JP2019125147A - Control unit, and method and program for writing data - Google Patents

Abstract

To provide a control unit and the like that can securely store confidential information and execute processing using the confidential information in a high-speed manner.SOLUTION: Disclosed is a control unit 2, which is a control unit comprising an I/O interface 23, a first execution area 201 in which inputting/outputting information via the I/O interface 23 is available, and a second execution area 202, which is a virtual area with limited access from the first execution area 201, and that executes inputting/outputting information to/from the first execution area 201 via a hypervisor 203. The second execution area 202 is configured so that inputting/outputting information via the I/O interface 23 is unavailable, and is configured to retain prescribed confidential information, and execute processing using the confidential information in response to requests from the first execution area 201.SELECTED DRAWING: Figure 7

Description

  The present invention relates to a control device, a data writing method, and a program.

  A secret key such as an encryption key and a PIN (Personal Identification Number) is stored in an IC (Integrated Circuit) chip such as a SIM (Subscriber Identity Module or Subscriber Identification Module), and a digital signature is generated in the IC chip using the secret information. There is a technology for performing arithmetic processing related to mutual authentication and the like. For example, Patent Document 1 discloses an IC card on which an IC chip is mounted, and which verifies itself a stored encryption key of the public key cryptosystem.

  In the IC chip such as SIM, the secret information such as the encryption key is not output to the outside, and the calculation using the secret information is performed in the chip. In this way, the security of the secret information stored in the IC chip is secured.

Japanese Patent Application Publication No. 2007-13342

  However, in the case of managing secret information in a physical module such as an IC chip, for example, the module needs to operate based on the protocol such as ISO 7816, and the processing speed of the above-mentioned operation and data exchange necessary for the operation is , SoC (System on Chip), low as compared with general-purpose operation modules called system LSI and so on. In addition, there is a possibility that a bus for inputting data to a physical module such as an IC chip or outputting data from the module may be hacked, and data may be exploited or tampered with.

  In one aspect, it is an object of the present invention to provide a control device or the like capable of safely storing secret information and performing processing using the secret information at high speed.

  The control device according to one aspect is an input / output interface, a first execution area capable of inputting / outputting information through the input / output interface, and a virtual area in which access from the first execution area is restricted. A second execution area for inputting and outputting information to and from the first execution area via a hypervisor, wherein the second execution area is information via the input / output interface Input / output is impossible, holds predetermined secret information, and executes processing using the secret information in response to a request from the first execution area.

  In one aspect, secret information can be securely stored and processing with the secret information can be performed at high speed.

It is a schematic diagram which shows the structural example of a chip | tip issuing system. It is a block diagram showing an example of composition of a server. It is a block diagram showing an example of composition of a chip. It is explanatory drawing which shows an example of the record layout of product DB. It is an explanatory view showing an example of a record layout of a command table. It is explanatory drawing which shows an example of the record layout of a conversion table. It is a functional block diagram showing an example of composition of a chip. It is explanatory drawing which shows the write-in process of the data with respect to a chip | tip. It is an explanatory view for explaining writing processing of data after chip issue. It is a flowchart which shows an example of the process sequence of the data write-in process in a chip | tip issue stage. It is a flowchart which shows an example of the process sequence of the data write-in process after chip | tip issue.

Hereinafter, the present invention will be described in detail based on the drawings showing the embodiments.
Embodiment
FIG. 1 is a schematic view showing a configuration example of a chip issuing system. In the present embodiment, a data writing method for writing secret information to a chip 2 mounted on various devices will be described. The present system includes an information processing apparatus 1 that instructs to write data to a chip (control device) 2.

  The information processing apparatus 1 is an information processing apparatus capable of various information processing and transmission / reception of information, and is, for example, a server apparatus, a personal computer, or the like. In the present embodiment, the information processing apparatus 1 is assumed to be a server apparatus, and hereinafter the server 1 will be read for simplicity. The server 1 instructs the issuing device (not shown) to write data to the chip 2 and causes the chip 2 to write data. The server 1 is communicably connected to a network N such as the Internet, and receives a request from a product maker that manufactures a device (product) on which the chip 2 is mounted, or an end user who uses the device. Remote control is performed to distribute and write data to the chip 2 via the interface.

  The chip 2 is a control device mounted on various devices and is, for example, an arithmetic processing device such as a central processing unit (CPU), random access memory (RAM), and ROM (read only) like a SoC (system on chip). It is an integrated circuit in which a storage area such as Only Memory) is mounted on one chip. The chip 2 is not limited to a so-called SoC, and different from a security chip such as SIM, it may be a control device capable of executing general processing of the device. Further, in the present embodiment, although the control device holding the secret information is described as a chip, the control device does not have to be an integrated circuit and may be a semiconductor circuit distributed in the device. .

  The storage area of the chip 2 stores data such as an operating system (OS) and an application program, and the chip 2 operates according to the OS and the application program. Further, in the storage area of the chip 2, predetermined secret information is stored. The secret information is, for example, unique information unique to each chip 2 (for example, the serial number of the chip 2), key information used for cryptographic computation (for example, public key or public key of public key cryptosystem, common key of common key cryptosystem, etc. And authentication information (for example, a PIN code) used for personal authentication and the like. Various kinds of secret information are written in the chip 2 in accordance with an instruction from the server 1.

  Before describing the details of this system, an outline of the manufacturing process of the device illustrated in FIG. 1 will be described. In this embodiment, the manufacture of the device and the chip 2 mounted on the device includes a chip manufacturer who manufactures the chip 2, a chip issuer who writes data to the chip 2, and the chip 2 mounted on the device. Description will be made assuming that the third party with a product maker that ships to users is responsible.

  The chip manufacturer is a manufacturer of semiconductor components, and manufactures the chip 2 to perform the minimum necessary initialization. The initial setting is, for example, installation of a basic OS necessary for activating the chip 2, writing of unique information (for example, serial number) capable of uniquely identifying each chip 2, or the like. The manufacturer writes the minimum necessary data to the chip 2 and ships it to the chip issuer.

  The chip issuer is an issuer that writes and issues various data in the chip 2 upon receiving an order from a product maker. When an order is received from a product maker, for example, designation of an application program to be installed on the chip 2 and confidential information to be written on the chip 2 is received. For example, the server 1 stores various data designated by each product maker on a database, reads data to be written to each chip 2 from the database, and instructs writing. The chip 2 in which various data are written by the chip issuer is shipped to each product maker.

  In addition, even after the chip 2 has been shipped (issued), the server 1 receives the request from the product maker or the end user and performs processing to write data in the chip 2 remotely via the network N. Details of the process will be described later.

  The product maker is a manufacturer which mounts the chip 2 delivered from the chip issuer on the device and ships it to the user. Devices manufactured by a product maker may be various electronic devices. For example, in addition to a smartphone shown in FIG. 1, an ECU (Electronic Control Unit) in a vehicle, a home appliance, etc., a personal computer, an infrastructure equipment device, a wearable device, etc. may be used. The device manufactured by the product manufacturer may be any electronic device on which the chip 2 is mounted, and the content thereof is not particularly limited.

  For example, as shown in FIG. 1, each device may be connected to the network N and function as a thing related to so-called IoT (Internet of Things).

FIG. 2 is a block diagram showing a configuration example of the server 1. The server 1 includes a control unit 11, a main storage unit 12, a communication unit 13, and an auxiliary storage unit 14.
The control unit 11 includes an arithmetic processing unit such as one or more CPUs, a micro-processing unit (MPU), and a graphics processing unit (GPU), and reads and executes the program P stored in the auxiliary storage unit 14. Thus, various information processing, control processing and the like related to the server 1 are performed. The main storage unit 12 is a temporary storage area such as a static random access memory (SRAM), a dynamic random access memory (DRAM), or a flash memory, and temporarily stores data necessary for the control unit 11 to execute arithmetic processing. Remember. The communication unit 13 includes a processing circuit and the like for performing processing related to communication, and transmits and receives information to and from other devices.

  The auxiliary storage unit 14 is a large capacity memory, a hard disk or the like, and stores a program P necessary for the control unit 11 to execute processing and other data. The auxiliary storage unit 14 also stores a product DB 141, a command table 142, and a conversion table 143. The product DB 141 is a database that stores order data of each product (chip 2) received from a product maker. The command table 142 is a table storing commands used when transmitting and receiving data between the server 1 and the chip 2. The conversion table 143 is a table storing conversion rules for converting data to be transmitted and received when transmitting and receiving data between the server 1 and the chip 2.

  The auxiliary storage unit 14 may be an external storage device connected to the server 1. Further, the server 1 may be a multi-computer comprising a plurality of computers, or may be a virtual machine virtually constructed by software.

  Furthermore, in the present embodiment, the server 1 is not limited to the above configuration, and may include, for example, a reading unit that reads information stored in a portable storage medium.

FIG. 3 is a block diagram showing a configuration example of the chip 2. The chip 2 includes a CPU 21, a RAM 22, an input / output I / F 23, and a non-volatile memory 24.
The CPU 21 is an arithmetic processing unit that executes various arithmetic processes, reads out various programs or data stored in the non-volatile memory 24, and executes arithmetic processes. The RAM 22 is a temporary storage area, and temporarily stores data necessary for the CPU 21 to execute arithmetic processing. The input / output I / F 23 is an interface for inputting and outputting information with the outside of the chip 2.

  The nonvolatile memory 24 includes, for example, a ROM, an EEPROM (Electrically Erasable Programmable ROM), etc., and stores various data. Specifically, the non-volatile memory 24 includes a rich OS 241, an application 242 operating under the rich OS 241 environment, a secure OS 243, an application 244 operating under the secure OS 243 environment, unique information 245, key information 246, and authentication. Information 247, a command table 142, and a conversion table 143 are stored.

  The rich OS 241, the application 242, the secure OS 243, and the application 244 are programs operating in separate virtual areas built in the chip 2. Specifically, the CPU 21 constructs, within the chip 2, a rich area (first execution area) for executing normal execution processing and a secure area (second execution area) which is a virtual area that is more secure than the rich area. And execute various programs in each virtual area. The CPU 21 executes the rich OS 241 and the application 242 in the rich area, and executes the secure OS 243 and the application 244 in the secure area. The details of each virtual area will be described later.

  The unique information 245 is information unique to the chip 2 and is, for example, the serial number of the chip 2 as described above. As described later, the server 1 rewrites the unique information 245 in response to a request from a product maker or the like, and writes desired information as the unique information 245 in the non-volatile memory 24. The said process is mentioned later.

  The key information 246 is an encryption key used for an encryption operation performed by the CPU 21, and is, for example, a key value such as a public key or a secret key of a public key cryptosystem or a common key of a common key cryptosystem.

  The authentication information 247 is, for example, data for authentication used for user authentication and the like, and is information personalized for individual users. The authentication information 247 is, for example, a PIN code such as a password, or biometric information for performing biometric authentication.

  The command table 142 and the conversion table 143 are common to the command table 142 and the conversion table 143 held by the server 1, and are tables used when transmitting and receiving data with the server 1.

  FIG. 4 is an explanatory view showing an example of the record layout of the product DB 141. As shown in FIG. The product DB 141 includes a chip ID column, an order source column, a product column, and a write data column. The chip ID column stores an ID for identifying each chip 2. The ordering source column stores the information of the product maker who has ordered data writing to each chip 2 in association with the chip ID. The product row stores information on the product (device) on which the chip 2 is mounted in association with the chip ID. The write data string stores data to be written to the chip 2 in association with the chip ID. The data to be written to the chip 2 is, for example, the applications 242 and 244, the unique information 245, the key information 246 and the like as described above, but is not limited to these.

  FIG. 5 is an explanatory view showing an example of the record layout of the command table 142. As shown in FIG. The command table 142 includes a command code sequence and a command content sequence. In the command code string, codes representing commands for transmitting and receiving data between the server 1 and the chip 2 are stored. The command content sequence stores the content of each command in association with the command code.

  FIG. 6 is an explanatory view showing an example of the record layout of the conversion table 143. As shown in FIG. The conversion table 143 is a code table in which a plurality of codes are listed. For example, as shown in FIG. 6, in the conversion table 143, two-digit codes (character strings) in hexadecimal notation from "00" to "FF" are listed. In the conversion table 143, the codes in the odd-numbered rows correspond to the codes in the even-numbered columns, and it is defined that the corresponding codes are mutually converted. For example, the code "00" in the first column of the first line corresponds to the code "5B" in the first column of the second line, and the code "00" is input to the conversion table 143. In the case, it converts to code "5B" and outputs it.

FIG. 7 is a functional block diagram showing a configuration example of the chip 2. Based on FIG. 7, the rich area 201 and the secure area 202 built in the chip 2 will be described.
The chip 2 constructs two virtual areas on the basis of hardware resources such as the CPU 21 and the RAM 22 as a virtualization basis. One virtual area is the rich area 201, and one virtual area is the secure area 202.

  The rich area 201 is a normal execution environment that executes basic, general-purpose processing of the device on which the chip 2 is mounted, and is an execution area that has no special functional restrictions other than access to the secure area 202 being restricted. It is. For example, when the chip 2 is mounted on a smartphone, the CPU 21 executes control processing related to a call, image display, and the like in the rich area 201. A rich OS 241 and an application 242 are stored in the rich area 201, and the CPU 21 executes general programs by executing each program.

  As shown in FIG. 7, the rich area 201 is configured to be able to input / output information with the outside through the input / output I / F 23. For example, the CPU 21 acquires the content of the operation input by the user via the input / output I / F 23, and returns a response to the operation input (for example, a response to the screen operation).

  The secure area 202 is a more secure execution environment than the rich area 201, and is a virtual area in which access from the rich area 201 is restricted. For example, as shown in FIG. 7, direct access from the rich area 201 to the secure area 202 is prohibited, and in order to access the secure area 202 from the rich area 201, the hypervisor 203 implemented on software is used. Must be accessed via.

  Although the chip 2 is described as having two virtual areas in the present embodiment, the chip 2 may have a plurality of virtual areas, and the number of virtual areas may be three or more.

  In the secure area 202, access from the rich area 201 is limited, and executable processing is also limited. Specifically, the CPU 21 executes processing important for security in the secure area 202. For example, as shown in FIG. 7, in the secure area 202, in addition to the secure OS 243 and the application 244, unique information 245 which is secret information, key information 246, authentication information 247 and the like are stored. The CPU 21 performs processing using the secret information in the secure area 202. For example, the CPU 21 performs cryptographic operation using the key information 246 in the secure area 202, and outputs the encrypted data to the rich area 201. Further, for example, in response to a request from the rich area 201, the CPU 21 performs personal authentication using the authentication information 247 in the secure area 202.

  In the secure area 202, a command table 142 and a conversion table 143 are stored. When the chip 2 transmits and receives data to and from the server 1, the CPU 21 generates transmission data and analyzes received data in the secure area 202 using each table.

  In the present embodiment, the secure area 202 is configured such that direct communication (input / output of information) with the outside of the chip 2 via the input / output I / F 23 is impossible. For example, as shown in FIG. 7, the hypervisor 203 is set to block the connection between the secure area 202 and the input / output I / F 23 and prohibit communication between the secure area 202 and the outside of the chip 2. . In order to input information to the secure area 202 from the outside of the chip 2 and acquire information from the secure area 202, it is necessary to go through the rich area 201 and the hypervisor 203.

  The secure area 202 executes security processing such as cryptographic operation only when a request is received from the rich area 201 via the hypervisor 203. The secure area 202 outputs the processing result of the security process (for example, an authentication result, encrypted data, etc.) to the rich area 201, and outputs it to the outside of the chip 2 through the rich area 201.

  As described above, the chip 2 has the rich area 201 and the secure area 202, and holds the secret information in the secure area 202. The secure area 202 is configured such that communication with the outside of the chip 2 through the input / output I / F 23 is not possible, and various types of use of secret information are made only when a request is received from the rich area 201 through the hypervisor 203. Execute the process of Thus, the chip 2 can securely store the secret information.

  Further, the chip 2 is not a physical module such as an IC chip mounted on an IC card, but holds secret information in a secure software module in the chip to perform calculation. As a result, the operation based on the secret information and the data exchange related to the operation can be executed at the bus level of the CPU, and the processing speed can be increased as compared with the case of mounting the physical module. In addition, in a physical module such as an IC chip, there is a risk that a bus connected to the module may be hacked and data may be extracted or malicious information may be input. However, when implemented as a software module as described above, the resistance against hacking can be enhanced. This can enhance security as compared to the case of implementing a physical module.

FIG. 8 is an explanatory view showing a process of writing data to the chip 2. FIG. 8 conceptually illustrates a process in which various data such as an OS, an application, and secret information are written to the chip 2.
FIG. 8 conceptually illustrates which data is written in a situation where the chip 2 exists under each of the chip manufacturer, the chip issuer, and the product maker.

  First, the chip manufacturer writes the minimum necessary OS (rich OS 241 and secure OS 243) for operating the chip 2 and the unique information 245 such as the serial number of the chip 2.

  Next, the chip issuer writes various data in the chip 2 so as to perform the customized operation according to the product according to the order received from the product maker. For example, the server 1 refers to the product DB 141 and sequentially writes data designated by each product maker in each chip 2 placed on the manufacturing line. For example, the server 1 writes the applications 242 and 244 and also writes the key information 246 used for the cryptographic operation.

  In this case, the server 1 rewrites the unique information 245 attached by the maker of the chip 2 when requested by the product maker.

  The unique information 245 written by the manufacturer is, for example, the serial number of the chip 2 and is data attached so that the chip manufacturer can uniquely identify each chip 2. However, the data (number) is a value determined by the manufacturer of the chip 2 and is not necessarily a value convenient for the product manufacturer or the end user. For example, assuming that the product on which the chip 2 is mounted is a portable medium such as a smartphone, the product functions as an employee ID card that performs authentication based on the data stored in the chip 2 and wants to use it as an IC card. There is. In this case, a user (company or the like) associates and manages the employee number and the serial number, reads the serial number from the chip 2, calls the employee number, and performs a two-step process of collating. This increases management costs.

  Therefore, depending on the product manufacturer or the end user, there is a need to rewrite the specific information 245 itself to a desired value. Therefore, the server 1 receives a value (for example, an employee number) of the unique information 245 to be rewritten from the product maker, and rewrites the unique information 245 with the value. This can enhance the convenience of the product maker and the end user.

  In addition, the server 1 sets a part or all of the secret information as the rewrite prohibition as necessary. For example, when the server 1 sets the unique information 245 to the rewrite prohibition, the server 1 writes a flag to the effect that the rewrite of the unique information 245 is prohibited to the chip 2 and causes the secure area 202 to hold the flag. When the secure area 202 is requested to rewrite the unique information 245 from the rich area 201, the secure area 202 rejects the rewrite. This can prevent the malicious third party from rewriting the secret information.

  Note that which secret information is set to prohibit rewriting is a design matter, and for example, the key information 246 may be set to prohibit rewriting. In addition, the server 1 may receive a specification from a product maker or the like as to which secret information is set to prohibit rewriting.

  As described above, the chip 2 in which various data are written by the chip issuer is shipped to the product maker. The product manufacturer writes the authentication information to the chip 2 using a predetermined terminal device 4 having a reader / writer function. The authentication information written by the product maker is, for example, a password or the like initially set for the product. The chip 2 in which the password has been set is incorporated into various products, and each product is shipped to the user. The user changes the password by himself, rewrites the authentication information, and uses them individually.

  In this embodiment, the server 1 not only instructs the chip issuer to write data on the production line but also communicates via the network N, and after receiving a request from a product maker etc., after issuing the chip 2 Even write data remotely.

  Here, as an example, the description will be made on the assumption that the chip 2 is issued by the chip issuer and data is remotely written to the chip 2 delivered to the factory of the product maker. For example, depending on the product manufacturer, there is a desire to customize and update the applications 242 and 244 in the chip 2 for their own use. Further, although only one product maker is illustrated in FIG. 8 for the sake of simplicity, a part maker that manufactures a part (for example, a vehicle ECU) on which the chip 2 is mounted and an entire product (for example, a vehicle) on which each device is mounted is manufactured. There may be a maker that In this case, a maker who manufactures the whole product may want to unify the unique information 245 of the chip 2 mounted on each part to the company's identification number.

  In such a case, the server 1 distributes data requested by the product maker to the chip 2 and writes the data to the non-volatile memory 24. For example, the terminal device 4 shown in FIG. 9 is connected to the network N, and the chip 2 communicates with the server 1 via the terminal device 4 to acquire desired data.

  However, if data writing to the chip 2 is unconditionally enabled, there is a possibility that data may be illegally written by a third party. Therefore, in the present embodiment, writing of data is permitted on the condition that authentication is successful between the server 1 and the chip 2.

  Further, since data is distributed from the server 1 to the chip 2 via the network N, there is a possibility that the data may be intercepted and exploited by a third party on the communication path. Therefore, in the present embodiment, the server 1 encrypts and distributes data, and the chip 2 restores the encrypted data to the original, and stores the data after restoration in the secure area 202 and writes the data. .

  Specifically, the server 1 and the chip 2 exchange data using the command table 142 and the conversion table 143, and perform the above authentication and encryption.

FIG. 9 is an explanatory diagram for explaining the process of writing data after the chip 2 is issued. Based on FIG. 9, the above-mentioned data writing by remote control will be described.
For example, a worker of a product manufacturer operates the terminal device 4 and inputs predetermined information for instructing the rewriting of the secret information to the chip 2. The information is input to the secure area 202 via the rich area 201. The chip 2 generates a transmission code shown in the upper right of FIG. 9 in the secure area 202 according to the input information and outputs the transmission code to the rich area 201.

  The transmission code is a data code including a command code corresponding to the content of the instruction, and a code specifying data to be written (hereinafter referred to as “write data”). In FIG. 9, a code for designating write data is linked to a command code indicated by "00" at the top. As described above, the command code is defined in the command table 142. The chip 2 reads a command code for requesting the server 1 to distribute data from the command table 142, and generates the transmission code of FIG. The generated transmission code is output from the secure area 202 to the rich area 201 and transmitted to the server 1.

  The write data may be secret information such as the unique information 245 or the key information 246, or may be data that is not required to be secret like the application 242 operating under the rich OS 241. Also, the write destination of the write data may be the secure area 202 or the rich area 201.

  The chip 2 converts the above command code in the secure area 202 in accordance with the conversion table 143. For example, as shown in FIG. 9, the chip 2 converts the command code "00" into "5B". The chip 2 holds the command code “5B” after conversion in order to use it for authentication.

  When the transmission code is acquired from the chip 2, the server 1 determines that the distribution request for the write data has been made from the chip 2 based on the command code “00” included in the transmission code. In this case, the server 1 converts the command code "00" into "5B" in accordance with the conversion table 143, similarly to the chip 2.

  The server 1 generates a transmission code including the converted command code “5B” and the write data requested from the chip 2. In this case, the server 1 converts the write data based on the conversion table 143, and uses the converted data as a transmission code. For example, when receiving a distribution request of the unique information 245 from the chip 2, the server 1 generates a data code obtained by converting the specified unique information 245 according to the conversion table 143. Thus, the data written to the chip 2 is encrypted, and it is possible to cope with the case where the third party eavesdrops and is exploited on the communication path. The server 1 transmits the generated transmission code to the chip 2.

  The chip 2 obtains from the server 1 a transmission code including the converted command code and the converted write data. The transmission code acquired from the server 1 is input to the secure area 202 via the rich area 201.

  In the secure area 202, the chip 2 executes an authentication process for authenticating the legitimacy of the server 1, which is the transmission source (input source) of the transmission code, based on the command code included in the transmission code. Specifically, the chip 2 collates the command code “5B” converted by itself with the command code “5B” converted by the server 1 and determines whether or not both match. As described above, the server 1 and the chip 2 share the command table 142 and the conversion table 143, and verify the transmission source of the write data by collating the data obtained by converting the same command code according to the conversion table 143. I do. If the command code converted by the chip 2 and the command code converted by the server 1 do not match, the chip 2 determines that the authentication has failed, and discards the data distributed from the server 1.

  If it is determined that the command codes match, the chip 2 determines that the authentication is successful. In this case, the chip 2 converts the write data included in the transmission code according to the conversion table 143 and restores the original data. The chip 2 writes the data by storing the restored data in the rich area 201 or the secure area 202.

  As described above, the server 1 writes data to the chip 2 remotely. In this case, the chip 2 performs the authentication in the secure area 202 using the data such as the command table 142 and the conversion table 143 written in the secure area 202 at the issuance stage. Thus, data can be written safely even at a remote location.

  Although the command code defined in the command table 142 is used for authentication in the above, authentication may be performed by means such as collation of the unique information 245, key exchange based on the key information 246, or the like. That is, the chip 2 may be capable of authenticating the legitimacy of the transmission source of the write data using the secret information held in the secure area 202, and the secret information to be used is not limited to the command code.

  In the above description, the server 1 distributes the write data to the chip 2 and remotely writes the data. However, the data may be written locally. For example, the terminal device 4 may read data corresponding to the transmission code from the portable storage medium and input the data to the chip 2. That is, the chip 2 may be capable of authenticating the legitimacy of the input source of the write data, and may obtain the write data without passing through the network N such as the Internet.

  In the above description, the write data is distributed to the chip 2 in the factory of the product manufacturer for convenience of explanation. For example, the end user distributes the write data to the device in use, and the chip 2 is authenticated. In some cases, it may be possible to write data. As a result, for example, the expired rich OS 241, application 242, key information 246, and the like can be updated. As described above, various modifications can be assumed to the present embodiment.

FIG. 10 is a flow chart showing an example of the processing procedure of the data write processing at the chip 2 issue stage. Based on FIG. 10, the process of writing data in the production line of the chip issuer will be described.
The control unit 11 of the server 1 reads out, from the product DB 141, various data designated by the product maker to be written to the chip 2 (step S11). Data to be written to the chip 2 is, for example, secret information to be written to the secure area 202 and applications 242 and 244 operating in the rich area 201 and the secure area 202, respectively. The secret information is data used in the processing executed by the CPU 21 of the chip 2 in the secure area 202, and is, for example, key information 246 used for cryptographic computation. Also, when requested by the product maker, the secret information written to the chip 2 includes rewrite data of the unique information 245 written by the maker of the chip 2.

  The control unit 11 instructs the writing of the data read in step S11 to the chip 2 (step S12). For example, the control unit 11 transmits data such as the applications 242 and 244 and the key information 246 to the issuing device that writes data to the non-volatile memory 24 of the chip 2 and requests to write the data. In addition, the CPU 21 writes the command table 142 and the conversion table 143 for writing data to the chip 2 remotely.

  Further, the control unit 11 instructs rewriting of the secret information written in the chip 2 (step S13). For example, as described above, the control unit 11 instructs the chip 2 to rewrite the unique information 245 unique to the chip 2.

  The control unit 11 sets the rewriting prohibition of a part or all of the secret information written in steps S12 and S13 in the chip 2 (step S14). For example, the control unit 11 writes a flag to the effect that the rewriting of any secret information is prohibited in the non-volatile memory 24 and causes the secure area 202 to hold the flag. The control unit 11 ends the series of processes.

FIG. 11 is a flowchart showing an example of the processing procedure of the data write processing after the issue of the chip 2. The processing content of the process of remotely writing data to the chip 2 will be described with reference to FIG.
For example, the chip 2 is connected to a predetermined terminal device 4 capable of communicating with the server 1 via the network N, and communicates with the server 1 via the terminal device 4. The CPU 21 of the chip 2 requests the server 1 to distribute the write data (step S31). For example, in the secure area 202, the CPU 21 generates a transmission code including a command code defined in the command table 142 and a data code specifying data to be written. The CPU 21 inputs the generated transmission code from the secure area 202 to the rich area 201 and transmits the generated transmission code to the server 1 via the network N. Further, the CPU 21 converts the command code included in the transmission code in the secure area 202 using the conversion table 143, and holds the converted code (step S32).

  When the transmission code is acquired from the chip 2 and the distribution request for the write data is received, the control unit 11 of the server 1 refers to the transmission code received from the chip 2 and writes the write data requested from the chip 2 to the product DB 141 From (step S33). For example, the control unit 11 determines that there is a distribution request based on the command code included in the transmission code, and determines the write data specified by the chip 2 from the code also included in the transmission code. The control unit 11 reads the write data from the product DB 141.

  The control unit 11 converts the command code acquired from the chip 2 and the write data read from the product DB 141 according to the conversion table 143 (step S34). The conversion table 143 is a table that defines conversion rules for converting data codes, and is a table in which input codes and output codes are associated. The control unit 11 converts the command code acquired from the chip 2 in accordance with the conversion table 143. Further, the control unit 11 converts the write data read from the product DB 141. The control unit 11 generates a transmission code including the converted command code and the converted write data, and transmits the transmission code to the chip 2 (step S35).

  When the command code and the transmission code including the write data are acquired from the server 1, the CPU 21 of the chip 2 collates the command code acquired from the server 1 with the command code converted in step S32 (step S36). That is, the CPU 21 verifies (authenticates) the authenticity of the command code by comparing the command code converted by itself with the command code converted by the server 1. Thus, the CPU 21 performs an authentication process for authenticating the validity of the server 1. The CPU 21 determines whether the command code matches (step S37). If it is determined that the command codes do not match (S37: NO), the CPU 21 discards the acquired data and ends the series of processing.

  If it is determined that the command codes match, the CPU 21 converts the write data included in the transmission code acquired from the server 1 according to the conversion table 143 (step S38). That is, the CPU 21 restores the write data converted by the server 1. The CPU 21 stores the converted write data in the rich area 201 or the secure area 202 (step S39), and ends the series of processes.

  Although a series of manufacturing processes have been described above separately for the chip manufacturer, chip issuer, and product maker, the distinction of this work subject is for convenience, and the present embodiment is limited to this. It is not a thing. For example, a chip manufacturer and a chip issuer may be the same business operator, and one business operator may perform from manufacture of the chip 2 to issuance. Also, one business operator may perform all the manufacturing operations up to the assembly of the device.

  As described above, according to the present embodiment, the secret information is held in the secure area 202, which is a software module in the chip 2, and the secure area 202 performs arithmetic processing using the secret information. Security of confidential information can be secured. In this embodiment, in particular, direct communication (input / output of information) between the secure area 202 and the outside of the chip 2 is not possible, and information is input to the secure area 202 or information is acquired from the secure area 202. For this reason, it is necessary to go through the rich region 201, and the security can be further strengthened. In addition, since the secure area 202 is a software module, the arithmetic processing capacity can be increased more than a physical module such as an IC chip. Furthermore, since it is not necessary to mount a dedicated physical module such as SIM in the device, it contributes to space saving and power saving.

  Further, according to the present embodiment, rewriting prohibition can be set to the secret information written to the chip 2 at the issuance stage, and it is possible to prevent falsification of the secret information after issuance.

  Further, according to the present embodiment, when additional writing, rewriting, etc. of data is performed after issuance, authentication is performed using the secret information (for example, the command table 142, the conversion table 143, etc.) written at the issuance stage. You can safely write data.

  Also, according to the present embodiment, data can be written remotely via the network N.

  Further, according to the present embodiment, when data is written remotely, it is possible to cope with eavesdropping, exploitation, etc. of data on a communication path by converting the written data according to conversion table 143 and then distributing it. .

  Further, according to the present embodiment, the server 1 and the chip 2 share the command code, and the verification of the authenticity (authentication) combining the command code and the conversion table 143 is performed to further improve the security. Can be enhanced.

  Further, according to the present embodiment, management of the chip 2 in the product maker or the like can be facilitated by rewriting the unique information 245 in accordance with the request from the product maker or the like.

  It should be understood that the embodiments disclosed herein are illustrative in all respects and not restrictive. The scope of the present invention is indicated not by the meaning described above but by the claims, and is intended to include all modifications within the meaning and scope equivalent to the claims.

1 Server (Information Processing Device)
11 control unit 12 main storage unit 13 communication unit 14 auxiliary storage unit P1 program 141 product DB
142 command table 143 conversion table 2 chips (control device)
21 CPU
22 RAM
23 Input / output I / F
24 non-volatile memory 241 rich OS
242 Application 243 Secure OS
244 application 245 unique information 246 key information 247 authentication information

Claims (12)

Input / output interface,
A first execution area capable of inputting and outputting information through the input / output interface;
A control device comprising: a virtual area in which access from the first execution area is restricted, and a second execution area performing input and output of information with the first execution area via a hypervisor. ,
The second execution area is
It is configured that input / output of information through the input / output interface is impossible,
Hold predetermined secret information,
The control device executes processing using the secret information in response to a request from the first execution area. The control device according to claim 1, wherein the second execution area receives a prohibition setting that prohibits rewriting of the secret information. The first execution area acquires data to be written to the first or second execution area via the input / output interface,
The second execution area is
When the first execution area acquires the data, an authentication process for authenticating the legitimacy of the input source of the data is executed based on the secret information,
The control device according to claim 1 or 2, wherein if the authentication is successful, the writing of the data is permitted. The input / output interface is connected to a network,
The control device according to claim 3, wherein the first execution area acquires the data transmitted via the network. The second execution area holds a conversion table which defines conversion rules of data code,
The first execution area is
Obtaining the data converted according to the conversion table;
The acquired data is input to the second execution area,
The control device according to claim 4, wherein the second execution area converts the input data according to the conversion table. The second execution area shares a command code used when transmitting and receiving the data with the input source, and
The first execution area acquires the command code converted according to the conversion table together with the data, and inputs the command code to the second execution area.
The control device according to claim 5, wherein the second execution area executes the authentication process for authenticating the authenticity of the command code with reference to the conversion table. A data writing method for writing data in a storage area of a control device, comprising:
The control device has a plurality of execution areas that input and output information with each other via a hypervisor.
A data writing method comprising: causing a computer to execute a process of writing predetermined secret information in a second execution area in which access from the first execution area is restricted among the plurality of execution areas. The controller comprises an input / output interface
The data write method according to claim 7, wherein the secret information is written to the second execution area configured to be unable to input / output information via the input / output interface. The second execution area holds in advance unique information specific to the control device,
9. The data writing method according to claim 7, wherein the specific information is rewritten to a predetermined value. The data writing method according to claim 9, further comprising: transmitting data to be newly written in the second execution area to the control device via a network. In the second execution area, write a conversion table that defines conversion rules of data code,
The data writing method according to claim 10, wherein the data converted according to the conversion table is transmitted to the control device. Control unit with input / output interface,
A first execution area capable of inputting and outputting information through the input / output interface; and a virtual area in which access from the first execution area is restricted, and the first execution area including a hypervisor Construct a second execution area that inputs and outputs information between
In the second execution area,
Configuring the input / output of information through the input / output interface as impossible,
Hold predetermined secret information,
A program that executes processing using the secret information in response to a request from the first execution area.

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