JP2010108313A - Integrity verification system and method for platform - Google Patents

Abstract

<P>PROBLEM TO BE SOLVED: To provide an integrity verification system for a platform capable of verifying even a place where a computer is used. <P>SOLUTION: The computer 1 when accessing a LAN 5, reads location information stored in an IC card 8 that a user 3 bears, and transmits the location information to an authentication server 2. The authentication server 2 once receiving a request to verify integrity of the platform refers to a hash value table stored in a USB memory 18 and containing a hash value (design value) of an OS for thin client associatively with location information to verify the integrity of the platform of the computer 1 using at least the hash value (design value) related to the location information received from the computer 1 and a hash value (measured value) calculated by the computer 1. <P>COPYRIGHT: (C)2010,JPO&INPIT

Description

  The present invention relates to a technique for verifying the integrity of a client platform accessing a security managed network.

In recent years, in companies and the like, only the minimum necessary functions are provided to clients, and functions such as management of information resources such as confidential information and processing of applications are concentrated on a server set in a LAN (Local Area Network). The introduction of thin client systems is increasing.

The reasons behind the introduction of the thin client system are: (1) Strengthening internal controls to comply with the Japanese version of the SOX Act, (2) Strengthening security to prevent leakage of personal information from clients, (3) Clients There are reduction of operation management costs (patch information, license management, etc.), (4) realization of telework, etc.

  When a thin client system is realized, for example, as described in Patent Document 1, a thin client operating system (OS: Operating System) having only a minimum function is connected to a USB memory or a CD-ROM (Compact It is stored in an external storage device such as Disc Read Only Memory, and the thin client OS is started on the computer.

  If the thin client OS is started, a general-purpose computer can be used as a thin client terminal. However, if the thin client OS stored in the external storage device is falsified intentionally or accidentally, it is expected Because there is a possibility that confidential information stored in a server set in a LAN (Local Area Network) may be leaked for a reason, the client platform before accessing the LAN from the thin client OS. As the integrity verification, it is necessary to verify the integrity of the thin client OS.

  In order to solve such a problem, the present applicant has disclosed a system that can easily verify the integrity verification of a client platform used as a terminal of a thin client system without using a special IC chip. However, in the invention disclosed in Patent Document 2, it was not possible to verify the location where the client of the thin client system is used as the integrity verification of the client platform.

For example, when a notebook computer that can be taken out is used as a thin client terminal and the OS for the thin client has a printer output function, when confidential information is printed out in a public place such as an Internet cafe, Since confidential information may be leaked to a third party, it is desirable that the location where the client is used can be verified as the platform integrity verification of the client.
JP 2007-29913 A Japanese Patent Application No. 2008-012402

  Thus, the present invention provides a platform that can also verify the location where a computer is used when verifying the integrity of a computer platform that remotely accesses a security-managed network, such as a thin client system. It is an object to provide an integrity verification system and method.

  A first invention for solving the above-mentioned problem is a platform integrity verification system comprising at least a computer outside a security-managed network and an authentication server for verifying the integrity of the computer platform, Location information acquisition means for acquiring location information of a user who operates the computer, integrity verification request means for transmitting the location information to at least the authentication server and requesting verification of platform integrity, In response to a request from the authentication server, the computer is provided with verification value calculation means for calculating an actual value of the verification value of the platform of the computer, and transmitting the actual value of the verification value to the authentication server. When a verification request is received, the actual value of the verification value Requesting transmission, referring to a verification value table storing at least the design value of the verification value in association with the location information, and using the design value of the verification value associated with the location information, from the computer The platform integrity verification system is characterized in that the authentication server is provided with integrity verification means for verifying the validity of the actually measured value of the received verification value.

  According to the first invention described above, when the authentication server includes the verification value table storing at least the design value of the verification value in association with the location information, and verifies the integrity of the computer platform. If the design value of the verification value associated with the location information is used, the design value of the verification value is stored by associating only the location information of the location where the use of the computer is permitted. Since the verification of the integrity of the platform fails at other locations, the location where the computer is used can be verified.

  Further, the second invention is the platform verification system according to the first invention, wherein the platform integrity verification system includes a door gate provided at a doorway of a room, and the door gate is the user's door. When unlocking the door when entering the room, when writing the location information indicating the room where the door gate is installed in the IC card possessed by the user, and when unlocking the door when the user leaves the room The location information acquisition unit included in the computer is a unit for reading the location information from the IC card possessed by the user. Is a platform integrity verification system characterized by

  Since there are many situations where it is desired to manage remote access to a corporate LAN (Local Area Network) as remote access management situations, the location of the location is determined by the door gate installed in the room as in the second aspect described above. If the location information is written in the IC card and the location information stored in the IC card is read by the computer, the place where the computer is used can be easily specified including inside and outside the company.

  Further, the third invention is the platform verification system according to the second invention, wherein the computer is provided with user information acquisition means for acquiring at least a user ID from a user operating the computer, and the completeness is provided. The verification request means is means for transmitting the user ID to the authentication server in addition to the location information, and the integrity verification means of the authentication server is associated with the location information for each user ID. The platform is characterized by using the design value of the verification value associated with the location information in the user ID received from the computer with reference to the verification value table storing at least the design value of the value. It is an integrity verification system.

  As in the third aspect described above, the authentication server stores at least the design value of the verification value in association with the location information for each user ID, thereby providing the access authority given to the user. Depending on the platform integrity verification can be performed.

  Furthermore, a fourth invention is the platform verification system according to the third invention, wherein the computer platform is an operating system for a thin client expanded in the memory of the computer, and the verification value is A platform integrity verification system characterized in that the computer is provided with a hash value of an image of the thin client operating system and the computer is provided with the thin client operating system. .

  Further, a fifth invention is the platform verification system according to the fourth invention, wherein the thin client operating system is stored in a USB memory possessed by the user, and the USB memory is attached to the computer. In this case, the platform integrity verification system is configured such that the operating system for the thin client is automatically started by the computer.

  By adopting the configurations of the fourth and fifth aspects described above, the platform integrity verification system according to the present invention can be applied to a thin client system.

  Furthermore, a sixth invention is a method for verifying the integrity of a platform of a computer outside a security-managed network, wherein the computer acquires location information of a user who operates the computer, and the computer The actual value of the verification value of the platform is calculated, and the location information and the actual value of the verification value are transmitted to the authentication server that verifies the integrity of the platform. The authentication server associates the location value information with the location information. With reference to the verification value table storing at least the design value of the verification value, the design value of the verification value associated with the location information received from the computer is used, and the verification value received from the computer Platform integrity verification method characterized by verifying the correctness of measured values It is.

  According to the sixth aspect described above, the same effect as in the first aspect can be obtained.

  Thus, according to the present invention described above, when verifying the integrity of a computer platform that remotely accesses a security-managed network, such as a thin client system, the location where the computer is used is also verified. A platform integrity verification system and method that can be provided.

  Now, preferred embodiments of the present invention will be described in detail with reference to the drawings. FIG. 1 is a diagram for explaining the configuration of a platform integrity verification system 9 according to this embodiment.

  The platform integrity verification system 9 shown in FIG. 1 is an embodiment when the present invention is applied to a thin client system using a USB memory 18, and is used as a thin client terminal to which an IC card reader 17 is connected. The computer includes at least a notebook computer 1 and an authentication server 2 that is connected to a security-managed LAN 5 (Loacal Area Network) and manages remote access to resources in the LAN 5 from the computer 1. As a resource, a confidential information server 50 in which confidential information is stored is illustrated, and a firewall device 51 that separates the LAN 5 and the Internet 4 is illustrated.

  Further, the user 3 who uses the platform integrity verification system 9 of the present embodiment has a USB memory 18 in which a thin client OS (OS: Operating System) with limited functions is stored, and a room 6 in the company (for example, The IC card 8 used for unlocking the door gate 7 installed in the satellite office is possessed.

  The authentication server 2 constituting the platform integrity verification system 9 in FIG. 1 is a Web server realized by using a RADIUS server or the like that supports the RADIUS (Radius: Remote Authentication Dial In User Service) protocol. In addition to a general RADIUS server function for user authentication of a user 3 accessing a resource in the LAN, a function for verifying the integrity of the platform of the computer 1 accessing the resource in the LAN 5 is provided.

  The authentication server 2 shown in FIG. 1 performs verification of the platform integrity of the computer 1 that accesses the resources in the LAN 5 in addition to verification of the validity of the thin client OS deployed in the memory of the computer 1. The validity of the place where the computer 1 is used is also verified.

  In order to verify the authenticity of the thin client OS deployed in the memory of the computer 1 in accordance with the contents disclosed in Patent Document 2, the authentication server 2 uses a USB memory 18 for each user ID that operates the computer 1. The hash value (design value) of the OS image for the thin client stored in is stored in association with the location information indicating the location where the computer 1 is used as a platform verification value.

  When the user 3 enters the room 6, location information, which is information specifying the room 6 in which the user 3 enters, is written in the IC card 8 by the door gate 7, and is stored in the memory of the computer 1. When verifying the validity, the computer 1 acquires the user ID from the user 3, further reads the location information from the IC card 8, and the authentication server 2 determines the hash value associated with the user ID received from the computer 1. Among the (design values), the hash value (design value) associated with the location information is used to verify the integrity of the platform.

  In this way, the authentication server 3 performs platform integrity verification using the hash value (design value) associated with the location information received from the computer, so that the functions provided in the thin client OS can be obtained. The use of the thin client OS can be prohibited where it is desired to prohibit the use.

  For example, the function for using the confidential information server 50 and the printer is provided in the thin client OS, and only the location information held by the authentication server 2 in the door gate 7 installed in the room 6 (for example, a satellite office). If a hash value (design value) is stored in association with, the user 3 accesses the confidential information server 50 from the room 6 and the printer 60 installed in the room 6 when the user 3 is in the room 6. Although it can be used, when the user 3 uses the computer 1 outside the company 6a (for example, an internet cafe), the verification of the integrity of the platform is failed. The printer 60a cannot be used.

  From here on, the processing executed by the platform integrity verification system 9 shown in FIG. 1 will be described together with the description of the method according to the present invention. FIG. 2 is a flowchart illustrating the procedure executed by the platform integrity verification system 9.

The USB memory 18 possessed by the user 3 is a device having a boot-up function as disclosed in Japanese Patent No. 3767818. The user 3 operates the computer 1 outside the LAN 5 to remotely access resources in the LAN 5. When the user 3 connects the USB memory 18 to the USB port of the computer 1, the image (byte code) of the thin client OS stored in the USB memory 18 by the boot-up function provided in the USB memory 18. Are expanded in the memory of the computer 1, and when the thin client OS is activated on the computer 1, the computer 1 requests access to the authentication server 2 (S1 in FIG. 2).

  When the authentication server 2 receives an access request from the computer 1, the authentication server 2 issues an authentication request to the computer 1 that has requested access (S2 in FIG. 2).

  Before the remote access to the authentication server 2, the computer 1 on which the thin client OS is started displays a screen for entering a user ID and password on the display, and allows the user 3 to input the user ID and password using a keyboard or the like. The user ID and password input by the user 3 are acquired (S3 in FIG. 2).

  Next, the computer 1 displays a message indicating that the IC card 8 is necessary for remote access to resources in the LAN 5 on the display. When the IC card reader 17 detects the IC card 8, the computer 1 A command for reading the location information is transmitted to the IC card 8, and a request for transmitting the location information is sent to the IC card 8 (S4 in FIG. 2).

  When the IC card 8 receives a command for reading the location information from the computer 1, the IC card 8 transmits the location information to the computer 1 via the IC card reader 17 (S5 in FIG. 2). When the location information is received from the server, a verification request message including a user ID, a password, and location information is sent to the authentication server 2 according to a predetermined type, and an authentication response is sent to the authentication server 2 (S6 in FIG. 2).

  The authentication server 2 stores the password of the user 3 in association with the user ID of the user 3, and the authentication server 2 is included in the verification request message and the password associated with the user ID included in the verification request message. The user 3 is authenticated by collating the password (S7 in FIG. 2).

  When the user authentication is executed, the authentication server 2 branches the process according to the result of the user authentication. When the user authentication is successful, the process for executing the platform integrity verification is continued. When the user authentication fails, the authentication server 2 Finish this procedure without performing platform integrity verification.

  When the authentication server 2 succeeds in user authentication, the hash value (design value) stored in association with the predetermined position information included in the verification request message from the hash value (design value) stored in the authentication server 2. ) Is determined as a hash value (design value) used for platform integrity verification (S8 in FIG. 2).

  When the hash value (design value) to be used for platform integrity verification is determined, the computer 1 that has transmitted the verification request message is requested to verify the platform integrity (S9 in FIG. 2) and disclosed in Patent Document 2 According to the contents, data is exchanged between the computer 1 and the authentication server 2, and platform integrity verification is executed (S20 in FIG. 2).

  When the platform integrity verification is completed, the authentication server 2 branches the process according to the result of the platform integrity verification (S10 in FIG. 2), and if the platform integrity verification fails, the remote access of the computer 1 is permitted. If the platform integrity verification is successful, the message indicating permission to access the resources in the LAN 5 is transmitted to the computer 1 that transmitted the verification request message (S11 in FIG. 2).

  When the access permission to the LAN 5 is notified, the computer 1 starts remote access to any resource in the LAN 5 (S12 in FIG. 2), and the procedure illustrated in FIG. 2 ends.

  Next, a procedure for verifying the integrity of the platform executed in S10 of FIG. 2 will be described with reference to FIG. When performing platform integrity verification between the computer 1 and the authentication server 2, the computer 1 on which the thin client OS is activated generates a random number Rc used for platform integrity verification, and the generated random number Rc is used as the computer 1. The random number generation request message including the random number Rc is transmitted to the authentication server 2 via the Internet 4 (S21 in FIG. 3).

  Upon receiving the random number Rc from the computer 1, the authentication server 2 generates a random number Rs used in platform integrity verification, transmits the random number Rs to the computer 1 (S11), and until the platform integrity verification is completed. The random number Rc and the random number Rs are held in the memory of the authentication server 2 (S22 in FIG. 3).

  When the computer 1 receives the random number Rs from the authentication server 2, the computer 1 holds the random number Rs transmitted from the authentication server 40 in the memory of the computer 1, and then determines from the image of the thin client OS developed in the memory of the computer 1. A hash value (actually measured value) is calculated according to the algorithm (for example, SHA1) (S23 in FIG. 3), and a configuration proof message in which the hash value (actually measured value), the random number Rc, and the random number Rs are combined is generated (FIG. 3). S24).

  When the computer 1 generates the configuration proof message, the MAC of the configuration proof message is used in accordance with a predetermined procedure (for example, a procedure according to ISO / IEC 9797-1) using a MAC key hard-coded in the thin client OS. And a digital signature generation command including the configuration certification message and the MAC is transmitted to the IC card 8 via the IC card reader 17 to request the IC card 8 to generate a digital signature of the configuration certification message ( (S25 in FIG. 3).

  When receiving the command message of the digital signature generation command including the configuration certification message and the MAC, the IC card 8 calculates the MAC from the configuration certification message using the same algorithm as the computer 1 using the MAC key stored in the IC card 8. Then, by verifying whether the MAC transmitted from the computer 1 is the same as the MAC calculated by itself, the validity of the thin client OS running on the computer 1 is verified (S26 in FIG. 3).

  The IC card 8 branches the process according to success / failure of the MAC verification of the configuration certification message. When the MAC verification of the configuration verification message is successful, the IC card 8 executes a process of generating a digital signature of the configuration verification message, When the MAC verification fails, an error message indicating that the MAC verification has failed is returned to the computer 1 and the procedure is terminated.

  When the IC card 8 succeeds in MAC verification of the configuration certification message in S26 of FIG. 3, the digital authentication signature message is digitally generated using the digital secret signature key and according to a predetermined digital signature generation algorithm (for example, PKCS # 1). A signature is generated, and the generated digital signature is returned to the computer 1 (S27 in FIG. 3).

  Upon receiving the digital signature of the configuration certification message from the IC card 8, the computer 1 transmits the configuration certification message and the digital signature to the authentication server 2 via the Internet 4 (S28 in FIG. 3).

  Upon receiving the configuration certification message and the digital signature, the authentication server 2 uses the digital signature public key that is stored in the authentication server 2 and is paired with the digital signature private key stored in the IC card 8 according to a predetermined algorithm. The validity of the IC card 8 that generated the digital signature is verified by verifying the digital signature of the configuration certification message (S29 in FIG. 3).

  If the authentication server 2 fails to verify the digital signature of the attestation message, the authentication server 2 determines that the platform integrity verification has failed, ends this procedure, and if the verification of the digital signature of the attestation message has succeeded, By verifying the legitimacy of the platform, the platform integrity is verified (S30 in FIG. 3).

  Specifically, when the authentication server 2 succeeds in verifying the digital signature of the configuration certification message, Rc and Rs held in the memory of the authentication server 2, and the hash value (design value) determined in S6 of FIG. , The validity of the configuration certification message is verified by confirming whether Rc, Rs, and the hash value (actual measurement value) included in the configuration certification message are correct values.

  If the authentication server 2 fails to verify the configuration proof message itself, the authentication server 2 determines that the platform integrity verification has failed and ends this procedure. If the verification of the validity of the configuration proof message itself is successful, the authentication server 2 performs platform integrity verification. The procedure is terminated when it is determined that the operation has succeeded.

  In the procedure illustrated in FIG. 2, the location information used when the authentication server 2 determines a hash value (design value) to be used for platform integrity verification is as follows when the user 3 enters the room 6. The location information is deleted from the IC card 8 by the door gate 7 when the user leaves the room 6.

  FIG. 4 is a flowchart for explaining a procedure executed when the user 3 enters and leaves the room 6.

  When the user 3 enters (leaves) the room 6 in the company, if the IC card 8 is brought close to the door gate 7 provided at the entrance of the room 6, the door gate 7 detects the IC card 8 (S40 in FIG. 4). ).

  When the door gate 7 detects the IC card 8, the door gate 7 transmits a command for reading the card ID, which is a unique number for each IC card 8, to the IC card 8, thereby transmitting the card ID to the IC card 8. A request is made (S41 in FIG. 4).

  When receiving the command for reading the card ID, the IC card 8 transmits the card ID held by itself to the door gate 7 (S42 in FIG. 2), and the door gate 7 receives the card ID received from the IC card 8. The card ID received from the IC card 8 is verified by confirming whether it is registered in the door gate 7 (S43 in FIG. 4).

  If the verification of the card ID fails, the door gate 7 terminates this procedure without unlocking the door gate 7. If the verification of the card ID is successful, a command for writing the location information held by the door gate 7 is sent to the IC card. 8 is sent to the IC card 8 (S44 in FIG. 4).

  When the IC card 8 receives the command for writing the location information, the IC card 8 writes the location information into the memory (S45 in FIG. 4), and returns a message indicating that the writing is completed to the door gate 7, and the door gate 7 Is received from the IC card 8, the door is unlocked (S46 in FIG. 4).

  When the user 3 leaves the room, a command for deleting the location information is transmitted from the door gate 7 to the IC card 8 in S44 of FIG. 4, and the location information is stored in the IC card in S45 of FIG. Deleted from.

  From here, the computer 1, the USB memory 18, the IC card 8, and the authentication server 2 constituting the access management system shown in FIG. 1 will be described in detail with reference to the drawings.

  5 is a block diagram of the computer 1, FIG. 5 (a) is a hardware block diagram, and FIG. 5 (b) is a functional block diagram.

  As shown in FIG. 5A, the computer 1 is realized by a general-purpose computer 1, and the computer 1 includes, as hardware, a CPU 10 (Central Processing Unit), a RAM 11 (Random Access Memory), and a hard disk as a data storage device. 12, a network interface circuit 13, a display 14, a keyboard 15, a pointing device 16 (for example, a mouse), and an IC card reader 17.

  Further, as illustrated in FIG. 5B, in the present embodiment, the thin client OS stored in the USB memory 18 is started on the computer 1, so that the computer 1 has the configuration illustrated in FIG. As a means realized by the computer 1 program using the hardware shown in FIG. 2, user information acquisition means 100 that operates when executing S3 of FIG. 2, and location information that operates when executing S4 of FIG. When executing the acquisition unit 101, the integrity verification request unit 102 that operates when executing S6 of FIG. 2, the verification value calculation unit 103 that operates when executing S20 of FIG. 2, and S11 of FIG. Remote access means 103 is provided.

  The user information acquisition unit 100 of the computer 1 acquires the user ID and password input by the user 3 to the computer 1 using the keyboard 15 and the pointing device 16 and stores the user ID and password in the RAM 11. The location information acquisition unit 101 controls the IC card reader 17 connected to the computer 1 and reads the location information stored in the IC card 8 electrically connected to the IC card reader 17. , Means for executing processing for storing the location information read from the IC card 8 in the RAM 11.

  Further, the integrity verification request unit 102 of the computer 1 includes a user ID, password, and location information stored in the RAM 11 of the computer 1 and transmits a verification request message conforming to a predetermined type to the authentication server 2, It is a means for executing processing for requesting verification from the authentication server 2.

  The verification value calculation means of the computer 1 is means for executing S21, S23 to S25 and S28 of the procedure shown in FIG. 3, and is expanded in the RAM 11 of the computer 1 when executing platform integrity verification in S20 of FIG. The hash value (actual value) of the image of the thin client OS is calculated, and in addition to the hash value (actual value), the random number Rc generated inside the computer 1 and the random number s received from the authentication server 2 are combined. This is means for generating a configuration certification message, attaching the digital signature generated by the IC card 8 and transmitting the configuration certification message to the authentication server 2.

  When receiving a message indicating access permission from the authentication server 2, the remote access unit 103 is a unit that executes a process of remotely accessing any resource indicated by the address indicated by the message.

  FIG. 6 is a block diagram of the USB memory 18 that is mounted on the computer 1 and used. The USB memory 18 includes, as hardware, a controller chip 180 and a flash memory 181 for causing the computer 1 to which the USB memory 18 is attached to recognize the USB memory 18 as a data storage device and performing USB communication with the computer 1. A thin client OS 182 is stored in the flash memory 181.

  Further, the thin client OS 182 includes a user information acquisition program 182 a that functions as the user information acquisition unit 100 of the computer 1, a location information acquisition program 182 b that functions as the location information acquisition unit 101, and an integrity verification request unit 102. An integrity verification request program 183c that functions, a verification value calculation program 183d that functions as the verification value calculation means 103, and a remote access program 183e that functions as the remote access means 103 are included.

  FIG. 7 is a block diagram of the IC card 8 possessed by the user 3. The IC card 8 includes, as hardware, a CPU 80 (Central Processing Unit), a RAM 81 (Random Access Memory), a ROM 82 (Read # Only Memory), a UART 83 according to a transmission control protocol with the IC card reader 17, and an electrical rewrite. An EEPROM 84, which is a possible non-volatile memory, is provided.

  In the ROM 82 of the IC card 8, as a computer program for operating the IC card 8, a write command 800 executed when the door gate 7 writes the location information to the EEPROM 84 of the IC card 8, and the door gate 7 includes the IC card 8. Delete command 801 executed when the location information is deleted from the EEPROM 84, a digital signature generation command 802 executed when a digital signature of a configuration certification message is generated in response to a request from the computer 1, and the computer 1 A read command 803 that is executed when the location information is read is mounted, and data (for example, location information and a digital signature private key) operated by these commands is stored in the EEPROM 84.

  FIG. 8 is a block diagram of the authentication server 2, FIG. 8 (a) is a hardware block diagram, and FIG. 8 (b) is a functional block diagram.

  As shown in FIG. 8A, the authentication server 2 is realized by a general-purpose server. The authentication server 2 includes, as hardware, a CPU 20 (Central Processing Unit), a RAM 21 (Random Access Memory), and a data storage device. A hard disk 22, a network interface circuit 23, a display 24, a keyboard 25, and a pointing device 26 (for example, a mouse) are provided.

  Further, as illustrated in FIG. 8B, in order to function as the authentication server 2 according to the present invention, the authentication server 2 is realized by a computer program using the hardware illustrated in FIG. As means for executing, user authentication means 200 for executing user authentication using the user ID and password included in the verification request message transmitted from the computer 1 by means for executing S7 of FIG. 2, and S20 of FIG. A hash value table 202 that includes integrity verification means 201 that executes integrity verification of the platform of the computer 1 that has transmitted the verification request message to the authentication server 2 and stores hash values (design values). A verification value table is provided on the hard disk 22.

  In the hash value table 202 provided in the hard disk 22 of the authentication server 2, a hash value (design value) is stored for each user ID of the user 3 in association with the user password and the location information.

  Upon receiving the verification request message from the computer 1, the user authentication means 200 provided in the authentication server 2 acquires the password associated with the user ID included in the verification request message from the hash value table 202, and the verification request User authentication is executed by collating the password included in the message with the password acquired from the hash value table 202.

  The integrity verification unit 201 provided in the authentication server 2 is a unit that executes S22, S29, and S30 in FIG. 3 and generates a random number Rs in response to a request from the computer 1, and a random number Rc generated by the computer 1; When the configuration certificate message combined with the random number Rs and the hash value (actual value) generated by the authentication server 2 and the digital signature are received, the digital certificate public key stored in the authentication server 2 is used to digitally generate the configuration certificate message. This is a means for verifying the signature and further verifying the validity of the configuration proof message itself using the random numbers Rc and Rs held by the authentication server 2 and the hash value (design value).

  Thus, according to the present invention, the authentication server 2 determines the hash value (design value) used for platform integrity verification according to the location information indicating the room 6 in which the user 3 is located, so that the same user 3, even if the same USB memory 18 is used, the platform integrity verification result (success / failure) of the authentication server 3 can be changed depending on the location of the user 3.

  Finally, the effect of the platform integrity verification system 9 described so far will be described. FIG. 9 is a diagram showing an example of the hash value table 202 stored in the authentication server 2.

  In the hash value table 202 shown in FIG. 9, the thin client OS (A) permitted to use the printer is associated with the location information “R01” of the satellite office of the company for the user ID “00001”. The hash value A is stored as a hash value (design value), and the hash value (design value) of the thin client OS (A) that is not permitted to use the printer is associated with the location information of other locations. The value B is stored.

  The hash value table 202 illustrated in FIG. 9 includes hash values (in the client ID “00002” associated with all location information and the thin client OS (A) that is not permitted to use the printer ( A hash value B is stored as a design value.

  FIG. 10 is a supplementary diagram for explaining the effect of the invention. In FIG. 10, as the USB memory 18, a USB memory 18a in which a thin client OS (A) permitted to use a printer installed in a satellite office is stored. 2 shows two USB memories 18b in which a thin client OS (B) that is not permitted to use the printer is stored.

  When the user 3 whose user ID is “00001” possesses the USB memory 18a, when the user 3 is present in the satellite office, the IC card 8 possessed by the user 3 is stored in the satellite office. Since the location information “R01” is stored, the authentication server 2 uses the hash value A associated with the user ID “00001” and further associated with the location information “R01” of the satellite office. Since the platform integrity verification is executed, the authentication server 2 succeeds in the platform integrity verification.

  Under the above-mentioned conditions, when the user 3 is outside the satellite office, the authentication server 2 uses the hash value B to execute the platform integrity verification. Therefore, the authentication server 2 fails in the platform integrity verification. To do. However, if the user 3 possesses the USB memory 18b, the hash value (design value) of the thin client OS (B) stored in the USB memory 18b even if the user 3 is outside the satellite office. Is the hash value B, the authentication server 2 succeeds in platform integrity verification.

  Similarly, when the user 3 whose user ID is “00002” possesses the USB memory 18b, the authentication server 2 uses the hash value B regardless of the location of the user 3 to use the platform integrity. In order to perform verification, the authentication server 2 succeeds in platform integrity verification regardless of the location of the user 3, but the user 3 uses the printer 51 regardless of the location of the user 3. I can't.

The figure explaining the structure of a platform integrity verification system. The flowchart explaining the procedure performed with the integrity verification system of a rat form. FIG. 3 is a flowchart illustrating a procedure for verifying platform integrity. The flowchart explaining the procedure performed when a user enters and leaves a room. The block diagram of a computer. The block diagram of USB memory. The block diagram of an IC card. The block diagram of an authentication server. The figure which showed an example of the hash value table. FIG. 6 is a supplementary diagram illustrating the effect of the invention.

Explanation of symbols

1 Computer 2 Authentication Server 3 User 4 Internet 5 LAN
50 Confidential Information Server 51 Printer 6 Corporate Room 7 Door Gate 8 IC Card 9 Platform Integrity Verification System

Claims (6)

  A platform integrity verification system comprising at least a computer outside a security-managed network and an authentication server that verifies the integrity of the computer platform, and acquires location information of a user who operates the computer The location information acquisition means for transmitting the location information to at least the authentication server and requesting verification of the integrity of the platform, and receiving a request from the authentication server, When the verification value calculation means for calculating the actual value of the verification value of the platform and transmitting the actual value of the verification value to the authentication server is included in the computer and receiving the verification request for the integrity of the platform, the verification value Requests transmission of actual measured values of and related to the location information Thus, referring to the verification value table storing at least the design value of the verification value, using the design value of the verification value associated with the location information, the actual value of the verification value received from the computer A platform integrity verification system, characterized in that the authentication server is provided with integrity verification means for verifying validity.   The platform verification system according to claim 1, wherein the platform integrity verification system includes a door gate provided at a doorway of a room, and the door gate unlocks the door when the user enters the room. When the location information indicating the room in which the door gate is installed is written in an IC card held by the user and the door is unlocked when the user leaves the room, the location information is stored in the IC card. Platform location verification means, wherein the location information acquisition means provided in the computer is means for reading the location information from the IC card possessed by the user. system.   3. The platform verification system according to claim 2, wherein the computer includes a user information acquisition unit that acquires at least a user ID from a user who operates the computer, and the integrity verification request unit includes the location information. In addition to means for transmitting the user ID to the authentication server, the integrity verification means of the authentication server stores at least a design value of the verification value in association with the location information for each user ID. A platform integrity verification system, wherein a design value of the verification value associated with the location information is used in the user ID received from the computer with reference to a verification value table.   4. The platform verification system according to claim 3, wherein the computer platform is a thin client operating system expanded in a memory of the computer, and the verification value is an image of the thin client operating system image. The platform integrity verification system according to claim 1, wherein the computer is provided with the hash value by means of the thin client operating system.   5. The platform verification system according to claim 4, wherein the thin client operating system is stored in a USB memory possessed by the user, and the thin client operating system is mounted when the USB memory is attached to the computer. The platform integrity verification system is configured to automatically start on the computer. A method for verifying the integrity of a platform of a computer outside a security-managed network, wherein the computer obtains location information of a user operating the computer, and at the same time an actual value of a verification value of the computer platform And the location information and the actual value of the verification value are transmitted to an authentication server that verifies the integrity of the platform, and the authentication server associates the location value with the design value of the verification value at least. With reference to the stored verification value table, the design value of the verification value associated with the location information received from the computer is used to verify the validity of the actual measurement value of the verification value received from the computer. A platform integrity verification method characterized by:

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