JP2019175017A - Communication device and communication method - Google Patents

Abstract

To provide a communication device capable of appropriately performing communication processing of a vehicle even when cellular communication cannot be used.SOLUTION: LPWA communication device 13 mounted on vehicle 10 includes: a control unit 131 configured to determine whether or not an intrusion detection device 12 has detected an intrusion into the vehicle 10 via cellular communication; and an LPWA communication processing unit 132 configured so as, when intrusion detection device 12 detects an intrusion into vehicle 10, to transmit a piece of vehicle information to an LPWA communication server 20 using LPWA (Low Power Wide Area) communication.SELECTED DRAWING: Figure 2

Description

  The present disclosure relates to a communication device and a communication method.

  As a vehicle-mounted network in a vehicle, a CAN (Controller Area Network) to which an ECU (Electronic Control Unit) and a TCU (Telematics Communication Unit) are connected is known. The TCU mounted on the vehicle communicates with an external device (for example, a server for monitoring the vehicle) by cellular communication (for example, see Patent Document 1).

JP 2003-217074 A

  However, the vehicle communication processing in the case where cellular communication cannot be used has not been sufficiently studied.

  One aspect of the present disclosure contributes to the provision of a communication device and a communication method capable of appropriately performing vehicle communication processing even when cellular communication cannot be used.

  A communication apparatus according to an aspect of the present disclosure includes a control unit that determines whether or not an intrusion to a vehicle via cellular communication is detected, and an LPWA (Low Power Wide Area when an intrusion to the vehicle is detected. And a communication processing unit that transmits vehicle information to the server using communication.

  A communication method according to an aspect of the present disclosure determines whether intrusion to a vehicle via cellular communication is detected, and performs LPWA (Low Power Wide Area) communication when intrusion to the vehicle is detected. Used to transmit vehicle information to the server.

  According to one aspect of the present disclosure, vehicle communication processing can be appropriately performed even when cellular communication cannot be used.

The figure which shows the structural example of the emergency stop system which concerns on Embodiment 1. FIG. Block diagram showing a configuration example of a vehicle and an LPWA communication server according to the first embodiment Sequence diagram showing an operation example of the LPWA communication apparatus according to the first embodiment

  In some cases, unauthorized access to a vehicle-mounted network (hereinafter referred to as CAN) from a third party such as a cyber attack may occur on a vehicle connected to an external network (for example, the Internet) by cellular communication. Due to unauthorized access to the CAN, in a vehicle or a connected car that is running in an autonomous driving, an unintended driving operation may be performed on the vehicle.

  On the other hand, for example, the in-vehicle device detects intrusion from the Internet or intrusion into the CAN and transmits a signal (abnormality log) for reporting an abnormality to a server (for example, a cloud server), and the server has a plurality of in-vehicle devices. Systems that update the response to new cyber attacks (for example, update of monitoring rules, etc.) have been proposed for each vehicle by aggregating abnormality logs from aircraft (for example, reference (http: //news.panasonic.com/en/press/data/2017/10/jn171010-2/jn171010-2.html)). With this system, each vehicle can respond to new cyber attacks, and can detect the signs of attacks before they become manifest as threats to the in-vehicle network, minimizing the impact of cyber attacks. .

  However, in the above system, even if a third person's intrusion into the vehicle can be detected, if the response processing by the server is not in time for the third person's intrusion, the third person can illegally use the vehicle. There is a risk of driving operations being executed. For this reason, when a third party intrusion into the vehicle is detected, it is desirable to immediately perform a response process by the server to prevent an unauthorized driving operation of the vehicle.

  However, if an intrusion into the vehicle via cellular communication occurs, there is a high possibility that the TCU will become unusable due to unauthorized access by a third party. That is, when an intrusion (abnormality) into the vehicle via cellular communication occurs, the vehicle cannot use cellular communication and cannot communicate with the server, and thus protects against an unauthorized driving operation of the vehicle by a third party. I can't.

  Therefore, in the present disclosure, a method for preventing an unauthorized driving operation of a vehicle by a third party even when cellular communication cannot be used will be described.

  Hereinafter, embodiments of the present disclosure will be described in detail with reference to the drawings.

[Outline of emergency stop system]
FIG. 1 shows a configuration example of an emergency stop system 1 according to the present embodiment.

  As shown in FIG. 1, the emergency stop system 1 includes at least one vehicle 10 and an LPWA communication server 20.

  The vehicle 10 can travel, for example, by automatic driving control. Further, LPWA (Low Power Wide Area) communication capable of covering a wide area with power saving is used for communication between the LPWA communication device 13 (details will be described later) of the vehicle 10 shown in FIG. 1 and the LPWA communication server 20. .

  In the emergency stop system 1, the LPWA communication device 13 of the vehicle 10 can identify the vehicle 10 when the intrusion (abnormality) of the vehicle 10 via cellular communication by a third party is detected (vehicle information). Is transmitted to the LPWA communication server 20 using LPWA communication.

  When the LPWA communication server 20 receives the vehicle information, the LPWA communication server 20 determines whether or not the vehicle 10 is to be urgently stopped with respect to the intrusion into the vehicle 10 corresponding to the vehicle information, and a “vehicle stop command for urgently stopping the vehicle 10. ”And“ running continuation command ”for continuing the running of the vehicle 10 are transmitted to the LPWA communication device 13 using LPWA communication.

  Then, the LPWA communication device 13 controls the stop of the vehicle 10 according to the travel control information received using the LPWA communication (stops or continues travel).

  The outline of the emergency stop system 1 has been described above.

  Next, the configuration of the vehicle 10 and the LPWA communication server 20 included in the emergency stop system 1 will be described. FIG. 2 is a block diagram illustrating a configuration example of the vehicle 10 and the LPWA communication server 20.

[Vehicle configuration]
The vehicle 10 includes a TCU 11, an intrusion detection device 12, an LPWA communication device 13, and at least one ECU.

  The TCU 11 includes at least a cellular communication processing unit (not shown). In other words, the TCU 11 connects to an external network (for example, the Internet) via an antenna using cellular communication. The TCU 11 outputs a signal received from the external network to the intrusion detection device 12 or the ECU connected to the CAN.

  The intrusion detection device 12 uses the signal input from the TCU 11 to intrude into the vehicle 10 via cellular communication (for example, intrusion from the Internet into the inside of the vehicle 10 or CAN) according to a predetermined rule (monitoring rule). Intrusion). Then, the intrusion detection device 12 outputs intrusion detection information indicating whether or not an intrusion into the vehicle 10 has been detected to the LPWA communication device 13.

  The LPWA communication device 13 includes a control unit 131 and an LPWA communication processing unit 132.

  Note that the LPWA communication device 13 is connected to the intrusion detection device 12 via a cable. Similarly, the LPWA communication device 13 is connected to the operation control ECU via a cable. That is, the LPWA communication device 13 is provided separately from the ECU and is disconnected from the CAN. For example, the LPWA communication device 13 is not directly connected to the CAN, but the LPWA communication device 13 (for example, the control unit 131) and the ECU (for example, the operation control ECU) are connected by a dedicated line. Thereby, the LPWA communication apparatus 13 can output a control signal to the operation control ECU without going through the CAN.

  In the LPWA communication device 13, the control unit 131 performs emergency stop control for the vehicle 10. Specifically, when intrusion detection information indicating that an intrusion has occurred in the vehicle 10 is input from the intrusion detection device 12, the control unit 131 outputs the vehicle information of the vehicle 10 to the LPWA communication processing unit 132. .

  The vehicle information may be information unique to the vehicle 10 that enables the LPWA communication server 20 to identify each vehicle 10. For example, the vehicle information may be vehicle identification information of the vehicle 10 (for example, a predetermined number of alphanumeric characters excluding I, O, Q, which may be referred to as VIN (Vehicle Identification Number)). Alternatively, the LPWA communication device 13 and the LPWA communication server 20 share in advance a correspondence between unique information (LPWA identification information) that can identify the LPWA communication processing unit 132 mounted on the vehicle 10 and the vehicle identification information. The vehicle information may be LPWA identification information.

  Further, the control unit 131 determines whether or not to stop the travel of the vehicle 10 (emergency stop or continued travel) based on the travel control information from the LPWA communication server 20 input from the LPWA communication processing unit 132. . The control unit 131 outputs a control signal instructing an emergency stop of the vehicle 10 to the driving control ECU when the vehicle 10 is stopped in an emergency.

  The LPWA communication processing unit 132 transmits the vehicle information input from the control unit 131 to the LPWA communication server 20 via the antenna using LPWA communication. In addition, after transmitting vehicle information, the LPWA communication processing unit 132 receives travel control information transmitted from the LPWA communication server 20 via the antenna using LPWA communication, and the received travel control information is controlled by the control unit 131. Output to.

  Each ECU is connected to another ECU or TCU 11 by a CAN via a bus. The ECU includes at least an operation control ECU that controls automatic operation. The driving control ECU performs automatic driving control by controlling, for example, a steering ECU that controls a steering operation, a brake ECU that controls a brake (braking device) of the vehicle 10, and an accelerator ECU that controls driving of an accelerator. .

  Further, when a control signal instructing an emergency stop of the vehicle 10 is input from the LWPA communication device 13, the operation control ECU controls the steering ECU, the brake ECU, and the accelerator ECU, for example, and stops the vehicle 10. Further, the operation control ECU gives priority to the instruction from the LPWA communication device 13 over the instruction input via the CAN.

  Note that the control target of the operation control ECU at the time of emergency stop is not limited to the steering ECU, the brake ECU, and the accelerator ECU, but may be at least one of these ECUs (for example, only the brake ECU). Other ECUs (not shown) related to the automatic operation control may be used.

[Management server configuration]
The LPWA communication server 20 includes an LPWA communication processing unit 201 and a determination unit 202.

  The LPWA communication processing unit 201 communicates with the vehicle 10 (LPWA communication device 13) via an antenna using LPWA communication. For example, the LPWA communication processing unit 201 receives vehicle information of the vehicle 10 transmitted from the LPWA communication device 13, and outputs the received vehicle information to the determination unit 202. In addition, the LPWA communication processing unit 201 transmits, to the LPWA communication device 13, corresponding control information that is input from the determination unit 202 and that indicates whether or not the vehicle 10 is to be urgently stopped.

  When the vehicle information of the vehicle 10 is input from the LPWA communication processing unit 201, the determination unit 202 determines whether or not the vehicle 10 is to be stopped urgently based on the vehicle information, and displays travel control information indicating the determination result. The data is output to the LPWA communication processing unit 201.

  For example, the determination unit 202 confirms the state of the TCU 11 of the vehicle 10 corresponding to the vehicle information via cellular communication, and specifies whether or not the TCU 11 cannot communicate. When the TCU 11 cannot communicate, the determination unit 202 determines that a third person has illegally entered the vehicle 10 and determines an emergency stop of the vehicle 10. In this case, the determination unit 202 includes a vehicle stop command instructing an emergency stop of the vehicle 10 in the travel control information and outputs the command to the LPWA communication processing unit 201.

  Note that the above-described state checking operation of the TCU 11 is not limited to being performed by the determination unit 202. For example, the state check operation of the TCU 11 may be performed by a server other than the LPWA communication server 20 (for example, a monitoring server (not shown)). In this case, the determination unit 202 may inquire the TCU state of the vehicle 10 corresponding to the vehicle information to the monitoring server, and may receive information indicating the state of the TCU 11 as the inquiry result.

[Operation in emergency stop system]
Next, the operation in the emergency stop system 1 having the above configuration will be described in detail.

  FIG. 3 is a flowchart showing an operation example of the LPWA communication device 13 of the vehicle 10.

  The process shown in FIG. 3 is started in the LPWA communication device 13 when the intrusion detection device 12 detects an intrusion into the vehicle 10.

  Specifically, LPWA communication apparatus 13 transmits vehicle information of vehicle 10 to LPWA communication server 20 using LPWA communication (ST101). When the LPWA communication device 13 transmits the vehicle information, the LPWA communication device 13 transitions to a standby state for the travel control information from the LPWA communication server 20.

  Next, LPWA communication apparatus 13 determines whether or not travel control information has been received from LPWA communication server 20 within a predetermined time after transmitting vehicle information in ST101 (ST102). When the travel control information is not received within a certain time (ST102: NO), the LPWA communication device 13 returns to the process of ST101 and retransmits the vehicle information to the LPWA communication server 20.

  On the other hand, if the travel control information is received within a certain time (ST102: YES), the LPWA communication device 13 determines whether the command included in the received travel control information is a vehicle stop command for instructing the emergency stop of the vehicle 10. It is determined whether or not (ST103).

  When the command included in the received travel control information is not a vehicle stop command (ST103: NO), the LPWA communication device 13 ends the process shown in FIG. 3 without performing an emergency stop on the vehicle 10. For example, when the command included in the travel control information is a travel continuation command, the LPWA communication device 13 continues the travel of the vehicle 10.

  On the other hand, when the command included in the received travel control information is a vehicle stop command (ST103: YES), the LPWA communication device 13 outputs a control signal instructing the emergency stop of the vehicle 10 to the operation control ECU. (ST104).

  The driving control ECU controls an ECU (for example, a steering ECU, a brake ECU, an accelerator ECU, etc.) related to an emergency stop operation of the vehicle 10 when a control signal instructing a stop is input from the LPWA communication device 13. The vehicle 10 is stopped. At this time, the operation control ECU gives priority to the operation control instruction (stop command) from the LPWA communication device 13 over the operation control instruction via CAN.

  Thus, in the present embodiment, in LPWA communication device 13 of vehicle 10, control unit 131 determines whether intrusion (abnormality) into vehicle 10 is detected, and LPWA communication processing unit 132 When intrusion into the vehicle 10 is detected, transmission processing is performed on the vehicle information transmitted to the LPWA communication server 20 using LPWA communication.

  Thereby, the LPWA communication apparatus 13 of the vehicle 10 can appropriately perform the communication process of the vehicle 10 even when the cellular communication cannot be used. In other words, the LPWA communication device 13 uses the LPWA communication, which is lower in cost than the cellular communication, to transmit the vehicle information to the LPWA communication server 20 even when the cellular communication cannot be used due to the intrusion into the vehicle 10 via the cellular communication. Can be sent to.

  For example, when a third person enters the CAN of the vehicle 10 and is illegally accessed via the TCU 11, for example, the program of the driving control ECU may be rewritten via the CAN. In this case, an unauthorized driving operation is performed on the vehicle 10 and an accident may occur.

  On the other hand, in this embodiment, since the LPWA communication device 13 is disconnected from the CAN, even if an unauthorized access via the CAN via the TCU 11 occurs, the LPWA communication device 13 is illegal to the CAN. Unaffected by access. Further, in the vehicle 10, the operation control instruction from the LPWA communication device 13 is given priority over the operation control instruction via CAN. As a result, the driving control ECU can ignore the instruction of unauthorized driving operation due to unauthorized access via CAN, and can safely stop the vehicle 10 according to the emergency stopping instruction from the LPWA communication device 13.

  Therefore, in the vehicle 10, even if unauthorized access to the CAN occurs, the LPWA communication device 13 instructs the operation control ECU to perform the operation control (emergency stop) of the vehicle 10 without going through the CAN. An unauthorized driving operation on the vehicle 10 by a third party can be prevented.

  As described above, according to the present embodiment, even when the in-vehicle network of the vehicle 10 is illegally accessed and the cellular communication cannot be used, it is possible to prevent the vehicle 10 from being illegally operated.

  The embodiments of the present disclosure have been described above.

  In the above embodiment, the case where the intrusion detection device 12 detects an intrusion via cellular communication has been described. However, the intrusion to the vehicle 10 is not limited to an intrusion via cellular communication, and is connected to a CAN. It may be an intrusion into the ECU or TCU 11. For example, the intrusion detection device 12 may detect an intrusion when directly connected to an ECU connected to the CAN.

  The vehicle 10 is not limited to cellular communication, and may be connectable to the Internet via wireless LAN communication. The in-vehicle network is not limited to CAN, and may be Ethernet (registered trademark), for example.

  Moreover, although the said embodiment demonstrated the case where the presence or absence (emergency stop or continuation of driving | running | working) of the vehicle 10 was included in the travel control information from the LPWA communication server 20, it is not limited to this. For example, the travel control information from the LPWA communication server 20 may indicate the danger level of entering the vehicle 10. In this case, the LPWA communication device 13 may determine the operation control of the vehicle 10 step by step according to the notified danger level. Alternatively, the travel control information may include a stepwise operation control instruction corresponding to the danger level of entry into the vehicle 10.

  The present disclosure can be realized by software, hardware, or software linked with hardware. Each functional block used in the description of the above embodiment is partially or entirely realized as an LSI that is an integrated circuit, and each process described in the above embodiment may be partially or entirely performed. It may be controlled by one LSI or a combination of LSIs. The LSI may be composed of individual chips, or may be composed of one chip so as to include a part or all of the functional blocks. The LSI may include data input and output. An LSI may be referred to as an IC, a system LSI, a super LSI, or an ultra LSI depending on the degree of integration. The method of circuit integration is not limited to LSI, and may be realized by a dedicated circuit, a general-purpose processor, or a dedicated processor. Further, an FPGA (Field Programmable Gate Array) that can be programmed after manufacturing the LSI or a reconfigurable processor that can reconfigure the connection and setting of circuit cells inside the LSI may be used. The present disclosure may be implemented as digital processing or analog processing. Further, if integrated circuit technology comes out to replace LSI's as a result of the advancement of semiconductor technology or a derivative other technology, it is naturally also possible to carry out function block integration using this technology. Biotechnology can be applied.

  One aspect of the present disclosure is useful for a system that controls an emergency stop of a vehicle.

1 Emergency stop system 10 Vehicle 20 LPWA communication server 11 TCU
12 Intrusion Detection Device 13 LPWA Communication Device 131 Control Unit 132, 201 LPWA Communication Processing Unit 202 Determination Unit

Claims (5)

A control unit that determines whether intrusion into the vehicle via cellular communication is detected;
A communication processing unit for transmitting vehicle information to a server using LPWA (Low Power Wide Area) communication when intrusion to the vehicle is detected;
A communication apparatus comprising: The communication processing unit receives control information indicating whether to stop the vehicle from the server after transmitting the vehicle information to the server,
The control unit controls stopping of the vehicle based on the control information.
The communication apparatus according to claim 1. The communication device is provided separately from an ECU (Electronic Control Unit),
When the control information indicates that the vehicle is to be stopped, the control unit outputs a control signal that instructs the vehicle to stop, to the ECU.
The communication apparatus according to claim 2. The communication device is not directly connected to CAN (Control Area Network), and the communication device and the ECU are connected by a dedicated line.
The communication apparatus according to claim 3. Determine whether an intrusion to the vehicle via cellular communication has been detected,
When intrusion to the vehicle is detected, vehicle information is transmitted to the server using LPWA (Low Power Wide Area) communication.
Communication method.

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