JP2020122791A - System and method for physically detecting counterfeit electronics - Google Patents

Abstract

To provide a system and a method for inspecting and screening counterfeit electronic equipment in a non-destructive manner by utilizing RF energy radiated by the electronic equipment.SOLUTION: A system for inspecting and screening an electrically powered device includes a signal generator for inputting a preselected signal to the electrically powered device. An antenna array positioned at a predetermined distance is also present above the electrically powered device. The device collects RF energy generated by the electrically powered device according to input of the preselected signal. A signature of the collected RF energy is compared with a signature of RF energy of a genuine part. The comparison determines whether the electrically powered device is in a genuine or counterfeit condition.SELECTED DRAWING: Figure 1

Description

CROSS REFERENCE TO RELATED APPLICATIONS This patent application is hereby filed on Mar. 2, 2011, US Provisional Patent Application No. 61/464,262, and on July 29, 2011, US Provisional Patent Application No. 61/574. , 250, which claims priority to these provisional patent applications, which are hereby incorporated by reference. This application is further closely related to co-pending US Application No. 13/410,909 entitled "INTEGRATED CIRCUIT WITH ELECTROMAGNETIC ENERGY ANOMALY DETECTION AND PROCESSING". There is. This application is assigned to the assignee of the present invention, the disclosure of which is hereby incorporated by reference.
Description of federally funded research and development N/A Sequence list, table, or computer program list Compact Disc adjunct N/A Field of the invention The invention generally is intended or unintended to originate from counterfeit electronic devices. System and method for detecting counterfeit electronic devices using a conventional radiator.

BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION According to a recent 2010 study by the US Department of Commerce, Industry and Security, the number of reported forgery cases increased from 3,868 cases in 2005 to 9,356 cases in 2008. Respondents to this survey say that the two most common types of counterfeit components are overt imitations and unsorted functional products. The number of respondents to this survey was 387, representing all members of the electronic component supply chain. All members of the supply chain reported examples of counterfeit products. Global semiconductor market statistics predict that the international TAM for semiconductors will exceed $200 billion, and the 387 respondents provide quantitative results for just a fraction of the total market. With the development of electronic devices, counterfeiters have become more sophisticated. Currently, many counterfeit products cannot be detected by visible detection, and although the best counterfeit products pass the rigorous electrical test, other counterfeit products have other parts that genuine parts do not have. It may not meet certain requirements. When incorporated into a fully functioning product, counterfeit products often malfunction and fail due to environmental conditions, premature aging and, in some cases, even electrical integrity, but not functioning at all. do not do.

Prior to the concept and design of the present invention, there were efforts to inspect and screen counterfeit goods. However, both are superficial or very expensive. The simplest of the superficial techniques is visual inspection, but this is unreliable as counterfeit products are becoming more sophisticated. On the other hand, existing reliable technology is either expensive or inherently disruptive.

Various types of inspection techniques that can find counterfeit components include visual external inspection to find resurfacing imprints, visual inspection of encapsulation and lead surfaces, and X Line inspection is mentioned. During X-ray inspection, the internal structure of electronic components of the same date and lot code can be examined to find a particular type of counterfeit part. Less sophisticated counterfeit devices exhibit significant differences in internal structure, including, but not limited to, different die frames and different wire bonds. X-ray fluorescence spectroscopy can also be used to confirm the RoHS status that counterfeiters often overlook. For microscopic inspection of brand marks, trademarks, laser die etching, date codes, and other defining features, using encapsulation removal to remove the outer package on the semiconductor and expose the semiconductor wafer or die, Some counterfeit goods can be determined. Chemical etching techniques that use acids to expose plastic or resin packaged wafers or dies can similarly expose internal components for inspection, but are destructive in nature.

Mechanical techniques of polishing, cutting, splitting, or cutting ceramic or metal to expose a wafer or die for inspection have also been used successfully, but still destroy the portion being inspected. Scanning acoustic microscopy can be used to reveal laser etching underneath the black coating material and to find evidence of resurface and black coating. Other options for determining whether a target product has the expected electrical characteristics include internal component layout tracking and external packaging curve tracking.

Electrical tests range from generally expensive all-electrical tests to gross leak and fine lead functional electrical tests.

Counterfeit electronic devices come in many forms. One of the mainstream features associated with most counterfeit products is that the internal electronics function differently, in some cases only slightly, from the genuine parts provided directly from the manufacturing line. is there. Internal components of electronic devices, whether discrete semiconductors, integrated circuits, printed circuit boards, circuit board assemblies or circuit board products, are functionally different and emit different electromagnetic signatures.

The radiated electromagnetic signature is a fundamental property of any electronic device. At the most basic level, accelerating electronics emit electromagnetic energy that creates an electromagnetic signature. The power supply and the oscillating input accelerate electrons in the device to be counterfeit sorted and radiate electromagnetic energy, and the basic feature of the present invention that is improved in sorting and inspection is applied to all recent electronic devices. To be done. The power source may be an external commercial power source, a battery power source, or an internal power generation mechanism. The oscillator input can be any source that produces a frequency-based oscillation. Some oscillator inputs are monotonic, such as, but not limited to, crystal oscillators or ceramic resonators. There are also other very complex timing control or communication signals. Basically, there are so many signals in modern electronic devices that they vibrate, coordinate, control, communicate, synchronize, and reference between high and low states. , Provides a wide variety of actions and a wide variety of circuits. This oscillation is a large energy source that is radiated to the outside of an electronic device or electric device by a radiating means or a conducting means in some way according to a physical law.

Therefore, there is a need for a system and method for non-destructively inspecting and screening counterfeit electronic devices by utilizing the RF energy emitted by such electronic devices.

SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION The present invention provides an apparatus and method for screening and inspecting electronic devices for counterfeit electrical and electronic based components, substrates, devices, systems. The present invention is directed to a sensing electromagnetic energy harvesting device, means for comparing the harvested energy to a known standard energy, or a predetermined understanding of the expected emissions of the sensed object, and the harvested energy to this standard energy. It includes an algorithm that automatically determines if there is a match.

The sensitive electromagnetic energy collecting device may be any means known in the art for collecting electromagnetic energy.

In one embodiment, the present invention uses a sensitive radio frequency (RF) energy harvesting device and a signature comparison means for comparing the harvested energy with a known standard of energy, where the RF is in the frequency range of 3 KHz to 300 GHz. Defined as converting.

In an exemplary embodiment, the same technique can be specifically adapted to higher frequency and shorter wavelength emitters such as infrared spectrum analysis, but will focus on the described RF frequency range.

In one embodiment, the sensitive RF energy harvesting device is a conventional RF receiver.

In another embodiment, the ultra-sensitive RF energy collector is a photon detector operating in the RF energy spectrum.

In other embodiments, the electronic device under test has at least a power supply connected to it and also has one or more oscillatory signals connected to one or more inputs of the electronic device under test. Good.

In another embodiment, an active free field RF illumination source is used to enhance radiation by the target device for simultaneous collection by the RF collection means for the purpose of detecting counterfeit goods.

OBJECTS OF THE INVENTION Accordingly, one of the primary devices of the present invention provides a system for detecting counterfeit electrical and electronic devices using electromagnetic energy in the RF spectrum.

Another object of the invention is a system for detecting counterfeit electrical and electronic devices, the system comprising a precision input source for producing a precision input for injection into such electrical and electronic devices. Is to provide.

It is a further object of the invention to provide a system for detecting counterfeit electrical and electronic devices that includes an antenna array with integrated low noise amplifiers.

Another object of the invention is to provide a system for detecting counterfeit electrical and electronic devices that includes means for comparing the signature of the emitted RF energy with a baseline RF characteristic.

Yet another object of the present invention is to provide a system for detecting counterfeit electrical and electronic devices that includes a preconfigured test device for screening individual circuit components.

Another object of the present invention is to provide a system capable of inspecting large lots of individual devices. The inspection may be done in response to deliveries from some suppliers to ensure that all of the parts are matched and genuine. There may be contractual requirements to screen each and every device in the lot.

Another object of the present invention is a test apparatus provided for testing multiple parts simultaneously.

Yet another object of the present invention is to provide a device having preconfigured power and oscillating inputs to the component of interest. Another object of the present invention is to provide an automated apparatus for simultaneously testing a large number of components and devices.

Yet another object of the present invention is to provide a system for non-destructively inspecting integrated circuits and internal die and wire bonding of integrated circuits for screening counterfeit parts.

Another object of the present invention is to provide a system for detecting counterfeit electrical and electronic devices that eliminates complex testing of numerous electronic components used within electrical and electronic devices.

Another object of the present invention is to provide a system for inspecting a fully mounted circuit board to determine if the board is counterfeit as compared to an authentic standard article.

Another object of the present invention is to provide a mechanism for inspecting a fully populated circuit board to determine if the board has any counterfeit components.

Another object of the present invention is to inspect fully mounted circuit boards to specifically determine which components are counterfeit and which are genuine.

Another object of the invention is to detect counterfeit components during steps in the manufacturing process of a circuit board that is on a partially mounted circuit board or before the board is fully mounted.

In the case of a fully or partially mounted board, another object of the invention is to perform the counterfeit screening or inspection process by simply applying power to the fully or partially mounted circuit.

Another object of the invention is an apparatus for testing a circuit board by applying only power to the circuit board.

Another object of the invention is to provide means for providing power and other signal inputs to further improve counterfeit detection.

Another object of the invention is to provide a free field active illumination means to further enhance the RF energy collected by the RF energy collector.

Another object of the present invention is to provide an inspection apparatus capable of identifying whether a counterfeit component is present in a fully assembled product including multiple boards, components and integrated circuits.

Yet another object of the present invention is to provide a system for detecting counterfeit electrical and electronic devices that eliminates complex testing of the overall functionality of electrical or electronic components and devices.

Another object of the present invention is to provide only power to electronic components, fully mounted circuit boards, a series of connected circuit boards or a complete circuit board for the detection of counterfeit electronic devices that have inspected or screened items for counterfeit parts. These are the steps to add to the assembled product.

Yet another object of the present invention is to provide a method for detecting counterfeit electrical and electronic devices, which comprises injecting one and only one signal into the electrical and electronic device under test.

Yet another object of the present invention is to provide a method for detecting counterfeit electrical and electronic devices that includes injecting only a combination of a power signal and a monotone oscillator signal into an electrical and electronic device under test. ..

Yet another object of the present invention is to provide a method of detecting counterfeit electrical and electronic devices comprising injecting a combination of a power signal monotone oscillator signal and a complex oscillator signal into an electrical and electronic device under test. is there.

Another object of the invention is a monotone oscillator input that is swept over a specified input range of the signal inputs of the device, including clock inputs, signal inputs and communication inputs, the monotone oscillator input being directly injected into the item under test. At the same time, the RF energy collecting means collects the energy radiated at each frequency change during the sweep and compares the collected energy against the expected predetermined signature of the authentic or genuine item being screened or inspected. To provide a monotone oscillator input.

Another object of the invention is a multitone oscillator input that is swept over a specified input range of the signal inputs of the device, including clock inputs, signal inputs and communication inputs, the monotone oscillator input being injected directly into the item under test. At the same time, the RF energy collecting means collects the energy radiated at each frequency change during the sweep and collects the collected energy against the expected predetermined signature of the genuine or authentic item to be screened or inspected. To provide a multitone oscillator input.

Another object of the invention is a method for identifying a signature match emitted in a given monotone or multitone step in a scan over a desired frequency band, wherein the energy collected in a given step is complete. Processed to output a scalar representing a counterfeit or genuine part, and then the sequence of each scalar output over the entire scanned band is weighted so that the item being inspected is a counterfeit or authentic. It is to provide a way to provide an overall score to determine which parts are.

FIG. 3 is a schematic block diagram of a system for inspecting or selecting an electric or electronic device. FIG. 2 is a schematic block diagram of the system of FIG. 1, particularly showing precision signal input and test equipment. 2 is a plan view of a test apparatus used in the system of FIG. 1. FIG. 4 is a flowchart of a method for inspecting or screening an electric or electronic device. It is a typical figure of the collected frequency distribution. 2 is a diagram of a harmonic radiator algorithm employed in the system of FIG.

Brief Description of Various Embodiments of the Invention Before proceeding to a more detailed description of the present invention, for clarity and clarity, the same components with the same functions may be referred to in some of the drawings. Are identified by the same reference numbers throughout the figures.

A counterfeit electronic component is, of course, one whose ID (identity) has been intentionally or unintentionally misrepresented by at least one member in the supply chain. Counterfeit electronic parts include parts that work similarly, used parts that are taken from an existing assembly and sold as new parts, and model/part number, manufacturer, cage code, date and/or lot code, and reliability. , Genuine parts known to have spoofed inspections, test levels, or performance specifications. This definition also includes parts that do not comply with the original manufacturer's design, type and/or performance criteria of the component, and parts that have been tampered with in an attempt to deceive as to their intended function.

The definition of these counterfeit components extends to all components including, but not limited to, active and passive circuit board components, semiconductor devices, and integrated circuits. The same definition applies to counterfeit devices, boards, circuit boards, circuit board assemblies, assemblies, subsystems, systems or products.

Referring now to FIGS. 1-3, there is shown a system, generally designated by reference numeral 10, that differentiates the forgery condition and the genuine condition of the electrically powered device 2. The device 2 includes, but is not limited to, at least a discrete component, an integrated circuit (IC), a circuit board, a circuit board assembly having electronic components mounted thereon, a subsystem, a system, an electronic device, and an electrical device using the electronic component for operation. Including one. All of these devices, when powered, either intentionally or unintentionally radiate energy.

The above description also considers radiators of electromagnetic energy, and in particular infrared radiators and very low frequency radiators in the present invention, but the high frequency (RF) spectrum referred to in the art as frequencies below 300 GHz. Pay attention to the electromagnetic energy radiators in.

Although the present invention is shown and described in combination with integrated circuits (ICs) or semiconductors, the present invention may be applied to other electrical or electronic devices and is therefore not to be construed as a limiting element of the invention. Will be apparent to those skilled in the art.

The invention described herein takes advantage of the fact that all electrical components emit electromagnetic radiation when powered. Electromagnetic radiation is defined by the radiating structure emitting the electromagnetic radiation. There must be an energy source that excites the electronic component, board, system or subsystem under test. The excitation mechanism can simply power the device, input an oscillating signal into the device, or illuminate the device with electromagnetic energy. The directly injected or connected oscillating inputs and illumination sources can be single tones, or multitone or multifrequency or complex frequencies, depending on the applied modulation and/or timing parameters.

Items that are powered and that are directly or indirectly inspected must provide a mechanism for the transmission of radiated energy that depends on the internal design of the item being inspected. Typically, the source powering the device is the energy powering the electronic device, which may be a clock, a clock signal, a signal, a frequency input, a frequency reference, a signal generator, as described above. , A frequency generator, or other oscillator source known in the art. The mechanism for transmitting this energy to radiating elements within the item under test is an integrated circuit die, wire bonds, semiconductor traces, substrate traces, wires, cables, or structural capacitive or inductive coupling. This radiating element may be an antenna that radiates intentionally or an unintended antenna that acts as a reasonable antenna due to its physical dimensions. Whether an internal component of an electronic device, whether a discrete semiconductor, an integrated circuit, a printed circuit board, a circuit board assembly or a product, behaves differently, it emits a different electromagnetic signature and is inspected or screened. Because of this, counterfeit parts can be differentiated from real parts.

The system 10 includes means for determining such a condition of the electrically powered device 2, indicated generally by the reference numeral 18, which condition is a radiator characteristic (or signature) of the RF energy 4 from the device 2 under test or inspection. Defined by

One essential element of the means 18, according to the presently preferred embodiment, is to detect, process, or algorithmically match at least one emitter of RF energy for at least one inspection or screening of electronic devices. , A first means or radiation detector, generally designated by the reference numeral 20.

A detailed description and operation of the first means 20 was submitted to Keller, III, US Pat. No. 7,515,094 and US Pat. No. 8,063,813, September 1, 2009. US Patent Application No. 12/55,1635 entitled "ADVANCE MANUFACTURING MONITORING AND DIAGNOSTIC TOOL", and "System and Method for Physically Detecting," filed January 6, 2012. US Patent Application No. 13/ entitled "Identifying, DiagnosingAnd Geo-locating Devices Connectable To A Network" (Systems and Methods for Physically Detecting, Identifying, Diagnosing, and Geographically Locating Devices Connectable to Networks) No. 344,717, which is best shown and described, which are all owned by the assignee of the present invention, the teachings of which are incorporated herein by reference.

In the present invention, the first means 20 comprises RF collection means coupled to an antenna 22. It should be noted that the RF acquisition means 20 includes a receiver which is a general receiver or a tuner, and this general receiver can be a heterodyne or superheterodyne receiver.

Many of the receiver embodiments are heterodyne or superheterodyne receivers, wideband crystal video receivers, tuned high frequency crystal video receivers, narrowband scanning superheterodyne receivers, channelized receivers, microscans, as described above. It is considered a component of RF energy harvesting devices because it includes receivers, acousto-optic receivers, and many tuner technologies that are often considered synonymous with receivers.

In another embodiment, the sensitive RF energy harvesting device is a cryogenic cooled receiver.

This receiver can be improved by providing a wideband response. Although one embodiment focuses on 100 KHz to 6 GHz radiators, the band may be reduced to 30 MHz to 1 GHz to capture the majority of the radiator from the device to the facility.

Further sensitivity is obtained by lowering the noise figure of the system. In one embodiment, the receiver has an improved front end with a very low noise figure low noise amplifier (LNA).

In one embodiment, the system has a noise figure of less than 5. In other embodiments, the system has a noise figure of less than 1. In other embodiments, the system has a noise figure of less than 0.1.

Signature data is transmitted from the receiver to the processor. One embodiment is direct analog analysis. Although the described embodiment is direct analog analysis, the preferred method of implementation is to use an analog-to-digital converter (not shown) to convert the analog output of the receiver to a digital output. The digital output is then sent to the signal processor.

In one embodiment, direct analysis of analog signals into digital outputs is used.

In other embodiments where higher frequencies are required, down conversion of the analog output is utilized before conversion to digital signals.

In one embodiment, the sensitive receiver further uses digital signal processing (DPS) to further improve the sensitivity of the receiver.

In another embodiment, the RF energy collector utilizes DSP filtering techniques to prepare the collected data for further processing by the DSP algorithm.

One embodiment for the purpose of improving receiver sensitivity uses the Fast Fourier Transform (FFT).

In another embodiment, the FFT is used for over 1 million points.

In another embodiment, the FFT is implemented on an embedded chip within the RF acquisition device.

Preferably, such antenna 22 is an antenna array positioned above device 2 at a predetermined distance 23. If device 2 is a small discrete component or integrated circuit, antenna array 22 is fixedly positioned with respect to device 2 under test. The elements of the antenna array 22 are weighted by electronic steering to optimize the energy collected from the particular component or larger item of circuit board under test. For a single component being tested, no weighting is necessary, or it can be weighted to enhance the signature amplification from that component's location. In this embodiment, the antenna array 22 is element weighted to constructively amplify the gain in different regions of the target substrate to inspect individual components on the substrate without the need for mechanical or robotic steering. Provide constructive interference of the antenna pattern for each antenna in the array. If the device 2 is a larger one, for example a printed circuit board assembly with electronic components mounted on it, a single antenna element, or fewer elements integrated at the end of the robot arm 32, or a compact one. A version of the antenna array 22 is positioned for movement on the surface of such a printed circuit board by electronically controlled mechanical or robotic steering, or the printed circuit board is moved below the antenna array 22. To be installed.

The antenna array 22 also includes an integrated low noise amplifier (LNA) 25 within the antenna array 22. The advantages of the integrated LNA 25 are improved sensitivity of the entire system and increased level of signature emitted by the device 2. Antenna 22 and LNA 25 are mounted in an integrated circuit (IC) to provide electronically steered detection of counterfeit products.

To further improve the radiator signature, a low noise amplifier 25 with a noise figure of less than 1 can be employed to better approach the theoretical room temperature sensitivity of system 10.

In other embodiments, a compact antenna array 22 with an integrated LNA 25, or a single compact antenna that is about the size of a component under test on a substrate with a single element, can be used for electronic items. It may be integrated on the robot arm 32 for inspection.

In other embodiments, suitable antenna/LNA array tips for robot arm 32 may be interchangeable based on the performance parameters required for testing a particular electronic device or component.

Further, in the present invention, it is conceivable that the antenna array 22 and the radiation detecting device 20 are mounted on a semiconductor substrate or die made of a silicone material or the like and mounted on the tip 33 of the robot arm 32. A more detailed description of this embodiment is set forth in co-pending U.S. Application Serial No. 13/410,909 entitled "INTEGRATED CIRCUIT WITH ELECTROMAGNETIC ENERGY ANOMALY DETECTION AND PROCESSING", which is incorporated herein by reference. ..

The predetermined distance 23 is basically determined by the counterfeit device, the type of device to be inspected or screened, and the desired success rate of detecting the sensitivity of the antenna array 22 and the RF collection means 20.

For immediate detection of electronic devices and identification of electronic devices within range, most radiant energy components are attenuated to levels that are very difficult to detect. For purposes of screening or inspecting counterfeit electronic devices, the detector can be placed in close proximity to the component, board, or system under test. The present invention addresses the advantages of such an environment and the additional information provided regarding the electronic device to be screened or inspected when in the immediate vicinity of the RF collection means. Therefore, in this case, it is preferable to position the end of the antenna array 22 between about 1 micrometer and about 1 centimeter from the surface of the device 2. Preferably, the sensitivity of the RF collection means 22 is better than about -152 dBm.

Further, the present invention provides an active illumination source configured to illuminate the device 2 that is at least one of detected, inspected, or screened by free field RF energy to further enhance the radiator signature of the device 2 under test. It is conceivable to use 38.

When the antenna array 22 is mounted for fixed electronic steering of the array's beams or for movement relative to the device 2 under test, the means 18 provide an automated mechanism 30 for collecting RF energy from the device 2. To do. As an example of FIG. 2, such automation mechanism 30 includes a robot arm 32 and an overall controller 34 configured to control movement of the robot arm 32. The automation mechanism 30 may further include a sensor 36 for setting the predetermined distance 23, especially when the height of a component within the device 2, such as a printed circuit board assembly, changes.

Of course, such an automated mechanism 30 for controlling the robot arm 32 used to position the means for collecting RF energy may be provided as a stand-alone system, or as a printed circuit board assembly or It may be incorporated into the manufacturing line (not shown) of any device that allows for at least one of input, output and power connection.

Furthermore, it should be appreciated that although the positioning of the antenna array 22 or the single element antenna above the device 2 under test is shown as being performed in the vertical direction, other directions and operations may be performed by the robot arm, Spaces that are difficult to contact in the finished assembly or complex assembly can be contacted. In other embodiments, that different orientation of the antenna array 22 may be utilized based on the evaluation that the device under test 2 tends to radiate the RF energy collected from that orientation. Thus, based on conventional knowledge in the art, other special orientations for many other test-designated orientations are contemplated by the present invention.

Unlike conventional full electrical testing, the present invention is based on activating the limited or baseline functionality of device 2 for counterfeit screening and inspection. For circuit boards, printed circuit board assemblies, or partially or fully assembled products, it is typically sufficient to power the board. Although not all inputs and outputs are required, it is obvious to those skilled in the art that connecting all inputs and outputs may contribute to the increased success rate of the statistical selection of the present invention. The substrate in this state has a basic function, and the RF radiation collecting unit 20 selects a counterfeit product to determine whether the substrate itself is a genuine product or a counterfeit product. Sufficiently distinguishable information can be collected to tell if it is a counterfeit product.

For components/devices 2 that are integrated onto a circuit board prior to the manufacturing line where the board is present, in one embodiment, the component/device 2 may simply be provided with a power input 42 to simply electrically power the component or board. turn on. In other embodiments, it is preferable to simply provide the outgoing input 44 to run the clock at the input or output of the device 2 under test. In the presently preferred embodiment of this invention, the power signal 42 is combined with an oscillating input 44. Such an oscillating input 44 is preferably a monotonic oscillating signal, but can also be provided as a multi-tone input or a modulated oscillating signal or a modulated oscillating signal. Multitone input injection is used to assist in the development of intermodulation and intermodulation responses that translate into unique signatures for counterfeit vs. genuine devices. In addition, the use of multitone injection assists in developing a non-linear response that translates into a unique signature for counterfeit versus genuine devices.

The method of exciting the device 2 with the power signal 42 and the oscillation signal 44 is a semiconductor device, an integrated circuit, a substrate level device such as a surface mount or through hole component, a sub-board or a daughter board, an entire circuit board, an assembly of a plurality of boards, and Applies to the entire product. In this case, what is important in the preferred embodiment of the invention is to provide a power signal 42 for powering the device 2 as a baseline and a single simple monotonic oscillation signal 44, by means of which signal 44 When the function of the active device is activated and activated, it is captured by the RF collecting means 20 and the antenna array 22 or a separate antenna positioned in the vicinity of the device 2 to achieve the reference or baseline characteristics expected in the real part. Produces an electromagnetic radiation which is analyzed.

In the example of device 2 being an IC component, power input 42 turns on the IC and provides an oscillating signal 44 to provide an oscillating input to a pin or port on the IC specification often referred to as a clock input or clock In. It enables internal circuitry but does not cause more complex operation of the IC since the other inputs are not activated. Another example is the provision of oscillating input-only signal, communication, or secondary clock inputs that are primarily focused on operating the basic circuitry of the IC.

Accordingly, system 10 provides a power input source 46 and an oscillator input source 48. Oscillator input source 48 may also be referred to as a crystal oscillator, ceramic oscillator, oscillator, standard time, signal, signal generator, frequency reference, or other similar term typical in the art. While each of these signal input sources will differ if analyzed in detail, each essentially provides a mechanism for providing an oscillating input to device 2.

It has been found that the way the semiconductor responds depends on the quality of the oscillating input 44 used to drive either the clock input or the signal input of the semiconductor device 2.

Temperature-compensated crystal oscillator (TCXO), microcomputer-compensated crystal oscillator (MXCO), crystal oscillator with constant temperature chamber (OCXO), small atomic frequency standard (rubidium (Rb) and rubidium oscillator (RbXO)), and high performance such as Cs Satisfactory results have been obtained with the use of atomic standards, all providing accuracies in excess of 10 ⁻⁴ . In the presently preferred embodiment, the accuracy of the oscillating signal 44 is greater than 10 ⁻⁸ and the oscillator input source 48 is a miniature atomic frequency standard oscillator. Therefore, the oscillator signal source 48 is hereinafter referred to as the “high precision signal source”, and the oscillator signal 44 is hereinafter referred to as the “high precision oscillator signal”. The high precision signal also has its frequency matching the input requirements of the device 2.

The oscillator source 48 described above need only be used to excite the device 2. More spectrally rich emissions can be derived by applying modulation or complex timing to the driving method of the device, this preferred embodiment only excites device inputs such as clocks or other signal inputs. Thus, it limits the complexity in the generation of radiator patterns that provide information as to whether the state of device 2 is genuine or fake.

In another embodiment, a second mechanism is provided that provides a means of measuring the radiation of device 2 while allowing oscillator source 48 to sweep the frequency band. In one embodiment, it has a continuously occurring frequency sweep. In other embodiments, a discrete sweep is used that sweeps only certain predetermined discrete frequencies over the band of interest. The frequency to be swept depends on the expected input of device 2 under test. In some cases, it may be sufficient to sweep a band of several Hz, in others, a band of KHz is swept, a band of MHz is swept, and a band of GHz is swept. The present invention can be applied to any of these ranges, but from the viewpoint of cost, the band is limited to an effective range rather than a comprehensive range. Of course, any of these band spacings could be used and would be expected by the present invention.

In addition, the invention contemplates exciting inputs outside the range inherent in the device being driven. In this case, the genuine part has been developed to have a wider than normal input range to provide a more robust part, while the counterfeit part does not have such capability. In any case, the response, such as the non-linear response that differs between parts, is easily converted to a properly configured RF collection means 20.

Further, the present invention contemplates changing the amplitude of the oscillator input to device inputs such as clock inputs, signal inputs, and other inputs defined by the manufacturer of device 2.

In other embodiments, amplitude modulation is applied as well as varying amplitude.

In addition to exciting the input, the present invention contemplates exciting the output(s). Driving the output also causes a device architecture response. For example, genuine parts are filtered or electrostatic discharge (ESD) protected in devices that counterfeit parts do not have. A counterfeit component is "illuminated like a Christmas tree" in the RF spectrum unless it has some standard protection in the circuit by a counterfeiter trying to save costs.

If the device 2 is a printed circuit board, a printed circuit board assembly or any larger device, the present invention contemplates simply connecting the power input 42 to the device and driving the other inputs or outputs of the device. No need. It is also contemplated, of course, that the present invention uses a power supply input 42 and an oscillator input 44 for each input (or output) of such device 2. For smaller components such as discrete semiconductors and integrated circuits, the present invention provides a test apparatus 50 that provides a means for transferring such inputs 42 and 44 to device 2. For example, such a test apparatus 50 is a zero insertion force socket configured to receive such a device 2 and preconfigured to apply inputs 42 and 44 to the device 2. In another example, the test apparatus 50 facilitates an effective method, that is, to add power to a power pin and to apply an oscillating signal to any other desired input (or output). It may be a device. Normally, ground is connected as well. Alternatively, as can be seen in FIG. 3, the test apparatus 50 may simply provide a means for temporarily securing the two surface level contacts 56, 58 and the device 2 positioned thereon. For example, such temporary securing means is a vacuum generating device 57 positioned below the surface 55 of the test apparatus 50.

The second basic element of the means 18 is a means 24 for comparing and matching the collected RF energy with a set of parameters specified for the baseline configuration of the real device 2. Of course, the means 24 comprises at least one processor, but other forms of hardware or firmware for confirming a match with the expected parameters are also conceivable.

Means 24 include at least one algorithm for matching the collected data with the expected signature of device 2. The preferred embodiment utilizes more than one automated algorithm. The preferred embodiment utilizes several algorithms that match mutually exclusive parameters of RF energy radiator signatures. In this way, the ability to match collected signatures with expected signatures is improved. Weighting these algorithms is preferable because it improves the ability to detect poor quality parts, including counterfeit parts.

Therefore, the means 24 includes harmonic analysis, matched filter, non-harmonic correlation, timing correlation, artificial neural network (ANN), specifically multi-layer perceptron (MLP) feedforward ANN by backpropagation (BP), wavelet. At least one of decomposition, autocorrelation, spectral characterization or statistics, clustering or phase detrending algorithms.

Clustering analysis measures and produces statistics on the significant electromagnetic emissions of the sampled components. A total of N statistics are measured for each of the M components, and then M sets of N statistics are developed. Then, each statistic is assigned an eigenaxis in N-dimensional space and the measured statistic for each of the M measured components is stored. Next, a hierarchical aggregation clustering (HAC) algorithm is applied to the separated clusters in the spatial distribution. The identified clusters represent a set of components with different performance parameters outside the typical distribution in manufacturing. In this analysis, the violating components inserted in the sampled set are always revealed as separate clusters. The HAC algorithm operates iteratively, iteratively, and aggregates (combines) the closest cluster pairs (or data points in the first iteration) by satisfying certain similarity criteria. This similarity is typically defined by a measure of the distance between the clusters. However, many of the measured features that represent the axis in N-dimensional space are different and unrelated. The Mahalanobis distance, a metric designed for this purpose that corrects for different scales by evaluating covariance, is used as a measure of similarity between clusters in this analysis. Mahalanobis distance d (vector x→, vector y→) is defined as follows between two vectors x→ and vector y→.

S is an estimate of the joint covariance between the two vectors. In the present application, each vector is represented by a position vector in N space, and the joint covariance between two clusters is estimated from the data points that compose them. The normalization of the two clusters into a joint covariance matrix gives the Mahalanobis distance a fundamental property of scale invariance.

A cluster is an extension in N-dimensional space, which requires that the endpoints of the distance metric be well defined. There are several "concatenation" options available, such as the minimum data point distance between two clusters (called single connection) and the maximum point direction distance (called maximum connection), but place the end points of the ruler Place is the average value of each cluster in N space. This linking method allows the covariance of each cluster to be considered in the Mahalanobis distance metric. Also, the cluster mean can be continuously updated without iterating for all constituent data points, thus requiring less computation.

The stopping criterion of the algorithm (ie the separation distance threshold that prevents further aggregation) is determined by the evaluation of manufacturing tolerances observed during the analysis. Clusters are expanded and nested in layers with similarities, and analysis of these layers provides insight into existing distributions.

As the number of clusters increases, information loss is used to identify the optimal stopping criterion. Symmetrized Kullback-Leibler divergence (SKLD) is a good measure of information loss. SKLD is defined as follows for the two models P and Q.

SKLD provides a measure of the information difference between the two models (ie, the two layers (stages) of HAC). Plotting D(P//Q) for several layers (steps) usually indicates an inflection point. The optimal number of clusters is identified just below the inflection point.

Referring now to FIG. 4, the presently preferred method of inspecting or screening for counterfeit electronic or electrical device 2 begins with powering on device 2 at step 102 and inputting an oscillating signal at step 104. The RF collection means 20 is then positioned in step 106 and is operable to collect RF radiation from the device 2 into which the power signal 42 and the oscillating signal 44 are injected. The collected RF radiation is processed at step 110, which includes comparing and matching the collected RF radiator 4 signature with the RF radiator signature characteristics for the genuine device 2, in various ways. , A plurality of devices 2, sampling, manufacturing specifications and similar methods.

It is contemplated to use various automated algorithms within step 110. Step 110 can include obtaining discrete wavelet transform coefficient statistics, obtaining relative phase measurements, and comparing phase measurements with expected phase measurements. Step 110 may also include using at least one of a clustering algorithm, a hierarchical aggregation clustering (HAC) algorithm.

Wavelet transform is a multi-resolution analysis technique used to obtain a time-frequency representation of the analyzed radiation. This wavelet transform is another basis function for the Fourier transform and is based on an extension of the input signal with respect to a function called the so-called mother wavelet which is transformed and spread early and late. From a computational point of view, the Discrete Wavelet Transform (DWT) analyzes the signal by breaking it down into "approximate" and "detailed" information, which uses successive low-band and high-band filtering processes, respectively. Is achieved by

It has been found that these multiple decomposition high band "detail" coefficient outputs as a feature in signal classification are advantageous for use in the present invention. The DWT has been found to be advantageous for classifying approximately the same device radiation fractions based on the skewness measures obtained by applying the Wahlet transform to the frequency domain information. The DWT analysis is applied to the frequency domain radiator data for each radiator within the defined intersection ∩E. The average energy at each of the different detail coefficient scales is calculated and the value of each result is retained and used in the classification.

The phase information of the identified radiators is used to provide a particular sensitivity assessment of circuit modification. The signal phase (and then the radiating phase) is easily modified by slight variations in either the distribution or the local impedance within a given circuit. Therefore, the phase information is very relevant when trying to identify subtle circuit changes.

Referring now to FIG. 6, in the relative phase measurement algorithm, the phase measurement is performed on each radiator relative to another (or some other) radiator, due to the lack of a known reference. .. Any set of static frequency radiators is necessarily repetitive within the time domain envelope, and thus contains a repetitive phase relationship at some point within this envelope termed the reference time t _ref . If the measurement of the signal is made at some other time t _M during the repetitive envelope, the phase at t _M clearly corresponds to the phase of t _ref due to the time difference t _ref −t _M. Usually does not appear. The identification of t _ref from the measurements made at t _M results in a shift of the time reference to t _ref , and alignment of the phases so that a single repeatable measurement of the relative phase relationship is taken.

Nominally, harmonics are expected to have relative phase measurements of 0°, while intermodulation components are expected to have relative phase measurements of 0° or 180°. The exact phase relationship between the harmonics and the intermodulation components often changes from these nominal expectations and can be effectively used to characterize circuits. Deviations in relative phase from the nominal value are due to small changes in circuit reactance at varying frequencies of the analyzed harmonics.

Some methods generally rely on frequency domain phase detrending, which is deficient in the computational versatility associated with modulo 2pi calculations. Another method relies on the use of a reference signal to establish the time-off of the precise reference being measured. Given these drawbacks, none of these approaches are the optimal method for measuring radiation. However, if this relationship is empirically known (ie, 0° shift if the signal is harmonic, or 0° or 180° shift if intermodulation component), then a single signal delay The phase offset can be used as an independent variable to minimize the function of the phase difference for each signal from the expected value. This approach taken by the inventors provides a framework for analyzing harmonic phase and intermodulation radiator content for variations between the measured IC and other devices.

Each of the radiation patterns identified as belonging to a harmonic or intermodulation relationship is evaluated to determine the exact relative phase measure.

The ANN algorithm has been found to be excellent at learning trends that occur in large databases and combining them in an optimal way to classify or functionally fit information.

There are several desirable aspects to neural network driven data analysis. RF emitter data includes a rich and diverse set of characteristic signatures for continuous monitoring and diagnostics. As much of this information as possible is included in the analysis to achieve the most sensitive, accurate and reliable results. However, the fact that the phenomenology of RF radiators consists of a combination of high-band and narrow-band features makes it difficult to determine a robust RF processing technique that fits the task. ANNs are highly skilled at combining large and diverse information into easily understood quantities. In addition, a solution to complex problems is obtained by simply providing the ANN with useful data and instructions suitable for the desired categorization. This feature allows the use of multiple RF technologies integrated, utilizing all relevant information to ultimately distinguish one unique signature from another.

Next, in step 112, the processed RF radiators are identified to determine the condition of the genuine or counterfeit device 2. If desired, the frequency setting of the oscillating signal may be changed in step 114 and steps 104 to 112 are repeated. Each measured response is stored at step 116 and the responses are compared to each other to improve counterfeit detection. Frequency changes may be associated with different frequency amplitude settings and/or different relative phases between two or more signals. When at least two inputs are injected at oscillating input 44, the collected RF delivery data for each input is compared against the injection for all inputs simultaneously with the individually expected signature.

Finally, in step 118, an assessment of the condition of device 2 is performed to distinguish between genuine and counterfeit device 2. The step 118 of determining the real device 2 comprises the frequency position of the radiator components, the phase of the radiators, the intermodulation and intermodulation components generated by the internal circuits, the shape of the individual radiators, the quality factors of the individual radiators and Analyzing at least one of the timing characteristics of the radiator.

The presently preferred embodiment of inspecting and screening for counterfeit electronic and electrical devices 2 further comprises establishing baseline RF characteristics representative of the genuine device 2. The step of establishing such a baseline RF characteristic includes the steps of making a large comparison of the spectral radiators and their large scale comparisons to a narrow band comparison, outputting after the comparison and further based on the quality of the comparison match. Reducing the scalar value of the. Also, establishing the baseline RF characteristics may include obtaining local spectral power density statistics, where a plurality of semiconductors are sampled and the measured localization for each of the common emitters between the sampled devices. It is identified based on statistical characteristics. The statistical features include at least one of radiator frequency position, radiator peak magnitude, radiator phase noise, radiator symmetry, skewness and radiator local noise floor, as best shown in FIG. ..

The present invention provides the necessary steps and details, simultaneously applies power and one or more oscillating inputs, and detects, sorts and identifies counterfeit electronic devices whether the radiator 4 should be treated. The RF emitted by the device 2 under these conditions is simultaneously measured whether it should be emitted for inspection.

The present invention also characterizes the device at the die and substrate level using an intended or unintended RF radiator 4. The introduction of the free field EM magnetic field strength at a selected frequency that measures what the device is radiating amplifies and/or modifies the unintended radiative properties of the device. The present invention further contemplates embodiments that use an active illumination source to enhance the radiation collected by the RF collection means. In this case, the power to the applied device is applied by the test equipment and the RF collecting means collect the radiated energy. During this acquisition, the free field illumination source is turned on to activate the circuit. Other embodiments include the application of power and oscillating signals by physical connection to the device under test, while free field illumination is performed and an RF collector collects the radiated energy. In this embodiment, the illumination source can be illuminated using single frequency monotone, multitone or complex modulated RF energy.

The introduction of the EM field strength by the illumination source at the selected frequency allows the amplification and/or modification of unintended radiation characteristics of the device. One advantage of the present invention involves the amplification of RF radiation signatures to improve the ability to detect, inspect and screen counterfeit electronic devices.

The magnetic field strength needed to elicit the response described does not have to be very robust. Low magnetic field strengths can also greatly improve the collected radiation. For example, oscillator instability at low field strengths can significantly alter the radiator signature of such devices.

While various other preferred embodiments of the present invention have been described in sufficient detail to enable those skilled in the art to make and use the same, various other adaptations and modifications of the invention and the appended claims are made. Obviously, it is envisioned by a person skilled in the art without departing from the scope.

Claims (53)

A system,
(A) means for injecting a preselected input into the electrically powered device,
(B) means for determining the state of the electrically powered device,
The system wherein the states are defined by a radiator of RF energy in response to the preselected input. The electrical device is at least one of a discrete component, an integrated circuit, a circuit board, a circuit board assembly, a subsystem, a system, an electronic device and an electrical device that uses the electrical component for operation. System. The system of claim 1, wherein the state defines a genuine device or a counterfeit device. The electrically powered device is at least one of a semiconductor and an integrated circuit, and the preselected input injection means includes a zero insertion force socket whereby the at least one of the semiconductor and the integrated circuit is within the zero insertion force socket. The system of claim 1, wherein the system is inserted. The system of claim 4, wherein the preselected input is at least one of a power and an oscillator input, and the zero insertion force socket is preconfigured at the at least one of the power and the oscillator input. The system of claim 5, wherein the preselected signal input means further comprises a source for generating the oscillator input. 7. The system of claim 6, wherein the source is a compact atomic frequency standard oscillator. The means for determining the state of the electrically powered device,
(A) first means for collecting RF energy emitted from the electrically powered device;
(B) a second means for matching the collected RF energy to a set of predetermined parameters;
The system of claim 1, comprising (c) third means for determining whether a match against a predetermined set of said parameters is sufficient. The first means is an automated mechanism for collecting the RF energy from a substrate on an automated manufacturing line and/or circuit board components attached to a device that allows for at least one of input, output and power connections. 9. The system of claim 8 including. 9. The system of claim 8, wherein the first means comprises an automated mechanism for collecting the RF energy from the powered device. The system of claim 10, wherein the automated mechanism comprises a robot arm. 11. The system of claim 10, wherein the automation mechanism includes an antenna array positioned a predetermined distance above the electrically powered device, the electrically powered device and the antenna array mounted for movement relative to each other. The system of claim 12, wherein the antenna array comprises an integrated low noise amplifier. The system of claim 12, wherein the antenna array is an electronic steering antenna array. 13. The system of claim 12, wherein the predetermined distance is between about 1 micrometer and about 1 centimeter, and the automatic mechanism includes an automatic sensor to assist in setting the predetermined distance. A system for inspecting or screening electrically powered devices, the system comprising:
(A) means for inputting a preselected signal to the electrically powered device,
(B) an antenna array,
(C) means for positioning the antenna array at a predetermined distance above the electrically powered device,
(D) means for collecting RF energy emitted by the electrically powered device in response to a preselected input;
(E) means for comparing the signature of the radiated RF energy with the RF energy signature of a genuine part;
(F) means for determining whether the electrically powered device is genuine or counterfeit. The means for comparing the signatures may be harmonic analysis, matched filters, artificial neural networks (ANN), specifically multi-layer perceptron (MLP) feedforward ANN with backpropagation (BP), wavelet decomposition, autocorrelation, 17. The system of claim 16 including at least one of spectral characterization or statistics, clustering or phase detrending algorithms. Said means for processing the digitized RF radiation to extract the device signature include discrete Fourier transform, fast Fourier transform, discrete cosine transform, Laplace transform, Z transform, star transform, short time Fourier transform, cepstrum, infinite impulse. 17. The system of claim 16, comprising at least one of a response filter, a finite impulse response filter, a cascade integrator comb filter, an elliptic filter, a Chebyshev filter, a Butterworth filter, or a Bessel filter. A system for inspecting or screening a counterfeit product of at least one of an integrated circuit and a device using the integrated circuit, the system comprising:
(A) a precision input source configured to drive at least one of a signal input and a clock input of the integrated circuit;
(B) means for collecting RF energy emitted by said integrated circuit in response to a precision signal source;
(C) means for determining one of a genuine state and a counterfeit state of at least one of the integrated circuit and a device using the integrated circuit. An apparatus for detecting at least one of a forged integrated circuit and a forged device using the integrated circuit, the apparatus comprising:
(A) a precision input source configured to generate a precision input to drive at least one of a signal input and a clock input powered to the integrated circuit and a device using the integrated circuit, A precision signal having a frequency of the signal that matches an input requirement of the at least one of the integrated circuit and a device using the integrated circuit;
(B) RF collection means positioned proximate to the semiconductor, said RF collection means emitting radiation emitted by said at least one of said integrated circuit driven by a precision signal and a device using said integrated circuit. Being configured to receive an object,
(C) a processor coupled to the RF collection means, the processor processing the signature of the emitted radiation, the signature of the emitted radiation being at least predetermined for the semiconductor. Comparing against a signature of one radiator, the comparison result of the comparison defining a genuine integrated circuit and/or a genuine device using said integrated circuit. 20. The device of claim 19, wherein the device comprises an antenna array and RF collection means is coupled to the antenna array. 20. The apparatus of claim 19, wherein the RF collection means is mounted proximate to at least one of the genuine integrated circuit and the genuine device using the integrated circuit. 20. Apparatus according to claim 19, wherein the RF collection means has a sensitivity better than -152 dBm. A method for identifying counterfeit and genuine semiconductor-based devices, the method comprising:
(A) a step of generating a high-precision input with a high-precision input source,
(B) injecting the input to the semiconductor into at least one of a clock input and a signal input;
(C) collecting with RF collection means the radiation emitted by the semiconductor-based device in response to the signal injected in step (b);
(D) comparing the characteristics of the RF radiators collected in step (c) against the baseline RF characteristics of a genuine semiconductor-based device;
(E) determining whether the device is a counterfeit device or a genuine semiconductor-based device based on the comparison. Furthermore, repeating steps (a) to (c) with different frequency settings for the precision input injected into the semiconductor-based device, and of at least two measured responses to improve counterfeit inspection. 25. The method of claim 24, comprising comparing RF data acquisitions. Further, repeating steps (a) to (c) with different frequency amplitude settings for the input injected into the semiconductor-based device, and RF of at least two measured responses to improve counterfeit inspection. 25. The method of claim 24, comprising comparing data collections. Further, repeating steps (a) to (c) with different phases between the two or more inputs injected into the semiconductor-based device, and at least two measured responses to improve counterfeit inspection. 25. The method of claim 24, comprising comparing the RF data collections of. Further, repeating steps (a) to (c) with different frequency settings for at least two inputs injected into the semiconductor-based device, and RF collected data for each individually injected input is obtained with the expected signature and all 25. The method of claim 24 including the step of simultaneously comparing injections to the inputs of the. The steps of determining the genuine semiconductor-based device include frequency detection of the radiator components, phase of the radiators, intermodulation and intermodulation components generated by internal circuits, shapes of individual radiators, individual radiators. 25. The method of claim 24, comprising analyzing at least one of a quality factor or a timing characteristic of the radiator. 25. The method of claim 24, wherein step (d) comprises using at least one automated algorithm. 25. The method of claim 24, further comprising establishing the baseline RF characteristic representative of the genuine semiconductor-based device. 32. The method of claim 31, wherein the step of establishing the baseline RF characteristic comprises the steps of making a large scale comparison of the spectral emissions and reducing the large scale comparison to a single scalar value. 32. The method of claim 31, wherein the step of establishing the baseline RF characteristic comprises obtaining local spectral power density statistics. The step of obtaining local spectral power density statistics is based on localized statistical characteristics of the plurality of semiconductor-based devices sampled and measured for each of the common emitters among the sampled semiconductor-based devices. 34. The method of claim 33, including identifying the plurality of semiconductor-based devices. 35. The method of claim 34, wherein the statistical features include at least one of radiator frequency position, radiator peak magnitude, radiator phase noise, radiator symmetry, skewness, and radiator local noise floor. 25. The method of claim 24, wherein the step of comparing the characteristics of the RF radiator comprises obtaining discrete wavelet transform coefficient statistics. 25. The method of claim 24, wherein the step of comparing the characteristics of the RF radiator comprises obtaining a relative phase measurement. 25. The method of claim 24, wherein the step of comparing the properties of the RF radiators comprises performing a clustering analysis. 39. The method of claim 38, wherein the step of performing the clustering analysis comprises using a hierarchical aggregation clustering (HAC) algorithm. 39. The method of claim 38, wherein the step of performing the clustering analysis comprises using a clustering algorithm and/or a hierarchical cohesive clustering (HAC) algorithm. 25. The method of claim 24, wherein the step of comparing the properties of the RF radiators comprises obtaining discrete wavelet transform coefficient statistics. 25. The step of comparing the characteristics of the RF radiators with each other comprises at least one of obtaining a relative phase measurement and/or comparing the phase measurement to an expected phase measurement. the method of. Further, repeating steps (a) to (c) with the same settings for the precision input injected into the semiconductor-based device, and to improve counterfeit inspection, at least two measured responses 25. Combining RF data collection by averaging or other mathematical transformations. Further comprising repeating steps (a) to (c) with the same settings for the precision input injected into the semiconductor based device and integrating RF energy over a band of at least 10 kHz. The method according to 24. Further, repeating steps (a) to (c) with the same settings for the high precision input injected into the semiconductor-based device and further inspection and comparison using a wideband RF radiator for narrowband RF. 25. Reporting the signature of the RF radiators observed in the radiator response. Further, repeating steps (a) to (c) with the same settings for the precision input injected into the semiconductor-based device, and further inspection and comparison using narrowband RF radiators for wideband RF. 25. Reporting the observed RF radiator signature in the radiator response.
A method for inspecting and/or screening at least one of an integrated circuit and a device using the integrated circuit for their counterfeit state or genuine state, the method comprising:
(A) providing at least one RF energy collecting means;
(B) positioning the RF energy collecting means in proximity to the integrated circuit;
(C) providing an accuracy signal source,
(D) injecting a signal of a first frequency into the integrated circuit with the precision signal source;
(E) collecting, in the RF energy collecting means, a first radiator radiated by the integrated circuit in response to the signal of the first frequency injected in step (d);
(F) injecting a signal of a second frequency into the integrated circuit with the precision signal source,
(G) collecting, in the RF energy collecting means, a second radiator radiated by the integrated circuit in response to the signal of the second frequency generated in step (f);
(H) generating a representative signature of the first and second radiators;
(I) determining a deviation between the first radiator signature and at least one of the predetermined radiator signatures for the integrated circuit;
(J) determining a deviation between a second radiator signature and at least one of the predetermined radiator signatures for the integrated circuit;
(K) detecting at least one of the counterfeit and genuine states of the integrated circuit based on the deviation of at least one of the first radiator signature and the second radiator signature. How to prepare. At least one device for inspecting or screening a semiconductor device for counterfeit goods, comprising an accuracy signal source and an RF collecting device comprising an antenna, a receiver and a processor, said device comprising: An apparatus configured to characterize a semiconductor being powered in response to a signal generated and injected into the semiconductor device. An apparatus for detecting, inspecting, and/or screening at least one counterfeit semiconductor-based device mounted on a printed circuit board assembly, the apparatus comprising:
(A) a robot arm,
(B) a mechanism for precision operation of the robot arm over different positions of the printed circuit board;
(C) a precision signal source that produces a precision input for injection into the printed circuit board assembly;
An antenna array including a low noise amplifier integrated in (d),
(E) RF collection means coupled to the antenna array, the RF collection means emitting radiation emitted by the at least one powered semiconductor-based device having at least one of the precision inputs. Providing sufficient sensitivity to accept
(F) arithmetic means coupled to the RF collection means and configured to perform at least one of inspection and/or screening of at least one semiconductor-based device on at least one printed circuit board. Further, an active illumination source configured to illuminate the semiconductor-based device that is at least one of free field RF energy detection, inspection, or screening to further enhance the emitter signature of the semiconductor-based device. 49. The device of claim 48, including. 49. The apparatus of claim 48, wherein the antenna array, the RF collection means and the computing means are mounted on a semiconductor die substrate and at the tip of the robot arm. 49. The apparatus of claim 48, wherein the high precision input is a multitone input injection configured to assist in the development of intermodulation and intermodulation responses that translate into unique signatures for counterfeit vs. genuine devices. A system for inspecting or sorting counterfeit electrical or electronic devices, the system comprising:
(A) a precision signal source configured to input one and only one oscillation signal to the electrical or electronic device;
(B) means for collecting RF energy emitted by the integrated circuit in response to the oscillating signal;
(C) means for determining one of the genuine or counterfeit state of the electrical or electronic device. Apparatus for counterfeit electronic steering detection including an antenna mounted within an integrated circuit and a low noise amplifier.

Images