JP2808651B2 - Encryption communication method - Google Patents
Encryption communication methodInfo
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- JP2808651B2 JP2808651B2 JP1102314A JP10231489A JP2808651B2 JP 2808651 B2 JP2808651 B2 JP 2808651B2 JP 1102314 A JP1102314 A JP 1102314A JP 10231489 A JP10231489 A JP 10231489A JP 2808651 B2 JP2808651 B2 JP 2808651B2
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Description
【発明の詳細な説明】 〔産業上の利用分野〕 この発明は，通信局間で秘密鍵を共有して秘密通信を
行う際の暗号通信方式に関するものである。Description: BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION 1. Field of the Invention The present invention relates to an encryption communication system for performing secret communication by sharing a secret key between communication stations.
第２図は例えばDH方式（W.Diffie and M.E.Hellman,N
ew Directions in Cryptography,″IEEE Trans,Infrom.
Theory,vol.IT−22,No.6,pp.644−654,Nov.（1976）と
呼ばれる従来の暗号通信方式を示す図であり，図におい
て，（101）は通信局A,（102）は通信局B,（103）は上
記通信局４（101）内の秘密情報格納メモリ，（104）は
上記通信局Ｂ（102）内の秘密情報格納メモリ，（105）
は通信路である。FIG. 2 shows a DH method (W. Diffie and MEHellman, N.
ew Directions in Cryptography, "IEEE Trans, Infrom.
It is a diagram showing a conventional cryptographic communication system called Theory, vol. IT-22, No. 6, pp. 644-654, Nov. (1976), where (101) is a communication station A, (102) Is the communication station B, (103) is the secret information storage memory in the communication station 4 (101), (104) is the secret information storage memory in the communication station B (102), (105)
Is a communication path.
次に動作について説明する。 Next, the operation will be described.
秘密通信を行うネットワークあるいはシステムの構築
時に，業務ｐとGF（ｐ）の原始元ｇを公開しておく。局
Ａ（101）と局Ｂ（102）との間で共通の鍵を持ちたい場
合，まず局Ａ（101）は〔0,p−１〕の間の整数XAをロラ
ンダムに選び，局内の秘密情報格納メモリ（103）に秘
密に保持しておく。局Ｂ（102）も〔0,p−１〕の間の整
数XBをランダムに選び，局内の秘密情報格納メモリ（10
4）に秘密に保持しておく。When constructing a network or system for performing secret communication, the business p and the primitive element g of GF (p) are made public. If you want to have a common key between a station A (101) and a station B (102), first station A (101) is chosen to b randomly integer X A between [0, p-1], station In the secret information storage memory (103). Station B (102) is also randomly selects an integer X B between [0, p-1], the secret information storage memory (10 station
4) Keep it secret.
そして、局Ａ（101）は秘密情報格納メモリ（103）の
情報より を計算し，通信路（105）を介して局Ｂ（102）へ送る。
同様に、局Ｂ（102）も秘密情報確認メモリ（104）の情
報により を計算し，通信路（105）を介して局Ａ（101）へ送る。
このようにYAとYBを交換してから、局Ａ（101）は鍵KAB
を次のように計算する。Then, the station A (101) obtains the information from the secret information storage memory (103). Is calculated and sent to the station B (102) via the communication path (105).
Similarly, the station B (102) also uses the information in the secret information confirmation memory (104). Is calculated and sent to the station A (101) via the communication path (105).
After exchanging Y A and Y B in this way, station A (101) sets the key K AB
Is calculated as follows.
局Ｂ（102）も鍵KABを次のように計算する。 Station B (102) also calculates key K AB as follows.
以上の方法で局Ａ（101）と局Ｂ（102）は鍵 を秘密に共有でき，この鍵で暗号化／復合化を行うこと
ができる。 Station A (101) and station B (102) are key Can be secretly shared, and encryption / decryption can be performed with this key.
従来の暗号通信方式は以上のような構成されているの
で，秘密通信を行う時の鍵を共有する場合，相手局との
通信が必要で，また，第三の局がなりすまして不正に鍵
を共有できてしまうなどの問題点があつた。Since the conventional cryptographic communication system is configured as described above, when sharing a key for performing secret communication, communication with the partner station is necessary, and the third station impersonates the key by impersonating it. There were problems such as being able to share.
この発明は上記のような問題点を解消するためになさ
れたもので，通信局間の相互通信を必要とせず，第三の
局がなりすまして不正に鍵を共有できない暗号通信方式
を得ることを目的とする。SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION The present invention has been made to solve the above-mentioned problems, and it is an object of the present invention to provide a cryptographic communication system which does not require mutual communication between communication stations and in which a third station can impersonate and share a key illegally. Aim.
この発明に係る暗号通信方式は、第１の公開情報ｎと
第２の公開情報ｅと秘密情報ｇとを有し各局を統括する
センタを設け、各局がセンタに自己のID情報Ｉを登録
し、センタは上記センタの第２の公開情報ｅと乱数Ｒと
上記センタの第１の公開情報ｎとから所定の格納値αを
計算し、この格納値αを各局の秘密情報格納メモリに送
出するとともに、上記各局のID情報Ｉと上記センタの第
１の公開情報ｎと第２の公開情報ｅとから中間値ｓを計
算し、この中間値ｓと上記センタの秘密情報ｇと上記乱
数Ｒと上記センタの第１の公開情報ｎとから各局の公開
値βを計算し、さらに上記センタの秘密情報ｇと上記乱
数Ｒと上記センタの第１の公開情報ｎと第２の公開情報
ｅとから各局の公開値Ｇを計算し、上記公開値β、Ｇと
上記ID情報Ｉとを各局に公開し、各局は、相手局の公開
値β、Ｇと相手局のID情報Ｉと上記センタの第２の公開
情報ｅとから上記公開値Ｇが正当であることを確認して
から、上記公開された相手局の公開値Ｇと自局の秘密情
報格納メモリに格納された格納値αと上記センタの第１
の公開情報ｎとから互いに共通の鍵Ｋを生成することを
特徴とするものである。The cryptographic communication system according to the present invention has a center that has first public information n, second public information e, and secret information g and controls each station, and each station registers its ID information I in the center. , The center calculates a predetermined stored value α from the second public information e of the center, the random number R, and the first public information n of the center, and sends the stored value α to the secret information storage memory of each station. At the same time, an intermediate value s is calculated from the ID information I of each station, the first public information n and the second public information e of the center, and the intermediate value s, the secret information g of the center, the random number R, The public value β of each station is calculated from the first public information n of the center, and further calculated from the secret information g of the center, the random number R, the first public information n of the center, and the second public information e. The public value G of each station is calculated, and the public values β and G and the ID information I are disclosed to each station. Each station confirms that the public value G is valid based on the public values β and G of the partner station, the ID information I of the partner station, and the second public information e of the center, and then releases the public information. And the stored value α stored in the secret information storage memory of the own station and the first value of the center.
And generating a common key K from the public information n.
各局はセンタ（１）に自局のID情報を登録すると，セ
ンタ（１）はこのID情報から一つの公開値を計算し，上
記ID情報と共に各局に公開する。When each station registers its own ID information in the center (1), the center (1) calculates one public value from this ID information and discloses it to each station together with the ID information.
またセンタ（１）は上記ID情報から一つの格納値を計
算し，局内の秘密情報格納メモリ（３），（６）に送出
する。The center (1) calculates one stored value from the ID information and sends it to the secret information storage memories (3) and (6) in the office.
各局間で通信を行う場合，相手局の公開された一つの
公開値の正当性を確認してから，その公開値と自局の秘
密情報格納メモリに格納れた格納値とを演算して互いに
共通の鍵を生成する。When communication is performed between stations, the validity of one published value of the partner station is checked, then the published value and the stored value stored in the secret information storage memory of the own station are calculated, and the values are mutually determined. Generate a common key.
以下，この発明の実施例を図について説明する。第１
図（ａ），（ｂ）は本発明の一実施例による暗号通信方
式を示す図であり，図において，（１）はセンタ，
（２）は通信局A,（３）はこの通信局Ａ（２）内の秘密
情報格納メモリ，（４）は公開リスト，（５）は通信局
B,（６）はこの通信局Ｂ（５）内の秘密情報格納メモ
リ，（７）は通信路である。Hereinafter, an embodiment of the present invention will be described with reference to the drawings. First
FIGS. 1A and 1B are diagrams showing an encryption communication method according to an embodiment of the present invention. In FIG.
(2) is a communication station A, (3) is a secret information storage memory in the communication station A (2), (4) is a public list, and (5) is a communication station.
B and (6) are secret information storage memories in the communication station B (5), and (7) is a communication path.
次に動作について説明する。 Next, the operation will be described.
秘密通信を行うネツトワークあるいはシステムの構築
時に,2つの大きな素数p,qを選び，それらの積をｎ＝ｐ
・q,nのオイラー関数（ｎと互いに素なる数の個数をオ
イラー関数と呼びφ（ｎ）で表す）をφ（ｎ）＝（ｐ−
１）・（ｑ−１）とする。次にgcd（e,φ（ｎ）＝１を
満たす整数ｅを選ぶ。さらに,GF（ｐ）およびGF（ｑ）
の原始元をｇとする。ここで,n,eをセンタ（１）の公開
情報,p,q,gをセンタ（１）の秘密情報とする。When constructing a network or system that performs secret communication, two large prime numbers p and q are selected, and their product is expressed as n = p
The Euler function of q, n (the number of numbers which are mutually prime to n is called an Euler function and is represented by φ (n)) is represented by φ (n) = (p−
1) · (q-1). Next, an integer e that satisfies gcd (e, φ (n) = 1 is selected. Further, GF (p) and GF (q)
Let g be a primitive element of. Here, n and e are the public information of the center (1), and p, q and g are the secret information of the center (1).
さて，局Ａ（２）がこのネツトワークあるいはシステ
ムに加入する際，局Ａ（２）はID情報IDAをセンタ
（１）へ送る。センタ（１）は， IDA＝sA e（modn） GA＝ｇｅ・RA（modn） αＡ＝ｅ・RA（modφ（ｎ）） を計算し，αＡを格納値として局Ａ（２）内の秘密情報
格納メモリ（３）へ送り,GAとβＡを公開値として公開
リスト（４）にID情報IDAとともに載せる。なお、ここ
で、RAはセンタが局Ａ用に生成した乱数である。局Ｂ
（５）も加入する際に,ID情報IDBをセンタ（１）へ送
り，局Ｂ（５）内の秘密情報格納メモリ（６）に格納値
αＢを送つてもらい，公開リスト（４）にはID情報IDB
とともに公開値GBとβＢを載せてもらう。以下同様に，
加入するすべての局に対して以上のような処理をする。Now, when the station A (2) joins this network or system, the station A (2) sends the ID information ID A to the center (1). Center (1), ID A = s A e ( modn) G A = g e · RA (modn) α A = e · R A (modφ (n)) Was calculated, alpha A feed to the secret information storage memory in the station A (2) as a stored value (3), placed together with the ID information ID A into publicized list (4) G A and beta A as the public values. Here, R A is a random number generated for the station A by the center. Station B
When (5) also subscribes, the ID information ID B is sent to the center (1), the stored value α B is sent to the secret information storage memory (6) in the station B (5), and the public list (4) is sent. Has ID information ID B
You get put on the public value G B and β B with. Similarly,
The above processing is performed for all the stations to be joined.
局Ａ（２）と局Ｂ（５）が鍵を共有しない場合を考え
る。局Ａ（２）は公開値ｅと共通鍵を生成した相手局Ｂ
（５）のID情報IDBと公開された公開値GB,βＢを用い
て， βB e（mod n）＝GB・IDB（mod n）＝sB Be・ｇｅ・RB（m
od n） をチエツクし，公開値GBが改ざんされていないことを確
認し，その公開値GBと秘密情報格納メモリ（３）内に格
納されている局Ａ（２）自身の秘密情報である格納値α
Ａを用いて， を生成する。ここで局Ｂ（５）が局Ａ（２）と同様に，
相手局Ａ（２）の公開値GAが改ざんされていないことを
確認してから，その公開値GA秘密情報格納メモリ（６）
内に格納されている局Ｂ（５）自身の秘密情報である格
納値αＢを用いて， を生成する。Let us consider a case where the station A (2) and the station B (5) do not share a key. The station A (2) is the partner station B that has generated the public value e and the common key.
ID information ID B with the published public value G B (5), using a β B, β B e (mod n) = G B · ID B (mod n) = s B Be · g e · RB ( m
od n) was a checking, confirms that the public values G B has not been tampered, with its public value G B and the secret information storage memory (3) a station is stored in the A (2) its own secret information A stored value α
Using A , Generate Here, station B (5) is similar to station A (2),
Other station A from the public value G A (2) is sure that it has not been tampered with, the public value G A secret information storage memory (6)
Using the stored value α B which is the secret information of the station B (5) itself stored in Generate
は一致するので，共通鍵 を通信路（７）を介さずに共有でき，この鍵で暗号化／
復号化を行うことができる。 Match, so the secret key Can be shared without passing through the communication channel (7).
Decryption can be performed.
このようにこの発明によれば、第１の公開情報ｎと第
２の公開情報ｅと秘密情報ｇとを有し各局を統括するセ
ンタを設け、各局がセンタに自己のID情報Ｉを登録し、
センタは上記センタの第２の公開情報ｅと乱数Ｒと上記
センタの第１の公開情報ｎとから所定の格納値αを計算
し、この格納値αを各局の秘密情報格納メモリに送出す
るとともに、上記各局のID情報Ｉと上記センタの第１の
公開情報ｎと第２の公開情報ｅとから中間値ｓを計算
し、この中間値ｓと上記センタの秘密情報ｇと上記乱数
Ｒと上記センタの第１の公開情報ｎとから各局の公開値
βを計算し、さらに上記センタの秘密情報ｇと上記乱数
Ｒと上記センタの第１の公開情報ｎと第２の公開情報ｅ
とから各局の公開値Ｇを計算し、上記公開値β、Ｇと上
記ID情報Ｉとを各局に公開し、各局は、相手局の公開値
β、Ｇと相手局のID情報Ｉと上記センタの第２の公開情
報ｅとから上記公開値Ｇが正当であることを確認してか
ら、上記公開された相手局の公開値Ｇと自局の秘密情報
格納メモリに格納された格納値αと上記センタの第１の
公開情報ｎとから互いに共通の鍵Ｋを生成するようにし
たので、通信局間の相互通信が不要だけでなく，不正な
なりしましで第三の局が共通鍵を得ることができない効
果がある。As described above, according to the present invention, a center having the first public information n, the second public information e, and the secret information g is provided, and each station registers its own ID information I in the center. ,
The center calculates a predetermined stored value α from the second public information e of the center, the random number R, and the first public information n of the center, and sends the stored value α to the secret information storage memory of each station. Calculating an intermediate value s from the ID information I of each station, the first public information n and the second public information e of the center, and calculating the intermediate value s, the secret information g of the center, the random number R, The public value β of each station is calculated from the first public information n of the center, and the secret information g of the center, the random number R, the first public information n of the center, and the second public information e are further calculated.
The public value G of each station is calculated from the above, and the public values β, G and the ID information I are made public to each station. Each station makes the public values β, G of the partner station, the ID information I of the partner station, and the center After confirming that the public value G is valid from the second public information e, the public value G of the disclosed partner station and the stored value α stored in the secret information storage memory of the own station are obtained. Since the common key K is generated from the first public information n of the center, the mutual communication between the communication stations is not only unnecessary, but also the third station uses the common key in an unauthorized manner. There is an effect that cannot be obtained.
第１図（ａ），（ｂ）はこの発明の一実施例による暗号
通信方式を示す図，第２図は従来の暗号通信方式を示す
図である。 （１）はセンタ，（２）は通信局A,（３）は秘密情報格
納メモリ，（４）は公開リスト，（５）は通信局B,
（６）は秘密情報格納メモリ，（７）は通信路，（10
1）は通信局A,（102）は通信局B,（103），（104）は秘
密情報格納メモリ，（105）は通信路である。 なお，図中，同一符号は同一，又は相当部分を示す。1 (a) and 1 (b) are diagrams showing an encrypted communication system according to an embodiment of the present invention, and FIG. 2 is a diagram showing a conventional encrypted communication system. (1) is a center, (2) is a communication station A, (3) is a secret information storage memory, (4) is a public list, (5) is a communication station B,
(6) is a secret information storage memory, (7) is a communication path, (10)
1) is a communication station A, (102) is a communication station B, (103) and (104) are secret information storage memories, and (105) is a communication path. In the drawings, the same reference numerals indicate the same or corresponding parts.
フロントページの続き (56)参考文献 特開 平２−248131（ＪＰ，Ａ) 特開 平２−152340（ＪＰ，Ａ) 特開 平２−82837（ＪＰ，Ａ) (58)調査した分野(Int.Cl.6，ＤＢ名) G09C 1/00 - 5/00 H04L 9/00 - 9/38 H04K 1/00 - 3/00 ＪＩＣＳＴファイル（ＪＯＩＳ)Continuation of the front page (56) References JP-A-2-248131 (JP, A) JP-A-2-152340 (JP, A) JP-A-2-82837 (JP, A) (58) Fields investigated (Int) .Cl. 6 , DB name) G09C 1/00-5/00 H04L 9/00-9/38 H04K 1/00-3/00 JICST file (JOIS)
Claims (1)
通信を行う場合、上記秘密情報格納メモリ内に格納され
た情報から暗号化して上記通信を行うための共通の暗号
鍵を生成する暗号通信方式において、 第１の公開情報ｎと第２の公開情報ｅと秘密情報ｇとを
有し各局を統括するセンタを設け、各局がセンタに自己
のID情報Ｉを登録し、センタは上記センタの第２の公開
情報ｅと乱数Ｒと上記センタの第１の公開情報ｎとから
式（１）で所定の格納値αを計算し、この格納値αを各
局の秘密情報格納メモリに放出するとともに、上記各局
のID情報Ｉと上記センタの第１の公開情報ｎと第２の公
開情報ｅとから式（２）で中間値ｓを計算し、この中間
値ｓと上記センタの秘密情報ｇと上記乱数Ｒと上記セン
タの第１の公開情報ｎとから式（３）で各局の公開値β
を計算し、さらに上記センタの秘密情報ｇと上記乱数Ｒ
と上記センタの第１の公開情報ｎと第２の公開情報ｅと
から式（４）で各局の公開値Ｇを計算し、上記公開値
β、Ｇと上記ID情報Ｉとを各局に公開し、各局は、相手
局の公開値β、Ｇと相手局のID情報Ｉと上記センタの第
２の公開情報ｅとから式（５）で上記公開値Ｇが正当で
あることを確認してから、上記公開された相手局の公開
値Ｇと自局の秘密情報格納メモリに格納された格納値α
と上記センタの第１の公開情報ｎとから式（６）で互い
に共通の鍵Ｋを生成することを特徴とする暗号通信方
式。 α＝ｅ・Ｒ（modφ（ｎ）） （１） Ｉ＝se（modn） （２） β＝ｓ・gR（modn） （３） Ｇ＝ｇｅ・Ｒ（modn） （４） βｅ（modn）＝Ｇ・Ｉ（modn）＝se・geR（modn）
（５） Ｋ＝Ｇα（modn） （６）When each station has a secret information storage memory and communicates between stations, a common encryption key for performing the communication by encrypting the information stored in the secret information storage memory is generated. In a cryptographic communication system, a center having first public information n, second public information e, and secret information g is provided, and each station registers its own ID information I in the center. From the second public information e of the center, the random number R, and the first public information n of the center, a predetermined storage value α is calculated by equation (1), and this storage value α is stored in the secret information storage memory of each station. At the same time, an intermediate value s is calculated from the ID information I of each station, the first public information n and the second public information e of the center by equation (2), and the intermediate value s and the secret of the center are calculated. From the information g, the random number R, and the first public information n of the center, Expression (3) Public value of each station β
Is calculated, and the secret information g of the center and the random number R
From the first public information n and the second public information e of the center, the public value G of each station is calculated by equation (4), and the public values β, G and the ID information I are disclosed to each station. After each station confirms that the public value G is valid from equation (5) based on the public values β and G of the partner station, the ID information I of the partner station, and the second public information e of the center, , The published value G of the disclosed partner station and the stored value α stored in the secret information storage memory of the own station.
And a first public information n of the center and a common key K is generated by equation (6). α = e · R (modφ (n)) (1) I = s e (modn) (2) β = s · g R (modn) (3) G = g e · R (modn) (4) β e (modn) = G · I ( modn) = s e · g eR (modn)
(5) K = G α (modn) (6)
Priority Applications (1)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| JP1102314A JP2808651B2 (en) | 1989-04-22 | 1989-04-22 | Encryption communication method |
Applications Claiming Priority (1)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| JP1102314A JP2808651B2 (en) | 1989-04-22 | 1989-04-22 | Encryption communication method |
Publications (2)
| Publication Number | Publication Date |
|---|---|
| JPH02281838A JPH02281838A (en) | 1990-11-19 |
| JP2808651B2 true JP2808651B2 (en) | 1998-10-08 |
Family
ID=14324131
Family Applications (1)
| Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
|---|---|---|---|
| JP1102314A Expired - Lifetime JP2808651B2 (en) | 1989-04-22 | 1989-04-22 | Encryption communication method |
Country Status (1)
| Country | Link |
|---|---|
| JP (1) | JP2808651B2 (en) |
Families Citing this family (1)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| JP2581440B2 (en) * | 1994-05-11 | 1997-02-12 | 日本電気株式会社 | Scramble communication method |
-
1989
- 1989-04-22 JP JP1102314A patent/JP2808651B2/en not_active Expired - Lifetime
Also Published As
| Publication number | Publication date |
|---|---|
| JPH02281838A (en) | 1990-11-19 |
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