device. After starting up the computer with built-in data backup device, make various settings (eg, backup schedule setting), and after the computer with built-in data backup device starts automatic operation, the administrator should leave the computer with built-in data backup device. During this time, the user's IC card 12 is removed from the slot of the IC card reader / writer 15 so that the computer with built-in data backup device cannot be illegally operated. If an unauthorized user tries to operate the computer with the built-in data backup device by using the time when the genuine administrator is away (B27), the data backup device 10 sends the IC card 12 to the IC card reader / writer 15 with the IC card 12 When it is detected that the IC card 12 is not inserted into the IC card reader / writer 15, the user is guided to insert the IC card 12 into the IC card reader / writer 15. On the other hand, if the person to be authenticated inserts an IC card 12 other than the IC card of the authentic administrator, even if password authentication is cleared, pairing authentication cannot be cleared (B34), and an unauthorized user The operation of the computer with the built-in data backup device becomes impossible (B25).
[0033]
FIG. 7 is an explanatory diagram of countermeasures against illegal movement of a computer with a built-in data backup device. The security card 11 is provided with an x-axis direction angular velocity sensor 40 and a y-axis direction angular velocity sensor 41 that detect angular velocities in the x-axis and y-axis directions on an xy coordinate plane as a predetermined plane. When the thief tries to take the data backup device built-in computer (B45), the data backup device built-in computer moves, and this movement is detected by the x-axis direction angular velocity sensor 40 and the y-axis direction angular velocity sensor 41. When the outputs of the y-axis direction angular velocity sensor 41 and the comparator 42 exceed the reference value, a predetermined signal is output to the abnormality detection logic circuit 50. In the abnormality detection logic circuit 50, the angular velocity applied to the data backup device built-in computer from the output from the comparator 42 this time is not the one during operation of the data backup device built-in computer, that is, the data backup device built-in computer may be illegally moved. Can be judged. The abnormality detection logic circuit 50 is configured to detect an OS abnormality (B46) and a data backup apparatus abnormality (B47) as an abnormality other than the unauthorized movement of the data backup device built-in computer. Immediately, (a) the encryption key in the RAM 33 of the data backup device embedded computer is cleared (B53), (b) the piezoelectric buzzer 61 in the security card 11 is activated, and (c) the data backup device 10 is stopped (B62). . In FIG. 2, OFF is described in the input to the abnormality detection logic circuit 50 from the OS abnormality (B46), DBU abnormality (B47), and OK (B23. FIG. 1). In the device 10, when the power is turned on (= start-up), the piezoelectric buzzer 61 and the like are activated and an alarm sound is generated. That is, the abnormality detection logic circuit 50 is turned on, and then the OS and data This means that as the backup device software starts up, an OFF signal is output from the OS and the data backup device software, the abnormality detection logic circuit 50 is turned off, and the alarm sound stops. Similarly, when OK (authentication) is issued by pairing authentication (B23), an OFF signal is output to the abnormality detection logic circuit 50, and the abnormality detection logic circuit 50 is turned OFF. The condition that the abnormality detection logic circuit 50 becomes OFFF is when an OFF signal is output from all of B23, B46, and B47 connected to the abnormality detection logic circuit 50. As an exception, when the abnormality detection logic circuit 50 receives an illegal take-out signal from the comparator 42 when it is OFF, the abnormality detection logic circuit 50 continues to sound an alarm until the power of the computer incorporating the data backup device is turned off. Further, when the abnormality detection logic circuit 50 operates, in addition to the above (a) to (c), (d) an alarm signal is output to the outside of the main body via the D-SuB terminal. As a result, an alarm lamp or loudspeaker can be connected outside the main body.
[0034]
FIG. 8 is a perspective view of the security card 11. Each element of the security card 11 such as the first ROM 17, the second ROM 27, the x-axis direction angular velocity sensor 40, the y-axis direction angular velocity sensor 41, the abnormality detection logic circuit 50, and the piezoelectric buzzer 61 is formed on one substrate 64. Mounted. The terminal portion 65 is provided along the side of the substrate 64 and is detachably inserted into the connector of the data backup device built-in computer main body. The wall portion 66 is exposed to the outside of the computer with the built-in data backup device, and the 9P D-Sub cable terminal is detachably connected from the outer surface side of the wall portion 66 to the connector of the wall portion 66.
[Brief description of the drawings]
FIG. 1 is a diagram showing one part of an entire data backup device divided into two.
FIG. 2 is a diagram showing the other part of the entire data backup device divided into two parts.
FIG. 3 is an explanatory diagram of password authentication in the data backup device.
FIG. 4 is an explanatory diagram of pairing authentication between an IC card and a data backup device.
FIG. 5 is an explanatory diagram of a process for generating an encryption key.
FIG. 6 is an explanatory diagram of a protection process for unauthorized operations during automatic operation of a data backup device embedded computer;
FIG. 7 is an explanatory diagram of countermeasures against illegal movement of a computer with a built-in data backup device.
FIG. 8 is a perspective view of a security card.
[Explanation of symbols]
10 Data backup device (data backup device)
11 Security card
12 IC card (administrator mobile card)
15 IC card reader / writer (card data reader)
33 RAM (encryption key recording memory)
40 x-axis direction angular velocity sensor (detection means)
41 y-axis direction angular velocity sensor (detection means)

Claims (3)

The encrypted data obtained by encrypting the plain data is stored in the storage device as backup data for the plain data, and when the backup is necessary, the plain data is recovered by decrypting the encrypted data read from the storage device, at least from the operator. In the data backup device (10) in which only the operator authenticated as the administrator is involved in the instruction to recover the plain data by decrypting the encrypted data of
Security card side authentication specific data S1 recorded on the security card (11) equipped in the data backup device (10) and the administrator mobile phone recorded on the administrator mobile card (12) owned by the administrator There is card-side authentication data M1,
The encrypted data obtained by encrypting the administrator mobile card side authentication data M1 using the security card side authentication unique data S1 as an encryption key is stored in advance in the data backup device (10) as a verification value V,
At the time of authentication (hereinafter, this authentication is referred to as “pairing authentication”), the authentication-subject mobile card side authentication data read from the authentication subject's mobile card (12) via the card data reader (15) Mc is encrypted based on the security card side authentication specific data S1 as an encryption key,
The encrypted data relating to the person to be authenticated is checked against the verification value V,
If both match, the person to be authenticated is authenticated as an administrator of the data backup device (10) ,
further,
Security card side encryption key generation unique data S2 recorded in the security card (11) attached to the data backup device (10), and the administrator mobile card owned by the administrator authenticated by the pairing authentication (12) includes the administrator mobile card side encryption key generation data M2 recorded in an encryption,
An encryption key is generated based on the encryption of the security card side encryption key generation unique data S2 and the administrator mobile card side encryption key generation data M2,
Generated encryption key recorded in the erasure freely encryption key recording memory (33) of the data backup device (10),
A data backup device, wherein the encrypted backup data is decrypted based on the encryption key read from the encryption key recording memory (33) during data recovery.   In the pairing authentication, the person to be authenticated presents a password for the mobile card (12) owned by the user, and password authentication is performed to confirm that the presented password matches the password related to the mobile card (12). 2. The data backup apparatus according to claim 1, wherein the data backup apparatus is implemented after completion. Detection means (40, 41) for detecting that the data backup device (10) is moved from the determined installation location, and the detection means (40, 41) detects the movement of the data backup device (10) . When detected, encryption key erasure means for immediately erasing the encryption key from the encryption key recording memory (33),
The data backup apparatus according to claim 1 , wherein the data backup apparatus includes:

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