JP2012058991A - Information processor - Google Patents

Abstract

PROBLEM TO BE SOLVED: To provide an information processor capable of properly detecting an unauthorized alteration to data relating to a non-contact IC card.SOLUTION: An information processor includes: a non-contact IC card unit 35; an application controller 40 for controlling an application 46 of the non-contact IC card unit 35; a driver controller 50 for controlling a driver 51 of the non-contact IC card unit 35; a generation unit 45 to be controlled by the application controller 40; and a storage unit 52 and an alteration detection unit which are controlled by the driver controller 50. The generation unit generates comparison information for detection on the basis of data relating to the application of the non-contact IC card unit. The storage unit previously stores normal comparison information generated on the basis of data relating to the application of the non-contact IC card unit in a normal state. The alteration detection unit detects an alteration to the data relating to the non-contact IC chip application by comparing the comparison information for detection with the normal comparison information.

Description

  Embodiments described herein relate generally to an information processing apparatus.

  Today, information processing devices equipped with non-contact IC cards are widely used. Since the function realized by the non-contact type IC card involves sending and receiving money, sufficient countermeasures against unauthorized use and malfunction by a third party are required.

  Information processing apparatuses equipped with an open platform (operating system) for mobile terminals such as Android (registered trademark) have also been widely used. In the open platform, the source code of the software is released and the modification is free. On the other hand, the modified source code may be required to be disclosed, and the released source code can be freely browsed on the Internet.

JP 2008-92304 A

  Various techniques for mounting a non-contact IC card on an information processing apparatus equipped with an open platform have been proposed. However, since the open platform is widely disclosed, there is a possibility that the software may be altered by a third party. There is a risk that information may be leaked from a non-contact IC card or money may be damaged due to tampering.

  For this reason, when a non-contact IC card is mounted on an open platform, security design for preventing unauthorized use of the non-contact IC chip is an important issue.

  The present invention has been made in view of such circumstances, and an object of the present invention is to provide an information processing apparatus that can preferably detect unauthorized tampering with data related to a non-contact IC card.

  An information processing apparatus according to an embodiment includes a non-contact IC card unit, an application control unit that controls an application of the non-contact IC card unit, a driver control unit that controls a device driver of the non-contact IC card unit, and an application A generation unit managed by the control unit, and a storage unit and a falsification detection unit managed by the driver control unit are provided. The generation unit generates comparison information for detection based on data related to the application of the non-contact IC card unit. The storage unit stores in advance normal comparison information generated based on data related to the application of the non-contact IC card unit during normal operation. The falsification detection unit receives the comparison information for detection from the generation unit, compares the comparison information for detection with the normal comparison information, and detects falsification of data related to the non-contact IC chip application.

1 is a schematic functional block diagram showing an embodiment of a mobile terminal according to the present invention. The block diagram explaining the relationship with the platform and non-contact IC card part which each CPU of a control part carries. The flowchart explaining the tampering detection lock process performed by the portable terminal in this embodiment. FIG. 4 is a sequence diagram showing falsification detection lock processing of FIG. 3. The flowchart explaining the tampering detection lock process in case the open side tampering detection mechanism performed by the portable terminal in this embodiment does not function normally. FIG. 6 is a sequence diagram showing falsification detection lock processing of FIG. 5. The sequence diagram explaining the process which locks an IC card based on the user operation performed by the portable terminal in this embodiment. The transition diagram of the lock state at the time of alteration detection and recovery. The flowchart explaining the lock release process after the alteration recovery performed by the portable terminal in this embodiment.

  An embodiment of an information processing apparatus according to the present invention will be described with reference to the accompanying drawings.

  FIG. 1 is a schematic functional block diagram showing an embodiment of a mobile terminal according to the present invention.

  The mobile terminal 1 can perform voice communication and data using any of the wireless communication methods of W-CDMA, GSM, cdma2000 1x RTT, EVDO, and E-UTRA, which is wireless access of the 3.9th generation LTE system. Communication is possible. The antenna 11, the wireless transmission / reception unit 12, and the signal processing unit 13 correspond to these methods.

  The antenna 11 receives a radio signal transmitted from a base station accommodated in a mobile communication network by various communication processing systems from space. The antenna 11 radiates a radio signal of a predetermined access method to the space so that wireless communication can be performed with a predetermined communication processing system.

  The wireless transmission / reception unit 12 performs wireless communication with a base station accommodated in the mobile communication network via the antenna 11 by various communication processing methods. The radio transmission / reception unit 12 generates a radio signal having a carrier frequency instructed from the control unit 19 based on the modulation signal generated by the signal processing unit 13. The radio transmission / reception unit 12 receives a radio signal having a carrier frequency instructed from the control unit 19, mixes it with a local oscillation signal output from the frequency synthesizer, and converts the frequency into an intermediate frequency signal (down-conversion). And the radio | wireless transmission / reception part 12 carries out orthogonal demodulation of this downconverted intermediate frequency signal, and outputs a reception baseband signal. This reception result is output to the signal processing unit 13 and the control unit 19.

  The signal processing unit 13 is configured by a DSP (Digital Signal Processor) or the like, and performs predetermined signal processing on the received baseband signal to obtain received packet data in a predetermined transmission format. The signal processing unit 13 demodulates the audio signal included in the received packet data and decodes the demodulation result to obtain audio data and the like. The audio data obtained by the decoding process is supplied to the PCM codec 14. The PCM codec 14 PCM-decodes the voice data and outputs an analog audio data signal after the PCM decoding to the reception amplifier 15. The analog audio signal is amplified by the receiving amplifier 15 and then output from the receiver 16.

  On the other hand, the voice signal (analog audio signal) of the speaker (user) input to the microphone 17 is amplified to an appropriate level by the transmission amplifier 18 and then PCM encoded by the PCM codec 14. The audio signal after PCM encoding is input to the signal processing unit 13. The signal processing unit 13 encodes the audio signal, generates a modulation signal based on audio data and other data obtained by the encoding, and outputs the generated modulation signal to the radio transmission / reception unit 12.

  The control unit 19 includes a CPU (Central Processing Unit), a ROM (Read Only Memory), a RAM (Random Access Memory), and the like. The CPU executes various processes in accordance with programs stored in the ROM or various application programs and control programs including the operating system (OS) loaded from the storage unit 30 to the RAM. In addition, the CPU generates various control signals and supplies them to each unit to control the mobile terminal 1 in an integrated manner. The RAM appropriately stores data necessary for the CPU to execute various processes.

  The control unit 19 has two CPUs. The communication system CPU 19a performs processing necessary for communication processing. The communication system CPU 19a controls communication processing using the antenna 11, the wireless transmission / reception unit 12, the signal processing unit 13, the PCM codec 14, the reception amplifier 15, the transmission amplifier 18, and the like. In addition, the communication system CPU 19 a includes a driver for controlling the non-contact IC card unit 35.

  The application CPU 19b performs processing necessary for operating the application. The application CPU 19b performs processing related to an application using the storage unit 30, the operation unit 33, the display unit 34, the clock circuit 38, and the like. Details of the communication system CPU 19a and the application system CPU 19b will be described later.

  The non-contact IC card unit 35 is a chip for realizing an electronic money function in the mobile terminal 1. The non-contact IC card unit 35 has a CPU, a memory, and an antenna. The non-contact IC card unit 35 performs near field communication with an IC card reader / writer, which is an external terminal device, using weak radio waves via an antenna. The CPU comprehensively controls processing performed in the non-contact IC card unit 35. The memory is, for example, a flash memory, and holds history information that is information on the amount of use of electronic money and balance information of electronic money.

  The storage unit 30 includes, for example, a flash memory element that is an electrically rewritable and erasable nonvolatile memory, an HDD (Hard Disc Drive), and the like. The storage unit 30 stores various application programs and various data groups executed by the CPU of the control unit 19, the control program and control data of the mobile terminal 1, and the like.

  For example, the operation unit 33 detects an input operation on an operation surface of an operation key type or a touch panel type. The display unit 34 displays data including characters and images based on instructions from the control unit 19. The display unit 34 includes, for example, an LCD (Liquid Crystal Display), an organic EL (ElectroLuminescence) display, and an inorganic EL display.

  The power supply circuit 36 generates a predetermined operating power supply voltage Vcc based on the output of the battery 37 and supplies it to each part of the mobile terminal 1. The clock circuit (timer) 38 measures the current time or a certain time.

  FIG. 2 is a configuration diagram illustrating the relationship between the platform mounted on each CPU of the control unit 19 and the non-contact IC card unit 35.

  The application CPU 19b includes an open platform (open platform) 40 (application control unit). The open platform 40 is a software stack composed of four pieces of software: a kernel 41, a library 42, an application framework 43, and an application 44. The open platform 40 in the present embodiment refers to a platform in which software source code is released through the Internet or the like and software can be freely modified and redistributed (for example, based on a license such as GNU (General Public License)) ).

  The kernel 41 manages a predetermined device of the mobile terminal 1 according to the device driver. However, the kernel 41 does not include a device driver for the non-contact IC card unit 35 and does not manage the non-contact IC card unit 35. When a driver for the non-contact IC card unit 35 is provided on the open platform 40 side, this driver may need to be disclosed. On the other hand, since the non-contact IC card function involves money exchange, the driver is not suitable for disclosure. For this reason, the driver of the non-contact IC card unit 35 is not managed on the open platform 40 side, but is managed on the closed platform 50 side described later.

  The library 42 is an encrypted library. The library 42 has an open side alteration detection mechanism 45. The open side alteration detection mechanism 45 is a mechanism for detecting whether or not a source code or setting file of an IC card application 46 described later has been altered. The open side alteration detection mechanism 45 calculates a hash value obtained from a source code or a setting file, which is data related to the IC card application 46, as a detection hash value based on a request from the communication system CPU 19a. The open side tampering detection mechanism 45 performs inter-CPU communication and notifies the communication CPU 19a of the detection hash value.

  The application 44 has an IC card application 46. The IC card application 46 accepts user operations on the non-contact IC card unit 35. That is, the open platform 40 of the application system CPU 19b includes application software for the non-contact IC card unit 35, but does not include a device driver for controlling the non-contact IC card unit 35.

  The communication CPU 19a is a platform in which the source code and the design thereof are not disclosed as in the open platform 40, and a third party other than the design side cannot view or disclose the contents. Hereinafter, the platform mounted on the communication CPU 19a is referred to as a closed platform 50 (driver control unit) with respect to the open platform 40 described above.

  The closed platform 50 includes an IC card unit driver 51, a hash value storage unit 52, and a closed side alteration detection mechanism 53.

  As described above, the open platform 40 does not have a device driver for the non-contact IC card unit 35 and does not control the non-contact IC card unit 35, whereas the closed platform 50 has an IC card unit driver 51. The non-contact IC card unit 35 is controlled.

  The hash value storage unit 52 stores, as a normal hash value, a hash value calculated from a source code or a setting file of a normal (not tampered) IC card application 46 that is determined in advance. This normal hash value is the same value as the detection hash value notified from the open side falsification detection mechanism 45 when the IC card application 46 is in a normal state where it has not been falsified.

  The close side alteration detection mechanism 53 is a mechanism for detecting whether or not the source code or setting file of the IC card application 46 of the application CPU 19b has been altered. The close side alteration detection mechanism 53 makes a hash value notification request to the open side alteration detection mechanism 45 at predetermined intervals. The close side alteration detection mechanism 53 compares the notified hash value for detection with the normal hash value stored in the hash value storage unit 52. When the detection hash value is different from the normal hash value, the close side alteration detection mechanism 53 notifies the IC card unit driver 51 and locks the non-contact IC card unit 35. The non-contact IC card unit 35 cannot communicate with the IC card reader / writer when locked.

  The portable terminal 1 has a function of returning the source code and the setting file to the state before the tampering when the source code and the setting file of the IC card application 46 are tampered. For example, the recovery of the mobile terminal 1 allows the IC card application 46 to return to the state before tampering.

  Next, a process for locking the non-contact IC card unit 35 performed when each of the falsification detection mechanisms 45 and 53 detects falsification of the IC card application 46 will be described.

  FIG. 3 is a flowchart for explaining the falsification detection lock process executed by the mobile terminal 1 in the present embodiment.

  FIG. 4 is a sequence diagram showing the falsification detection lock process of FIG.

  In step S1, the close side alteration detection mechanism 53 of the communication system CPU 19a determines whether or not a predetermined time has elapsed. If it is determined that the predetermined time has not elapsed, the falsification detection mechanism 53 waits until the predetermined time has elapsed.

  On the other hand, when it is determined that the predetermined time has elapsed, the tampering detection mechanism 53 requests the open side tampering detection mechanism 45 of the application CPU 19b to calculate a hash value in step S2 (step S11 in FIG. 4). In step S3, the open side alteration detection mechanism 45 (generation unit) of the application system CPU 19b calculates a hash value for detection (detection comparison information) based on this request (step S12). The falsification detection mechanism 45 notifies the calculated detection hash value to the close side falsification detection mechanism 53 of the communication system CPU 19a (step S13).

  In step S4, the close side alteration detection mechanism 53 of the communication CPU 19a detects the detection hash value notified from the open side alteration detection mechanism 45 and the normal hash value (normal) stored in the hash value storage unit 52 (storage unit). Comparison information) is compared (step S14). In step S5, the falsification detection mechanism 53 determines whether or not the detection hash value matches the normal hash value. If it is determined that the hash values match, the falsification detection mechanism 53 returns to step S1 and repeats the subsequent processing. That is, the tampering detection mechanism 53 determines that data regarding the IC card application 46 of the application CPU 19b has not been tampered with and is in a normal state. The close side tampering detection mechanism 53 requests a hash value from the open side tampering detection mechanism 45 every elapse of a predetermined time, and periodically detects tampering.

  If it is determined that the detection hash value does not match the normal hash value, the close-side alteration detection mechanism 53 locks the non-contact IC card unit 35 based on detection of alteration in steps S6 (steps S15 and S16). . As a result, the non-contact IC card unit 35 becomes unusable, and the use of the non-contact IC card unit 35 based on the altered IC card application 46 by the user can be prevented.

  The portable terminal 1 can preferably detect unauthorized tampering performed on the data related to the IC card application 46 by the tampering detection lock processing in a communication system CPU 19a different from the application system CPU 19b that controls the IC card application 46. it can. In other words, even when the IC card application 46 operates on the open platform 40 side, it is possible to suitably detect tampering on the closed platform 50 side where there is little possibility of tampering. In addition, the mobile terminal 1 can prevent a situation in which the IC card application 46 does not function correctly due to unauthorized tampering.

  Furthermore, the portable terminal 1 locks the non-contact IC card unit 35 when tampering is detected. This prevents the occurrence of money damage and information leakage associated with the use of the non-contact IC card unit 35 by the IC card application 46 that has been tampered with by the user, and prevents unauthorized access to a server that provides a non-contact IC card service. Access can also be reduced.

  This is the end of the description of the lock processing when alteration of the data related to the IC card application 46 is detected.

  Next, a lock process when the open side tampering detection mechanism 45 does not function normally will be described.

  FIG. 5 is a flowchart for explaining the falsification detection lock process when the open side falsification detection mechanism 45 executed by the mobile terminal 1 in this embodiment does not function normally.

  FIG. 6 is a sequence diagram showing the falsification detection lock process of FIG.

  Steps S21 and S22 (step S31 in FIG. 6) are the same processes as the progress determination step S1 and the calculation request step S2 (step S11 in FIG. 4) in FIG.

  In step S23, the close side alteration detection mechanism 53 determines whether or not a predetermined time T has elapsed since the hash value for detection was requested. When it is determined that the time T has not elapsed, the close-side alteration detection mechanism 53 determines whether or not a detection hash value has been notified from the open-side alteration detection mechanism 45 in step S24. If it is determined that the detection hash value has not been notified, the close-side alteration detection mechanism 53 returns to step S23 and waits for the detection hash value until the time T elapses.

  If the close-side alteration detection mechanism 53 determines that the detection hash value has been notified, the process proceeds to step S25. Steps S25 to S27 are substantially the same processes as the comparison step S4 to the lock step S6 in FIG.

  On the other hand, when it is determined that the time T has elapsed in step S23, the close-side alteration detection mechanism 53 proceeds to step S27 and locks the non-contact IC card unit 35 (steps S33 and S34). The close-side alteration detection mechanism 53 has a normal function for calculating the detection hash value in the open-side alteration detection mechanism 45 when the detection-side hash value is not notified from the open-side alteration detection mechanism 45 after the time T has elapsed. Is considered non-functional. In this case, the close-side alteration detection mechanism 53 prevents the alteration detection mechanisms 45 and 53 from being invalidated by locking the non-contact IC card unit 35.

  This is the end of the description of the lock process when the open side tampering detection mechanism 45 does not function normally.

  The portable terminal 1 demonstrated the example which locks the non-contact IC card part 35 based on detection of alteration. In addition, the portable terminal 1 may lock the non-contact IC card unit 35 based on a user operation. The lock based on this user operation can be appropriately locked and unlocked. On the other hand, the lock based on the tampering detection described above cannot be released by a user operation. This is to prevent money damage and information leakage when the IC card application 46 is tampered with. Hereinafter, the lock based on the user operation will be specifically described.

  FIG. 7 is a sequence diagram illustrating a process of locking the IC card based on a user operation executed by the mobile terminal 1 in the present embodiment.

  In step S41, the application CPU 19b (lock operation accepting unit) accepts a user operation (for example, a password input operation) to lock the non-contact IC card unit 35 via the operation unit 33. In step S42, the application CPU 19b requests the communication CPU 19a to lock the non-contact IC card unit 35.

  In step S43, the communication CPU 19a locks the non-contact IC card unit 35. Thereby, the non-contact IC card unit 35 is locked based on the user operation and becomes unusable (step S44).

  Next, a description will be given of the transition of the lock state when the data related to the IC card application 46 is detected and the non-contact IC card unit 35 is locked and then returned to the state before the alteration by recovery of the mobile terminal 1 or the like.

  FIG. 8 is a transition diagram of the lock state at the time of tampering detection and recovery.

  When the non-contact IC card unit 35 is in the unlocked state A, when the lock based on the user operation (password input in FIG. 8) is performed, the state is the IC card lock state based on the user operation. Transition. Further, when unlocking based on a user operation is performed when the non-contact IC card unit 35 is in the state B, the non-contact IC card unit 35 transits to the state A.

  When tampering is detected when the non-contact IC card unit 35 is in the unlocked state A or the non-contact IC card unit 35 is in the locked state B based on the user operation, the state C Transition to the IC card lock state based on the indicated alteration. When the non-contact IC card unit 35 is in the state C and the mobile terminal 1 is recovered and returns to the state before tampering, the non-contact IC card unit 35 changes according to the state before transitioning to the state C (before tampering detection). To state A or state B. This will be described below with reference to a flowchart.

  FIG. 9 is a flowchart for explaining the post-falsification recovery unlocking process executed by the mobile terminal 1 according to this embodiment.

  In step S51, the IC card application 46 is restored to the state before the falsification by the recovery of the mobile terminal 1 or the like. In step S52, the communication CPU 19a determines whether or not the non-contact IC card unit 35 is locked based on a user operation before tampering is detected. That is, the communication CPU 19a determines whether or not the state B shown in FIG. If the communication system CPU 19a determines that it is not in the state B, the lock based on the alteration detection is released in step S53. That is, the communication CPU 19a shifts to the state A that is in the unlocked state.

  On the other hand, when determining that the communication system CPU 19a is in the state B, in step S54, the communication system CPU 19a transits to the state B that is a locked state based on the user operation.

  According to this portable terminal 1, when the IC card application 46 returns to the state before falsification, the lock state of the non-contact IC card unit 35 is changed according to the state before falsification detection. As a result, the mobile terminal 1 can continue to maintain the locked state in accordance with the user's intention even after the return from falsification, and when the lock based on the user operation has been performed, This is effective in that it does not allow the use of any third party.

  In the embodiment of the present invention, an example in which two CPUs are provided has been described. However, if it is possible to mount an open platform and a closed platform with one CPU, the mobile terminal 1 may include only one CPU.

  Further, although the hash value is used as the comparison information, other values may be used as long as the open side alteration detection mechanism 45 and the close side alteration detection mechanism 53 are comparable.

  Although several embodiments of the present invention have been described, these embodiments are presented by way of example and are not intended to limit the scope of the invention. These novel embodiments can be implemented in various other forms, and various omissions, replacements, and changes can be made without departing from the scope of the invention. These embodiments and modifications thereof are included in the scope and gist of the invention, and are included in the invention described in the claims and the equivalents thereof.

DESCRIPTION OF SYMBOLS 1 Mobile terminal 11 Antenna 12 Wireless transmission / reception part 13 Signal processing part 14 PCM codec 15 Reception amplifier 16 Receiver 17 Microphone 18 Transmission amplifier 19 Control part 19a Communication system CPU
19b Application CPU
30 Storage Unit 33 Operation Unit 34 Display Unit 35 Non-Contact IC Card Unit 36 Power Supply Circuit 37 Battery 38 Clock Circuit (Timer)
40 Open Platform 41 Kernel 42 Library 43 Application Framework 44 Application 45 Open Side Tamper Detection Mechanism 46 IC Card Application 50 Closed Platform 51 IC Card Unit Driver 52 Hash Value Storage Unit 53 Close Side Tamper Detection Mechanism

Claims (5)

A non-contact IC card part;
An application control unit for controlling an application of the non-contact IC card unit;
A driver control unit for controlling a device driver of the non-contact IC card unit;
A generation unit that is managed by the application control unit and generates detection comparison information based on data related to the application of the non-contact IC card unit;
A storage unit that is managed by the driver control unit and stores in advance normal comparison information generated based on data related to the application of the non-contact IC card unit at normal time;
Tamper detection that is managed by the driver control unit, receives the detection comparison information from the generation unit, compares the detection comparison information with the normal comparison information, and detects data tampering with respect to the non-contact IC chip application And an information processing apparatus. The information processing apparatus according to claim 1, wherein the alteration detection unit locks the non-contact IC card unit when alteration of the data is detected. The falsification detection unit requests the generation unit to generate the detection comparison information, and locks the non-contact chip unit when the comparison information cannot be received from the generation unit within a predetermined time. The information processing apparatus according to claim 1. The information processing apparatus according to claim 2, wherein the non-contact tip portion cannot release the lock based on a user operation. A lock operation reception unit that operates based on the control of the application control unit and receives a user operation to lock or unlock the non-contact IC card unit;
The tampering detection unit, when the non-contact IC card unit is locked based on the detection of the tampering of the data and the data returns to a normal state before the tampering, the lock before the tampering based on the detection of the tampering The information processing apparatus according to claim 2 or 3, wherein the state of the non-contact IC card unit is changed in accordance with a state received by the lock operation receiving unit.

Images