JP2007074392A - System, method, and computer program for building up secure adhoc network - Google Patents

Abstract

<P>PROBLEM TO BE SOLVED: To provide a system capable of building up a secure adhoc network without the need for devices configuring the adhoc network to individually access a certificate station. <P>SOLUTION: In the system, the certificate station generates a network identifier and a possessor registration key (imprinting key) in response to requests from mobile stations. A network device permits control over the network device for a mobile station first exhibiting the possessor registration key. The network device authenticates whether or not a party accessing the network device is a membership of a management group by using the possessor registration key. The network device generates a certificate issue request signed by a private key and the certificate station issues a device certificate in response to the certificate issue request. The network device executes mutual authentication by exchanging the device certificate with the other network device belonging to the adhoc network. <P>COPYRIGHT: (C)2007,JPO&INPIT

Description

  The present invention relates to the technical field of wireless communication using an ad hoc network, and more particularly to a system, method, and computer program for constructing a secure ad hoc network.

  In an ad hoc network, one or more relay nodes are interposed between a source node that is a source of information and a target node that is a final destination, and signals are transmitted. An ad hoc network may be referred to as a multi-hop network or a mesh network. In this scheme, a central control station such as a fixed base station or a certification authority (CA) is not required, and each node expands coverage while transmitting signals to each other. Therefore, the ad hoc network has the advantages that the area where communication is possible is theoretically not limited at all, and that the communication network can be quickly and flexibly constructed anywhere.

  By the way, it is difficult to maintain network security (security) in an environment in which there is no central control station or an environment in which participants in the network change dynamically. In this regard, the invention described in Non-Patent Document 1 distributes the functions of the central control station on the ad hoc network so that each node is connected to one of the control stations. However, since each node individually communicates with the control station, there is a problem that communication control becomes more complicated as the network size increases, and the advantage that an ad hoc network can be easily constructed is lost. In addition, as described in Non-Patent Document 2, an attempt to provide a virtual control station is being studied in order to integrate information distributed on a network. However, this method also has a problem that processing to be executed at each node becomes complicated.

On the other hand, in a wireless local area network (LAN), nodes that should not communicate are registered in an access control list (ACL), and security is improved by exchanging a sequentially updated access control list between the nodes. May be maintained. Non-Patent Documents 3 and 4 consider how such an access control list can be used in an ad hoc network, in the context of “duck imprinting”. However, Non-Patent Documents 3 and 4 consider such a concept, but do not specifically disclose how to construct a secure ad hoc network based on the concept.
L. Zhou and J.H. Haas, “Securing AdHoc Networks”, IEEE Networks, Volume 13, Issue 6, 1999. H. Luo, P.A. Zerfos, J. et al. Kong, S.M. Lu and L.L. Zhang, “Self-securing AdHoc Wireless Networks”, IEEE ISCC 2002. F. Stajano and R.M. Anderson, “The Reducing Duckling: Security Issues for Ad-Hoc Wireless Networks”, Seventh International Workshop on Security 99. F. Stajano, “The Reducing Duckling—what next? Security Protocols”, 8th International Workshop, LNCS, 2000.

  The present invention has been made to address at least one of the above-mentioned problems, and its problem is to construct a secure ad hoc network even if devices constituting the ad hoc network do not individually access the certificate authority. It is to provide a system, a method and a computer program that can be used.

  According to the present invention, a network identifier for identifying an ad hoc network and an owner authority key corresponding to the network identifier are generated upon request, a mobile station that communicates with the certificate authority, and the ad hoc network constituting the ad hoc network A system having the above network devices is used. Each of the one or more network devices enables setting of the network identifier and the owner registration key by the mobile station when the network identifier and the owner registration key are not yet set. To the mobile station. In response to a request from the mobile station, the certificate authority generates a device identifier that identifies a network device and transmits the device identifier to the mobile station. The network device generates a certificate issuance request signed with an owner registration key associated with the device identifier received through the mobile station. The mobile station receives the certificate issuance request from the network device and transmits it to the certificate authority. The mobile station sets a device certificate issued by the certificate authority in response to the certificate issuance request in the network device. The network device performs mutual authentication by exchanging a device certificate with another network device belonging to the ad hoc network.

  According to the present invention, it is possible to construct a secure ad hoc network even if the devices constituting the ad hoc network do not individually access the certificate authority.

  In one aspect of the present invention, the certificate authority generates a network identifier and an owner registration key (imprinting key) corresponding to the network identifier in response to a request from the mobile station. The network device permits the mobile station that first presented the owner registration key to control the network device. Only those who are registered at the certificate authority (members of the management group) have the authority to change the settings of the network device. The network device uses the owner registration key to authenticate whether the person who accesses the network device is a member of the management group. Further, the network device generates a certificate issuance request signed with the private key, and the certificate authority issues a device certificate in response to the certificate issuance request. The device certificate and the like are set in the network device by the mobile station. The network device can perform mutual authentication by exchanging device certificates with other network devices belonging to the ad hoc network. Communication between the mobile station and the network device such as installation of an imprinting key is performed by, for example, close infrared communication. Thereby, for example, key installation and network information setting can be easily performed with one touch.

  In the network device, a plurality of network identifiers and owner registration keys corresponding to the network identifiers may be set. Thereby, one network apparatus can be shared by a plurality of networks. However, a plurality of networks do not become active at the same time, and the setting of the network device needs to be switched each time.

  The certificate authority may manage a exclusion list (DRL) that specifies specific network devices to be excluded from the ad hoc network. By exchanging the exclusion list DRL between the network devices in the ad hoc network, network devices that should not participate in communication can be effectively excluded from the network.

  According to an aspect of the present invention, the network device generates a termination message signed with a private key in response to a request from the mobile station and transmits the termination message to the mobile station, and the certification authority receives the mobile station from the mobile station. In response to the termination message, information on the network device is discarded. Thereby, the network device can be directly separated from the network.

  According to one aspect of the present invention, the guest mobile station changes the operation mode of the guest network device to enter the guest registration key standby state in order to cause the guest network device that can be operated by the guest mobile station to participate in the host network. To do. The host mobile station acquires the guest registration key created by the certificate authority and sets it in the guest network device. The guest network device generates a certificate issuance request signed with a private key associated with the device identifier received through the host mobile station. The host mobile station transmits a certificate issuance request to the certificate authority. The host mobile station sets the device certificate issued by the certificate authority in response to the certificate issuance request in the guest network device. The guest network device can participate in the ad hoc network by exchanging device certificates with other network devices belonging to the ad hoc network and performing mutual authentication. As a result, the guest device can participate in the network as a guest member different from the regular member, and the network can be flexibly constructed while maintaining the security of the network.

  FIG. 1 shows a system for constructing an ad hoc network according to an embodiment of the present invention. The system includes a management network 10, a mobile station 13, and an ad hoc network 14. The management network 10 includes an authentication device 11 and an authentication server 12. The ad hoc network 14 includes a plurality of network devices or mesh network access points (MAP) constituting the ad hoc network 14. For simplicity, only five network devices are depicted, but any number of network devices may be included. Some of the network devices are also connected to a communication device called a station. In general, the following description describes the configuration and operation for building a secure ad hoc network 14. The network device may be any communication device capable of executing various functions described below.

  FIG. 2 is a functional block diagram including the authentication device 11 and the authentication server 12 in the management network 10. A part of these functional block diagrams may be provided in one or more physically separated devices, or all of their functions may be accommodated in one device. In this embodiment, as shown in FIG. 1, an authentication apparatus 11 that performs an operation related to authentication and an authentication server 13 (also stores customer information and the like) that stores information necessary for authentication are provided separately. (However, in FIG. 2, they are drawn in one block.)

  2 includes a communication interface 202, an admission control unit 204, a network manager management unit 206, a network member management unit 208, a network ID management unit 210, a network certificate management unit 212, a registration key management unit 214, and a device ID management unit. 216, a device certificate management unit 218, a DRL management unit 220, a certificate issuance unit 222, a certificate creation unit 224, and a key pair generation unit 226 are depicted.

  The communication interface 202 is a communication interface with the mobile station 13. This communication is performed through a highly secure communication link, and may be performed by, for example, a secure socket layer (SSL) method.

  The reception control unit 204 controls transmission / reception of signals exchanged with the mobile station.

  The network administrator management unit 206 and the network member management unit 208 manage persons (management groups) who have the authority to join or leave a network device in an ad hoc network. The management group may be composed of any network member. For example, the management group may be configured by a unit such as a family, or the management group may be configured by members of an organization of a company. The mobile stations (typically mobile phones) belonging to the same management group have the same authority and may control any network device in the ad hoc network related to the management group. A specific member among network members may be managed as a network administrator, and for example, the authority to change or add members may be given only to the network administrator. A management group is distinguished from other management groups by setting a group account ID.

  The network ID management unit 210 manages a network identifier (NW-ID) that identifies an ad hoc network, and the NW-ID identifies an ad hoc network formed by a network device operated by a network member. The NW-ID may be managed while associating a certificate authority ID (CA-NW-ID) unique in the entire system with a user ID (USER-NW-ID) unique to a specific user. For example, a user ID such as “Home” and a certificate authority ID (for example, “Home.aaa”) with a group account ID added thereto may be managed by the network ID management unit 210.

  The network certificate management unit 212 manages a network certificate (Network Root Certification) generated when creating a network identifier (NW-ID). This certificate indicates that the network exists effectively. The certificate may include, for example, information such as a serial number given for each certificate, a certificate validity period (specified by the start and end times, etc.), an algorithm used for authentication, and the like.

  The registration key management unit 214 manages a registration key or an imprinting key that is created for each network. The registration key is downloaded to the mobile station as necessary, and is verified when an operation is performed on the network device. A registration key can be registered only once with an unregistered network device, and thereafter only the mobile station that presents the registration key can change the setting of that network device. Various operation examples related to the registration key will be described later.

  The device ID management unit 216 manages a device identifier (device ID) that identifies a network device in the ad hoc network. The device ID may be managed while associating a certificate authority ID (CA device ID) unique within the entire system with a user ID (user device ID) unique to a specific user. For example, a user apparatus ID such as “TV (TV)” and a certificate authority ID (for example, TV.aaa) with a group account ID added thereto may be managed by the apparatus ID management unit 216.

  The device certificate management unit 218 manages a certificate unique to the network device signed by the network certificate. This certificate indicates that such a device exists in the network. The certificate may include, for example, information such as a serial number given for each certificate, a certificate validity period (specified by the start and end times, etc.), an algorithm used for authentication, and the like.

  The DRL management unit 220 manages a device exclusion list (DRL: Device Revocation List) that specifies network devices that should not communicate within an ad hoc network. The network devices in the ad hoc network can avoid unnecessary communication with the network devices that should not communicate with each other by exchanging the DRL with each other. The DRL is updated by a request from a mobile station that can download a registration key. The DRL indicates a device that should not communicate in the network. The DRL includes, for example, a serial number assigned to each DRL, a valid period of the DRL (specified by start and end times, etc.), an algorithm used for authentication, and information for specifying a device for which communication is prohibited ( Information such as (device ID) may be included.

  The certificate issuing unit 222 and the certificate creating unit 224 issue and create a certificate that appears in an operation example described later.

  The key pair generation unit 226 creates a secret key and a public key.

  FIG. 3 shows a functional block diagram for a network device or mesh network access point (MAP). The network device includes a first communication interface 302, an acceptance control unit 304, a key pair generation unit 306, a profile management unit 308, a connection authentication management unit 310, and a second communication interface 312.

  The first communication interface 302 is an interface for performing communication with the mobile station 13. Communication with the mobile station 13 is performed in such a manner that the transmission side can identify the receiving party, such as near-field infrared communication, communication using a non-contact type IC card, or communication using a cable. This is because information leakage from the mobile station is prevented from being transmitted to unintended devices in addition to the need to prevent information leakage.

  The reception control unit 304 controls transmission / reception of signals exchanged with the mobile station.

  The key pair generation unit 306 creates a public key and a secret key. The private key is used, for example, when signing a device certificate issuance request (CSR: Certification Signature Request). A public key / private key pair can be created by using the function of the secure IC card at the time of imprinting to be described later. When the registration key is deleted, the key pair held on the secure IC card is discarded. Alternatively, when the valid medical term of the device certificate expires or when it expires for other reasons, the corresponding key pair is discarded.

  The profile management unit 308 manages setting information or configuration information. The setting information may include the following items, for example.

Registration key (imprinting key)
Network certificate Device certificate Network-related user ID and certificate authority ID
User ID and certificate authority ID for network devices
Device exclusion list (DRL).
The setting information is set for each assumed ad hoc network. Therefore, when a plurality of ad hoc networks are assumed for one network device, a plurality of setting information is managed separately. In the illustrated example, two pieces of setting information are managed by profile storage units # 1 and # 2, respectively. For example, the setting information may be stored in a secure IC card.

  The connection authentication management unit 310 determines whether or not communication with other network devices in the ad hoc network may be performed. Mutual authentication is performed between network devices. For example, mutual authentication is performed by IEEE 802.1X EAP-TLS. In addition, referring to the device exclusion list DRL exchanged between the network devices, the network devices that should not communicate are confirmed. In this case, if the received DRL is newer, it updates its DRL to that. If the received DRL is not newer, its own DRL is maintained as it is. Whether the DRL is new or old may be determined, for example, by comparing the serial numbers associated with the DRL.

  The second communication interface 312 is an interface for communicating with other network devices in the ad hoc network.

  FIG. 4 is a flowchart illustrating an example of an operation according to an embodiment of the present invention. In the illustrated example, an initial setting operation for allowing a network device to participate in an ad hoc network is shown. For example, a personal computer (PC) is added to a home network to be constructed. For convenience of explanation, it is assumed that an existing ad hoc network does not yet exist, and the network itself is newly set or registered. In the figure, the certificate authority represents an authentication device or an authentication server as necessary. First, in step 402, a user network ID (eg, “Home”) and a group account ID are input to the mobile station and notified to the certificate authority.

  In step 404, the uniqueness within the management group is confirmed from the user network ID and the group account ID at the certificate authority. When the uniqueness is confirmed, for example, Home. A unique certificate authority network ID (CA-NW-ID) is generated in a system such as aaa. Further, the certificate authority includes a registration key (imprinting key) corresponding to the certificate authority network ID, a public key and a private key (private / public key) for the network certificate, a network certificate (NW Root Certificate), and The device exclusion list DRL is generated. The DRL at this point is a list in which no network device to be excluded is specified. These pieces of information are transmitted to the mobile station.

  In step 406, the mobile station displays the received information as necessary and stores them.

  In step 412, the installation button of the registration key (key-1) is pressed at the mobile station, and the mobile station is brought close to the network device. In this embodiment, communication using a contactless IC card is performed between the mobile station and the network device. As a result, information regarding the registration key (key-1) held in the mobile station is given to the network device.

  In step 414, the network device for which the registration key has not yet been set receives the registration key (key-1) from the mobile station for the first time, sets it to itself, and as a result, subsequently controls the setting contents of the network device. The mobile station is authorized to do this. Even if a mobile station that does not indicate the registration key (key-1) thereafter approaches the network device, the mobile station cannot control the setting contents of the network device. Only a mobile station presenting a registration key (key-1) can do so. Such an operation looks like a duck (network device) sees first (a mobile station indicating a registration key (key-1)) to be rubbed (imprinted) as its parent. Can. The network device stores a registration key (key-1) and a certificate authority network ID (CA-NW-ID) corresponding to the certificate authority network ID in the profile management unit.

  “Scrubbing” (imprinting) the network device with the registration key is performed when the registration key is first presented to the network device. Therefore, even if the same mobile station presents the same registration key again and performs the rubbing, it is not performed and an error occurs. If the rubbing is done properly, a message to that effect is displayed in step 416. By performing such imprinting, it is possible to allow only those who have been authenticated by the authorities to operate and control the apparatus.

  The mobile station may always hold the registration key in its own memory, or may download it from the certificate authority as necessary. For example, as shown in steps 408 and 410, the mobile station may display the network ID for the certificate authority and download the necessary registration key. When the mobile station holds the registration key, it is desirable to store the registration key in a place where it is difficult to make unauthorized changes, such as a SIM card. When a means such as a SIM card cannot be used, for example, the following procedure may be performed to maintain safety. The registration key is encrypted at the mobile station with a personal identification number (PIN) for software access. Only when the user enters the PIN, the registration key is decrypted. When the user finishes the desired process, the registration key is encrypted again. Duplicating the registration key when it is not encrypted is prohibited.

  FIG. 5 is a flowchart illustrating an example of an operation according to an embodiment of the present invention. In the illustrated example, an operation for joining a network device to an ad hoc network is shown. In step 502, a user network ID (USER NW ID) such as “Home” and a user device ID (USER Device ID) such as “PC” are input to the mobile station and transmitted to the certificate authority.

  In step 504, the certificate authority confirms that the user network ID received from the mobile station has already been created. If it has not yet been created, the user is prompted to perform the processing of steps 402 and 404 in FIG. The certificate authority confirms that the user device ID received from the mobile station does not overlap with the existing one. If it is duplicated, an action to avoid the duplicate is prompted. When the user network ID and the user device ID are confirmed, a certificate authority device ID (CA device ID) corresponding to the user device ID is generated. The registration keys for the CA-NW-ID, user device ID, CA device ID, and CA-NW-ID are transmitted to the mobile station and are displayed at the mobile station as needed at step 506.

  In step 508, the “CSR (certificate issuance request) generation button” is pressed on the mobile station, the mobile station is brought close to the network device, and short-range infrared communication or the like is performed. Authentication by challenge / response is performed between the mobile station and the network device. For example, when the network device receives an authentication request from the mobile station, it returns a challenge code to the mobile station. Although the challenge code is arbitrary, a value generated from the transmission date and time of the challenge code, a random number, or the like may be used. The current mobile station presents the same key as the registration key (key-1) stored in the network device, and can control the operation of the network device. Otherwise, of course, the mobile station cannot control the operation of the network device.

  In step 510, after the mobile station is authenticated by the network device, the CA-NW-ID and the CA device ID are transmitted from the mobile station to the network device. The network device creates a public key and a private key, and a certificate issuance request (CSR) signed with the private key is created. This certificate issuance request (CSR) is transmitted to the mobile station.

  In step 512, an indication that a certificate issuance request (CSR) has been created and received is displayed.

  In step 514, the “device certificate issuance request (CSR) button” is pressed at the mobile station and notified to the certificate authority.

  In step 516, the certificate authority issues a device certificate for the received certificate issuance request. The device certificate is transmitted to the mobile station together with the network certificate of the network device and the device exclusion list DRL.

  In step 518, a display indicating that the device certificate has been created and received is displayed.

  In step 520, the “certificate install button” is pressed at the mobile station, and the mobile station is brought closer to the network device.

  In step 522, the network device authenticates the mobile station using a challenge response. If the registration key presented by the mobile station is different from that stored in the network device, the mobile station is not authenticated and no further operations can be performed by the mobile station. When the mobile station is properly authenticated, a network certificate, a device certificate, and a device exclusion list DRL are installed from the mobile station to the network device.

  In step 524, the mobile station confirms that a device certificate corresponding to the certificate issuance request has been received, and a message to that effect is displayed. Thereafter, the network device can participate in a secure ad hoc network by performing mutual authentication with other adjacent network devices and exchanging the network certificate, the device certificate, and the device exclusion list DRL with each other. Further, the network device refers to the device exclusion list DRL exchanged with each other, and confirms the network device that should not communicate. In this case, if the received DRL is newer, it updates its DRL to that. If the received DRL is not newer, its own DRL is maintained as it is.

  Note that it is desirable that the registration key is updated regularly or irregularly from the viewpoint of further maintaining network security. For example, after setting the registration key, the mobile station may prompt the user to update the registration key after a certain period of time has elapsed. Since there is a correspondence between the registration key and the network ID, it is desirable that the registration key and the network ID are updated at the same time.

  FIG. 6 is a flowchart showing an example of the operation according to the embodiment of the present invention, and shows the operation related to the update of the device exclusion list DRL. As described above, a network device that does not wish to participate in the network can register with the DRL so that it cannot communicate with it. In step 602, the certificate authority transmits a list of network devices included in the network to the mobile station by a button operation on the mobile station by the network administrator or another network member (step 604). It is displayed (step 606).

  In step 608, the network member designates a network device to be excluded from the network and notifies the certificate authority.

  In step 610, the certification authority creates a DRL in which the network device is registered so as to exclude the designated network device, and sends the DRL to the mobile station.

  In step 612, the updated DRL is displayed as necessary.

  In step 614, a button operation for installing the latest DRL is performed at the mobile station. Then, the mobile station is brought closer to the network device. The network device authenticates the mobile station in the manner described.

  In step 616, the latest DRL is installed on the network device. Thereafter, the network device sends the latest DRL to other nearby network devices (devices not specified by the DRL). As a result, the latest DRL is sent to all network devices not designated as the latest DRL, and the designated network device is excluded from the network. For example, when it is determined that a certain network device has been stolen, by changing the DRL, the network device can be excluded from the ad hoc network, and the security of the network can be maintained.

  FIG. 7 is a flowchart showing an example of an operation according to an embodiment of the present invention. In this embodiment, the network device setting information is deleted by the operation of the mobile station. In step 702, a button operation is performed in the mobile station so that the termination processing of the network device is performed. The user network ID of the network device to be terminated is input, and the mobile station is brought close to the network device. It is assumed that the registration key is stored or downloaded in the mobile station. The network device authenticates the mobile station in the manner described.

  In step 704, the network device creates a device termination message signed with the private key and sends it to the mobile station. The mobile station displays that the termination message has been received as shown in step 706.

  In step 708, the mobile station transfers the device termination message to the certificate authority, and performs an operation for deleting the information for the network device with respect to the certificate authority.

  In step 710, the certificate authority confirms the validity of the device termination message, and then deletes the information of the corresponding network device.

  In step 712, the mobile station receives a notification that the certificate authority has deleted the network device information.

  In step 714, the button operation of the mobile station is performed so that the setting information of the network device is deleted, and the mobile station is brought closer to the network device. As a result, the setting information held in the network device is deleted in step 716, and a display indicating that the termination process has been completed is displayed in step 718.

  By performing such an operation, the network device can be excluded from the ad hoc network. In order to exclude the network device from the ad hoc network, the DRL may be changed as in the method described in FIG. 6, but in this embodiment, the network device can be easily excluded from the network without changing the DRL. can do.

  As described above, the network ID and the registration key are set in association with each other. Therefore, a plurality of registration keys may be prepared for one network device and a plurality of networks may be managed.

  FIG. 8 shows an example in which a plurality of mobile stations and networks are set. In the illustrated example, mobile stations M1 and M2 belong to a first management group (ID: aaa), and mobile stations M2, M3 and M4 belong to a second management group (ID: bbb). The first management group can control the first home network (ID: HOMEaaa) using the first registration key (key1). The second management group can control the second home network (ID: HOMEbbb) using the second registration key (key2), and can use the third registration key (key3) for the office network. (ID: OFFICEbbb) can be controlled. In this case, the mobile station M1 can control only the first home network, but the mobile stations M3 and M4 can control both the second home network and the office network. Furthermore, the mobile station M2 can control all three networks.

FIG. 9 shows a case where one network device indicated by a black circle in the example of FIG. 8 can be used among three networks. This network device
The first home network has an ID of PC1HOMEaaa
In the second home network, it has an ID of PC1HOMEbbb,
The office network has an ID of PC1OFFICEbbb.
Such a mobile station that enables movement between networks needs to have the authority to control the network before and after movement. Accordingly, the mobile station that enables movement between the first and second home networks is the mobile station M2. The mobile stations that allow movement between the second home network and the office network are mobile stations M2, M3 and M4. As shown in FIGS. 8 and 9, various networks can be managed by setting a large number of network information such as registration keys and network IDs.

  FIG. 10 is a flowchart showing an example of an operation according to an embodiment of the present invention, and shows how network information is added. As described above, it is a mobile station that has the same registration key that can change the setting contents of the network device. Accordingly, the network device is set so that network information relating to another registration key can be added by the mobile station. In step 1002, such a mobile station notifies the certificate authority that it wishes to add a network. The certificate authority is notified of the user network ID of the network to be added.

  In step 1004, a registration key, a certificate authority network ID, and the like related to the network to be added are generated. This step is the same as step 404 in FIG.

  In step 1006, the “add network” button is pressed in the mobile station, and the mobile station is brought close to the network device.

  In step 1008, the mobile station is authenticated in the manner already described by the network device. The network device receives information such as a registration key to be added and a certificate authority network ID, and installs them as additional network information.

  In step 1010, it is displayed that the network device has been successfully imprinted with the additional registration key. Thereafter, an additional ad hoc network can be constructed by executing the method described in FIG.

  FIG. 11 schematically shows a change in information content performed by the profile management unit 308 of the network device when a network is newly added. In the figure, “NA” indicates an unconfigured state, “Ready” indicates a state of waiting for setting, “Active” indicates a state selected as an active network, and “Inactive” indicates an active network. Indicates a non-selected state.

  In FIG. 11A, the first network (network 1) is already imprinted. This is a state in which the procedures of FIGS. 4 and 5 relating to the first network have been completed.

  In FIG. 11B, an operation from a mobile station having the registration key key-1 is instructed to generate a new network (network 2). As a result of this operation, the network apparatus becomes ready for imprinting (scrubbing) using a registration key different from key-1.

  In FIG. 11C, the registration key key-2 is set by imprinting from the mobile station having the registration key key-2.

  In FIG. 11D, a network certificate is installed from a mobile station having a registration key key-2.

  In FIG. 11E, the device certificate is installed from the mobile station having the registration key key-2. This completes registration of network information related to the network 2. As a result, both the mobile station having key-1 and the mobile station having key-2 can operate the network apparatus. Other devices that do not have these registration keys cannot operate the network device.

  FIG. 11 (F) shows a state where the mobile station having registration key key-1 switches the network.

  FIG. 12 schematically shows a change in information content performed by the profile management unit 308 of the network device when the network information is deleted. FIG. 12A shows a state in which two pieces of network information are set.

  In FIG. 12B, the mobile station having the registration key key-2 is instructed to delete the network information, and these are deleted.

  In FIG. 12C, switching to the network 1 is performed by the mobile station having the registration key key-1.

  In FIG. 12D, the mobile station having the registration key “key-1” is instructed to delete the network information, and these are deleted. At this time, since the networks 1, 2, and 3 are all in the “NA” state, no operation can be performed by any mobile station.

  In FIG. 12E, the network device is reset and returns to the initial state. As a result, only the network 1 is in a standby state. In this way, the network state can be deleted appropriately.

  The network device associated with the network by the certificate authority can be freely communicated with other network devices in the network or the network setting status can be changed unless the setting information is deleted in the DRL. Can be changed. Therefore, from the viewpoint of maintaining the security of the network, sufficient consideration is required for the registration of the network device, that is, the management of the members of the management group. On the other hand, users and devices that are not members cannot freely communicate with devices in the network, thereby maintaining security. Strict device registration and authentication conditions may maintain a high level of security, but doing so may make it impossible to build a network quickly and flexibly and diminish the advantages of ad hoc networks. . Therefore, in an embodiment of the present invention, guest members can be set in addition to regular members of the management group, so that not only network security but also network construction flexibility can be maintained.

  In this embodiment, a guest device is used separately from the regular member network device. The guest device is a device that temporarily participates in the network, and may have the same configuration and function as the network device in the ad hoc network as hardware. For convenience of explanation, a mobile station that can control regular member network devices is called a “host mobile station”, and a mobile station that can control guest devices is called a “guest mobile station”. The host mobile station can control the network device using a registration key (imprinting key) registered in the certificate authority. The guest mobile station can also control the guest device with another registration key registered in the certificate authority. Although network devices can control or manipulate the state of the network, guest devices are not given such authority, and guest devices are simply allowed to communicate temporarily or temporarily with network devices in the network. It's just The guest mobile station can delete the setting contents for operating as a guest mobile station at any time for the guest device. When it is deleted, the operation with the setting contents for the network to which the guest device belongs as a regular member is resumed.

  FIG. 13 is a flowchart showing an example of an operation according to an embodiment of the present invention, in which a registration key for a guest device is set. In step 1302, the owner of the guest device performs an operation for making it registerable as a guest device of the ad hoc network. The guest mobile station downloads a registration key (imprinting key) from the certificate authority as necessary. Then, the guest mobile station is brought close to the guest device (communication using a non-contact IC card or infrared communication is performed). This registration key is set in advance between the guest mobile station and the guest device.

  In step 1304, the guest device authenticates the guest mobile station using the method described with the registration key. After the authentication, the guest device is ready to be registered as an ad hoc network guest device in accordance with an instruction from the guest mobile station. In other words, the guest mobile station having the registration key switches the guest device to the guest mode.

  In step 1306, the host mobile station instructs the certificate authority to create a registration key (Imprint key_G) (abbreviated as key-G) for the guest device. In this case, the host mobile station transmits the ID of the guest device, the user network ID of the ad hoc network (host network) in which the guest device participates, the time when the guest device participates (start time), the stay time of the guest, and the like. For the stay time, for example, a default value such as 8 hours may be used as it is.

  In step 1308, the certificate authority creates a registration key (key-G) for the guest device and sends it to the host mobile station. This registration key (key-G) may be commonly used for all guest devices regardless of the number of guest devices. The registration key (key-G) is different from the registration key for the regular member. By making the registration key of the regular member different from that of the guest member, the concern about leakage of the registration key for the regular member can be reduced.

  In step 1310, the host mobile station is brought close to the guest device in order to install the guest device registration key (key-G) downloaded from the certificate authority by the host mobile station. As a result of the operation in step 1304, the guest device is ready to accept the registration key (key-G).

  In step 1312, the guest device receives a registration key (key-G), a certificate authority network ID (CA-NW-ID), a guest device ID, a network certificate, a device certificate, etc., and their information is set. (Imprinted). If the setting is successful, this is notified to the host mobile station, and it is shown in step 1314 that the setting has been made normally.

  FIG. 14 is a flowchart showing an example of the operation according to the embodiment of the present invention. In the illustrated example, an operation for joining a guest device to an ad hoc network is shown. In step 1402, a user network ID (eg, “Home”) and a guest device ID (eg, the name of the owner of the device) are entered into the host mobile station and transmitted to the certificate authority.

  In step 1404, the certificate authority confirms that the user network ID received from the host mobile station has already been created. If it has not yet been created, the user is prompted to perform the processing of steps 402 and 404 in FIG. The certificate authority confirms that the guest device ID received from the host mobile station does not overlap with the existing one. If it is duplicated, an action to avoid the duplicate is prompted. When the user network ID and guest device ID are confirmed, a certificate authority device ID (CA guest device ID) corresponding to the guest device ID is generated. The CA-NW-ID, guest device ID, CA guest device ID, and registration key for the CA-NW-ID are transmitted to the host mobile station, and they are displayed at the host mobile station as needed at step 1406.

  In Step 1408, the “CSR (Certificate Issuance Request) generation button” is pressed at the host mobile station, and the host mobile station is brought closer to the guest device. Authentication by challenge / response is performed between the host mobile station and the guest device.

  In step 1410, after the host mobile station is authenticated by the guest device, the CA-NW-ID and the CA guest device ID are transmitted from the host mobile station to the guest device. The guest device creates a public key and a private key, and a certificate issuance request (CSR) signed with the private key is created. This certificate issuance request (CSR) is transmitted to the host mobile station.

  In step 1412, a display indicating that a certificate issuance request (CSR) has been created and received is displayed.

  In step 1414, the “Guest device certificate issuance request (CSR) button” is pressed at the host mobile station and notified to the certificate authority.

  In step 1416, the certificate authority issues a device certificate for the received certificate issuance request. The device certificate is transmitted to the host mobile station together with the network certificate of the guest device and the device exclusion list DRL.

  In step 1418, a display indicating that the device certificate has been created and received is displayed.

  In Step 1420, the “Certificate Install Button” is pressed at the host mobile station, and the host mobile station is brought closer to the network device.

  In step 1422, the guest device authenticates the mobile station using a challenge response. If the registration key presented by the host mobile station is different from that stored in the guest device, the host mobile station is not authenticated and no further operation can be performed by the host mobile station. When the host mobile station is properly authenticated, the network certificate, the device certificate, and the device exclusion list DRL are installed from the host mobile station to the guest device.

  In step 1424, the host mobile station confirms that the device certificate corresponding to the certificate issuance request has been received, and displays that fact if necessary. Thereafter, the guest device can participate in a secure ad hoc network by performing authentication with an adjacent network device and exchanging a network certificate, a device certificate, and a device exclusion list DRL with each other. Also, the guest device refers to the device exclusion list DRL exchanged with each other, and confirms the network device that should not communicate.

  FIG. 15 schematically shows changes in the information content made by the profile management unit 308 of the guest device when registering and deleting the guest device. FIG. 15A shows a state in which two pieces of network information are set. In this example, the network relating to the second registration key (key-2) is in an activated state.

  In FIG. 15B, the guest device is changed to the guest mode by the operation of the guest mobile station having the registration key (key-2), and the guest device enters the standby state for the registration key for the guest device. This state corresponds to the state in step 1304 in FIG.

  In FIG. 15C, the host mobile station sets a guest registration key (key-G) in the guest device.

  In FIG. 15D, the network certificate (NetRootCert_G) and the device certificate (DeviceCert_G) are set in the guest device by the host mobile station having the registration key (key-G) for the guest device. The states in FIGS. 15C and 15D correspond to the state in step 1312 in FIG.

  In FIG. 15E, the setting content related to the guest device is deleted.

  In FIG. 15F, the mobile station (guest mobile station) having the registration key (key-1) of the network 1 is brought close to the guest device, and the setting contents for the network 1 become active.

  The setting contents related to the guest device may be deleted from the guest mobile station or from the host mobile station. The guest mobile station can delete the setting contents of the guest device by using any of the registered keys of the networks 1 and 2 that have been set. The host mobile station can delete the setting contents of the guest device using the registration key for the guest device. In addition, by setting the validity period of the registration key for the guest device short, the guest device can be appropriately excluded from the ad hoc network without performing additional termination work. Alternatively, a guest device that should not communicate thereafter may be registered in the DRL, and the guest device may be appropriately excluded from the ad hoc network.

  The guest device and the guest mobile station may have any number of 1 or more. For example, an ad hoc network may be used for a conference held for several hours, and a plurality of guest devices may participate in the network.

1 is a diagram illustrating a system for building an ad hoc network according to an embodiment of the present invention. FIG. The functional block diagram regarding a management network is shown. The functional block diagram regarding a network apparatus is shown. 3 is a flowchart illustrating an example of an operation according to an embodiment of the present invention. 3 is a flowchart illustrating an example of an operation according to an embodiment of the present invention. 3 is a flowchart illustrating an example of an operation according to an embodiment of the present invention. 3 is a flowchart illustrating an example of an operation according to an embodiment of the present invention. It is a figure which shows a mode that several network information is set. It is a figure which shows a mode that several network information is set. 3 is a flowchart illustrating an example of an operation according to an embodiment of the present invention. It is a figure which shows the content managed by the profile management part of a network device. It is a figure which shows the content managed by the profile management part of a network device. 3 is a flowchart illustrating an example of an operation according to an embodiment of the present invention. 3 is a flowchart illustrating an example of an operation according to an embodiment of the present invention. It is a figure which shows the content managed by the profile management part of a guest apparatus.

Explanation of symbols

DESCRIPTION OF SYMBOLS 10 Management network; 11 Authentication apparatus; 12 Authentication server; 13 Mobile station; 14 Ad hoc network;
202 Communication interface; 204 Admission control unit; 206 Network administrator management unit; 208 Network member management unit; 210 Network ID management unit; 212 Network certificate management unit; 214 Registration key management unit; 216 Device ID management unit; Certificate management unit; 220 DRL management unit; 222 certificate issuing unit; 224 certificate creation unit; 226 key pair generation unit;
302 first communication interface; 304 reception control unit; 306 key pair generation unit; 308 profile management unit; 310 connection authentication management unit; 312 second communication interface 312

Claims (8)

A certificate authority that generates, upon request, a network identifier that identifies the ad hoc network and an owner registration key corresponding to the network identifier;
A mobile station in communication with the certificate authority;
One or more network devices constituting the ad hoc network,
Each of the one or more network devices enables setting of the network identifier and the owner registration key by the mobile station when the network identifier and the owner registration key are not yet set. To the mobile station,
A device identifier that identifies a network device is generated by the certificate authority in response to a request from the mobile station and transmitted to the mobile station,
The network device generates a certificate issuance request signed with an owner registration key associated with the device identifier received through the mobile station;
The mobile station receives the certificate issuance request from the network device and sends it to the certificate authority;
A device certificate issued by the certificate authority in response to the certificate issuance request is set by the mobile station in the network device;
A system for constructing an ad hoc network, wherein the network device exchanges a device certificate with another network device belonging to the ad hoc network to perform mutual authentication. The system according to claim 1, wherein a plurality of network identifiers and owner registration keys corresponding to each of the network identifiers can be set in the network device. The system according to claim 1, wherein the certification authority manages an exclusion list that specifies a specific network device to be excluded from an ad hoc network specified by the network identifier. The system of claim 3, wherein the exclusion list is exchanged between each network device in the ad hoc network. In response to a request from the mobile station, the network device generates a termination message signed with a private key and sends it to the mobile station,
The system according to claim 1, wherein the certificate authority discards information related to the network device in response to the termination message received from the mobile station. In order for another network device that can be operated by a mobile station different from the mobile station to participate in the ad hoc network, the other mobile station changes the operation mode of the other network device and waits for a guest registration key. State
The mobile station acquires a guest registration key created by the certificate authority and sets it in the other network device,
The other network device generates a certificate issuance request signed with a private key associated with the device identifier received through the mobile station;
The mobile station receives the certificate issuance request from the other network device and transmits to the certificate authority;
A device certificate issued by the certificate authority in response to the certificate issuance request is set by the mobile station in the other network device;
The system according to claim 1, wherein the another network device performs mutual authentication by exchanging a device certificate with another network device belonging to the ad hoc network. A certificate authority generates a network identifier for identifying an ad hoc network and an owner registration key corresponding to the network identifier in response to a request from the mobile station,
The mobile station sets the network identifier and the owner registration key in a network device for which the network identifier and the owner registration key are not yet set, and permits the mobile station to perform subsequent operations on the network device. ,
A device identifier that identifies the network device is generated by the certificate authority in response to a request from the mobile station and transmitted to the mobile station,
The network device generates a certificate issuance request signed with an owner registration key associated with the device identifier received through the mobile station;
The mobile station receives the certificate issuance request from the network device and sends it to the certificate authority;
A device certificate issued by the certificate authority in response to the certificate issuance request is set by the mobile station in the network device;
A method for constructing an ad hoc network, wherein the network device exchanges a device certificate with another network device belonging to the ad hoc network to perform mutual authentication. A certificate authority generates a network identifier for identifying an ad hoc network and an owner registration key corresponding to the network identifier in response to a request from the mobile station,
The mobile station sets the network identifier and the owner registration key in a network device for which the network identifier and the owner registration key are not yet set, and permits the mobile station to perform subsequent operations on the network device. ,
A device identifier that identifies the network device is generated by the certificate authority in response to a request from the mobile station and transmitted to the mobile station,
The network device generates a certificate issuance request signed with an owner registration key associated with the device identifier received through the mobile station;
The mobile station receives the certificate issuance request from the network device and sends it to the certificate authority;
A device certificate issued by the certificate authority in response to the certificate issuance request is set by the mobile station in the network device;
A computer program for causing the network device to exchange a device certificate with another network device belonging to the ad hoc network and performing mutual authentication to construct an ad hoc network.

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