JP2016099906A - Method for managing manager password, computer and computer program - Google Patents

Abstract

PROBLEM TO BE SOLVED: To inhibit a manager from arbitrarily unlocking a user PC by using a manager password set in the user PC.SOLUTION: A user PC 10U receives a credential associated with a manager computer from a manager PC 10M to store the credential. The user PC sets a manager password received from the manager PC. When a user is absent, the manager PC sends the credential and the manager password to the user PC. The user PC authenticates the credential and the manager password. Since only a manager holding the credential except the user can unlock the user PC, arbitrary unlocking by the manager can be prevented. A nickname of the manager associated with the credential is registered, and the user who starts the user PC after the manager unlock the user PC can confirm the nickname.SELECTED DRAWING: Figure 1

Description

  The present invention relates to a technique for managing an administrator password set in system firmware.

  In a personal computer used in a company, a plurality of passwords (firmware passwords) can be set for system firmware such as BIOS or UEFI. Firmware passwords include power-on password (POP) and user hard disk password (UHDP) set by the user, and supervisor password (SVP) and master hard disk password normally set by the system administrator. (MHDP) exists.

  In the computer in which the POP is set, the user is requested to input the POP every time the system firmware is powered on. In a computer in which SVP and POP are set, the user can input the POP and power on, but the main configuration of the computer cannot be changed without knowing the SVP. Here, “power-on” refers to a state in which processing is performed from when the power supply is activated until the system firmware executes POST and loads the OS.

  Patent Document 1 discloses an invention for receiving a password from an administrator of a server through a network when the password for logging in to the server is forgotten. Patent Document 2 discloses an invention that reduces management costs when an administrator sets POP or HDP as a client. The administrator remotely sets the computer to the password forced mode when or after the computer is transferred to the client. A computer set in the password forced mode does not start the OS unless a password is set at the time of startup.

JP 2002-132725 A JP 2006-18451 A

  In a computer in which only the POP is set, the user can turn on the power by inputting the POP, but any number of people can cancel the POP by removing the coin battery. However, SVP cannot be released even if the coin battery is removed. On computers with SVP and POP settings, the user can turn on the power by entering the POP, the administrator can turn on the power by temporarily disabling the POP by entering the SVP, and cancel the POP. Or you can make changes.

  The administrator can set UHDP and MHDP. The user can then change the UHDP set by the administrator. The user can access all files on the HDD by inputting UHDP to the HDD set with UHDP and MHDP, and the administrator can access all files on the HDD by inputting MHDP. . The administrator can enter MHDP to cancel or change UHDP. When setting MHDP, SVP is often set according to operation or system request.

  Companies lend business computers to users who are employees. Users set POP and UHDP for business computers to ensure their privacy and data security. At this time, if only POP is set, it can be released by removing the coin battery, so that a security problem remains. Since SVP and MHDP cannot be recovered, if they are lost, the system board must be replaced or the HDD cannot be reused, and the HDD data is lost. In addition, when the user sets SVP and MHDP without permission and suddenly leaves the office, the computer reuse is hindered.

  Here, there is a case where an administrator wants to access the user's computer in the situation where an emergency occurs and the user does not exist. Furthermore, the user may forget the POP or UHDP. If SVP and MHDP are set, such a situation can be coped with and security can be improved. Therefore, many companies set SVP and MHDP in business computers.

  At this time, the administrator can always access the computer in which the SVP and MHDP are set, even though the user is using the computer personally in the business scope. Note that the OS installed on the computer itself also protects the user with a password, but this prevents the user from starting the operating environment normally used by the OS, that is, to log in to the OS environment. It is only limiting. For example, if a USB memory on which another OS is installed is temporarily attached to the computer and started up, the contents of the file data in the HDD under the management of the OS can be simplified unless it is encrypted for each individual file. It can be freely viewed or copied to the USB memory.

  Even if the manager is part of an organization in a relatively large company, the direct supervisor or president may be the manager in a small company. At this time, unless an arbitrary access by an administrator using SVP and MHDP is suppressed, the user cannot use the computer with peace of mind. Furthermore, assuming that there is a general manager of those computers, a password management system that includes a mechanism that allows the supervisor, who is the proxy manager, to have arbitrary and arbitrary access to the subordinate's computers, is managed by the general manager. It is hesitating for the person in charge to operate under his / her own responsibility. In other words, the password management method that is difficult for the general manager to manage is not convenient. Therefore, it is necessary to prepare an environment in which a user can use a computer in which SVP and MHDP are set with peace of mind.

  Therefore, an object of the present invention is to provide a method for appropriately managing an administrator password set by the system firmware. A further object of the present invention is to provide a method for constructing an environment in which an administrator password can be easily set on a user computer. It is another object of the present invention to provide a method for suppressing an administrator's arbitrary access to a user computer for which an administrator password is set. A further object of the present invention is to provide a computer and a computer program for realizing such a method.

  One aspect of the present invention is realized in a user computer that can set an administrator password and can communicate with the administrator computer. The user computer stores the credentials associated with the administrator computer and sets the administrator password. Next, the credentials received from the administrator computer and the administrator password are authenticated.

  As a result of the above configuration, when the administrator computer unlocks the user computer using the administrator password, the credentials are also authenticated, so that the administrator is prevented from arbitrarily unlocking. Can do. Even if an administrator password is set, the user can use the user computer with peace of mind because the user password is not unlocked unless unavoidable circumstances occur.

  The above procedure can be executed with the system firmware that is executed first when the user computer is started. Comparing the administrator password with the password set in the disk drive of the user computer can prevent a situation in which the disk drive cannot be used due to the loss of the administrator password.

  A nickname indicating the administrator computer is registered in association with the credential, an authentication flag indicating that the authentication of the credential is successful is set, and the nickname can be displayed when the setting of the authentication flag is confirmed at the time of activation. In this case, even if a plurality of administrator computers have the same administrator password, the user can know which administrator computer has been unlocked. Here, the nickname may be information that can identify an administrator who uses an administrator computer protected by a password. If the password of the user computer is required when registering this nickname, a user who knows the password must be present, so which administrator computer will unlock the computer in the future. Will ensure you have the opportunity to know for sure.

  When storing the credentials, if the nickname is displayed on the display of the user computer, the user can confirm the person who sets the administrator password in association with the nickname. The administrator password can be received from the administrator computer via a wireless communication path that does not go through the backbone network. By not going through the backbone network, it is easy to build a wireless communication path with system firmware. At this time, the same authentication code as that entered on the administrator computer is received, and the authentication code is used to perform mutual authentication with the administrator computer, and when mutual authentication is successful, a common key is generated with the administrator computer. Thus, a secure wireless communication path can be constructed using a common key cryptosystem.

  Another aspect of the present invention is implemented in an administrator computer that can communicate with a user computer. Generate credentials associated with the administrator computer, send the administrator password and credentials to the user computer, and set the administrator password. When the user computer is powered on, it sends a credential and an administrator password to the user computer to request authentication.

  When the administrator computer unlocks the administrator password, authentication of the credential associated with the administrator computer is also required, so that the user computer cannot be unlocked unless there is a valid reason. If you store the credentials on the administrator computer so that the administrator does not know them, you can prevent the administrator from entering the credentials and administrator password directly on the user computer so that there is no trace of unlocking. be able to.

  According to the present invention, it is possible to provide a method for appropriately managing the administrator password set by the system firmware. Furthermore, according to the present invention, a method for constructing an environment in which an administrator password can be easily set in a user computer can be provided. Furthermore, according to the present invention, it is possible to provide a method for suppressing an administrator's arbitrary access to a user computer for which an administrator password is set. Furthermore, according to the present invention, it is possible to provide a computer and a computer program for realizing such a method.

It is a functional block diagram for demonstrating the structure of main hardware of a notebook PC. It is a figure for demonstrating the structure of the main software of a notebook PC. It is a figure for demonstrating the data which NVRAM memorize | stores. It is a flowchart for demonstrating the procedure in which administrator PC sets administrator PW to user PC. It is a flowchart for demonstrating the procedure which unlocks user PC by administrator PC. It is a figure for demonstrating the method to manage the manager PW hierarchically. It is a figure for demonstrating the method to manage the manager PW hierarchically.

[Overall hardware configuration]
FIG. 1 is a schematic functional block diagram for explaining an example of a hardware configuration of a notebook personal computer (notebook PC) 10 applicable to the administrator PC 10M and the user PC 10U. In this specification, regarding the hardware elements of the notebook PC 10, when it is necessary to distinguish between the administrator PC 10M and the user PC 10U, M and U are respectively added to the reference numbers, and when it is not necessary to distinguish between both, M, We will not add U.

  FIG. 2 is a diagram for explaining the configuration of software being executed by the notebook PC 10. 2A corresponds to the administrator PC 10M, and FIG. 2B corresponds to the user PC 10U. FIG. 3 is a diagram for explaining data stored in the NVRAM 25. 3A corresponds to the administrator PC 10M, and FIG. 3B corresponds to the user PC 10U.

  Since the present invention does not depend on any specific hardware and operating system (OS) 53, the hardware and software elements will be described to the extent necessary to understand the present invention. The CPU package 11 includes a CPU core, a GPU, a memory controller, a PCIe interface, a PCH (Platform Controller Hub), and the like as a single package using an MCM (Multi-Chip Module).

  The CPU package 11 includes programs such as a system memory 13 for storing a program executed by the CPU core, a wireless module 15 for connecting to a wireless LAN network in an ad hoc mode or an infrastructure mode, an OS 53, and an application 55. HDD 17 for storing, near field communication module 19 for performing communication such as infrared communication or blue tooth (registered trademark), firmware ROM 23 for storing system firmware 100 such as LCD 21, UEFI or BIOS, and the administrator PC in the present invention is a user An NVRAM 25 and a keyboard 27 for storing various data for setting a password in the PC are connected.

  The system firmware 100 is executed first by the CPU core that is powered on and reset when the system resumes from the power off state, the hibernation state, or the suspend state to the power on state. The CPU core executes POST (Power On Self Test) and sets and authenticates firmware passwords (POP, SVP, UHDP and MHDP). In the following, POP and UHDP are collectively referred to as user PW, and SVP and MHDP are collectively referred to as administrator PW.

  The system firmware 100 is stored in a boot block that is write-protected in the firmware ROM 23 so that it cannot be rewritten without special authority, and serves as the basis for platform trust as a CRTM (Core Root of Trust for Measurement). Configure. The system firmware 100 includes an authentication module 101 that plays a main role in the present invention.

  The HDD 17 is a boot disk drive that stores a boot image, and UHDP and MHDP can be set through the system firmware 100. UHDP and MHDP can be input by the administrator PC 10M through the wireless module 15M or the near field communication module 19M according to the present invention in addition to input from the keyboard 27. The present invention can be applied to an SSD instead of the HDD 17.

  The set MHDP and UHDP are stored in a secure area that cannot be accessed from the system of the notebook PC 10 of the HDD 17. The HDD 17 in which only UHDP is set, and the HDD 17 in which UHDP and MHDP are set lock access from the system unless UHDP or MHDP is received from the system firmware 100.

  When the present invention is implemented, NVRAM 25M stores SVP 151, MHDP 153, credential 155, and nickname 157 as shown in FIG. 3A, and NVRAM 25U stores credential 155, nickname 157, and unlock flag 161. Remember. By storing the SVP 151 and the MHDP 153 in the NVRAM 25U, it is possible to prevent and securely manage the administrator PW, which has conventionally depended on the administrator's memory or has been noted by the administrator. become able to. The nickname 157 is data in which plain data is used to specify an administrator such as a first name and last name.

  The system firmware 100 locks the controller when transferring the control right of the CPU core to the OS 53, and prohibits other programs from accessing the NVRAM 25. The controller once locked cannot be released unless the CPU package 11 is reset. When the CPU package 11 is reset, the system firmware 100 is executed first, so that a program under the operating environment of the OS 53 cannot access the NVRAM 25.

  FIG. 4 is a flowchart for explaining a procedure when the administrator sets the administrator PW in the user PC 10U through the administrator PC 10M. Blocks 201 to 215 show the procedure of the administrator PC 10M, and blocks 251 to 265 show the procedure of the user PC 10U. An administrator PC 10M and a user PC 10U are lined up in front of the administrator. The user may be on the administrator side. Even if there are a plurality of user PCs 10U, the administrator PC 10M executes the same procedure.

  In block 201, the NVRAM 25M of the administrator PC 10M stores the SVP 151, MHDP 153, and nickname 157 input by the administrator from the keyboard 27M. The NVRAM 25U of the user PC 10U does not store any data shown in FIG. In block 251, the administrator sets POP and UHDP for the authentication module 101U.

  The user PW can set the user's name or simple character string so that the user can easily change it later. The present invention can be applied separately to POP and UHDP. However, in normal security operation, when setting MHDP, SVP is also set. Therefore, both administrator PWs are set thereafter. It is assumed that The set POP is stored in a secure area of the firmware ROM 23U, and the set UHDP is stored in a secure area of the HDD 17U.

  When the administrator who activated the power supply of the administrator PC 10M in block 203 presses a predetermined function key, the authentication module 101M is executed, and a screen for setting the administrator PW for the user PC 10U is displayed on the LCD 21M. indicate. When the administrator gives an instruction for setting the administrator PW from the keyboard 27M, the authentication module 101M operates the wireless module 15M in block 205 and transmits a beacon for building an ad hoc network.

  In parallel with this, when the administrator who activated the power of the user PC 10U in block 253 presses a predetermined function key, the authentication module 101U is executed, and the administrator PW is set on the LCD 21U for the user PC 10U. Displays a screen for When the administrator gives an instruction for setting the administrator PW from the keyboard 27U, the authentication module 101U operates the wireless module 15U.

  The administrator PC 10M and the user PC 10U have previously unified the communication channel and SSID so that an Ethernet (registered trademark) ad hoc network can be constructed between them. If the user PC 10U exists within a range where radio waves can reach each other with the administrator PC 10M, an ad hoc network is established between the user PC 10U and the administrator PC 10M so that communication is possible.

  However, the administrator PC 10M and the user PC 10U may communicate with each other through an infrastructure mode network, or may directly communicate with each other through the short-range communication modules 19M and 19U. Using the ad hoc mode that communicates directly without going through the access point and the backbone network, or the short-range communication module 19 that establishes an independent communication path between the two devices, the system firmware 100 has a complete network stack. Since it is no longer necessary to equip, the burden can be reduced.

  In blocks 207 and 257, the administrator PC 10M and the user PC 10U perform mutual authentication. Mutual authentication is performed in blocks 209 and 259 by, for example, the Diffie-Hellman (D / H) method, and the man-in-the-attack (Man-in-the-theft) by impersonation when the administrator PC 10M and the user PC 10U generate a common key. This is done to increase resistance against middle-attack. The administrator inputs the same authentication code from the keyboards 27M and 27U.

  The authentication modules 101M and 101U perform mutual authentication by a challenge / response method. First, the authentication module 101M makes an authentication request to the authentication module 101U, and the authentication module 101U returns a challenge accordingly. The authentication module 101M returns a response created by a specific algorithm from the challenge and the input authentication code to the authentication module 101U.

  The authentication module 101U authenticates the administrator PC 10M by comparing the received authentication value with the value generated by the same algorithm for the challenge sent earlier and the received response. Subsequently, the authentication module 101M authenticates the user PC 10U in the same procedure. The man-in-the-middle attack may be performed except when a communication path that does not have the possibility of eavesdropping is established by directly connecting the administrator PC 10M and the user PC 10U by infrared rays or wires. Therefore, the Ethernet (registered trademark) or WiFi is used. This is especially desirable when communicating over the Internet.

  When the mutual authentication is completed, in blocks 209 and 259, secret values held by the authentication modules 101M and 101U in the D / H method are exchanged to independently generate a common key and hold it until the power is stopped. The common key is used to construct a secure communication path using the common key encryption method between the administrator PC 10M and the administrator PC 10U in the following procedure. In block 211, the authentication module 101M generates a credential 155 composed of a character string that cannot be predicted by the administrator, such as a random number or time. Thereafter, the authentication module 155 stores the credential 155 in the NVRAM 25M so that it cannot be retrieved except when the credential 155 is sent to the user PC 10U. Therefore, the credential 155 stored in the NVRAM 25M is not known to anyone including the administrator.

  In block 213, the authentication module 101M sends the credential 155 and the nickname 157 to the authentication module 101U. In block 261, the authentication module 101U associates the received credential 155 with the nickname 157 and stores them in the NVRAM 25U. At this time, if the authentication module 101U displays the nickname 157 on the LCD 21U, the user can confirm that the nickname 157 corresponding to the administrator is stored, so the administrator intentionally uses another person's nickname. You can get rid of your worries. Furthermore, if you ask for the password of the user computer that only the user knows, the user must be present to register the nickname, so the user will be registered for future unlock operations on his computer. It is possible to guarantee an opportunity to know the administrator PC 10M without fail.

  The authentication module 101U manages the credential 155 so that it cannot be taken out except when it is unlocked by the administrator PW described later. Therefore, the credential 155 stored in the NVRAM 25U is not known to anyone including the user. In block 263, the authentication module 101U shifts to the setting standby state of the administrator PW on condition that the credential 155 and the nickname 157 are stored. The setting standby state is the same as the state in which a predetermined function key is operated to enter the BIOS setup security setting screen immediately after the user PC 10U is powered on. The authentication module 101U notifies the authentication module 101M that it has shifted to the setting standby state.

  Recognizing that the user PC 10U has entered the setting standby state in block 215, the authentication module 101M sends the administrator PW stored in the NVRAM 25M to the authentication module 101U. In block 265, the authentication module 101U sets the SVP 151 and MHDP 153 in the system firmware 101U in the same manner as when input from the keyboard 27U to the setup screen.

  The SVP 151 is stored in a secure location in the firmware ROM 23U by the authentication module 101U, and the MHDP 153 is sent to the HDD 17U by the authentication module 101U. The internal firmware of the HDD 17U stores the MHDP 153 in an internal secure location. The administrator gives the user PC 10U in which the administrator PW and the user PW are set to the user. Even if the user is on the side of the administrator in the procedure so far, the administrator PW and the credential 155 cannot be known and cannot be known after the start of use, but thereafter, the POP and UHDP are changed. I can.

  FIG. 5 is a flowchart for explaining a procedure when the administrator inputs the administrator PW to the user PC 10U through the administrator PC 10M and unlocks it. In front of the administrator, the administrator PC 10M and the user PC 10U to which the administrator PW is set by the procedure of FIG. 4 are arranged. The procedures of blocks 301 to 307 and blocks 351 to 357 are almost the same as those of blocks 203 to 209 and blocks 253 to 257 in FIG. 4, but in this case, the administrator uses the administrator PC 10M without a user. It is assumed that the user PC 10U is unlocked.

  When the administrator who activated the power supply of the administrator PC 10M in block 303 presses a predetermined function key, the authentication module 101M is executed, and a screen for unlocking the user PC 10U is displayed on the LCD 21M. The administrator gives an instruction to unlock the user PC 10U from the keyboard 27M. In parallel with this, when the administrator who activated the power of the user PC 10U in block 353 presses a predetermined function key, the authentication module 101U is executed and a screen for inputting the administrator PW to the LCD 21U. Is displayed. The administrator gives an instruction for inputting the administrator PW from the keyboard 27U. At this time, the user PC 10U can request the administrator to input a user ID.

  In block 309, the authentication module 101M sends the credentials 155 stored in the NVRAM 25M to the authentication module 101U. In block 359, the authentication module 101U compares the credentials 155 stored in the NVRAM 25U with the received credentials 155 to authenticate the administrator PC 10M. If the authentication is successful in block 361, the process proceeds to block 363. If the authentication is unsuccessful, the process proceeds to block 377 and the procedure is terminated, and unlocking is impossible.

  The credential 155 is managed by the administrator PC 10M and the user PC 10U so that no one including the administrator and the user can know. Therefore, the administrator PC 10M cannot acquire the credentials of another person who has the same administrator PW, and cannot send the credentials by impersonating another person. In addition, it is not possible to input the user's own credential 155 directly from the keyboard 27U without going through the procedure of FIG. 5 and unlock it without leaving a trace.

  Therefore, the successful mutual authentication of the credential 155 in the blocks 305 and 355 corresponds to the administrator who set the administrator PW in the block 265 (FIG. 4) sent the credential 155 in a proper procedure. In particular, as described with reference to FIG. 6, even when a plurality of proxy managers have the same manager PW, the authentication module 101U does not authenticate the credentials of proxy managers other than the proxy manager who sets the manager PW.

  In block 363, the authentication module 101U sets the unlock flag 161 in the NVRAM 25U. On the condition that the authentication of the credential 155 is successful, the authentication module 101U enters a state waiting for input of the administrator PW in block 365. The input waiting state corresponds to a state in which the administrator PW can input from the keyboard 27U on the BIOS setup screen. The authentication module 101U notifies the authentication module 101M that the state has shifted to the input waiting state.

  The authentication module 101M that has received the notification of the input waiting state in block 311 sends the SVP 151 and MHDP 153 stored in the NVRM 25M to the management module 101U. In block 367, the authentication module 101U authenticates the administrator PW in the same manner as when the BIOS setup screen is input from the keyboard 27U. Even if the user PW is set, the power-on and the HDD 17U can be accessed by inputting the administrator PW. At block 369, POST by the system firmware 100U is completed, and loading of the OS from the HDD 17U is started.

  The administrator stops the power supply of the user PC 10U when the predetermined work is completed in the absence of the user. Next, when the user activates the power source of the user PC 10U and executes the system firmware 100U in block 371, the management module 101U checks the unlock flag 161 of the NVRAM 25U in block 373. If the unlock flag 161 is not set, the process proceeds to block 377, the procedure ends, and the loading of the OS starts as usual. When the management module 100U confirms the setting of the unlock flag 161, the management module 100U deletes it and simultaneously displays the nickname 157 associated with the credential 155 authenticated in block 359 on the LCD 21U in block 375.

  The administrator can unlock the user PC 10U using the administrator PW while the user is absent, but the user can know from the nickname that the administrator has unlocked when the power is subsequently turned on. . This is equivalent to suppressing an arbitrary unlocking by the administrator and creating a state where the user PC 10U can be accessed even if the user PW is set in an emergency. This also corresponds to preventing the setting of the administrator PW by the user by constructing an operating environment in which the administrator PW can be set so that the user can feel at ease.

  The procedures in FIGS. 4 and 5 describe the embodiment of the present invention. All the described procedures are not essential elements of the present invention, and the order may be changed within the scope of the idea of the present invention. it can. For example, in blocks 309 and 311 (FIG. 5), the administrator PW is sent after the credential 155 is authenticated. However, the credential 155 and the administrator PW may be sent at the same time, or the administrator PW may be sent first. You may send it. For example, the administrator PW can be sent at block 309, the administrator PW can be authenticated at block 359, and the unlock flag 161 can be set at block 363 when authentication is successful.

  Block 365 then enters a credential input wait state, block 311 sends credential 155 and block 367 authenticates the credential. When the administrator PW is authenticated first, an identifier that does not require authentication, such as a user ID for identifying the administrator, may be used instead of the credential 155. In addition, if there is a single person who has the administrator PW, it is possible to identify the unlocked person without registering the nickname by recording that the credential has been authenticated and unlocked. Registration is no longer mandatory.

  Next, a method of hierarchically managing the managers PW using the procedures in FIGS. 4 and 5 will be described with reference to FIGS. In FIG. 6, there are proxy administrator PCs 411 to 415 owned by a plurality of proxy managers under the management of the route manager PC 400 held by the route manager, and the users are under the management of the proxy manager PCs 411 to 415. PC groups 401 to 403 exist. The solid line indicates that the administrator PW can be set, and the dotted line indicates that the administrator PW can be unlocked. The administrator PW is unified throughout. However, in the present invention, the administrator PW may be different for each proxy administrator.

  The relationship between the route administrator PC 400 and each proxy administrator PC 411 to 413 and the relationship between each proxy administrator PC 411 to 415 and each user PC of the corresponding user PC group 401 to 403 will be described with reference to FIGS. It can be understood in the same manner as the relationship between the administrator PC 10M and the user PC 10U. Each of the proxy manager PCs 411 to 413 has the credentials and nickname of the root manager PC 400. Each user PC in each user PC group 401 to 403 has the credentials and nicknames of the corresponding proxy administrator PCs 411 to 413.

  In this case, the root manager PC 400 can unlock the proxy manager PCs 411 to 415, but when the proxy manager boots his / her proxy manager PC, the administrator's nickname is displayed on the LCD. Each of the proxy administrator PCs 411 to 413 can unlock the user PCs of the managed user PC groups 401 to 403, but when the user subsequently boots his own user PC, the proxy unlocked to the LCD The administrator's nickname is displayed.

  The credential 155 cannot know any of the route manager, the proxy manager, and the user. Therefore, for example, the proxy administrator PC 411 unlocks the user PCs of the user PC group 403 by impersonating the authorized administrator PW and the credential 155 and nickname 157 of the proxy administrator PC 413 obtained illegally. I can't do that.

  In FIG. 7, the proxy managers 421 to 423 set the manager PW for each user PC of the managed user PC groups 401 to 405, but only the root manager PC 400 unlocks each user PC. Indicates what to do. The user PCs of the proxy administrator PCs 421 to 425 and the user PC groups 401 to 405 have the credentials and nickname of the route administrator PC 400. Each proxy administrator PC 421 to 425 sends the credentials and nickname of the route administrator 400 to the user PCs of the corresponding user PC group 401 to 405.

  The root administrator PC 400 can unlock all the user PCs of all the proxy administrator PCs 421 to 425 and the user PC groups 401 to 405, but then use the proxy managers 421 to 425 or the user PC groups 401 to 405. When the administrator PC boots, the nickname of the route manager 400 unlocked is displayed on the LCD. Since the route administrator PC 400 can set the administrator PW through the proxy administrator PCs 421 to 425, the time can be saved even if the number of user PCs increases, and the user can only unlock the route administrator. Because there is, you can feel secure.

  Although the present invention has been described with the specific embodiments shown in the drawings, the present invention is not limited to the embodiments shown in the drawings, and is known so far as long as the effects of the present invention are achieved. It goes without saying that any configuration can be adopted.

10 Notebook PC
10M administrator PC
10U user PC
400 Route administrator PC
401-405, user PC group 411-415, 421-423 proxy administrator PC

Claims (20)

On the user computer that can set the administrator password and can communicate with the administrator computer,
Storing credentials associated with the administrator computer and setting the administrator password;
Authenticating the credentials received from the administrator computer;
A computer program for causing a process to include the step of authenticating the administrator password received from the administrator computer.   The computer program according to claim 1, wherein the computer program is system firmware that is executed first when the user computer is started.   The computer program according to claim 2, wherein the administrator password is a password set in a disk drive of the user computer. Registering a nickname indicating the administrator computer in association with the credential;
Setting an authentication flag indicating successful authentication of the credential;
The computer program according to claim 2, further comprising a step of displaying the nickname on a display when the setting of the authentication flag is confirmed at startup.   The computer program according to claim 4, wherein the step of setting the administrator password includes the step of displaying the nickname on a display of the user computer.   The computer program according to claim 2, wherein the step of setting the administrator password receives the administrator password from the administrator computer through a wireless communication path that does not pass through a backbone network. Receiving the same authentication code as the authentication code entered in the administrator computer;
Performing mutual authentication with the administrator computer using the authentication code;
Generating a common key with the administrator computer when the mutual authentication is successful;
The computer program according to claim 6, further comprising the step of constructing the wireless communication channel secure by a common key encryption method. To an administrator computer that can communicate with the user computer,
Generating credentials associated with the administrator computer;
Sending the administrator password and the credentials to the user computer and setting the administrator password;
Sending an authentication request by sending the credentials to the user computer when the user computer is powered on;
System firmware for causing the user computer to send the administrator password and requesting authentication.   9. The system firmware of claim 8, wherein generating the credentials includes storing the credentials on the administrator computer so that the credentials are not known to an administrator. An administrator password can be set and the computer can communicate with the administrator computer.
Credentials associated with the administrator computer;
A computer having the credentials received from the administrator computer and system firmware that causes the computer to function to authenticate the administrator password. A nickname associated with the credential;
An authentication flag that is set when the credential is authenticated;
The computer according to claim 10, wherein the system firmware causes the computer to realize a function of displaying the nickname on a display when confirming the setting of the authentication flag.   The computer of claim 10, comprising a wireless module that communicates over an ad hoc network for receiving the administrator password and the credentials from the administrator computer. A method for managing an administrator password set in system firmware between an administrator computer and a user computer,
Storing credentials associated with the administrator computer received by the user computer from the administrator computer;
Setting the administrator password received by the user computer from the administrator computer;
The administrator computer sending the credentials and the administrator password to the user computer;
The user computer authenticating the credentials and the administrator password. Storing a nickname associated with the credential received by the user computer from the administrator computer;
Setting an authentication flag when the user computer authenticates the administrator password;
The user computer confirming the authentication flag at power-on and displaying the nickname;
14. The method of claim 13, comprising: A method for managing an administrator password set in system firmware between a root administrator computer and a plurality of user computers,
Assigning a proxy administrator computer to a plurality of user computer groups each including a plurality of user computers;
Sending the administrator password from the root administrator computer to the proxy administrator computer;
Sending the credential associated with the proxy administrator computer to the user computer of the user computer group assigned by the proxy administrator computer and setting the administrator password; and
The user computer authenticating the credentials and the administrator password;
Recording that the user computer has authenticated the credential.   The method of claim 15, wherein a plurality of proxy administrator computers each receive the same administrator password from the root administrator computer. Sending the credentials associated with the root administrator computer from the root administrator computer to the proxy administrator computer;
Sending an administrator password from the root administrator computer to the proxy administrator computer to set the administrator password; and
The proxy administrator computer authenticating the credentials and the administrator password;
16. The method of claim 15, comprising recording that the proxy administrator computer has authenticated the credential. A method for managing an administrator password set in system firmware between a root administrator computer and a plurality of user computers,
Assigning a proxy administrator computer to a plurality of user computer groups each including a plurality of user computers;
Sending the credentials associated with the root administrator computer and the administrator password from the root administrator computer to the proxy administrator computer;
Setting the administrator password by sending the credentials and the administrator password to a user computer of the user computer group assigned by the proxy administrator computer;
The user computer authenticating the credentials and the administrator password;
Recording that the user computer has authenticated the credential. An administrator password can be set for the disk drive, and the user computer can communicate with the administrator computer.
Receiving an identifier of a user of the administrator computer from the administrator computer;
Authenticating the administrator password received from the administrator computer;
System firmware for causing a process to include the step of recording the identifier in response to the authentication of the administrator password.   20. The system firmware according to claim 19, further comprising a step of displaying the identifier on a display at startup.

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