JP2015032260A - Vehicle authentication system - Google Patents

Abstract

PROBLEM TO BE SOLVED: To provide a vehicle authentication system capable of reliable vehicle authentication to a wide range of vehicles while restraining cost increase.SOLUTION: A vehicle authentication system includes an authentication object vehicle and a server capable of communication with the authentication object vehicle and for performing authentication of the authentication object vehicle. The authentication object vehicle or the server generates travel trace information including a travel trace of the authentication object vehicle. The server determines whether the travel trace information is adequate or not on the basis of the travel trace, and authenticates the authentication object vehicle on the basis of the determination.

Description

  The present invention relates to a vehicle authentication technique.

  Conventionally, a server that receives and accumulates information (for example, position, travel route, vehicle speed, etc.) transmitted from a plurality of vehicles has been provided, and road traffic information (congestion, route guidance) is based on the information accumulated in the server. Etc.) are known. In addition, technologies related to information sharing using inter-vehicle communication between multiple vehicles have also been proposed, so that the driver of the vehicle exists in driving assistance information such as road conditions, recommended routes, etc. and blind spots at intersections. It is possible to acquire traffic safety information and the like of the vehicle to be used.

  Thus, when using driving support information or traffic safety information based on information from a plurality of vehicles, it is important that the information from the information source can be trusted. In particular, in the case of a server that provides driving support information and traffic safety information in real time (for example, information on road conditions and blind spots existing several minutes ago) or when sharing information by inter-vehicle communication, Often there is no time to filter unreliable information.

  Therefore, it is necessary to authenticate the vehicle that is the information source, and techniques relating to vehicle authentication have been proposed. For example, in Patent Document 1, in a vehicle-to-vehicle communication system, a roadside device provided on a road in a specific area receives ID information or the like from a vehicle by road-to-vehicle communication, determines its validity, and then validates in the specific area. There has been proposed a technique for issuing authentication information indicating the property and transmitting it to the vehicle.

JP 2002-233151 A JP 2011-209779 A JP 2007-164328 A

  However, in the authentication technique described in Patent Document 1, it is necessary to provide a plurality of roadside devices for issuing authentication information on the road, which may cause a problem in terms of cost. In addition, since it is vehicle authentication in a specific area, it cannot be used in, for example, a server that distributes driving support information and traffic safety information in a wide range. Further, since the vehicle owner may maliciously alter the ID information of the vehicle-mounted device, the so-called cryptographic authentication method using the ID information or the like may perform highly reliable vehicle authentication. There are cases where it is not possible.

  Then, in view of the said subject, it aims at providing the vehicle authentication system which can perform reliable vehicle authentication with respect to a wide range of vehicles, suppressing a cost increase.

In order to achieve the above object, in one embodiment, the vehicle authentication system includes:
A certified vehicle,
A server capable of communicating with the vehicle to be authenticated, and a server for authenticating the vehicle to be authenticated;
A vehicle authentication system comprising:
The authenticated vehicle or the server is
Generate travel locus information including the travel locus of the authenticated vehicle,
The server
Based on the travel locus, it is determined whether or not the travel locus information is valid, and the authenticated vehicle is authenticated based on the determination.

  According to the present embodiment, it is possible to provide a vehicle authentication system capable of performing highly reliable vehicle authentication for a wide range of vehicles while suppressing an increase in cost.

1 is a diagram illustrating a configuration of a vehicle authentication system 1. FIG. 1 is a diagram illustrating a configuration of an in-vehicle device 110 included in a vehicle 100. FIG. It is a flowchart which shows an example of the vehicle authentication flow by the vehicle authentication system. It is a figure explaining the vehicle authentication based on an example of the vehicle locus | trajectory information transmitted from the vehicle 100A, and surrounding vehicle information.

  Hereinafter, embodiments for carrying out the invention will be described with reference to the drawings.

  FIG. 1 is a diagram illustrating a configuration of a vehicle authentication system 1 according to the present embodiment.

  Referring to FIG. 1, a vehicle authentication system 1 according to this embodiment is used in a road traffic information distribution system 2.

  First, the road traffic information distribution system 2 will be described.

  The road traffic information distribution system 2 collects so-called probe information from the vehicle 100 and provides a service for distributing traffic information (driving support information, traffic safety information) such as traffic jam information and regulation information in real time based on the probe information. Do. Note that the probe information is based on data acquired by a sensor or the like mounted on the vehicle 100 when the vehicle 100 actually moves (including a state where the vehicle 100 is stopped when the IG is on). It is the generated information. The information included in the probe information is mainly position information of the vehicle 100, vehicle speed information, fuel consumption information, and the like, but also includes traffic jam information generated by combining the vehicle speed information and the position information. In addition, the probe information is not limited to information related to the traveling state and road state, and includes, for example, weather information generated based on data of a raindrop sensor of a wiper mounted on the probe vehicle. In addition, “real time” in the present embodiment means that traffic information is distributed based on information collected from the vehicle 100 at the latest several minutes at the latest, for example.

  The road traffic information distribution system 2 includes a road traffic information server 20 and the like.

  The road traffic information server 20 includes a road traffic information storage unit 21, an individual information generation unit 22, a distribution processing unit 23, a communication processing unit 24, and the like.

  The road traffic information storage unit 21 is a storage device that stores and accumulates map information, probe information, and the like. The probe information transmitted from the vehicle 100 is stored in the road traffic information storage unit 21 via the vehicle authentication server 10 (logging unit 12) described later.

  The individual information generation unit 22 generates individual traffic information to be distributed to the vehicle 100 based on the map information, probe information, and the like included in the road traffic information storage unit 21. For example, right-turn traffic jam information occurring at a certain intersection, obstacle information on a certain road, local weather information, green wave traveling information (such as the optimum traveling speed for keeping passing the intersection with a green light), and the optimal route Driving support information such as information and traffic safety information may be generated.

  The distribution processing unit 23 performs a process for distributing the individual traffic information generated by the individual information generating unit 22. For example, in response to a request from the vehicle 100, individual traffic information or the like according to the request is distributed (via the communication processing unit 24), or the vehicle 100 near the road where the traffic jam occurs, or heading to the road The vehicle 100 or the like may be selected and traffic jam information may be distributed (via the communication processing unit 24). In addition, the delivery destination of individual traffic information etc. is not restricted to the vehicle 100, For example, delivery to information processing terminals, such as a smart phone and a personal computer, may be performed.

  The communication processing unit 24 converts the individual traffic information and the like transmitted from the distribution processing unit 23 into a signal to be transmitted to the vehicle 100 via the Internet 40, the wireless network 30, and the like. In addition, the distribution request transmitted from the vehicle 100 is received and converted into a signal usable by the distribution processing unit 23 or the like.

  Here, since the road traffic information distribution system 2 distributes traffic information and the like to the vehicle 100 and the like in real time, probe information with low reliability (for example, an abnormal value is included and has been intentionally altered) There is no time to suppress the use of data). Therefore, it is very important to be able to trust the vehicle 100 as an information source. In the present embodiment, the vehicle authentication system 1 is used to perform vehicle authentication of the vehicle 100, so that it is based on highly reliable probe information. Provide traffic information.

  The vehicle authentication system 1 determines the validity of the information transmitted from the vehicle 100 as an overview. Although details will be described later, a plurality of validity determinations are performed, and the more that are determined to be valid, the higher the reliability of the vehicle 100 and the higher the possibility of authenticating the vehicle 100. When the vehicle authentication system 1 authenticates the vehicle 100, the vehicle authentication system 1 permits use in the road traffic information distribution system 2 on the assumption that the information from the vehicle 100 is highly reliable. Moreover, when the vehicle authentication system 1 does not authenticate the vehicle 100, the information from the vehicle 100 is regarded as having low reliability, and the use in the road traffic information system 2 is suppressed.

  The vehicle authentication system 1 includes a vehicle authentication server 10 and a vehicle (authenticated vehicle) 100.

  The vehicle authentication server 10 is a server that authenticates the vehicle 100, and includes a communication processing unit 11, a logging unit 12, a validity determination unit 13, a vehicle authentication storage unit 14, and the like.

  The communication processing unit 11 converts information received from the vehicle 100 via the wireless network 30, the Internet 40, and the like into signals that can be used by the logging unit 12, the validity determination unit 13, and the like.

  The logging unit 12 stores so-called probe information transmitted from the vehicle 100 in the road traffic information storage unit 21. At this time, since the probe information to be stored is not authenticated by the vehicle authentication system 1, for example, a flag indicating that it is not authenticated may be attached. Further, since authentication is performed for each vehicle included in the vehicle 100, a flag indicating probe information of a predetermined vehicle may be attached.

The validity determination unit 13 determines the validity of the information transmitted from the vehicle 100, that is, the travel locus information and the surrounding vehicle information. The travel trajectory information of the vehicle 100 includes a position of the vehicle 100 at a certain time, an orientation at the certain time of the vehicle 100, a travel trajectory of the vehicle 100 up to a certain time, a predicted trajectory of the vehicle 100 from a certain time, ( Observation time etc. (corresponding to the certain time) may be included. Further, the surrounding vehicle information may include a relative position of the surrounding vehicle detected at a certain time, attribute information of the surrounding vehicle, an observation time (corresponding to a certain time when the surrounding vehicle is detected), and the like. . The attribute information may include, for example, a vehicle type category (1BOX, hatchback, sedan, SUV, etc. may be set as appropriate), a body color, a registration number, and the like. Details of the travel locus information and the surrounding vehicle information will be described later. The validity determination unit 13 performs the validity determination described below, and determines that the reliability is higher as more items are determined to be valid, that is, the possibility of performing authentication of the vehicle 100 is increased. For example, if it is determined that the items in the following (1) to (6) are determined to be appropriate in an item of a predetermined ratio or more, an authentication rule is determined to authenticate the vehicle 100 or the like. Good. The details of the validity determination described below will be described later.
(1) Validity of travel trajectory and predicted trajectory on vehicle travel (validity determination of travel trajectory information)
(2) Validity of travel trajectory and predicted trajectory on map (determination of validity of travel trajectory information)
(3) Validity of travel trajectory with respect to past predicted trajectory (validity determination of travel trajectory information)
(4) Validity of traveling locus of vehicle 100A relative to relative position of vehicle 100A detected by vehicle 100B (determination of validity of traveling locus information of vehicle 100A)
(5) Validity of the relative position of the vehicle 100B detected by the vehicle 100A with respect to the travel locus of the vehicle 100B (determination of validity of surrounding vehicle information of the vehicle 100A)
(6) Validity of the delay between the observation time of the travel locus information and surrounding vehicle information and the reception time at the vehicle authentication server 10 (determination of validity of the travel locus information and surrounding vehicle information)
When the validity determination unit 13 authenticates the vehicle 100, the validity determination unit 13 generates individual traffic information or the like using the probe information transmitted from the authenticated vehicle 100 to the individual information generation unit 22 of the road traffic information server 20. Allow. In addition, the distribution processing unit 23 of the road traffic information server 20 is permitted to distribute traffic information and the like to the authenticated vehicle 100.

  Moreover, the validity determination part 13 performs a corrective measure, when the vehicle 100 is not authenticated. For example, the validity determination unit 13 generates individual traffic information or the like using probe information transmitted from the vehicle 100 that has not been authenticated with respect to the individual information generation unit 22 of the road traffic information server 20 as a corrective measure. A command may be issued to suppress this. In addition, the suppression may be, for example, deleting the probe information itself and making it unusable at all, or holding it as reference probe information, or generating it using the reference probe information Individual traffic information may be treated as reference traffic information. Further, as a corrective measure, for example, distribution of traffic information or the like to the vehicle 100 that has not been authenticated may be stopped.

  The vehicle 100 transmits information (probe information, travel locus information, surrounding vehicle information, etc.) to the vehicle authentication server 10 every predetermined time. Corresponding to this information transmission every predetermined time, the vehicle authentication in this embodiment is performed every time information is received from the vehicle 100 by the vehicle authentication server 10. Therefore, even if the vehicle 100 is authenticated based on the travel locus information and the surrounding vehicle information at a certain time transmitted from the vehicle 100, the travel locus information and the surrounding vehicle information at a time after a predetermined time from the certain time are displayed. The vehicle 100 may not be authenticated based on the above. For example, when the vehicle 100 has not been authenticated once, the validity determination unit 13 temporarily generates individual traffic information or the like using the probe information transmitted from the vehicle 100. For example, the distribution of traffic information and the like to the vehicle 100 may be temporarily stopped. Further, when the vehicle 100 is not authenticated for a predetermined number of times or more (or continuously for a predetermined number of times), generation of individual traffic information or the like using probe information transmitted from the vehicle 100 is permanently suppressed, and For example, distribution of traffic information or the like to the vehicle 100 may be stopped.

  The vehicle authentication storage unit 14 is a storage device that stores information used for vehicle authentication. In the vehicle authentication storage unit 14, for example, attribute information (vehicle type, vehicle type category, vehicle body color, registration number, etc.) of each of a plurality of authenticated vehicles included in the vehicle 100 may be registered and stored. The attribute information may be used by the validity determination unit 13 when specifying which vehicle the received information is for. Further, the validity determining unit 13 may use the vehicle to identify a surrounding vehicle in which a relative position or the like included in the received surrounding vehicle information is detected. The vehicle authentication storage unit 14 may store map information. The map information may be used when the validity determination unit 13 determines (2) the validity of the travel locus and the predicted locus on the map.

  The vehicle 100 is a probe vehicle in the road traffic information distribution system 2 and is an authenticated vehicle in the vehicle authentication system 1. The vehicle 100 includes a plurality of vehicles. In FIG. 1, vehicles 100A and 100B included in the vehicle 100 are exemplarily shown.

  The vehicle 100 can perform wireless communication as described later, and can transmit information to the vehicle authentication server 10 via the wireless network 30 and the Internet 40. For example, after the IG is turned on, the vehicle 100 may connect to the vehicle authentication server 10 via the wireless network 30, the Internet 40, etc., and establish a session by HTTPS of TCP / IP communication. As described above, the vehicle 100 transmits probe information, travel locus information, surrounding vehicle information, and the like to the vehicle authentication server 10 every predetermined time. Note that the probe information, the travel locus information, and the surrounding vehicle information may include overlapping information (for example, the probe information includes the position information of the vehicle 100, and the travel locus information also includes the position information). For example). Probe information, travel locus information, and surrounding vehicle information may be transmitted as comprehensive information without any particular distinction. In the present embodiment, for convenience of explanation, it is assumed that the probe information, the travel locus information, and the surrounding vehicle information are transmitted as separate information and received by the vehicle authentication server 10.

  Further, the vehicle 100 can receive traffic information and the like from the road traffic information server 20 of the road traffic information distribution system 2. In other words, the traffic information transmitted from the road traffic information server 20 is received by the vehicle 100 via the Internet 40, the wireless network 30, and the like. As described above, when the vehicle 100 is not authenticated by the vehicle authentication server 10 (the validity determination unit 13), the distribution of traffic information and the like from the road traffic information server 20 to the vehicle 100 is stopped.

  Here, the configuration of the vehicle-mounted device 110 included in the vehicle 100 will be described. The in-vehicle device 110 receives a signal detected by a sensor or the like included in the vehicle 100 via the in-vehicle LAN 120, and generates probe information, travel locus information, surrounding vehicle information, and the like based on the signal, and a vehicle authentication server 10 has a function of transmitting to the network. The in-vehicle device 110 has a driving support function for the driver of the vehicle 100 by receiving traffic information transmitted from the road traffic information server 20 and displaying the traffic information on the display unit 118. In the present embodiment, the in-vehicle device 110 is an in-vehicle terminal included in the car navigation device of the vehicle 100.

  FIG. 2 is a diagram illustrating a configuration of the vehicle-mounted device 110 included in the vehicle 100.

  Referring to FIG. 2, the in-vehicle device 110 includes a wireless unit 111, a communication processing unit 112, a GPS receiving unit 113, an electronic compass 114, an interface unit 115, an ECU 116, a storage unit 117, a display unit 118, and the like.

  The wireless unit 111 is a device for communicating with the outside via a wireless network 30 such as a mobile phone network. For example, a mobile phone terminal connected to a DCM (Data Communication Module) or the vehicle-mounted device 110 regardless of wired or wireless. Etc. In the present embodiment, communication with the vehicle authentication server 10 is performed via the wireless network 30 or the like, and information is transmitted from the in-vehicle device 110 to the vehicle authentication server 10. In addition, communication with the road traffic information server 20 is performed, and information transmitted from the road traffic information server 20 is received by the in-vehicle device 110.

  The communication processing unit 112 converts the received signal from the road traffic information server 20 received through the wireless unit 111 into a signal that can be used by the ECU 116 or the like. Moreover, the signal output from ECU116 is converted into the signal for transmitting to the vehicle authentication server 10 through the radio | wireless part 111, etc.

  A GPS (Global Position System) receiving unit 113 receives signals from several (for example, four) GPS satellites in the sky, calculates the position (longitude, latitude) of the vehicle 100, and outputs it to the ECU 116.

  The electronic compass 114 includes a geomagnetic sensor, and can measure the direction in which the front portion of the vehicle 100 is facing (the traveling direction when the vehicle 100 is traveling forward) by detecting weak geomagnetism. The electronic compass 114 outputs the measured azimuth to the ECU 116.

  The interface unit 115 is connected to the in-vehicle LAN 120 and is provided for the ECU 116 to receive information (signals) transmitted from the sensors, various ECUs, and the like included in the vehicle 100 via the in-vehicle LAN 120. Information received by the ECU 116 via the in-vehicle LAN 120 may include a time signal 121, a vehicle speed signal 122, an acceleration signal 123, a steering angle signal 124, a camera image signal 125, and the like. The time signal 121 is output from a timepiece (not shown) of the vehicle 100. The vehicle speed signal 122 is a signal that detects the speed of the vehicle 100, and may be output from a vehicle speed sensor (not shown) mounted on the vehicle 100. The acceleration signal 123 is a signal that detects the acceleration of the vehicle 100 and may be output from an acceleration sensor (not shown) mounted on the vehicle 100. The steering angle signal 124 is a signal obtained by detecting the steering angle of the steering by the driver of the vehicle 100, and may be output from a steering sensor (not shown) mounted on the vehicle 100. The camera image signal 125 is an image signal from a stereo camera (not shown) mounted on the vehicle 100. In addition, it is preferable that the stereo camera is provided so as to be able to image a surrounding vehicle in all directions of 360 ° in a plan view of the vehicle 100.

  An ECU (Electric Control Unit) 116 is an in-vehicle control unit including a CPU, a RAM, a ROM, an input / output unit, and the like, and the CPU performs various processes according to a program stored in the ROM. For example, from the position of the vehicle 100 input from the GPS receiving unit 113, the direction of the vehicle 100 input from the electronic compass 114, various information (signals) input through the interface unit 115, etc. Generates vehicle information and the like. The generation process is performed every predetermined time (for example, 0.5 seconds). The generated probe information, travel locus information, surrounding vehicle information, and the like are transmitted to the vehicle authentication server 10 every predetermined time. Further, the route search process may be performed based on the vehicle position information input from the GPS receiving unit 113, the map information stored in the storage unit 117, the traffic information transmitted from the road traffic information server 20, and the like. Further, based on the searched route, a route guidance information generation process for guiding from the departure place to the destination may be performed, and the generated route guidance information may be output to the display unit 118 as a video signal. Moreover, the process for displaying the traffic information etc. which were transmitted from the road traffic information server 20 on the display part 118 may be performed, and it may output to the display part 118 as a video signal.

  As described above, the travel locus information of the vehicle 100 includes the position of the vehicle 100 at a certain time, the direction of the vehicle 100 at a certain time, the traveling locus of the vehicle 100 up to a certain time, and the prediction of the vehicle 100 from a certain time. The locus and the observation time corresponding to the certain time are included. As the observation time, a time signal 121 corrected by a signal from a GPS satellite received by the GPS receiver 113 may be used. The travel trajectory of the vehicle 100 is a point at each sampling time using a speed and a steering angle detected at intervals of a sampling time (for example, 0.1 second) shorter than the predetermined time from a time point before the observation time. It may be calculated as a group. The travel locus of the vehicle 100 may be obtained based on the position information of the vehicle 100 input from the GPS receiving unit 113, but is preferably calculated using the speed and the steering angle in terms of accuracy. The predicted trajectory of the vehicle 100 may be calculated as a predicted trajectory from the observation time to a predetermined time later using the speed, acceleration, steering angle, and steering angular velocity of the vehicle 100 at the observation time. Further, the predicted trajectory of the vehicle 100 may be calculated as a point group for each sampling time. The acceleration of the vehicle 100 may be calculated as a time change amount (differential amount) of the speed, and the steering angular velocity may be calculated as a time change amount (differential amount) of the steering angle.

  As described above, the surrounding vehicle information includes the relative position of the surrounding vehicle detected at a certain time, the attribute information of the surrounding vehicle, and the observation time corresponding to the certain time. The ECU 116 can detect the surrounding vehicle by analyzing the camera image signal 125 and calculate the direction and distance of the surrounding vehicle. The relative positions of the surrounding vehicles may be expressed in polar coordinates with the vehicle 100 as the center. Further, the ECU 116 can detect attribute information (vehicle type category, vehicle body color, registration number, etc.) of surrounding vehicles by analyzing the camera image signal 125.

  The storage unit 117 is a nonvolatile storage device or the like, and stores map information and the like. In addition, traffic information transmitted from the road traffic information server 20 may be stored.

  The display unit 118 includes a liquid crystal display or the like, and displays an image corresponding to a video signal such as route guidance information and traffic information input from the ECU 116. The in-vehicle device 110 provides driving assistance such as route guidance from the departure point to the destination for the user by the route guidance display, traffic information display, and the like displayed on the display unit 118. Separately, driving assistance such as voice route guidance through a speaker (not shown) may be performed together with route guidance display on the display unit 118 and the like.

  Next, a vehicle authentication flow by the vehicle authentication system 1 according to the present embodiment will be described.

  FIG. 3 is a flowchart showing an example of a vehicle authentication flow by the vehicle authentication system 1.

  Referring to FIG. 3, in step S <b> 101, the logging unit 12 stores the probe information transmitted from a predetermined vehicle (for example, the vehicle 100 </ b> A) included in the vehicle 100 and received by the vehicle authentication server 10. Store in the unit 21. As described above, since the probe information to be stored is not authenticated by the vehicle authentication system 1, for example, a flag indicating that it is before authentication may be attached. Further, since authentication is performed for each vehicle included in the vehicle 100, a flag indicating probe information of a predetermined vehicle may be attached.

  In step S102, the validity determination unit 13 determines the validity of the travel locus information and the surrounding vehicle information transmitted from the vehicle 100A together with the probe information. Note that steps S101 and S102 may be performed in parallel. The validity determination unit 13 performs the above-described validity determinations (1) to (6) for the travel locus information and the surrounding vehicle information. Hereinafter, the validity determination of (1) to (6) will be described.

(1) Validity of travel trajectory and predicted trajectory on vehicle travel (validity determination of travel trajectory information)
It is determined whether or not the travel trajectory and the predicted trajectory included in the travel trajectory information transmitted from the vehicle 100A are appropriate as the travel of the vehicle. Specifically, for example, when the travel trajectory and the predicted trajectory have a rotation radius that is considerably smaller than the minimum rotation radius of the vehicle 100A, or when the movement of the vehicle 100A is impossible (travel in the left-right direction, etc.) Therefore, it is determined that the travel locus information is not valid. In addition, the validity determination on vehicle travel may be performed for at least one of the travel trajectory and the predicted trajectory.

(2) Validity of travel trajectory and predicted trajectory on map (determination of validity of travel trajectory information)
It is determined whether or not the travel trajectory and the predicted trajectory included in the travel trajectory information transmitted from the vehicle 100A are appropriate on the map. Specifically, for example, when the travel trajectory and the predicted trajectory are included in a place such as a building where there is no road, or when the travel trajectory is one-way reverse travel, the travel trajectory information is determined to be invalid. The As described above, the validity determination unit 13 uses the map information stored in the vehicle authentication storage unit 14 when performing the determination. Moreover, the validity determination on a map may be performed about at least any one of a driving | running locus | trajectory or a prediction locus | trajectory. In addition to or instead of the validity of the travel trajectory and the predicted trajectory included in the travel trajectory information of the vehicle 100A on the map, the position and orientation of the vehicle 100A included in the travel trajectory information of the vehicle 100A are appropriate on the map. You may determine whether it is a thing.

(3) Validity of travel trajectory with respect to past predicted trajectory (validity determination of travel trajectory information)
It is determined whether or not the travel locus included in the travel locus information transmitted by the vehicle 100A is valid with respect to the predicted locus included in the travel locus information transmitted by the vehicle 100A in the past. In the present embodiment, the travel trajectory included in the travel trajectory information transmitted this time from the vehicle 100A is appropriate for the predicted trajectory included in the travel trajectory information transmitted from the vehicle 100A last time (predetermined time). It is determined whether or not. For example, the traveling locus information transmitted this time from the vehicle 100A is compared with the predicted locus transmitted last time from the vehicle 100A. If the traveling locus information is within a predetermined error range, it is determined that the traveling locus information is valid. May be.

  Here, the validity determination of the above (3) will be described more specifically with reference to FIG.

  FIG. 4 is a diagram for explaining vehicle authentication based on an example of vehicle trajectory information transmitted from the vehicle 100A and surrounding vehicle information, and shows a situation in which the vehicle 100A is turning right at an intersection in a plan view. While turning right at the intersection, vehicle 100A is located at point A0 at time Ta-α, is located at point A1 at time Ta, and is located at point A2 at time Ta + α. Note that α corresponds to the predetermined time, which is a time interval at which the vehicle 100A generates and transmits probe information, travel locus information, surrounding vehicle information, and the like. Further, the vehicle trajectory information transmitted this time from the vehicle 100A will be described below on the assumption that it is vehicle trajectory information at time Ta + α (point A2).

  Referring to FIG. 4, the travel locus included in the travel locus information transmitted this time from vehicle 100A is a time Ta + α after a predetermined time α from point A1 at time Ta corresponding to the travel locus information transmitted last time from vehicle 100A. Is a locus connecting the points A2. As described above, the travel locus may be expressed as a point group for each sampling time shorter than the predetermined time α. For example, the traveling locus is transmitted as a point group corresponding to the sampling time on the curve connecting A1 and A2 in FIG. The running trajectory may be expressed. Here, the predicted trajectory included in the travel trajectory information transmitted last time from the vehicle 100A predicts a trajectory from the point A1 at the time Ta to the time Ta + α after the predetermined time α. Therefore, the traveling trajectory connecting the points A1 and A2 and the predicted trajectory included in the traveling trajectory information transmitted from the vehicle 100A last time are compared, and a certain degree of alignment is achieved, for example, within a predetermined error range. If it is, the traveling locus information transmitted this time from the vehicle 100A may be determined to be valid. In addition, when it is not within the predetermined error range, it may be determined that the travel locus information transmitted this time from the vehicle 100A is not valid.

  In the above description, the travel locus included in the travel locus information transmitted from the vehicle 100A is a travel locus at a predetermined time α up to a certain time, but goes back further in the past than the predetermined time α until a certain time. The travel locus may be a predetermined time β (> α). When the travel locus included in the travel locus information transmitted from the vehicle 100A is a travel locus at a predetermined time β from a certain time, the travel locus transmitted this time from the vehicle 100A is transmitted a plurality of times in the past from the vehicle 100A. It may be determined whether the predicted trajectory is valid. For example, in the case of a travel locus at a predetermined time 2α (twice the predetermined time α) from a time at which there is a travel locus transmitted from the vehicle 100A, the travel locus included in the travel locus information transmitted this time from the vehicle 100A is the point A0. And a curve connecting A2 (upper sampling point group). Therefore, the traveling trajectory connecting the points A0 and A2 is compared with the predicted trajectory transmitted from the vehicle 100A last time and the predicted trajectory transmitted last time from the vehicle 100A to some extent, for example, a predetermined error range. May be determined that the travel locus information transmitted this time from the vehicle 100A is appropriate.

(4) Validity of traveling locus of vehicle 100A relative to relative position of vehicle 100A detected by vehicle 100B (determination of validity of traveling locus information of vehicle 100A)
Whether the travel locus included in the travel locus information transmitted from the vehicle 100A is valid with respect to the relative position of the vehicle 100A included in the surrounding vehicle information transmitted from the other vehicle (the vehicle 100B) that detected the vehicle 100A. Determine whether or not. In the present embodiment, the travel locus included in the travel locus information transmitted from the vehicle 100A and the relative position of the vehicle 100A included in the surrounding vehicle information transmitted from the vehicle 100B that has detected the vehicle 100A at the same observation time. Compare. If it can be determined that the two are consistent to some extent, for example, if the amount of deviation between the two is within a predetermined error range, it is determined that the travel locus transmitted from the vehicle 100A is valid. Good. The relative position of vehicle 100A transmitted from vehicle 100B may be converted to an absolute position based on the position of vehicle 100B included in the travel locus information transmitted from vehicle 100B, and the above determination may be made.

  Here, the validity evaluation of the above (4) will be described more specifically with reference to FIG.

  FIG. 4 is a diagram for explaining vehicle authentication based on an example of the vehicle trajectory information and surrounding vehicle information transmitted from the vehicle 100A as described above, and shows a situation in which the vehicle 100A is turning right at the intersection in a plan view. ing. While turning right at the intersection, vehicle 100A is located at point A0 at time Ta-α, is located at point A1 at time Ta, and is located at point A2 at time Ta + α. The vehicle 100B is a vehicle that goes straight through the intersection in front of the vehicle 100A, is located at the point B0 at the time Ta-α, is located at the point B1 at the time Ta, and is located at the point B2 at the time Ta + α. . The vehicle 100C is a vehicle that is temporarily stopped on the opposite lane of the road into which the vehicle 100A enters after a right turn, and is located at the point C1 at times Ta−α, Ta, and Ta + α. Note that α corresponds to the predetermined time, which is a time interval at which the vehicle 100A generates and transmits probe information, travel locus information, surrounding vehicle information, and the like. Further, it is assumed that the vehicle trajectory information transmitted this time from the vehicle 100A is vehicle trajectory information at time Ta + α (point A2). In addition, at time Ta−α, Ta, Ta + α, the vehicle 100B detects the vehicle 100A, and the surrounding vehicle information transmitted at time Ta−α, Ta, Ta + α from the vehicle 100B is relative to the vehicle 100A. It is assumed that position, attribute information, etc. are included.

  Referring to FIG. 4, the travel locus included in the travel locus information transmitted this time from vehicle 100A is a time Ta + α after a predetermined time α from point A1 at time Ta corresponding to the travel locus information transmitted last time from vehicle 100A. Is a locus connecting the points A2. Here, the travel locus connecting points A1 and A2 is compared with the relative position of vehicle 100A detected at time Ta + α (point B2) included in the surrounding vehicle information transmitted from vehicle 100B. If it can be determined that the two are consistent to some extent, it is determined that the travel locus information transmitted this time from the vehicle 100A is appropriate. For example, if the relative position of the vehicle 100A transmitted from the vehicle 100B does not completely coincide with the traveling locus connecting the points A1 and A2, but is within a predetermined error range, the vehicle 100A transmits this time. It may be determined that the travel locus information is valid.

  In addition, the validity based on the comparison between the travel locus included in the travel locus information transmitted from the vehicle 100A this time and the relative position of the vehicle 100A included in the surrounding vehicle information at the time Ta (point B1) transmitted from the vehicle 100B. The sex may be further determined. Similarly to (3), the travel locus included in the travel locus information transmitted from the vehicle 100A may be a travel locus at a predetermined time β that goes back further in the past than the predetermined time α until a certain time. For example, in the case of a travel locus at a predetermined time 2α (twice the predetermined time α) from a time at which there is a travel locus transmitted from the vehicle 100A, the travel locus included in the travel locus information transmitted this time from the vehicle 100A is the point A0. This is a curve (upper sampling point group) connecting (time Ta−α) and A2 (time Ta + α). Therefore, the traveling locus connecting the point A0 and the point A2 may be compared with the relative position of the vehicle 100A included in the surrounding vehicle information transmitted three times (time Ta−α, Ta, Ta + α) from the vehicle 100B. . If it can be determined that the two are consistent to some extent, for example, if both are within a predetermined error range, it may be determined that the travel locus information transmitted this time from the vehicle 100A is appropriate.

  In FIG. 4, in addition to vehicle 100B, vehicle 100C may also detect vehicle 100A. That is, there may be a plurality of vehicles that have detected the authentication target vehicle (vehicle 100A) at the same time. In this case, the above determination may be made with each vehicle that has detected the vehicle 100A. In addition, regarding the handling of the respective determination results performed with each vehicle that has detected the vehicle 100A, for example, from the vehicle 100A with respect to vehicles of a predetermined ratio or more among the vehicles that have detected the vehicle 100A. When it is determined that the transmitted travel locus information is valid, (4) the travel locus information transmitted from the vehicle 100A as a whole may be determined to be valid. Further, for example, each determination result performed with each vehicle that detects the vehicle 100A is handled in parallel with the validity determination results of (1) to (3), (5), and (6), and authentication is performed. It may be determined whether or not it is possible.

(5) Validity of the relative position of the vehicle 100B detected by the vehicle 100A with respect to the travel locus of the vehicle 100B (determination of validity of surrounding vehicle information of the vehicle 100A)
It is determined whether or not the relative position of the vehicle 100B detected by the vehicle 100A included in the surrounding vehicle information transmitted from the vehicle 100A is appropriate with respect to the travel locus included in the travel locus information transmitted from the vehicle 100B. To do. In the present embodiment, the relative position of the vehicle 100B included in the surrounding vehicle information transmitted from the vehicle 100A that has detected the vehicle 100B, and the travel locus included in the travel locus information transmitted from the vehicle 100B at the same observation time, Compare. When it can be determined that the two are consistent to some extent, for example, when the amount of deviation between the two is within a predetermined error range, it is determined that the surrounding vehicle information transmitted from the vehicle 100A is appropriate. Note that the relative position of the vehicle 100B transmitted from the vehicle 100A may be converted into an absolute position based on the position of the vehicle 100A included in the travel locus information transmitted from the vehicle 100A, and the above determination may be made.

  Here, the validity evaluation of the above (5) will be described more specifically with reference to FIG.

  FIG. 4 is a diagram for explaining vehicle authentication based on an example of the vehicle trajectory information and surrounding vehicle information transmitted from the vehicle 100A as described above, and shows a situation in which the vehicle 100A is turning right at the intersection in a plan view. ing. While turning right at the intersection, vehicle 100A is located at point A0 at time Ta-α, is located at point A1 at time Ta, and is located at point A2 at time Ta + α. The vehicle 100B is a vehicle that goes straight through the intersection in front of the vehicle 100A, is located at the point B0 at the time Ta-α, is located at the point B1 at the time Ta, and is located at the point B2 at the time Ta + α. . The vehicle 100C is a vehicle that is temporarily stopped on the opposite lane of the road into which the vehicle 100A enters after a right turn, and is located at the point C1 at times Ta−α, Ta, and Ta + α. Note that α corresponds to the predetermined time, which is a time interval at which the vehicle 100A generates and transmits probe information, travel locus information, surrounding vehicle information, and the like. Further, it is assumed that the surrounding vehicle information transmitted this time from the vehicle 100A is the surrounding vehicle information at the time Ta + α (point A2). In addition, at time Ta−α, Ta, Ta + α, the vehicle 100A detects the vehicle 100B, and the surrounding vehicle information transmitted from the vehicle 100A at each of the times Ta−α, Ta, Ta + α is relative to the vehicle 100B. It is assumed that position, attribute information, etc. are included.

  Referring to FIG. 4, the relative position of the vehicle 100B detected by the vehicle 100A included in the surrounding vehicle information transmitted this time from the vehicle 100A is indicated by a dotted arrow connecting the point A2 and the point B2. Here, the relative position is compared with the travel locus included in the travel locus information at time Ta + α transmitted from vehicle 100B. If it can be determined that the two are consistent to some extent, for example, if they are within a predetermined error range, it may be determined that the surrounding vehicle information transmitted this time from the vehicle 100A is appropriate.

  Further, the relative position of the vehicle 100B detected by the vehicle 100A included in the surrounding vehicle information at the time Ta previously transmitted from the vehicle 100A (the dotted arrow connecting the point A1 to the point B1) and the time Ta + α transmitted from the vehicle 100B. The validity based on the comparison with the travel locus included in the travel locus information may be further determined. In addition, the travel locus included in the travel locus information transmitted from the vehicle 100B may be a travel locus at a predetermined time β that is further back in time than the predetermined time α until a certain time. For example, in the case of a travel locus at a predetermined time 2α (twice the predetermined time α) from the time at which there is a travel locus transmitted from the vehicle 100B, the travel locus included in the travel locus information transmitted this time from the vehicle 100B is the point B0. A straight line (upper sampling point group) connecting (time Ta−α) and B2 (time Ta + α). Therefore, the relative position of the vehicle 100B included in the surrounding vehicle information transmitted three times (time Ta−α, Ta, Ta + α) from the vehicle 100A may be compared with the travel locus connecting the points B0 and B2. If it can be determined that the two are consistent to some extent, for example, if the deviation between the two is within a predetermined error range, it is determined that the surrounding vehicle information transmitted this time from the vehicle 100A is appropriate. It's okay.

  Further, in FIG. 4, vehicle 100A may detect vehicle 100C in addition to vehicle 100B. That is, there may be a plurality of vehicles detected by the authentication target vehicle (vehicle 100A) at the same time. In this case, the above determination may be made with each vehicle detected by the vehicle 100A. In addition, regarding the handling of each determination result performed with each vehicle detected by the vehicle 100A, for example, from the vehicle 100A to a vehicle with a predetermined ratio or more among the vehicles detected by the vehicle 100A. When it is determined that the transmitted surrounding vehicle information is valid, (5) the surrounding vehicle information transmitted from the vehicle 100A as a whole may be determined to be valid. In addition, for example, each determination result performed with each vehicle detected by the vehicle 100A is handled in parallel with the validity determination results of (1) to (4) and (6), and the determination of whether or not authentication is possible. You may go.

(6) Validity of the delay between the observation time of the travel locus information and surrounding vehicle information and the reception time at the vehicle authentication server 10 (determination of validity of the travel locus information and surrounding vehicle information)
It is determined whether or not the observation time included in the travel locus information transmitted from the vehicle 100 </ b> A is valid with respect to the reception time of the travel locus information in the vehicle authentication server 10. There is a delay between transmission from the vehicle 100 </ b> A and reception by the vehicle authentication server 10. In consideration of the delay, when the difference between the observation time included in the travel locus information transmitted from the vehicle 100A and the reception time of the travel locus information in the vehicle authentication server 10 is too large, the transmission is performed from the vehicle 100A. It is determined that the travel trajectory information is not valid. For example, when the difference between the two exceeds a predetermined delay time, it is determined that the travel locus information transmitted from the vehicle 100A is not valid. The same determination is also performed on the surrounding vehicle information transmitted from the vehicle 100A. Further, for example, when the case where the predetermined delay time is exceeded continues, the traveling locus information and the surrounding vehicle information transmitted from the vehicle 100A may be determined to be invalid.

  Here, the effect | action by performing the validity determination of said (1)-(6) is demonstrated.

  By performing the validity determination of (1), for example, an abnormal value of a traveling locus or a predicted locus due to abnormality of a sensor included in the vehicle 100A can be detected. In addition, for example, an unnatural traveling locus or predicted locus can be detected as the vehicle traveling that has been tampered with and transmitted. Therefore, highly reliable vehicle authentication can be performed.

  By performing the validity determination of (2), for example, an abnormal value of a traveling locus or a predicted locus due to abnormality of a sensor included in the vehicle 100A can be detected. Further, for example, it is possible to detect a traveling locus, a predicted locus, etc. that cannot be traveled on the map transmitted by falsification. Therefore, highly reliable vehicle authentication can be performed.

  By performing the validity determination of (3), for example, an abnormal value of a traveling locus or a predicted locus due to an abnormality of a sensor included in the vehicle 100A can be detected. In addition, when impersonating another vehicle, it is difficult to predict the travel locus of the other vehicle. However, as described above, a vehicle that is actually traveling can detect speed, acceleration, steering angle, steering angular velocity, and the like from sensors included in the vehicle, and accurately calculate a predicted trajectory from these detection information. Is possible. Therefore, as described in (3) above, by determining the validity of the actual travel locus with respect to the past predicted locus, it is possible to detect impersonation of other vehicles with high accuracy and a highly reliable vehicle. Authentication can be performed.

  By performing the validity determination of (4), for example, an abnormal value of the travel locus due to an abnormality of a sensor included in the vehicle 100A can be detected. In addition, by performing validity determination by mutual monitoring between the vehicles to be authenticated, it is possible to detect impersonation of other vehicles with high accuracy and to perform highly reliable vehicle authentication.

  By performing the validity determination of (5), for example, an abnormal value of surrounding vehicle information due to an abnormality of a stereo camera included in the vehicle 100A can be detected. In addition, by performing validity determination by mutual monitoring between the vehicles to be authenticated, it is possible to detect impersonation of other vehicles with high accuracy and to perform highly reliable vehicle authentication.

  By performing the validity determination of (6), for example, an abnormal value of the observation time due to an abnormality of a sensor included in the vehicle 100A can be detected. Further, for example, an attack in which the traveling locus of another vehicle is observed from the outside and the traveling locus is transmitted to the vehicle authentication server as the predicted locus of the own vehicle is also assumed. On the other hand, by making the case where the difference between the observation time and the reception time exceeds a predetermined delay time as described in (6) above is not appropriate, such an attack can also be detected, and the reliability High vehicle authentication can be performed.

  In summary, by performing each validity determination of (1) to (6), for example, detection of an abnormal value due to abnormality of a sensor included in the vehicle 100A, vehicle trajectory information due to malicious intention such as impersonation of another vehicle, etc. It becomes possible to detect tampering. Therefore, the vehicle authentication system 1 can perform highly reliable authentication by comprehensively considering the validity determinations (1) to (6) above and determining whether or not the vehicle authentication is possible. Moreover, the road traffic information distribution system 2 can distribute traffic information etc. in real time using the highly reliable vehicle information by using the vehicle authentication system 1.

  In particular, since the owner of the vehicle 100 may maliciously alter the ID information of the in-vehicle device 110, the so-called cryptographic authentication method using the ID information or the like performs highly reliable vehicle authentication. It may not be possible. On the other hand, by performing vehicle authentication based on the validity determinations of the above (1) to (6), it becomes possible to provide highly reliable vehicle authentication in combination with a cryptographic authentication method. .

  In addition, since the vehicle authentication in the present embodiment by the validity determinations of (1) to (6) is performed using signals from various sensors or the like that are normally mounted on the vehicle 100, additional hardware is added to the vehicle 100. It is not necessary to provide on the road side, and the cost increase can be suppressed. In addition, since vehicle authentication is performed by the vehicle authentication server 1 that can communicate with the vehicle 100 to be authenticated in the present embodiment via the wireless network 30 and the Internet 40, vehicle authentication is performed for a wide range of authenticated vehicles (vehicles 100). Is possible.

  Returning to FIG. 3, in step S <b> 102, the validity determination unit 13 of the vehicle authentication server 10 is transmitted from the vehicle 100 </ b> A after comprehensively considering the validity determinations (1) to (6) above. It is determined whether the travel locus information and the surrounding vehicle information are valid. Note that, as described above, when determining whether or not it is appropriate in step S102, for example, of all the validity determination items (1) to (6), items that are equal to or greater than a predetermined ratio are appropriate. When it is determined that the travel locus information and the surrounding vehicle information transmitted from the vehicle 100A may be determined to be appropriate.

  If it is determined in step S102 that the travel locus information and the surrounding vehicle information transmitted from the vehicle 100A are valid, the process proceeds to step S103.

  In step S103, the vehicle authentication server 10 (validity determination unit 13) authenticates the vehicle 100A, transmits it to the road traffic information server 20 (individual information generation unit 22, distribution processing unit 23), and proceeds to step S104.

  In step S104, the vehicle authentication server 10 (validity determination unit 13) uses the probe information transmitted from the vehicle 100A to the road traffic information server 20 (individual information generation unit 22) to perform individual traffic information and the like. Is permitted to proceed to step S105. In addition, the said permission may be performed by the control part (not shown) of the road traffic information server 20 which received that the vehicle 100A was authenticated in step S103.

  In step S105, the vehicle authentication server 10 (validity determination unit 13) permits the road traffic information server 20 (distribution processing unit 23) to distribute traffic information and the like to the vehicle 100A. In addition, the said permission may be performed by the control part of the road traffic information server 20 which received that the vehicle 100A was authenticated in step S103.

  Note that steps S104 and S105 may be performed in parallel.

  If it is determined in step S102 that the travel locus information and the surrounding vehicle information transmitted from the vehicle 100A are not valid, the process proceeds to step S106.

  In step S106, the vehicle authentication server 10 (validity determination unit 13) does not authenticate the vehicle 100A and sends unauthenticated information (information indicating that the vehicle 100A is not authenticated) to the road traffic information server 20 (individual information generation unit 22). , To the distribution processing unit 23), and proceeds to step S107.

  In step S107, the vehicle authentication server 10 (validity determination unit 13) uses the probe information transmitted from the vehicle 100A to the road traffic information server 20 (individual information generation unit 22) to perform individual traffic information and the like. Is suppressed, and the process proceeds to step S108. In addition, the said suppression may be performed by the control part of the road traffic information server 20 which received that the vehicle 100A was not authenticated in step S103.

  In step S108, vehicle authentication server 10 (validity determination unit 13) causes road traffic information server 20 (distribution processing unit 23) to stop distributing traffic information and the like to vehicle 100A. In addition, the said stop may be performed by the control part of the road traffic information server 20 which received that the vehicle 100A was not authenticated in step S103.

  Note that steps S107 and S108 may be performed in parallel.

  The flow of steps S101 to S108 is performed every time the vehicle authentication server 10 receives information (probe information, travel locus information, surrounding vehicle information, etc.) from the vehicle 100A. As described above, the vehicle 100A generates and transmits probe information, travel locus information, surrounding vehicle information, and the like at predetermined time intervals. That is, the flow of steps S101 to S108 is performed every predetermined time.

  As described above, even when the vehicle 100A is authenticated based on the traveling locus information and surrounding vehicle information transmitted from the vehicle 100A, the traveling locus information at a time after a predetermined time from the certain time and The vehicle 100A may not be authenticated based on the surrounding vehicle information. Therefore, when the vehicle authentication server 10 (the validity determination unit 13) performs the corrective action, for example, when the vehicle 100A is not authenticated once, the vehicle authentication server 10 (the validity determination unit 13) temporarily uses the probe information transmitted from the vehicle 100A. Generation of individual traffic information or the like may be suppressed, and distribution of traffic information or the like to the vehicle 100A may be temporarily stopped. Further, when the vehicle 100A is not authenticated for a predetermined number of times or more (or continuously for a predetermined number of times), generation of individual traffic information or the like using probe information transmitted from the vehicle 100A permanently is suppressed, and For example, distribution of traffic information or the like to the vehicle 100A may be stopped.

  As mentioned above, although the form for implementing this invention was explained in full detail, this invention is not limited to this specific embodiment, In the range of the summary of this invention described in the claim, various Can be modified or changed.

  In the embodiment described above, the vehicle 100 generates the travel locus information and the surrounding vehicle information. However, the vehicle authentication server 10 may generate at least one of the travel locus information and the surrounding vehicle information. In this case, the vehicle 100 (the in-vehicle device 110) transmits the time signal 121, the vehicle speed signal 122, the acceleration signal 123, the steering angle signal 124, the camera output signal 125, and the like transmitted via the in-vehicle LAN 120 at predetermined time intervals. 10 may be transmitted.

  In the above-described embodiment, the vehicle authentication system 1 performs vehicle authentication using both the travel locus information and the surrounding vehicle information, but may perform vehicle authentication using only the travel locus information. For example, when a stereo camera is not mounted on the vehicle 100 to be authenticated, vehicle authentication based on the validity determination according to the above (1) to (3) and (6) may be performed.

  Moreover, in embodiment mentioned above, although the vehicle authentication system 1 (relevance evaluation part 13) performs vehicle authentication based on all the validity determination of (1)-(6), (1)-(6) Of these, vehicle authentication based on validity determination using at least one may be performed.

  In the embodiment described above, in the validity determination of (4), the validity determination of the travel locus included in the travel locus information of the vehicle 100A with respect to the relative position of the vehicle 100A included in the surrounding vehicle information of the vehicle 100B is performed. . However, the validity of the travel locus (or position) included in the travel locus information of the vehicle 100A may be determined with respect to the attribute information of the vehicle 100A included in the surrounding vehicle information of the vehicle 100B. That is, in the mutual monitoring of the vehicles 100A and 100B, when the traveling locus (or position) of the vehicle 100A and the position where the vehicle 100B detects the vehicle 100A are close to some extent, the traveling locus information of the vehicle 100A is appropriate. It may be determined that Similarly, in the validity determination of (5), the validity of the attribute information of the vehicle 100B included in the surrounding vehicle information of the vehicle 100A with respect to the travel locus (or position) included in the travel locus information of the vehicle 100B is determined. May be. That is, in the mutual monitoring of the vehicles 100A and 100B, if the position where the vehicle 100A detects the vehicle 100B and the travel locus (or position) of the vehicle 100B are close to some extent, the surrounding vehicle information of the vehicle 100A is appropriate. It may be determined that

  In the above-described embodiment, the vehicle authentication server 10 and the road traffic information server 20 are separate servers. However, one server may include a vehicle authentication function and a road traffic information distribution function.

  In the above-described embodiment, the in-vehicle device 110 that receives information (signal) via the in-vehicle LAN 120 and generates and transmits probe information, travel locus information, surrounding vehicle information, and the like is a device included in the car navigation device. However, the configuration is not limited thereto. For example, an on-vehicle device (ECU) dedicated to vehicle authentication may be used, or another ECU mounted on the vehicle 100 may have the function of the on-vehicle device 110 (ECU 116) described above.

1 Vehicle Authentication System 2 Road Traffic Information Distribution System 10 Vehicle Authentication Server (Server)
13 Validity determination unit 20 Road traffic information server 100 Vehicle (authenticated vehicle)
100A vehicle (first certified vehicle)
100B vehicle (second certified vehicle)
100C vehicle (second certified vehicle)

Claims (13)

A certified vehicle,
A server capable of communicating with the vehicle to be authenticated, and a server for authenticating the vehicle to be authenticated;
A vehicle authentication system comprising:
The authenticated vehicle or the server is
Generate travel locus information including the travel locus of the authenticated vehicle,
The server
Based on the travel locus, it is determined whether or not the travel locus information is valid, and the authenticated vehicle is authenticated based on the determination.
Vehicle authentication system. The authenticated vehicle or the server is
Generate the travel locus information over multiple times,
The travel locus information is
Including a travel trajectory up to a certain time of the authenticated vehicle and a predicted trajectory from the certain time of the authenticated vehicle,
The vehicle authentication system according to claim 1. The server
Based on a comparison between the travel locus included in the generated travel locus information and the predicted locus included in the travel locus information generated in the past, whether or not the travel locus information is valid is determined. It is characterized by judging,
The vehicle authentication system according to claim 2. The authenticated vehicle or the server is
Generate the travel locus information every predetermined time,
The travel locus is
Including a travel locus at the predetermined time until the certain time of the authenticated vehicle,
The predicted trajectory is
Including a predicted trajectory at the predetermined time from the certain time of the authenticated vehicle,
The server
Based on a comparison between the traveling locus included in the traveling locus information generated this time and the predicted locus included in the traveling locus information generated last time, it is determined whether or not the traveling locus information is appropriate. It is characterized by
The vehicle authentication system according to claim 3. The server
When it is determined that the travel trajectory information of the authenticated vehicle is appropriate, the possibility of authenticating the authenticated vehicle is increased.
The vehicle authentication system according to any one of claims 1 to 4. The authenticated vehicle or the server is
Generate peripheral vehicle information related to vehicles detected in the vicinity by the authenticated vehicle,
The server
The travel locus information of the first authenticated vehicle included in the authenticated vehicle, and the second authenticated vehicle included in the authenticated vehicle, wherein the second authenticated vehicle detects the first authenticated vehicle. Based on the surrounding vehicle information, it is determined whether or not the travel locus information of the first authenticated vehicle is valid, and the first authenticated vehicle is authenticated based on the determination. Features
The vehicle authentication system according to any one of claims 1 to 5. The travel locus information is
Including a travel locus up to a certain time of the certified vehicle,
The surrounding vehicle information is
Including a relative position of a surrounding vehicle detected by the vehicle to be authenticated at the certain time with respect to the vehicle to be authenticated,
The vehicle authentication system according to claim 6. The server
Based on the travel locus included in the travel locus information of the first authenticated vehicle and the relative position of the first authenticated vehicle included in the surrounding vehicle information of the second authenticated vehicle, Determining whether or not the travel locus information of the first authenticated vehicle is valid,
The vehicle authentication system according to claim 7. The authenticated vehicle or the server is
Generate the surrounding vehicle information over multiple times,
The server
The travel locus included in the travel locus information of the first authenticated vehicle and the relative position of the first authenticated vehicle included in the surrounding vehicle information of the second authenticated vehicle generated a plurality of times. Based on the comparison with the observation trajectory of the first authenticated vehicle based on whether or not the travel trajectory information of the first authenticated vehicle is valid.
The vehicle authentication system according to claim 8. The server
Based on the surrounding vehicle information of the first authenticated vehicle that detected the second authenticated vehicle and the travel locus information of the second authenticated vehicle, the surrounding vehicle information of the first authenticated vehicle is It is determined whether or not it is appropriate, and based on the determination, the first authenticated vehicle is authenticated.
The vehicle authentication system according to any one of claims 6 to 9. The travel locus information is
Including a travel locus up to a certain time of the certified vehicle,
The surrounding vehicle information is
Including a relative position of a surrounding vehicle detected by the authenticated vehicle at the certain time with respect to the authenticated vehicle;
The server
Based on the relative position of the second authenticated vehicle included in the surrounding vehicle information of the first authenticated vehicle and the traveling locus included in the traveling locus information of the second authenticated vehicle, It is determined whether or not the surrounding vehicle information of the first authenticated vehicle is valid,
The vehicle authentication system according to claim 10. The authenticated vehicle or the server is
Generate the surrounding vehicle information over multiple times,
The server
The relative position of the second authenticated vehicle included in the surrounding vehicle information of the first authenticated vehicle generated a plurality of times, and the traveling locus included in the traveling locus information of the second authenticated vehicle , Based on the comparison, it is determined whether the surrounding vehicle information of the first authenticated vehicle is valid,
The vehicle authentication system according to claim 11. The server
When it is determined that the surrounding vehicle information of the first authenticated vehicle is valid, the possibility of authenticating the first authenticated vehicle is increased.
The vehicle authentication system according to any one of claims 10 to 12.

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