JP2014102676A - Environment authentication system, control target device, connection management device, and environment definition device - Google Patents

Abstract

PROBLEM TO BE SOLVED: To provide a technique for switching states of a control target device, when a device being a reference surely exists around the control target device.SOLUTION: The connection management device performs authentication processing for a control target device which approaches within a radio communication zone of the connection management device. When determining the authentication processing is successful, the connection management device permits connection between the control target device and an environment definition device. Otherwise, the connection between the control target device and the environment definition device is inhibited. When connection with the control target device is permitted, the environment definition device provides closed confidential environment information for restoring control target information from secrecy information or the control target information restored from the secrecy information by using the confidential environment information to the control target device, or outputs signature information necessary for acquiring the confidential environment information or the control target information on the control target device.

Description

  The present invention relates to a technique for controlling the availability of functions and data on a device depending on the location of the device.

  Conventionally, there is a technique for switching the state of a device to be controlled (referred to as a “control target device”) according to environmental information acquired by a sensor or the like without a switching operation by a user. In such a technique (prior art 1), specific information (referred to as “environment information”) is wirelessly transmitted from an apparatus serving as a reference, and depending on whether or not the control target apparatus has received the environment information, Switch the device state. For example, in the “Anshin Key” (registered trademark) system, when environmental information wirelessly transmitted from a wireless terminal device called “Anshin Key” cannot be received by a mobile phone, the function of the mobile phone is automatically locked, When it can be received, the lock is automatically released (see, for example, Non-Patent Documents 1 and 2).

  There is also a technique (conventional technology 2) that allows the control target apparatus to acquire the environment information when the control target apparatus accesses the reference apparatus to perform the authentication process and succeeds in the authentication process (for example, patent) References 1, 2 etc.).

  In the case of the prior art 1, even if a third party without a legitimate title obtains a control target device by picking up or the like, the third party takes the control target device beside the reference device. Thus, the state of the control target device can be switched. On the other hand, in the case of the prior art 2, such a problem does not arise.

JP 2005-27108 A JP 2012-3299 A

Yasuhiro Honda, Shoichi Horiguchi, Shinzo Okubo, “Demonstration of Information Providing Services Using Active RFID Readers Mounted on Mobile Terminals”, [online], NTT DoCoMo Technical Journal Vol.15 No.1, pages 40-44 [Search on November 5, 2012], Internet <http://www.nttdocomo.co.jp/binary/pdf/corporate/technology/rd/technical_journal/bn/vol15_1/vol15_1_040jp.pdf> “Press Release:“ P904i ”Released”, [online], June 11, 2007, NTT DoCoMo, Inc. [Search November 5, 2012], Internet <http: / /www.nttdocomo.co.jp/info/news_release/page/070611_00.html>

  However, the environment information used in the prior art 2 is public information that anyone can know. Therefore, regardless of the presence or absence of a legitimate title, a holder of a control target device having technical knowledge can easily forge the environment information of the control target device. Such a counterfeiter can switch the state of the control target device using the forged environment information without having the control target device beside the reference device. In other words, the conventional technology has a mechanism for ensuring the authenticity of the environmental information for switching the state of the control target device, that is, a mechanism for authenticating the fact that the reference device is surely present around the control target device. not exist.

  The present invention has been made in view of such points, and provides a technique for switching the state of a control target device when a reference device is surely present around the control target device.

  The system of the present invention includes an environment definition device, a connection management device having a wireless communication function, and a control target device having a wireless communication function. The control target device holds concealment information obtained by concealing the control target information.

  The connection management device performs an authentication process for the control target device that has reached the wireless communication range of the connection management device. The connection management device permits the connection between the control target device and the environment definition device when it is determined that the authentication process is successful, and otherwise, the connection between the control target device and the environment definition device. Reject the connection between.

  The environment definition device restores from the confidential information using the secret environment information that is not disclosed or the secret environment information for restoring the control target information from the confidential information when the connection with the control target device is permitted. The control target information is provided to the control target device, or signature information necessary for obtaining the secret environment information or the control target information in the control target device is output.

  In the present invention, the state of the control target device can be switched when the reference device is surely present around the control target device.

FIG. 1 is a block diagram for explaining the configuration of the environment authentication system according to the first and second embodiments. FIG. 2 is a flowchart for explaining the environment authentication method of the first embodiment. FIG. 3 is a flowchart for explaining the environment authentication method of the second embodiment. FIG. 4 is a block diagram for explaining the configuration of the environment authentication system of the third and fourth embodiments. FIG. 5 is a flowchart for explaining the environment authentication method of the third embodiment. FIG. 6 is a flowchart for explaining the environment authentication method of the fourth embodiment.

Hereinafter, embodiments of the present invention will be described with reference to the drawings.
[First Embodiment]
A first embodiment of the present invention will be described.
<Configuration>
As illustrated in FIG. 1, the environment authentication system 1 according to the first embodiment includes an environment definition device 110, a connection management device 120, and a portable control target device 130. The environment definition device 110 includes a secret environment information storage unit 111, a communication unit 112, and a secret environment information management unit 113. The connection management device 120 includes an authentication information storage unit 121, a wireless communication unit 122, an authentication processing unit 123, a connection management unit 124, and a communication unit 125. The control target device 130 includes a concealment information storage unit 131, a wireless communication unit 132, an authentication processing unit 133, an information processing unit 134, and a control target information storage unit 135. The environment definition device 110, the connection management device 120, and the control target device 130 are configured, for example, by loading a predetermined program into a known computer having a CPU (central processing unit), a RAM (random-access memory), and the like. Is a special equipment. Information obtained by each unit is stored in a temporary memory (not shown), read as necessary, and input to each unit. The communication units 112 and 125 may be wireless communication units or wired communication units. For simplification of description, FIG. 1 illustrates one environment definition device 110, one connection management device 120, and one control target device 130. However, the environment definition device 110, the connection management device 120, and the control target device are illustrated. A plurality of 130 may exist.

  The wireless communication units 122 and 132 of the connection management device 120 and the control target device 130 perform wireless communication such as wireless LAN. When the control target device 130 is located within the communication range of the connection management device 120 (when the control target device 130 is located within a certain distance range from the connection management device 120), the connection management device 120 and the control target device 130 are: Wireless communication can be performed through the wireless communication units 122 and 132. When the control target device 130 is not within the communication range of the connection management device 120, the connection management device 120 and the control target device 130 cannot perform wireless communication through the wireless communication units 122 and 132.

<Initial setting process>
The administrator stores private secret environment information in the secret environment information storage unit 111 of the environment definition device 110. The administrator may be a user of the control target device 130 or an administrator of the environment authentication system 1. The secret environment information is information for restoring the control target information from the concealment information obtained by concealing the control target information. Examples of secret environment information include public key cryptography secret key, common key cryptography common key, ID-based cryptography secret key, function cryptography (“T. Okamoto and K. Takashima,“ Fully Secure Functional Encryption with General Relations from the Decisional Linear Assumption, “In CRYPTO, volume 6223 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 191-208, Springer, 2010.”). The control target information means information for executing a control target function or control target information. Examples of the control target information include programs, contents, data, tables, addresses, keywords, setting information, passwords, authentication tokens, and the like.

  The administrator conceals the control target information of the control target device 130 and generates the concealment information so that the secret environment information stored in the secret environment information storage unit 111 can be restored. For example, the administrator encrypts the control target information of the control target device 130 so that it can be decrypted with the secret environment information stored in the secret environment information storage unit 111, and generates concealment information that is a ciphertext. For example, if the secret environment information is a secret key of a public key cryptosystem, the control target information is encrypted using the public key corresponding to the secret key, and the ciphertext obtained thereby is used as the concealment information. The concealment information is stored in the concealment information storage unit 131 of the control target device 130.

<Environmental authentication processing>
The environment authentication process according to this embodiment will be described with reference to FIG.
The wireless communication unit 132 of the control target device 130 determines whether the control target device 130 is located within the communication range of the connection management device 120 (whether it has entered the communication range) (step S101). For example, the wireless communication unit 122 of the connection management device 120 transmits a beacon signal, and whether the wireless communication unit 132 is within the communication range of the connection management device 120 depending on whether the beacon signal is received or not. Determine. In this example, the beacon signal may include identification information (SSID or the like) corresponding to the control target device 130. In this case, the wireless communication unit 132 allows the control target device 130 to communicate with the connection management device 120 only when the identification information included in the received beacon signal corresponds to the concealment information held in the concealment information storage unit 131. It may be determined that it is located within the vicinity. “The identification information corresponding to the control target device 130 corresponds to the concealment information held in the concealment information storage unit 131” is stored in the environment definition device 110 that the control target device 130 permits connection. “Secret environment information” means a relationship in which the control target information can be correctly restored from the concealment information held in the concealment information storage unit 131. The process of step S101 is repeated until it is determined that the control target device 130 is located within the communication range of the connection management device 120.

  When it is determined in step S101 that the control target device 130 is located within the communication area of the connection management device 120, the authentication processing unit 133 sends an authentication request (NW (network) connection authentication request) to the wireless communication unit 132, and the wireless communication unit 132 132 wirelessly transmits an authentication request (step S102). The authentication request includes information for proving the validity of the user of the control target device 130. Examples of information for proving the validity of the user are secret information such as passwords, barcode information, biometric information such as fingerprints and irises, or challenge information corresponding to such secret information. Furthermore, the authentication request may include information corresponding to the concealment information held in the concealment information storage unit 131. Examples of “information corresponding to the concealment information” include a public key, a public key certificate corresponding to the public key, a key ID corresponding to the common key, an ID, a vector (attribute vector, etc.), and the like. For example, when the concealment information is a ciphertext of a public key cryptosystem, the public key used to generate the ciphertext or a public key certificate corresponding to the public key may be included in the authentication request. For example, when the secret environment information is a ciphertext of a common key cryptosystem, a key ID corresponding to the common key used for generating the ciphertext may be included in the authentication request. For example, when the secret environment information is an ID-based encryption ciphertext, the ID used to generate the ciphertext may be included in the authentication request. For example, when the secret environment information is a ciphertext of a function cryptosystem, a vector used for generating the ciphertext may be included in the authentication request.

  When the authentication request is received by the wireless communication unit 122 of the connection management device 120, the authentication request is sent to the authentication processing unit 123. As a result, the authentication processing unit 123 starts the authentication process of the control target device 130 using a table or the like made of authentication information necessary for the authentication process stored in the authentication information storage unit 121 (step S103). The authentication process is performed between the authentication processing unit 123 and the authentication processing unit 133 via the wireless communication units 122 and 132. For the authentication process, a known authentication method such as password authentication, biometric authentication, challenge & response, or the like can be used. Further, when the authentication request includes information corresponding to the confidential information held in the confidential information storage unit 131, the secret corresponding to the confidential environment information storage unit 111 holds (stores) the information corresponding to the confidential information. It may be verified whether it corresponds to environmental information. For example, if the “information corresponding to the confidential information” included in the authentication request is a public key or its public key certificate, it is verified whether the secret environment information is a secret key corresponding to the public key or the like. Good. For example, the authentication processing unit 123 generates a ciphertext by encrypting an arbitrary value (authentication information) such as a random number stored in the authentication information storage unit 121 with a public key that is “information corresponding to confidential information”, and The ciphertext is sent to the secret environment information management unit 113 of the environment definition device 110. The secret environment information management unit 113 decrypts the ciphertext using the secret environment information stored in the secret environment information storage unit 111, and sends the decryption result to the authentication processing unit 123. The authentication processing unit 123 verifies whether the decryption result and the arbitrary value stored in the authentication information storage unit 121 are equal, and if they are equal, the secret environment information is a secret key corresponding to the public key or the like. If it is not, the secret environment information is determined not to be a secret key corresponding to the public key or the like. For example, when “information corresponding to the concealment information” included in the authentication request is a key ID, it may be verified whether the secret environment information is a common key corresponding to the key ID. For example, when “information corresponding to the concealment information” included in the authentication request is an ID, it may be verified whether the secret environment information is a secret key corresponding to the ID. For example, when the “information corresponding to the concealment information” included in the authentication request is a vector, the secret environment information corresponds to a vector having a specific relationship with the vector (for example, a relationship in which the inner product between the vectors is 0). It may be verified whether it is a secret key. When such verification is performed, a known authentication process such as password authentication is successful (authentication OK, passed), and if the concealment information corresponds to the secret environment information, the authentication process is successful. Otherwise, it is determined that the authentication process has failed (authentication NG, failed) at other times.

  If it is determined that the authentication process in step S103 is unsuccessful (step S104), the authentication processing unit 123 rejects the connection between the control target apparatus 130 and the environment definition apparatus 110, and ends the process with an error (step S105). ).

  When it is determined that the authentication process in step S103 is acceptable (step S104), the authentication processing unit 123 permits the connection between the control target device 130 and the environment definition device 110 and connects the authentication result indicating that the authentication is successful. The data is sent to the management unit 124 (step S106). The connection management unit 124 that has received the authentication result indicating successful authentication connects the wireless communication unit 122 and the communication unit 125, and establishes a connection between the control target device 130 and the environment definition device 110.

  When the connection between the control target device 130 and the environment definition device 110 is established, this is also transmitted to the information processing unit 134 of the control target device 130. Receiving this, the information processing unit 134 outputs a secret environment information request to the wireless communication unit 132. The wireless communication unit 132 wirelessly transmits a secret environment information request (step S107). The secret environment information request is relayed by the wireless communication unit 122, the connection management unit 124, and the communication unit 125, and transmitted to the environment definition device 110 (step S108).

  The secret environment information request is received by the communication unit 112 and sent to the secret environment information management unit 113. Upon receiving the secret environment information request, the secret environment information management unit 113 reads the secret environment information from the secret environment information storage unit 111 and provides it to the control target device 130. That is, the secret environment information is transmitted from the communication unit 112 (step S109), relayed by the communication unit 125, the connection management unit 124, and the wireless communication unit 122, transmitted to the control target device 130, and received by the wireless communication unit 132. And sent to the information processing unit 134 (step S110).

  The information processing unit 134 restores the control target information using the sent secret environment information and the concealment information read from the concealment information storage unit 131. In other words, the information processing unit 134 uses the secret environment information to cancel the protection of the confidential information and obtain the control target information (activates the control target information). For example, the information processing unit 134 decrypts the concealment information using the secret environment information, and obtains control target information. The information processing unit 134 outputs the control target information, and the control target information is stored in the control target information storage unit 135 (step S111).

  The information processing unit 134 reads the control target information from the control target information storage unit 135, executes processing using the control target information, and outputs a processing result (step S112).

  The wireless communication unit 132 monitors whether the control target device 130 has gone out of the communication range of the connection management device 120 (step S113). In other words, the wireless communication unit 132 determines whether the control target device 130 is located outside the communication range of the connection management device 120. For example, the wireless communication unit 122 of the connection management device 120 transmits a beacon signal, and whether the wireless communication unit 132 is within the communication range of the connection management device 120 depending on whether the beacon signal is received or not. It is determined whether it is located outside the communication range. When it is determined that the control target device 130 is not out of the communication range of the connection management device 120, the process of step S112 is executed. When it is determined that the control target device 130 has moved out of the communication range of the connection management device 120, the information processing unit 134 deletes the control target information and secret environment information held by the control target device 130 (step S114). For example, the information processing unit 134 deletes the control target information and the secret environment information held in the control target information storage unit 135 of the control target device 130 or a temporary memory (not shown). As a result, the control target information is protected again, and the control target device 130 cannot execute the process using the control target information.

<Features of First Embodiment>
In this embodiment, the control target information stored in the control target device 130 is concealed as concealment information. Although the control target information can be restored from the concealment information by using the secret environment information that is not disclosed, it is difficult to forge the secret environment information because the secret environment information is secret information. Therefore, even though the control target device 130 is not located near the connection management device 120, the control target information is restored from the concealment information by the forged secret environment information, and the control target information is illegally used. Can be prevented.

  Further, in this embodiment, the control target device 130 is not secretly disclosed from the environment definition device 110 only when the control target device 130 enters the communication range of the connection management device 120 and the authentication process with the connection management device 120 is successful. Information can be acquired. Even if a third party without a legitimate title acquires the control target device 130 and brings it to the side of the connection management device 120, the authentication processing fails (authentication NG). In this case, the control target device 130 cannot acquire the secret environment information, and the control target information cannot be restored from the confidential information. Therefore, it is possible to prevent such a third party from illegally using the control target information of the control target device 130.

  Furthermore, in this embodiment, when the control target device 130 goes out of the communication range of the connection management device 120, the control target information and secret environment information held by the control target device 130 are deleted. Thereby, it is possible to prevent the control target device 130 from using the control target information outside the communication range of the connection management device 120.

[Second Embodiment]
A second embodiment of the present invention will be described. This embodiment is a modification of the first embodiment, and when the authentication process is successful, the secret environment information is not provided to the control target device, but the restored control target information is provided. Below, it demonstrates centering on difference with 1st Embodiment, and abbreviate | omits description about the common point with 1st Embodiment using the same reference number.

<Configuration>
As illustrated in FIG. 1, the environment authentication system 2 of the second embodiment includes an environment definition device 210, a connection management device 120, and a control target device 230. The environment definition device 210 includes a secret environment information storage unit 111, a communication unit 112, and a secret environment information management unit 213. The control target device 230 includes a concealment information storage unit 131, a wireless communication unit 132, an authentication processing unit 133, an information processing unit 234, and a control target information storage unit 135. Each device is a special device configured by reading a predetermined program into a known computer.

<Initial setting process>
The same initial setting process as in the first embodiment is executed. However, the environment definition apparatus 210 executes the process executed by the environment definition apparatus 110 in the first embodiment, and the control object apparatus 230 executes the process executed by the control object apparatus 130 in the first embodiment.

<Environmental authentication processing>
The environment authentication process according to this embodiment will be described with reference to FIG.
First, the same processing as steps S101 to S106 of the first embodiment is executed. However, the environment definition apparatus 210 executes the process executed by the environment definition apparatus 110 in the first embodiment, and the control object apparatus 230 executes the process executed by the control object apparatus 130 in the first embodiment.

  When the connection between the control target device 230 and the environment definition device 110 is established, this is also notified to the information processing unit 234 of the control target device 230. Receiving this, the information processing unit 234 outputs a restoration request to the wireless communication unit 132. The wireless communication unit 132 wirelessly transmits a restoration request (step S107). The restoration request in this embodiment includes the concealment information read from the concealment information storage unit 131. The restoration request is relayed by the wireless communication unit 122, the connection management unit 124, and the communication unit 125, and transmitted to the environment definition device 210 (step S108).

  The restoration request is received by the communication unit 112 and sent to the secret environment information management unit 213. Thus, the secret environment information management unit 213 that has received the restoration request provided from the control target device 230 via the connection management device 120 reads the secret environment information from the secret environment information storage unit 111. The secret environment information management unit 213 restores the control target information from the concealment information using the secret environment information. For example, the secret environment information management unit 213 decrypts the concealment information using the secret environment information to obtain control target information (step S208).

  The secret environment information management unit 213 provides the restored control target information to the control target device 230. That is, the control target information is transmitted from the communication unit 112 (step S209), relayed by the communication unit 125, the connection management unit 124, and the wireless communication unit 122, transmitted to the control target device 130, and received by the wireless communication unit 132. Then, it is stored in the control object information storage unit 135 (step S210).

  The information processing unit 234 reads the control target information from the control target information storage unit 135, executes a process using the control target information, and outputs a processing result (step S112).

  The wireless communication unit 132 monitors whether the control target device 230 has gone out of the communication range of the connection management device 120 (step S113). When it is determined that the control target device 230 is not out of the communication range of the connection management device 120, the process of step S112 is executed. When it is determined that the control target device 230 has gone out of the communication range of the connection management device 120, the information processing unit 234 deletes the control target information held by the control target device 230 (step S214). As a result, the control target information is protected again, and the control target device 230 cannot execute the process using the control target information.

<Features of Second Embodiment>
Also in this embodiment, the control target information stored in the control target device 230 is concealed as concealment information. Although the control target information can be restored from the concealment information by using the secret environment information that is not disclosed, it is difficult to forge the secret environment information because the secret environment information is secret information. Therefore, even though the control target device 230 is not located near the connection management device 120, the control target information is restored from the concealment information by the forged secret environment information, and the control target information is illegally used. Can be prevented.

  Further, in this embodiment, the environment definition device 210 uses the secret environment information only when the control target device 230 succeeds in the authentication process with the connection management device 120, and the control target is determined from the concealment information provided from the control target device 230. Information is restored and provided to the control target device 230. Even if a third party without a legitimate title acquires the control target device 230 and brings it to the side of the connection management device 120, the authentication processing fails. In this case, the control target device 230 cannot acquire control target information. Therefore, it is possible to prevent such a third party from illegally using the control target information of the control target device 230.

  Further, in this embodiment, when the control target device 230 goes out of the communication range of the connection management device 120, the control target information held by the control target device 230 is deleted. Thereby, it is possible to prevent the control target device 230 from using the control target information outside the communication range of the connection management device 120.

  Further, in this embodiment, since the secret environment information is not given to the control target device 230, the secret environment information is illegally leaked, and the control target device 230 is not placed near the connection management device 120. It is possible to prevent the control target information from being restored from the concealment information by using the secret environment information and to prevent the control target information from being illegally used.

[Third Embodiment]
A third embodiment of the present invention will be described. This embodiment is a modification of the first embodiment. In this embodiment, when the authentication process is successful, the environment definition device outputs the signature information, and the secret environment information holding device that has received the signature information provides the secret environment information to the control target device. Below, it demonstrates centering on difference with 1st Embodiment, and abbreviate | omits description about the common point with 1st Embodiment using the same reference number.

<Configuration>
As illustrated in FIG. 4, the environment authentication system 3 according to the third embodiment includes a control target device 130, an environment definition device 310, a connection management device 320, and a secret environment information holding device 340. The environment definition device 310 includes a signature information storage unit 311, a communication unit 112, and a secret environment information management unit 313. The connection management device 320 includes an authentication information storage unit 121, a wireless communication unit 322, an authentication processing unit 123, a connection management unit 124, and a communication unit 125. The secret environment information holding device 340 includes a secret environment information storage unit 341, a wireless communication unit 342, and a secret environment information management unit 343. Each device is a special device configured by reading a predetermined program into a known computer.

<Initial setting process>
The administrator stores private secret environment information in the secret environment information storage unit 341 of the secret environment information holding device 340. The administrator conceals the control target information of the control target device 130 so as to be restored with the secret environment information stored in the secret environment information storage unit 341, and generates the concealment information. The concealment information is stored in the concealment information storage unit 131 of the control target device 130. Further, the administrator stores signature generation information necessary for the environment definition device 310 to generate signature information in the signature information storage unit 311 of the environment definition device 310. The signature generation information is secret information, for example, a public key cryptosystem secret key. The signature generation information and the secret environment information may be the same.

<Environmental authentication processing>
The environment authentication process of this embodiment will be described with reference to FIG.
First, the same processing as steps S101 to S108 of the first embodiment is executed. However, the environment definition apparatus 310 executes the process executed by the environment definition apparatus 110 in the first embodiment, and the connection management apparatus 320 executes the process executed by the connection management apparatus 120 in the first embodiment.

  The secret environment information request sent from the control target device 130 via the connection management device 320 is received by the communication unit 112 of the environment definition device 310 and sent to the secret environment information management unit 313. Upon receiving the secret environment information request, the secret environment information management unit 313 reads the signature generation information from the signature information storage unit 311. The secret environment information management unit 313 generates signature information for the secret environment information request using the signature generation information. The secret environment information request and the signature information are transmitted from the communication unit 112 (step S301), relayed by the communication unit 125, the connection management unit 124, and the wireless communication unit 322, transmitted to the secret environment information holding device 340, and the wireless communication unit Received at 342 (step S302).

  The secret environment information request and signature information received by the wireless communication unit 342 are sent to the secret environment information management unit 343. When the secret environment information management unit 343 verifies the signature information and determines that the signature information is valid, the secret environment information management unit 343 reads out the secret environment information from the secret environment information storage unit 341 and provides it to the control target device 130. That is, the secret environment information is transmitted from the wireless communication unit 342 (step S309), relayed by the wireless communication unit 322, transmitted to the control target device 130, received by the wireless communication unit 132, and sent to the information processing unit 134. (Step S310).

  Thereafter, the same processing as steps S111 to S114 of the first embodiment is executed.

<Features of Third Embodiment>
Also in this embodiment, the control target information is restored from the concealment information by the forged secret environment information, and the control target information can be prevented from being illegally used. Further, a third party without a legitimate title can be controlled by the control target device 130. It is possible to prevent unauthorized use of the control target information. In addition, it is possible to prevent the control target device 130 from using the control target information outside the communication range of the connection management device 320.

  In this embodiment, the environment definition device 310 transmits a secret environment information request and signature information to the secret environment information holding device 340 via the connection management device 320. However, the environment definition device 310 may transmit the secret environment information request and the signature information to the secret environment information holding device 340 without going through the connection management device 320. Alternatively, the environment definition device 310 transmits the secret environment information request and signature information to the control target device 130 via the connection management device 320, and the control target device 130 transmits the secret environment information request and signature information to the secret environment information holding device 340. May be. In addition, the secret environment information request and the signature information may be transmitted to the secret environment information holding device 340 by any route. In this embodiment, since the environment definition device 310 assigns a signature using a server type, the degree of freedom in handling signature information is high. The secret environment information holding device 340 may perform wired communication instead of wireless communication with a device such as the connection management device 320. When the signature information is transmitted and held in the control target device 130, the control target device 130 that has left the wireless communication area of the connection management device 320 receives the secret environment information, the control target information, and the signature information in the control target Delete from the device 130.

[Fourth Embodiment]
A fourth embodiment of the present invention will be described. This embodiment is a modification of the second embodiment. In this embodiment, the environment definition device outputs the signature information when the authentication process is successful. The secret environment information holding device that has received the signature information restores the control target information from the concealment information using the secret environment information, and provides the control target information to the control target device. Below, it demonstrates centering on difference with 1st-3rd embodiment, and it abbreviate | omits description about the common point with 1st-3rd embodiment using the same reference number.

<Configuration>
As illustrated in FIG. 4, the environment authentication system 4 of the fourth embodiment includes a control target device 230, an environment definition device 310, a connection management device 320, and a secret environment information holding device 440. The secret environment information holding device 440 includes a secret environment information storage unit 341, a wireless communication unit 342, and a secret environment information management unit 443. Each device is a special device configured by reading a predetermined program into a known computer.

<Initial setting process>
The same initial setting process as that in the third embodiment is executed. However, the process executed by the environment definition device 310 in the third embodiment is executed by the environment definition device 410, the process executed by the control target device 130 in the third embodiment is executed by the control target device 230, and the third embodiment is executed. The secret environment information holding device 440 executes the process executed by the secret environment information holding device 340.

<Environmental authentication processing>
The environment authentication process according to this embodiment will be described with reference to FIG.
First, similarly to the second embodiment, the processes of steps S101 to S106, S207, and S108 are executed. However, the environment definition device 310 executes processing executed by the environment definition device 110 in the second embodiment, and the connection management device 320 executes processing executed by the connection management device 120 in the second embodiment.

  A restoration request (including confidential information) sent from the control target device 230 via the connection management device 320 is received by the communication unit 112 of the environment definition device 310 and sent to the secret environment information management unit 313. The secret environment information management unit 313 that has received the restoration request reads the signature generation information from the signature information storage unit 311. The secret environment information management unit 313 generates signature information for the restoration request using the signature generation information. The restoration request and signature information are transmitted from the communication unit 112 (step S401), relayed by the communication unit 125, connection management unit 124, and wireless communication unit 322, transmitted to the secret environment information holding device 340, and transmitted by the wireless communication unit 342. Received (step S402).

  The restoration request and signature information received by the wireless communication unit 342 are sent to the secret environment information management unit 443. When the secret environment information management unit 443 verifies the signature information and determines that the signature information is valid, the secret environment information management unit 443 reads the secret environment information from the secret environment information storage unit 341. The secret environment information management unit 443 restores the control target information from the concealment information included in the restoration request using the secret environment information (step S408). The secret environment information management unit 443 provides the control target information to the control target device 230. That is, the control target information is transmitted from the wireless communication unit 342 (step S309), relayed by the wireless communication unit 322, transmitted to the control target device 230, received by the wireless communication unit 132, and sent to the information processing unit 234. (Step S410).

  Thereafter, similarly to the second embodiment, the processes of steps S112, S113, and S214 are executed.

<Features of Fourth Embodiment>
Also in this embodiment, the control target information is restored from the concealment information by the forged secret environment information, and the control target information can be prevented from being illegally used. Further, a third party without a legitimate title can be controlled by the control target device 130. It is possible to prevent unauthorized use of the control target information. Further, it is possible to prevent the control target device 230 from using the control target information outside the communication range of the connection management device 320.

  Similarly to the third embodiment, the restoration request and the signature information may be transmitted to the secret environment information holding device 440 by any route. The secret environment information holding device 440 may perform wired communication instead of performing wireless communication with a device such as the connection management device 320. Further, when the signature information is transmitted and held in the control target device 230, the control target device 230 that has left the wireless communication area of the connection management device 320 deletes the control target information and the signature information from the control target device 230. To do.

[Other variations, etc.]
The present invention is not limited to the above-described embodiment. For example, the environment definition device and the connection management device may be configured integrally. The environment definition device and the connection management device may be fixed at a specific place or may be a portable device. The connection management device may be a portable device, and the control target device may be fixed at a specific location. In addition, when it is determined in the authentication process in step S103 that “the information corresponding to the concealment information does not correspond to the secret environment information”, the process is not ended in error (step S105), but the connection management device 120 connects. Secret environment information stored in the environment definition device 110 that permits the connection or the secret environment information corresponding to the signature information stored in the environment definition device 310 that the connection management device 120 permits the connection is given to the control target device 130 May be. The information processing unit 134 given the secret environment information fails to restore the control target information. Further, when it is determined in the authentication process in step S103 that “the information corresponding to the concealment information does not correspond to the secret environment information”, the process is not ended in error (step S105), but the connection management device 220 is connected. The restoration result obtained by performing the restoration process of the concealment information with the secret environment information stored in the environment definition device 210 that permits the connection, or the signature stored in the environment definition device 310 that the connection management device 220 permits the connection to A restoration result obtained by performing the restoration processing of the concealment information with the secret environment information corresponding to the information may be given to the control target device 230. This restoration result is incorrect. In these cases, the process may end in error or the authentication process may be re-challenged.

  The various processes described above are not only executed in time series according to the description, but may also be executed in parallel or individually as required by the processing capability of the apparatus that executes the processes. Needless to say, other modifications are possible without departing from the spirit of the present invention.

  When the above configuration is realized by a computer, the processing contents of the functions that each device should have are described by a program. By executing this program on a computer, the above processing functions are realized on the computer. The program describing the processing contents can be recorded on a computer-readable recording medium. An example of a computer-readable recording medium is a non-transitory recording medium. Examples of such a recording medium are a magnetic recording device, an optical disk, a magneto-optical recording medium, a semiconductor memory, and the like.

  This program is distributed, for example, by selling, transferring, or lending a portable recording medium such as a DVD or CD-ROM in which the program is recorded. Furthermore, the program may be distributed by storing the program in a storage device of the server computer and transferring the program from the server computer to another computer via a network.

  A computer that executes such a program first stores, for example, a program recorded on a portable recording medium or a program transferred from a server computer in its own storage device. When executing the process, this computer reads a program stored in its own recording device and executes a process according to the read program. As another execution form of the program, the computer may read the program directly from the portable recording medium and execute processing according to the program, and each time the program is transferred from the server computer to the computer. The processing according to the received program may be executed sequentially. The above-described processing may be executed by a so-called ASP (Application Service Provider) type service that realizes a processing function only by an execution instruction and result acquisition without transferring a program from the server computer to the computer. Good.

  In the above embodiment, the processing functions of the apparatus are realized by executing a predetermined program on a computer. However, at least a part of these processing functions may be realized by hardware.

1-4 Environment authentication systems 110, 210, 310 Environment definition device 120, 320 Connection management device 130, 230 Control target device 340, 440 Secret environment information holding device

Claims (9)

An environment definition device, a connection management device having a wireless communication function, and a control target device having a wireless communication function,
The control target device holds concealment information that conceals control target information,
The connection management device performs authentication processing of the control target device that has reached the wireless communication range of the connection management device, and determines that the authentication processing is successful when the control target device and the environment definition device The connection between the control target device and the environment definition device is rejected when it is not determined that the authentication process is successful,
The environment definition device uses private secret environment information for restoring the control target information from the concealment information or the secret environment information when the connection with the control target device is permitted. Providing the control target information restored from the concealment information to the control target device, or outputting signature information necessary for obtaining the secret environment information or the control target information in the control target device;
Environmental certification system characterized by that. The environment authentication system according to claim 1,
The authentication process of the control target device includes a process for verifying whether the concealment information held in the control target device corresponds to the secret environment information,
The environment definition device determines that the authentication process is successful when the concealment information held in the control target device corresponds to the secret environment information.
Environmental certification system characterized by that. The environment authentication system according to claim 1 or 2,
The control target device that has left the wireless communication area of the connection management device deletes, from the control target device, information held by the control target device among the secret environment information, the control target information, and the signature information. ,
Environmental certification system characterized by that. The environment authentication system according to any one of claims 1 to 3,
The environment definition device holds the secret environment information,
The environment definition device provides the secret environment information to the control target device when connection with the control target device is permitted,
The control target device restores the control target information from the concealment information and the secret environment information.
Environmental certification system characterized by that. The environment authentication system according to any one of claims 1 to 3,
The environment definition device holds the secret environment information,
The control target device provides the concealment information to the environment definition device,
The environment definition device provides the control target device with the control target information restored from the concealment information using the secret environment information when the connection with the control target device is permitted.
Environmental certification system characterized by that. The environment authentication system according to any one of claims 1 to 3,
A secret environment information holding device for holding the secret environment information;
The environment definition device outputs the signature information when connection with the control target device is permitted,
The secret environment information holding device that has received the signature information provides the secret environment information holding device with the secret environment information or the control target information restored from the concealment information using the secret environment information. ,
Environmental certification system characterized by that. A control target device having a wireless communication function,
A storage unit for holding concealment information obtained by concealing control target information;
An authentication processing unit that performs an authentication process with the connection management device when entering the wireless communication range of the connection management device;
When it is determined that the authentication process is successful, private secret environment information for restoring the control target information from the concealment information, or restoration from the concealment information using the secret environment information A communication unit that receives the control target information, or signature information necessary to obtain the secret environment information or the control target information in the control target device;
A control target device. A connection management device having a wireless communication function,
Performing authentication processing of the control target device that has entered the wireless communication area of the connection management device, permitting a connection between the control target device and the environment definition device when it is determined that the authentication processing is successful, An authentication processing unit that rejects connection between the control target device and the environment definition device when it is determined that the authentication processing is not successful;
When connection with the control target device is permitted, the secret environment information that is provided from the environment definition device and is used to restore the control target information from the concealment information, or the secret environment information Providing the control target information restored from the concealment information to the control target device or outputting the signature environment information necessary for obtaining the secret environment information or the control target information in the control target device A connection management unit,
A connection management device. When the authentication processing of the control target device that has entered the wireless communication range of the connection management device is successful, the connection management device determines that the connection management device is permitted to connect to the control target device, Undisclosed secret environment information for restoring the control target information from the concealment information, or providing the control target information restored from the concealment information using the secret environment information to the control target device, Or outputting the signature information necessary for obtaining the secret environment information or the control target information in the control target device,
An environment definition device characterized by that.

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