JP2006323691A - Authentication device, registration device, registration method and authentication method - Google Patents

Abstract

<P>PROBLEM TO BE SOLVED: To provide an authentication device, registration method and authentication method, capable of executing an authentication system capable of enhancing security to biological characteristic information. <P>SOLUTION: This authentication device 4 generates a pair of a public key 40 and a private key 41 after mutual authentication of a smart card 2 and an information provision server 3, acquires a common key 23 generated and stored by the information provision server while the common key 23 is encrypted by the public key 40, and decrypts it by the private key 41. The authentication device 4 reads encryption regular person characteristic information 32A encrypted with regular person characteristic information 31 that is a characteristic peculiar to a regular user extracted from biological information, from the smart card 2, decrypts it by use of the common key 23, authenticate-decides the regular person characteristic information 31 and user characteristic information 43 that is the biological characteristic information of the user of the authentication device 4, and erases the common key 23, the regular person characteristic information 31, the encryption regular person characteristic information 32A and the user characteristic information 43. <P>COPYRIGHT: (C)2007,JPO&INPIT

Description

  The present invention relates to an authentication device, and is suitable for application to biometric authentication, for example.

  2. Description of the Related Art Conventionally, a technology for preventing spoofing by so-called biometric authentication has been developed, in which biometric feature information is extracted from biometric information that is very difficult to forge, such as blood vessels, fingerprints, voiceprints, and mouthprints, and user authentication is performed.

As an authentication process using this biometric authentication, there has been proposed a method capable of improving security by performing mutual authentication between a server and an authentication device, and performing biometric authentication between the authentication device and the user and between the user and the server. (Patent Document 1).
JP 2003-44436 A

  By the way, in this authentication processing method, the biometric feature information of the user is collectively stored in the server because of the necessity of customer management. Because biometric feature information is a personal feature as a living body that does not change for a lifetime or for a very long period of time, there is a merit that it is difficult to forge, but for example if it is leaked outside due to theft by a server administrator, The user cannot change the biometric feature information like a personal identification number.

  Therefore, once the biometric feature information of the user is leaked, the user cannot prevent the biometric feature information from being used for an act such as a crime. For this reason, it was negative with respect to biometric feature information being collectively stored in the server.

  On the other hand, a method of storing biometric feature information in the authentication device is conceivable. However, in this method, if the authentication device itself is stolen, it means that the biometric feature information has been stolen, and security is not sufficient. . In addition, since the biometric feature information of the user is stored in a plurality of authentication devices, the relationship between the terminal and the registration information must be managed by the server, and as a result, the user is collectively managed.

  The present invention has been made in consideration of the above points, and an object of the present invention is to propose an authentication apparatus capable of realizing an authentication system capable of strengthening security for biometric feature information.

  In order to solve such a problem, in the authentication device of the present invention, a plurality of first devices assigned to authorized users and key information for encrypting a registration target registered in the first device are stored in the first device. A biometric feature indicating a biometric feature pattern from biometric information output from biometric reading means that reads a biometric reading target as biometric information, and is an authentication device interposed between a second device generated for each device. Using information extraction means for extracting information, decryption means for decrypting the key information supplied in an encrypted state from the second device, and the key information decrypted by the decryption means Then, the biometric feature information extracted by the information extraction unit is encrypted, and the encrypted biometric feature information is registered in the first device and decrypted by the decryption unit. The encrypted biometric feature information registered by the registration unit is decrypted using the key information, and the decrypted biometric feature information is compared with the biometric feature information extracted by the information extraction unit. A collating unit and an erasing unit for erasing the key information and the biometric feature information at the end of registration by the registration unit and at the end of the collation by the collating unit are provided.

  Therefore, in this authentication device, by acquiring the key generated by the second device in an encrypted state, the key can be acquired safely, and the legitimate person characteristic information is encrypted using the key, Since it is registered in one apparatus, the legitimate person characteristic information stored in the first apparatus is protected by strong encryption. Further, since the authentication device deletes the key information temporarily stored in the authentication device and the authorized person feature information, the authorized device feature information is not shared with the encrypted authorized person feature information. The safety of the person characteristic information can be enhanced.

  In the registration device of the present invention, the first device assigned to the authorized user and the key information for encrypting the registration target registered in the first device are generated for each first device. An information extraction means for extracting biometric feature information indicating a biometric feature pattern from biometric information output from biometric reading means that reads a biometric reading target as biometric information. Using the decryption means for decrypting the key information supplied in an encrypted state from the second device, and the information extraction means using the key information decrypted by the decryption means. An encryption means for encrypting the extracted biometric feature information; a registration means for registering the encrypted encrypted biometric feature information in the first device; and at the end of registration by the registration means and the verification It was provided an erasing means for erasing the key information and the biometric information at the time of verification ends by stage.

  Therefore, in this registration device, by acquiring the key generated by the second device in an encrypted state, the key can be acquired safely, and the authorized person characteristic information is encrypted using the key, Since it is registered in one apparatus, the legitimate person characteristic information stored in the first apparatus is protected by strong encryption. Furthermore, in this registration device, since the key information temporarily stored in the authentication device and the authorized person feature information are deleted, the encrypted authorized person feature information and the key are not shared. The safety of legitimate person characteristic information can be improved.

  Furthermore, in the authentication device according to the present invention, a first device assigned to the authorized user and a key information for encrypting a registration target to be registered in the first device are generated for each first device. A key information decryption unit for decrypting the key information supplied in an encrypted state from the second device, and a biometric reading target as biometric information. Information extraction means for extracting biometric feature information indicating the biometric feature pattern from the biometric information output from the biometric reading means, and the encrypted biometric information from the first device stored as encrypted biometric feature information. The feature information is read and decrypted by using the key information decrypted by the decryption unit, the decrypted biometric feature information, and the biometric feature extracted by the information extraction unit. And collating means for collating the information, and be provided an erasing means for erasing the key information and the biometric information at the time of verification termination by registered end and the checking means according to the registration means.

  Therefore, in this authentication device, by acquiring the key generated by the second device in an encrypted state, the key can be acquired safely, and the key information temporarily stored in the authentication device and the authorized person Since the feature information is erased, the encrypted authorized person feature information and the key are not shared, and the safety of the authorized person feature information can be improved.

  Further, in the registration method of the present invention, there is an intervening between the first device assigned to the authorized user and the second device that generates key information for encrypting the registration target to be registered in the first device. A first step of extracting biometric feature information indicating a biometric feature pattern from the biometric information output from biometric reading means that reads a biometric reading target as biometric information; A second step of decrypting the key information supplied in an encrypted state from the second device and an extraction in the first step using the key information decrypted in the second step. A third step of encrypting the biometric feature information, and registering the encrypted encrypted biometric feature information in the first device, and in response to completion of registration in the third step. Key information and to be provided and a fourth step of erasing the biometric information.

  Therefore, in this registration method, by acquiring the key generated by the second device in an encrypted state, the key can be acquired safely, and the authorized person characteristic information is encrypted with the key, Since it is registered in one apparatus, the legitimate person characteristic information stored in the first apparatus is protected by strong encryption. Further, in this registration method, the key information temporarily stored in the authentication device and the authorized person feature information are deleted, so that the encrypted authorized person feature information and the key are not shared. The safety of legitimate person characteristic information can be improved.

  Furthermore, in the authentication method of the present invention, there is an intervening between the first device assigned to the authorized user and the second device that generates key information for encrypting the registration target to be registered in the first device. A first step of decrypting the key information supplied in an encrypted state from the second device, and a biometric reading unit that reads a biometric reading target as biometric information. A second step of extracting biometric feature information indicating a biometric feature pattern from the biometric information to be output, and the biometric feature information is encrypted using the key information and stored as the encrypted biometric feature information. The encrypted biometric feature information is read from the first device, and the read encrypted biometric feature information is decrypted using the key information decrypted in the first step. 3, a fourth step for collating the biometric feature information decoded in the third step with the biometric feature information extracted in the second step, and a collation in the fourth step And a fifth step of erasing the key information and the biometric feature information in response to the end of.

  Therefore, in this authentication method, by acquiring the key generated by the second device in an encrypted state, the key can be acquired safely, the key information temporarily stored in the authentication device, and the authorized person Since the feature information is erased, the encrypted authorized person feature information and the key are not shared, and the safety of the authorized person feature information can be improved.

  According to the present invention, the key generated by the second device can be acquired in an encrypted state, and the key can be safely acquired. The authorized person characteristic information is encrypted using the key, and the first device Therefore, the legitimate person characteristic information stored in the first device is protected by strong encryption. Further, since the authentication device deletes the key information temporarily stored in the authentication device and the authorized person feature information, the authorized device feature information is not shared with the encrypted authorized person feature information. Since the safety of the person characteristic information can be improved, it is possible to realize an authentication device, a registration method, and an authentication method that can execute an authentication system capable of strengthening security for biometric characteristic information.

  Hereinafter, an embodiment of the invention will be described in detail with reference to the drawings.

(1) Overall Configuration of Authentication System In FIG. 1, reference numeral 1 denotes an overall authentication system according to the present embodiment, which is a portable small-sized storage device (hereinafter referred to as a smart card) 2 and an information providing server 3. And the authentication device 4.

  The smart card 2 is assigned to each of a plurality of authorized users 5 who receive information from the information providing server 3, and the smart card 2 has biometric features extracted from the corresponding authorized users 5. The information shown (hereinafter referred to as authorized person feature information) is registered in an encrypted state.

  On the other hand, the information providing server 3 generates key information for encrypting the authorized person feature information for each smart card 2 and is authenticated by the authentication device 4 as an authorized user based on the authorized person feature information. In addition, various information regarding the service can be provided to the regular user 5.

  On the other hand, the authentication device 4 registers the authorized person feature information in the smart card 2, and also shows the registered authorized person feature information and the biometric characteristic extracted from the user who uses the authentication device 4 ( Hereinafter, this is referred to as user characteristic information) to authenticate that the user is the authorized user 5.

(1-1) Registration of Regular Person Feature Information Here, a method for registering regular person feature information will be described. However, for convenience of explanation, only one smart card 2 will be described here. In the case of the present embodiment, the authentication device 4 stores information on a smart card and a sensor unit for reading a reading target such as a part of a living body or a sound of a living body as information (hereinafter referred to as biological information). A card reader / writer unit for reading and writing is provided, and the authorized user 5 inputs his / her reading target to the sensor unit, and the unregistered smart card 2 assigned to the authorized user 5 is used as the card reader / writer unit. The registration of the authorized person feature information is started.

  As shown in FIG. 2, when the authentication device 4 recognizes the smart card 2 in which the authorized person characteristic information is not yet stored, the authentication device 4 should mutually authenticate the information providing server 3 with the smart card 2. Notify that there is. The authentication device 4 mediates mutual authentication performed between the smart card 2 and the information providing server 3, and when the mutual authentication is established, a pair of public keys 20 and a secret by a public key cryptosystem such as RSA or elliptical encryption. A key 21 is generated and the public key 20 is sent to the information providing server 3.

  When the information providing server 3 acquires the public key 20, the information providing server 3 obtains a common key 23 corresponding to the smart card 2 identified at the time of mutual authentication according to a common key encryption method such as triple DES (Data Encryption Standard) or AES (Advanced Encryption Standard). Generate. As shown in FIG. 3, the information providing server 3 encrypts the common key 23 with the public key 20 described above, and uses the encrypted common key 30 (hereinafter referred to as an encryption key) 30 as the authentication device 4. To send.

  Here, since the common key 23 is encrypted by the public key 20 that can be decrypted only by the private key 21, a third party steals information from the information providing server 3 to the authentication device 4 by, for example, hacking or the like. Even if it is obtained, the third party cannot obtain the secret key 21 and cannot decrypt it into the common key 23. For this reason, the authentication device 4 can safely acquire the common key 23 from the information providing server 3.

  The authentication device 4 acquires the common key 23 by decrypting the encryption key 30 with the secret key 21. On the other hand, the authentication device 4 extracts patterns such as blood vessels, fingerprints, voiceprints, or lipsticks from the biometric information by the sensor unit 6 as the authorized person feature information 31.

  Then, as shown in FIG. 4, the authentication device 4 encrypts the authorized person feature information 31 into the encrypted authorized person feature information 32 using the common key 23, and the encrypted authorized person feature information 32 is a copy of the encrypted authorized person feature information 32. The person characteristic information 32A is generated and transmitted to the smart card 2. As a result, in the smart card 2, the encrypted authorized person characteristic information 32A is stored in the internal memory. At this time, the authentication device 4 reads out the encrypted authorized person feature information 32A stored in the internal memory and collates with the encrypted authorized person feature information 32, so that the storage state of the encrypted authorized person feature information 32A is defective. Check if there is any.

  When the authentication device 4 confirms that there is no defect in the encrypted authorized person feature information 32A, as shown in FIG. 5, information about the living body such as the authorized person feature information 31 remaining in the authentication device 4 and the common key 23 Delete all key information.

  In this way, the authentication device 4 acquires the authorized person feature information 31 and the common key 23 when registering the authorized person feature information 31 extracted from the living body in the corresponding smart card 2, and uses the common key 23. After the encrypted encrypted authorized person feature information 32 is registered in the smart card 2, the obtained authorized person feature information 31 and the common key 23 are deleted.

  Therefore, in this authentication system 1, the legitimate person characteristic information 31 is only stored in an encrypted state in the corresponding smart card 2 without being involved in the information providing server 3 and being held in the authentication device 4. On the other hand, the common key 23 that can decrypt the encryption state is only stored in the information providing server 3.

  In this way, the authentication system 1 can register the authorized person characteristic information 31 in the smart card 4.

(1-2) User Authentication Next, an authentication method using the authorized person characteristic information 31 stored in an encrypted state in the smart card 2 as described above will be described.

  When a user who wants to receive information from the information providing server 3 loads his / her smart card 2 into the card reader / writer unit, user authentication is started.

  As illustrated in FIG. 6, when the authentication device 4 recognizes the smart card 2 in which the encrypted authorized person characteristic information 32 </ b> A is stored, the authentication device 4 should mutually authenticate the information providing server 3 with the smart card 2. Notify that there is. The authentication device 4 mediates mutual authentication performed between the smart card 2 and the information providing server 3, and when mutual authentication is established, the authentication device 4 generates a public key 40 and a secret key 41, and the public key 40 is sent to the information providing server 3.

  When the information providing server 3 acquires the public key 40 described above, the public key 40 is used to encrypt the stored common key 23 and the encrypted key 42 that is the encrypted common key 23 is used as an authentication device. 4 to send.

  The authentication device 4 obtains the common key 23 by decrypting the encryption key 42 with the secret key 41 as shown in FIG.

  Since the common key 23 is encrypted by the public key 40 that can be decrypted only by the private key 41, a third party steals information from the information providing server 3 to the authentication device 4 by, for example, hacking, Even if the encryption key 42 can be obtained, the third party cannot obtain the secret key 41 and cannot decrypt it into the common key 23. For this reason, the authentication device 4 can safely acquire the common key 23 from the information providing server 3.

  Then, the authentication device 4 decrypts the encrypted authorized person feature information 32 </ b> A read from the smart card 2 with the common key 23 into the authorized person feature information 31.

  Next, as shown in FIG. 8, the authentication device 4 extracts the user feature information 43 from the biometric information acquired from the user via the sensor unit 6, and uses the user feature information 43 and the authorized person feature information 31. The biometric authentication determination is performed by collating. If the collation result is equal to or greater than a predetermined threshold, it means that the user of the authentication device 4 is a registered regular user 5 and authentication is established.

  As a result, even when the smart card 2 is used by a third party other than the authorized user 5, the authentication device 4 can identify that the user is not the authorized user 5 and use the smart card 2 illegally. It is designed to prevent this.

  When the above-described authentication is established, the authentication device 4 uses the remaining information on the living body such as the authorized person feature information 31 and the user feature information 43 and the key information such as the common key 23 as shown in FIG. After erasing all, various information can be exchanged with the smart card 2 loaded in the card reader / writer section.

  As described above, at the time of authentication, the authentication device 4 decrypts the encrypted authorized person characteristic information 32 registered in the smart card 2 with the common key 23 corresponding to the loaded smart card 2, and the decrypted information is obtained. After authenticating the user using the authorized person feature information 31, the authorized person feature information 31 and the common key 23 are deleted.

  Therefore, in this authentication system 1, only when the smart card 2 managed by the information providing server 2 is loaded, the legitimate person characteristic information 31 is in the non-encrypted state, and the legitimate person characteristic in the non-encrypted state. Only when the information 31 matches or resembles the user characteristic information 42 of the user who has loaded the smart card 2, information in the information providing server 3 can be provided.

  In this manner, the authentication system 1 can perform user authentication without storing information in the authentication device 4.

(2) Circuit Configuration of Authentication Device 4 Next, the circuit configuration of the authentication device 4 in the present embodiment will be described with reference to FIG.

  10, the authentication device 4 includes a signal processing unit 50 via a bus 54, an interface (hereinafter referred to as a communication interface) 61 for communicating with the card reader / writer unit 60 and the information providing server 3, and a sensor. The unit 6 and the display unit 62 are connected to each other.

  The signal processing unit 50 includes a control unit 51 that controls the entire authentication device 4, a ROM (Read Only Memory) in which various programs are stored, and a RAM (Random Access Memory) 53 as a work memory of the control unit 51. When the smart card 2 is loaded in the card reader / writer 60, it is recognized whether or not the encrypted authorized person characteristic information 32A (FIG. 2) is registered in the smart card 2. Has been made.

  When the signal processing unit 50 recognizes that the encrypted authorized person characteristic information 32A is not registered in the smart card 2, the operation mode is changed to the registration mode based on the corresponding program and the registration process is executed. To do.

  On the other hand, when the signal processing unit 50 recognizes that the encrypted authorized person characteristic information 32A is registered, the operation mode is changed to the authentication mode based on the corresponding program, and the authentication process is executed. Depending on the result of the authentication process, various information can be exchanged between the audio device 2 and the PC 3 via the card reader / writer unit 60 and the communication interface unit 61.

(3) Processing contents of registration mode in signal processing unit Next, specific processing contents in the above-described registration mode will be described. Here, when the processing contents of the registration mode are functionally classified, as shown in FIG. 11, a mutual authentication mediation processing unit 70 that mediates mutual authentication between the smart card 2 and the information providing server 3, and the mutual authentication. A key acquisition processing unit 71 that acquires the common key 23 in a concealed state according to the result, a biometric pattern extraction processing unit 72 that extracts the biometric pattern from the biometric information, and encryption that encrypts the biometric pattern with the common key 23 The processing unit 73 can be divided into a data erasing unit 75 that erases data temporarily stored in the RAM 53 during processing in each of the processing units 70 to 73. Hereinafter, the processing contents will be described in detail based on such classification.

(3-1) Mutual Authentication Mediation Processing The mutual authentication mediation processing unit 70 connects to the information providing server 3 via the communication interface 61 and connects based on the digital signature certificate CC supplied from the information providing server 3. It is verified that the other party is the information providing server 3.

  When the mutual authentication intermediary processing unit 70 confirms that the connection partner is the information providing server 3, the mutual authentication intermediary processing unit 70 sends the identifier of the smart card 2 (hereinafter referred to as a card ID) via the card reader / writer unit 60. The acquired card ID is sent to the information management server 3 via the communication interface 61.

  In this case, the information management server 3 determines whether or not the smart card 2 is a legitimate smart card 2 based on the card ID. The mutual authentication mediation processing unit 70 is notified.

  When the mutual authentication mediation processing unit 70 confirms that the mutual authentication has been established by receiving such notification, the mutual authentication mediation processing unit 70 generates a mutual authentication establishment notification D1 indicating that the mutual authentication has been established, and obtains the key. The data is sent to the processing unit 71.

(3-2) Key Acquisition Processing The key acquisition processing unit 71 is a pair of disclosure different from the key information used at the time of mutual authentication between the information providing server 3 and the smart card 2 according to the acquisition of the mutual authentication establishment notification D1. A key 20 and a secret key 21 are generated. Then, the key acquisition processing unit 71 sends the public key 20 to the information providing server 3 via the communication interface 61, and sends the secret key 21 to the encryption processing unit 73.

  In this case, the information management server 3 uses the public key 20 supplied from the authentication device 4 to encrypt the common key 23 (FIG. 2) corresponding to the card ID of the smart card 2 loaded in the card reader / writer unit 60. The encrypted encryption key 30 (FIG. 3) is supplied to the encryption processing unit 73 via the communication interface 61.

(3-3) Biometric pattern extraction processing The biometric pattern extraction processing unit 72 performs predetermined processing for extracting a biometric pattern on the biometric information OI output by being read by the sensor unit 6, for example. Regular person characteristic information 31 (FIG. 3) representing a biological pattern such as a blood vessel, a fingerprint, a voice print, or a mouth print is generated and sent to the encryption processing unit 73.

(3-4) Encryption Processing The encryption processing unit 73 uses the encryption key 30 (FIG. 3) supplied from the information management server 3 as the private key 21 (FIG. 3) supplied from the key acquisition processing unit 71. The authorized person characteristic information 31 (FIG. 4) supplied from the biometric pattern extraction processing unit 72 is decrypted using the common key 23 (FIG. 3) obtained as a result of the decryption.

  The encryption processing unit 73 generates the encrypted authorized person feature information 32A (FIG. 4) as a copy of the encrypted authorized person feature information (FIG. 4) obtained as a result of the encryption, and the generated encrypted authorized person feature. The information 32A is registered by being stored in the smart card 2 via the card reader / writer 60.

  Then, the encryption processing unit 73 reads the encrypted authorized person feature information 32A stored in the smart card 2 again via the card reader / writer unit 60, and the read encrypted authorized person feature information 32A (FIG. 4) and the encryption The normalized regular person feature information 32 is collated.

  Here, the encryption processing unit 73 determines that there is no defect in the storage state of the encrypted authorized person characteristic information 32A stored in the smart card 2 when the comparison result is equal to or greater than a predetermined threshold. Registration completion notification data D2 indicating that registration to the smart card 2 is completed is generated and sent to the data erasure unit 75.

(3-5) Data Erasing Processing When the data erasing unit 75 acquires the registration completion notification data D2 from the encryption processing unit 73, the common key 23 and the encryption key 30 held in the RAM in the control unit 51 at this time. Then, the biometric information OI and the encrypted authorized person characteristic information 32 are deleted (FIG. 5).

  In this way, the control unit 51 is configured to execute the registration process.

(4) Processing Contents of Signal Processing Unit in Authentication Mode Next, specific processing contents of the signal processing unit 50 in the authentication mode described above will be described with reference to FIG. Note that portions having the same functions as those in FIG. Here, when the processing contents are functionally classified, they are divided into a mutual authentication unit 70, a key acquisition processing unit 71, a biometric pattern extraction processing unit 72, an encryption processing unit 73, a biometric authentication determination unit 80, and a data erasure unit 75. Can do. Hereinafter, the processing contents will be described in detail based on such classification.

(4-1) Mutual Authentication Mediation Processing When the mutual authentication mediation processing unit 70 performs the mutual authentication mediation processing in the same manner as the mutual authentication mediation processing (3-1) in the registration mode described above, it is confirmed that mutual authentication has been established. A mutual authentication establishment notification D3 is generated and sent to the key acquisition processing unit 71.

(4-2) Key Acquisition Processing When the key acquisition processing unit 71 acquires the mutual authentication establishment notification D3, the pair of public keys 40, as in the key acquisition processing (3-2) in the registration mode described above. A secret key 41 is generated (FIG. 6), and the public key 40 is sent to the information providing server 3 via the communication interface 61, while the secret key 41 is sent to the encryption processing unit 73.

  In this case, the common key 23 (FIG. 6) is encrypted by the information management server 3 as described above, and the encrypted encryption key 42 (FIG. 6) is sent to the encryption processing unit 73 via the communication interface 61. Supplied. The encryption processing unit 73 decrypts the encryption key 42 with the secret key 41 and acquires the common key 23. The encryption processing unit 73 decrypts the encrypted authorized person feature information 32A acquired via the card reader / writer unit 60 with the common key 23 (FIG. 7), and the biometric authentication determination processing unit 80 as the authorized person feature information 31. To send.

(4-3) Biometric Pattern Extraction Processing The biometric pattern extraction processing unit 72 generates user feature information 43 (FIG. 8) in the same manner as the biometric pattern extraction processing (3-3) in the registration mode described above. It is sent to the biometric authentication determination unit 80.

(4-4) Biometric Authentication Determination Process The biometric authentication determination unit 80 performs biometric authentication determination by comparing the authorized person feature information 31 with the user feature information 43. If the collation result is equal to or greater than a predetermined threshold, it means that the user of the authentication device 4 is the authorized user 5 of the smart card 2 and authentication is established. The biometric authentication determination unit 80 generates authentication completion notification data D4 indicating that the authentication has been established, and sends this to the data erasing unit 75.

(4-5) Data Erasing Process When the data erasing unit 75 acquires the authentication completion notification data D4 from the encryption processing unit 73, the common key 23 and the encryption key 42 held in the RAM 53 in the control unit 51 at this time. Then, the biometric information OI and the encrypted authorized person characteristic information 32A are deleted (FIG. 9).

(5) Operation and Effect In the above configuration, when the authentication device 4 in the authentication system 1 recognizes the smart card 2 in which the encrypted authorized person feature information 32A is not stored, the authorized person feature information 31 is registered. On the other hand, when the authentication device 4 recognizes the smart card 2 in which the encrypted authorized person characteristic information 32A is stored, it authenticates the user.

  In the registration mode, the authentication device 4 performs mutual authentication between the information providing server 3 and the smart card 2 via the authentication device 4 and then uses the information providing server 3 to encrypt the encryption key 30 encrypted by the public key cryptosystem. And decrypted to the common key 23.

  Here, the authentication device 4 acquires the common key 23 encrypted with the public key 20 generated by the authentication device 4 only when mutual authentication between the information providing server 3 and the smart card 2 is established. Since the authentication device 4 obtains the encryption key 30 by using an encryption system different from the encryption system used for mutual authentication, the authentication device 4 has a secret key 21 that is the only key that can decrypt the encryption key 30. The authentication device 4 is not released to the outside, and is not decrypted even when a third party illegally acquires the encryption key 30. For this reason, the authentication device 4 can safely acquire the common key 23.

  Next, the authentication device 4 encrypts the authorized person feature information 31 of the authorized user 5 using the decrypted common key 23 and registers it as the encrypted authorized person feature information 32 </ b> A in the smart card 2.

  Here, the authentication device 4 encrypts the legitimate person characteristic information 31 with the common key 23 generated by the information providing server 3 even when the processing capacity of the smart card 2 is low due to restrictions on size, weight, and the like. Therefore, it is possible to use stronger encryption as compared with the conventional method of encrypting the authorized person characteristic information based on the key information of the smart card 2. As a result, the authentication device 4 can prevent the biometric feature information 31 from being forged or altered by a third party. Therefore, the authentication device 4 can significantly improve security as compared with a conventional authentication device that stores unencrypted authorized person feature information or authorized person feature information encrypted with a smart card in the smart card.

  As a result, the authentication device 4 stores the same authorized person feature information as the authorized person feature information stored in the smart card in the authentication device, and confirms that the authorized person feature information stored in the smart card has not been tampered with. It is not necessary to perform the processing that has been performed in the past. Therefore, the authentication device 4 does not have to store the authorized person characteristic information 31 in the authentication device 4 separately.

  Further, the authentication device 4 encrypts and decrypts the authorized person characteristic information 31 by the authentication device 4 even when the processing speed of the smart card 2 is slow due to restrictions on size, weight, and the like. Therefore, it is not necessary to cause the smart card 2 to perform encryption and decryption processing. As a result, the authentication device 4 can shorten the processing time required for registering the authorized person characteristic information and authenticating the user, and thus does not have to wait for the user.

  Next, when the authentication device 4 confirms that the encrypted authorized person characteristic information 32A stored in the smart card 2 is not defective, the authentication device 4 erases data related to all authorized users 5 temporarily stored in the authentication device 4. The registration of the authorized person feature information is terminated.

  Here, in order to confirm that the encrypted authorized person feature information 32A is registered in a state where the smart card 2 is not defective, the authentication device 4 decrypts the encrypted authorized person feature information 32A because of the defect. The threshold value of the authorized person feature information 31 and the user feature information 43 of the authorized user 5 becomes less than a predetermined value, and the situation where the authorized user 5 is not authenticated as the authorized user 5 can be prevented.

  Furthermore, since the authentication device 4 erases the data related to the authorized user 5, the authentication device 4 can be prevented from being stolen from the authentication device 4 by a third party.

  In this way, the authentication device 4 stores the encrypted authorized person feature information 32A in the smart card 2, and the information providing server 3 stores the common key 23 that can decrypt the encrypted authorized person feature information 32A. The encrypted authorized person characteristic information 32A and the common key 23 can be stored separately. As a result, the authentication device 4 does not use the authentication device 4 and does not create a situation where both the encrypted authorized person characteristic information 32A and the common key 23 can be obtained simultaneously, and both are stolen at the same time. Can be prevented.

  That is, the authentication device 4 stores the encrypted legitimate person characteristic information in the smart card, and is stored in the smart card 2 as compared with the conventional method of storing the decryption key in the smart card or the authentication device. Since the common key 23 for decrypting the encrypted authorized person feature information 32A can be safely stored, the authorized person feature information 31 can be protected with even stronger security.

  Further, since the authentication device 4 can decrypt the encrypted authorized person characteristic information 32A only by the authentication device 4 using the common key 23, all of the authentication device 4, the information providing server 3, and the smart card 2 described above are used. If not, the third party cannot acquire the authorized person characteristic information 31 of the authorized user 5. Further, since the common key 23 and the encrypted authorized person feature information 32A can be stored without being associated with each other, the authorized person feature information 31 cannot be acquired by any administrator of the apparatus.

  Therefore, for example, the authentication device 4 has a much higher level of safety than the conventional authentication device that stores the key for decrypting the biometric feature information stored in the smart card in the authentication device. 31 can be stored in the smart card 2, so that the authorized user 5 can keep the authorized person characteristic information 31 in a state in which the safety of the authorized person feature information 31 is ensured without centrally managing the authorized person feature information 31 that is individual privacy. It can be managed in responsibility.

  On the other hand, in the authentication mode, the authentication device 4 performs mutual authentication between the information providing server 3 and the smart card 2 via the authentication device 4, and then uses the encryption key 42 encrypted by the public key 40 as the information providing server. 3 and decrypted into the common key 23.

  Here, since the authentication device 4 advances the authentication mode only by performing mutual authentication between the information providing server 3 and the smart card 2 via the authentication device 4, the information providing server 3 having the common key 23. Unless the three of the smart card 2 holding the encrypted authorized person characteristic information 32A, the information providing server 3 and the authentication device 4 that mediates the smart card 2 are prepared, the authorized person characteristic information 31 of the authorized user 5 is obtained. Cannot be generated. Therefore, the authentication device 4 can prevent the legitimate person characteristic information 31 from being stolen by a third party.

  Next, the authentication device 4 uses the common key 23 to decrypt the encrypted authorized person feature information 32 </ b> A stored in the smart card 2 into the authorized person feature information 31. Thereafter, the normal user characteristic information 31 and the user characteristic information 43 are collated to authenticate that the user is the normal user 5.

  Thereby, the authentication device 4 can prevent the information providing server 3 from being used illegally by a third party who holds the smart card 2. Further, as described above, since the authentication device 4 does not allow the third party to acquire the legitimate person characteristic information 31, it can prevent the legitimate person characteristic information 31 from being counterfeited, and impersonation of the third party legitimate user 5 can be prevented. Can be prevented.

  Next, the data regarding all authorized users 5 temporarily stored in the authentication device 4 is deleted, and the user authentication is terminated.

  Accordingly, the authentication device 4 does not store any information regarding the authorized user 5 such as the common key 23 for decrypting the authorized person feature information 31 and the encrypted authorized person feature information 32A used for user authentication. The user and the authorized user 5 can be authenticated. As a result, the authentication device 4 does not allow both the authentication encrypted authorized person feature information 32A and the common key 23 to coexist except during the registration mode and authentication mode processing, and the encrypted authorized person feature information 32A, the common The risk of the key 23 and the authorized person characteristic information 31 being stolen can be reduced to the utmost limit.

  In this way, the authentication device 4 aggregates the encrypted authorized person feature information 32A and the common key 23, and verifies the biometric authentication by collating the decrypted authorized person feature information 31 with the user feature information 43. Since it plays a role as an institution, even the administrator of the authentication device 4, the information providing server 3, and the smart card 2, the encrypted authorized person characteristic information 32 </ b> A is obtained by a method other than the authentication processing by the authentication device 4 described above. Cannot be decrypted. For this reason, the authentication device 4 can store the authorized person registration information 31 safely.

  Further, the authentication device 4 can improve security without requiring special functions from the smart card 2 and the information providing server 3.

  According to the above configuration, the authentication device 4 can execute an authentication system that can strengthen security for biometric feature information.

(6) Other Embodiments In the above-described embodiment, the common key 23 is generated using the key information of the information providing server 3 after mutual authentication between the information providing server 3 and the smart card 2. However, the present invention is not limited to this, and the common key 23 is generated using an identifier obtained from the smart card 2 after the mutual authentication, for example, based on the mutual authentication process. May be.

  As a result, the information providing server 3 can acquire the identifier from the smart card 2 for each authentication and generate the common key 23, so that it is not necessary to store the common key 23. That is, since the common key 23 does not exist anywhere other than at the time of authentication, the security of the authorized person characteristic information 31 can be further improved.

  In the above-described embodiment, the case where the information providing server 3 generates the common key 23 after mutual authentication is established between the information providing server 3 and the smart card 2 (FIG. 2) is described. The invention is not limited to this. In addition to the mutual authentication, the information providing server 3 may generate the common key 23 after the authorized user 5 and the information providing server 3 authenticate with, for example, a password. .

  As a result, the authentication device 4 stores the biometric information of the third party as the legitimate user feature information 31 of the legitimate user 5 even when the smart card 2 before the legitimate person feature information 31 is registered is acquired by a third party. Can be prevented, and the security of the authentication system 1 can be further strengthened.

  Further, in the authentication of the user, the authentication device 4 can prevent unauthorized use of the smart card 2 by a third party by performing the authentication using the above-described personal identification number in addition to the mutual authentication. Security can be further strengthened.

  Further, in the above-described embodiment, the authentication device 4 encrypts the legitimate person characteristic information 31 with the common key 23 generated by the common key encryption method, and encrypts the common key 23 with the public key encryption method. Although the case where it is obtained (FIG. 4) has been described, the present invention is not limited to this, and as a method for encrypting the authorized person characteristic information 31 and the common key 23, a common key cryptosystem and a public key cryptosystem Any of these may be selected, and they can be freely combined.

  Furthermore, in the above-described embodiment, the authentication device 4 describes the case where the encrypted authorized person feature information 32A obtained by encrypting the authorized person feature information 31 with the common key 23 is stored in the smart card 2 (FIG. 4). However, the present invention is not limited to this, and in addition to the encryption using the common key 23, the encrypted authorized person characteristic information 32A is stored in a further encrypted state by the key generation function of the smart card 2. Anyway.

  As a result, the authentication device 4 stores the authorized person feature information 31 in the smart card 2 in a state of being double-encrypted, so that the authorized person feature information 31 can be protected with stronger security.

  Furthermore, in the above-described embodiment, the information providing server 3 encrypts the common key 23 corresponding to the encrypted authorized person characteristic information 32A stored in the smart card 2 with the public key 40 and sends it (see FIG. Although the present invention is not limited to this, the information providing server 3 stores other information related to the smart card 2 and the common key 23 separately and without associating them, for example, approximate values. Alternatively, an arbitrary plurality of common keys including the common key 23 may be selected by grouping or the like, encrypted with the public key 40, and sent to the authentication device 4. In this case, the authentication device 4 can select and use the common key 23 after decrypting the plurality of acquired keys with the secret key 41.

  Accordingly, the common key 23 and the smart card 2 cannot be associated with each other and the device other than the authentication device 4, and even if the common key 23 is stolen by the administrator of the information providing server 3 or the like, Since the smart card 2 having the encrypted authorized person characteristic information 32A that can be decrypted by the common key 23 cannot be specified, much stronger security can be realized.

  Furthermore, in the above-described embodiment, the case where the sensor unit 6 which is an acquisition unit for acquiring biometric information is provided in the authentication device 4 (FIG. 10) has been described, but the present invention is not limited to this, The acquisition means may be prepared as a separate device and externally attached to the authentication device 4 by, for example, terminal connection or integral connection.

  Furthermore, in the above-described embodiment, the case where both the registration mode and the authentication mode are executed by the authentication device 4 has been described. However, the present invention is not limited to this, and only the registration mode is executed by the registration device. You may do it.

  As a result, the registration device only needs to register the authorized person feature information 31 to the smart card 3, and the verification process of the authorized person feature information 31 and the user feature information 43 in the authentication mode, and the authentication of the user Since it is not necessary to perform subsequent information provision processing or the like, the configuration can be simplified.

  Furthermore, in the above-described embodiment, the case where both the registration mode and the authentication mode are executed by the authentication device 4 has been described. However, the present invention is not limited to this, and only the authentication mode is executed by the authentication device. You may do it.

  As a result, the authentication apparatus only needs to authenticate the authorized person feature information 31 and the user feature information 43, and performs registration processing of the authorized person feature information 31 to the smart card 3 and mode switching processing in the registration mode. Since it is not necessary to do so, the configuration can be simplified.

  Also, by causing the registration mode and authentication mode to be executed by separate registration devices and authentication devices, for example, using a dedicated device installed in a store as a registration device, a personal computer installed in the home as an authentication device, etc. Therefore, it is possible to improve the degree of design freedom of the apparatus.

  Further, in the above-described embodiment, the case where the smart card 2 as the first device is distributed to a plurality of authorized users has been described. However, the present invention is not limited to this, and the authorized user 5 An owned device such as a mobile phone may be used as the first device.

  In this case, an execution program for executing the authentication system 1 is installed from a storage medium such as a CD-ROM (Compact Disc-Read Only Memory), downloaded through a network such as the Internet, or a chip storing the execution program. By providing various devices can be used as the first device.

  Furthermore, in the above-described embodiment, the case where the authentication system 1 is executed by the authentication device 4 having the authentication function has been described. However, the present invention is not limited to this, and the execution for executing the authentication system 1 is performed. Install the program from a storage medium such as a CD-ROM, download it via a network such as the Internet, or provide a chip storing an authentication system execution program, and use various devices as the authentication device 4 Can do.

  In the above-described embodiment, the case where the smart card 2 as the first device, the authentication device 4 as the authentication device, and the information providing server 3 as the second device are applied has been described. The present invention is not limited to this. For example, various electronic devices such as a mobile phone and a PDA (Personal Digital Assistant) as the first device, and various electronic devices such as an ATM (Automatic teller machine), vending machine and personal computer as the authentication device. Various electronic devices such as a management server may be applied as the second device.

  The authentication apparatus of the present invention can be applied to an authentication apparatus that can realize an authentication system that can protect biometric feature information with strong security, for example.

It is a basic diagram which shows the whole structure of an authentication system. It is a basic diagram with which it uses for description of registration (1) of legitimate person characteristic information. It is a basic diagram with which it uses for description of registration (2) of legitimate person characteristic information. It is a basic diagram with which it uses for description of registration (3) of legitimate person characteristic information. It is a basic diagram with which it uses for description of regular person characteristic information registration (4). It is a basic diagram with which it uses for description of a user's authentication (1). It is a basic diagram with which it uses for description of a user's authentication (2). It is a basic diagram with which it uses for description of a user's authentication (3). It is a basic diagram with which it uses for description of a user's authentication (4). It is a block diagram which shows the circuit structure of an authentication apparatus. It is a functional block diagram which shows the process of the signal processing part in registration mode. It is a functional block diagram which shows the process of the signal processing part in authentication mode.

Explanation of symbols

DESCRIPTION OF SYMBOLS 1 ... Authentication system, 2 ... Smart card, 3 ... Information provision server, 4 ... Authentication apparatus, 6 ... Sensor part, 20, 40 ... Public key, 21, 41 ... Private key, 23 ... Common key 30, 42 ... Encryption key, 31 ... Authorized person feature information, 32, 32A ... Encrypted authorized person feature information, 43 ... Biometric information, 50 ... Signal processing unit, 51 ... Control unit , 52... ROM, 53... RAM, 60... Card reader / writer section, 61 ..communication interface, 62 ....... display section, 70 .. mutual authentication mediation processing section, 71. ... biometric pattern extraction processing unit, 73 ... encryption processing unit, 75 ... data erasing unit, 80 ... biometric authentication determination unit.

Claims (7)

It is interposed between a first device assigned to an authorized user and a second device that generates key information for encrypting a registration target registered in the first device for each first device. An authentication device,
Information extracting means for extracting biometric feature information indicating a biometric feature pattern from the biometric information output from the biometric reading means that reads a biometric reading target as biometric information;
Decryption means for decrypting the key information supplied in an encrypted state from the second device;
Using the key information decrypted by the decryption means, the biometric feature information extracted by the information extraction means is encrypted, and the encrypted encrypted biometric feature information is registered in the first device. Registration means to
Using the key information decrypted by the decryption means, the encrypted biometric feature information registered by the registration means is decrypted, and the decrypted biometric feature information and the information extraction means are extracted. Collating means for collating the biometric feature information,
An authentication apparatus comprising: an erasing unit that erases the key information and the biometric feature information at the end of registration by the registration unit and at the end of verification by the verification unit. Comprising key generation means for generating a pair of public key and secret key in response to establishment of mutual authentication between the second device and the first device;
The decryption means decrypts the key information generated in the second device and supplied from the second device in a state encrypted with the public key, using the secret key. The authentication device according to claim 1. The erasing means confirms a registration state of the biometric feature information registered in the first device, and erases the key information and the biometric feature information with the confirmed time as the registration end time. The authentication device according to claim 1. It is interposed between a first device assigned to an authorized user and a second device that generates key information for encrypting a registration target registered in the first device for each first device. A registration device,
Information extracting means for extracting biometric feature information indicating a biometric feature pattern from the biometric information output from the biometric reading means that reads a biometric reading target as biometric information;
Decryption means for decrypting the key information supplied in an encrypted state from the second device;
An encryption means for encrypting the biometric feature information extracted by the information extraction means using the key information decrypted by the decryption means;
Registration means for registering the encrypted encrypted biometric feature information in the first device;
A registration apparatus comprising: an erasing unit that erases the key information and the biometric feature information at the end of registration by the registration unit and at the end of verification by the verification unit. It is interposed between a first device assigned to an authorized user and a second device that generates key information for encrypting a registration target registered in the first device for each first device. An authentication device,
Key information decrypting means for decrypting the key information supplied in an encrypted state from the second device;
Information extracting means for extracting biometric feature information indicating a biometric feature pattern from the biometric information output from the biometric reading means that reads a biometric reading target as biometric information;
Decryption means for reading out the encrypted biometric feature information from the first device stored as encrypted biometric feature information and decrypting it using the key information decrypted by the decryption means;
Collating means for collating the decrypted biometric feature information with the biometric feature information extracted by the information extracting means;
An authentication apparatus comprising: an erasing unit that erases the key information and the biometric feature information at the end of registration by the registration unit and at the end of verification by the verification unit. A device registration method interposed between a first device assigned to a regular user and a second device that generates key information for encrypting a registration target registered in the first device. ,
A first step of extracting biometric feature information indicating a biometric feature pattern from the biometric information output from the biometric reading unit that reads a biometric reading target as biometric information;
A second step of decrypting the key information supplied in an encrypted state from the second device;
Using the key information decrypted in the second step, the biometric feature information extracted in the first step is encrypted, and the encrypted encrypted biometric feature information is stored in the first device. A third step of registering with
A registration method comprising: a fourth step of erasing the key information and the biometric feature information upon completion of registration in the third step. An authentication method for an apparatus interposed between a first apparatus assigned to an authorized user and a second apparatus for generating key information for encrypting a registration target registered in the first apparatus. ,
A first step of decrypting the key information supplied in an encrypted state from the second device;
A second step of extracting biometric feature information indicating a biometric feature pattern from the biometric information output from the biometric reading means that reads a biometric reading target as biometric information;
The biometric feature information is encrypted using the key information, the encrypted biometric feature information is read from the first device stored as the encrypted biometric feature information, and the read encrypted biometric feature information is A third step of decrypting using the key information decrypted in the first step;
A fourth step of collating the biometric feature information decoded in the third step with the biometric feature information extracted in the second step;
An authentication method comprising: a fifth step of erasing the key information and the biometric feature information upon completion of collation in the fourth step.

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