JP2006293874A - Ic card - Google Patents

Abstract

<P>PROBLEM TO BE SOLVED: To detect unauthorized rewrite of a biological information template for use in collation of biological information. <P>SOLUTION: An IC card 100 includes a means 104 for mutual authentication between the IC card and an external apparatus, a means 106 for generating random numbers for use in authentication, a means 103 for encrypting data of the IC card, a biological authentication processing means 105, a template 108 for biological authentication with which biological information of a person to be identified is collated by the means 105, a master key 110 for use in mutual authentication processing, a session key 111 generated after mutual authentication, random numbers 112, a storage part 107 to store them, and an unauthorized processing detection flag 109 for detecting rewriting the template 108 without successful mutual authentication, as unauthorized processing, whereby unauthorized rewrite of the template 108 for biological authentication for use in collation of biological information is detected. <P>COPYRIGHT: (C)2007,JPO&INPIT

Description

  The present invention relates to an IC card used for biometric authentication in which authentication is performed using characteristics of a human body, and relates to an IC card that detects unauthorized rewriting of a biometric authentication template stored in the IC card.

  As the personal authentication technology, there is a biometric authentication technology that performs authentication by using characteristics of the human body. For example, Patent Document 1 describes that the biometric information of a user to be authenticated is stored in an IC card in advance.

JP 2000-215294 A

  In the above prior art, when a personal authentication process is performed using a biometric identification information matching processing unit included in the IC card for a biometric authentication template registered in advance in the IC card, the personal authentication is performed if the verification does not match. Although it becomes a failure, if a malicious third party holds the IC card, the user can try the user authentication any number of times. In addition, when a malicious third party tries to illegally rewrite the biometric authentication template registered in the IC card using an unauthorized external device, the unauthorized rewriting process is tried many times. I can do it. In such a case, there is a possibility that the processing in the IC card can be analyzed by repeatedly performing the processing while changing the data to be sent to the IC card and the processing procedure to a plurality of types. Further, even when an unauthorized access IC card is connected to an authorized personal authentication external device, the authorized external authentication device is an IC card whose unauthorized processing has been tried. Something cannot be detected.

  In order to solve the above-described problem, in the IC card for performing personal authentication using the biometric information of the person to be authenticated according to the present invention, mutual authentication processing means for performing mutual authentication between the IC card and an external device; A random number generating means for generating a random number used for authentication, a connecting means for communicating with the external device via a contact interface, an encryption means for encrypting the data when outputting the data outside the IC card, Biometric authentication processing means for performing authentication using characteristics of a human body, biometric authentication processing means for matching with biometric information of a person who is a subject of personal authentication, and master used for mutual authentication processing A key, a session key generated by the mutual authentication processing unit after mutual authentication, a random number generated by the random number generation unit, the biometric authentication template, and the mass A storage unit for storing the key, the session key, and the random number, and an unauthorized process detection flag for detecting an unauthorized process when the biometric authentication template is rewritten without successful mutual authentication. .

  With the above configuration, in the IC card of the present invention, if the biometric authentication template is rewritten without following predetermined procedures such as mutual authentication and key exchange between the IC card and the external device, it is illegal. Can be detected as a simple process. In addition, when the biometric authentication template is to be rewritten without following the predetermined procedure, the biometric authentication template to be registered without following the predetermined procedure is stored in the IC card, so that mutual authentication, and Only when the mutual authentication and key exchange are successful in a predetermined procedure such as key exchange, the fraud processing detection flag or the biometric authentication template can be read out.

  In addition, it is possible to detect whether there is an evidence that an IC card to be subjected to personal authentication, that is, an IC card connected to an external device, has illegally registered a template. In addition, the biometric authentication template and the terminal ID stored in the IC card can be read only when mutual authentication and key exchange are successful in a predetermined procedure such as mutual authentication and key exchange. It is possible to acquire the information content of the biometric authentication template to be illegally registered, and to specify the external device used for the illegal registration process from the unique ID for identifying the external device.

  According to the present invention, when a biometric authentication template is rewritten illegally, it can be detected as an unauthorized process.

Hereinafter, embodiments of the present invention will be described in detail with reference to the drawings.
FIG. 1 is a configuration diagram of an IC card according to an embodiment of the present invention. In the present embodiment, a case where a finger vein pattern is used will be described as an example of a feature of a human body used for biometric authentication. However, this is only an example for explaining the present invention, and it can be performed using an iris, a fingerprint, a voiceprint, a palm shape, a retina pattern, or the like.

  As shown in FIG. 1, the IC card 100 enables communication with an external device via a contact interface, which performs overall control of the IC card 100 and performs various determinations, calculations, and control processes. When the IC card 100 performs external device communication via the connection unit 102, the encryption processing unit 103 that encrypts / decrypts communication data when the IC card 100 communicates with the external device, and the IC card 100 In addition, a mutual authentication processing unit 104 for performing mutual authentication between the IC card 100 and an external device, a biometric authentication processing unit 105 for authenticating biometric information of a person who is a subject of personal authentication, and a mutual authentication. A random number generation unit 106 that generates a random number to be generated, and a storage unit 107. The storage unit 107 detects a biometric authentication template 108 of a person who is a subject of personal authentication used for personal authentication and an unauthorized process when the biometric authentication template 108 is rewritten maliciously. An unauthorized processing detection flag 109, a master key 110 used for mutual authentication processing, a session key 111 generated by the mutual authentication processing unit 104 after mutual authentication, and a random number 112 generated by the random number generation unit 106 are stored. .

  FIG. 2 is a diagram showing an example of a message structure exchanged between the IC card 100 and an external device that performs mutual authentication between the IC card and the IC card. As shown in FIG. 2, the challenge messages are a challenge request message 200, a challenge request response message 210, a verification request message 220, a verification request response message 230, a template registration request message 240, and a template registration request response message 250. Each has a configuration in which information data is added to a message identification code or a message identification code.

  The challenge request message 200 is a message for requesting IC card verification data 212 for the external device to verify the IC card in mutual authentication from the external device to which the IC card performs mutual authentication. The challenge request message 200 has a configuration in which a message identification code 201 indicating that it is a challenge request message 200 and a random number 202 generated by an external device with which the IC card performs mutual authentication are added.

  The challenge request response message 210 is a message transmitted from the IC card 100 to the external device that performs mutual authentication as a response to the challenge request message 200, and is a message identification code indicating that it is the challenge request response message 210 211, IC card verification data 212, and a random number 112 generated by the random number generation unit 106 by the IC card 100 are added.

The verification request message 220 is a message for sending terminal verification data for the IC card 100 to verify the external device in the mutual authentication from the external device to which the IC card performs mutual authentication to the IC card 100. The verification request message 220 has a configuration in which a message identification code 221 indicating the verification request message 220 and terminal verification data 222 are added.
The verification request response message 230 is a message sent from the IC card 100 to an external device that performs mutual authentication as a response to the verification request message 220. The verification request response message 230 is a verification request response message 230. The configuration includes a message identification code 231 indicating a certain thing and a verification result indicating a result of verifying an external device using the mutual authentication processing unit 104 in the IC card 100.

  The template registration request 240 indicates the identity authentication target used for biometric authentication from the external device to the IC card when the mutual authentication between the IC card 100 and the external device with which the IC card performs mutual authentication is successful. A message identifying code 241 indicating that it is a template registration request 240, and the IC card 100 and the IC card perform mutual authentication. The biometric authentication template 108 encrypted using the session key 111 shared between the IC card 100 and the external device after mutual authentication with the external device is successful, and the information added to the template registration request message 240 The signature data 243 for ensuring the authenticity of the data is added.

  The template registration request response 250 is a message sent from the IC card 100 to the external device as a response to the template registration request response 250, and includes a message identification code 251 indicating that the template registration request response 250, and the IC card 100. However, it has a configuration in which a registration result indicating whether the verification of the signature is successful and the biometric authentication template 108 has been stored in the storage unit 107 is added.

  Next, a processing procedure until the IC card 100 according to the present embodiment performs mutual authentication on an external device and registers the biometric authentication template 108 will be described with reference to FIG. In describing the mutual authentication processing procedure and the registration processing procedure, the IC card 100 can be connected to any external device that can be connected via a contact interface. Although not shown in the figure, here, a connection via a contact interface is possible, and a biometric information acquisition unit that acquires biometric information from the person to be authenticated in order to perform biometric authentication, and the IC card 100 perform mutual authentication processing. Assume possible external equipment. For this purpose, the external device also has a master key used for mutual authentication with the IC card and a random number generated by a random number generator provided in the external device.

  First, a processing procedure when a mutual authentication process is performed between the IC card 100 and the external device will be described with reference to FIG. When the IC card 100 is connected to an external device via the contact interface, the IC card 100 is in a standby state waiting for a request message from the external device (S301). Here, when the request message is received from the external device (S302), the message identification code added to the request message is referred to, and the process moves to a process corresponding to each message identification code (S303). Here, when the request message is received by processing other than the mutual authentication processing and the biometric authentication template 108 registration processing, the processing is performed as the other card processing (S304), and the processing result is transmitted to the external device as a response. (S305), it returns to a standby state waiting for a request message from an external device (S319). In the illustrated example, the other card process is simplified and described as one process, but a plurality of other card processes may exist for each different process content.

  In the mutual authentication process, first, a challenge request message 200 is received from an external device. When receiving the challenge request message 200, the IC card 100 determines a message identification code in step S303, and proceeds to step S306. In step S306, the IC card 100 creates the IC card verification data 212 using the master key 110 stored in the storage unit 107 and the random number 202 added to the challenge request message 200. As a method of generating the IC card verification data 212, for example, there is a method of encrypting the random number 202 with a master key. Next, the random number generator 106 generates a random number 112 (S307). Then, a challenge request response message to which the IC card verification data 212 and the random number 112 are added is created and transmitted to the external device (S308).

  Normally, in the case of mutual authentication, when the external device receives the IC card verification data 212 from the IC card, it uses the random number 202 generated by the external device and the master key stored inside the external device for IC card verification. The data 212 is verified. As a verification method of the IC card verification data 212, the random number 202 held by the external device is encrypted with the master key held by the external device, and it is verified whether or not it matches the received IC card verification data 212. Conversely, the received IC card verification data 212 may be decrypted with a master key to verify whether it matches the random number 202 held by the external device.

  If the verification is successful using the above method, the external device creates the terminal verification data 222 using the random number 112 received by the challenge request response message 210 and the master key stored in the external device. . The method for creating the terminal verification data 222 may be the same method as described above. Then, a verification request message 220 to which the terminal verification data 222 is added is created and transmitted to the IC card 100. When receiving the verification request message 220, the IC card 100 determines a message identification code in step S303, and proceeds to step S309. In step S309, the IC card 100 determines whether or not the random number 112 has been generated (S309).

  This is for determining whether the IC card 100 is performing the challenge request process before receiving the verification request message. If the random number has already been generated (S309: YES), the terminal verification data 222 added to the verification request message 220 is verified (S310). The verification method of the terminal verification data 222 here may be the same as the verification method of the IC card verification data 212 described above. If the verification is correct (S310: OK), a session key is generated using the master key (S311).

  Here, as a method for generating a session key, for example, a logical OR operation is performed on a random number 112 generated by an IC card and a random number 202 generated by an external device, and the operation result encrypted with a master key is used as a session key. Also good. The session key may be a method other than the above-described session key generation method as long as the same value and the same method as the IC card verification data and the terminal verification data are not used. If the session key can be generated, a verification result 232 indicating successful verification is added to the verification request response message 230 and transmitted to the external device (S312).

  If the random number 112 has not been generated in step S309 (S309: NO), the terminal verification data is not verified and the session key is not generated, and the process proceeds to step S312 to request a verification result 232 indicating a verification failure. It is added to the response message 231 and transmitted to the external device (S312). Also, if the verification of the terminal verification data 222 is invalid in step S310 (S310: NG), the verification result 232 indicating the verification failure is similarly added to the verification request response message 231 and transmitted to the external device (S312). ).

The above is an example of a sequence of mutual authentication processing performed between the IC card 100 and the external device. In this embodiment, the case where the common key cryptosystem is used as the mutual authentication and key exchange has been described. However, the mutual authentication such as the case where the public key cryptosystem is used or a combination of various cryptosystems is used. Alternatively, an alternative method may be used as long as the process can correctly perform key exchange.
In this embodiment, the master key is shared between the external device and the IC card 100. However, the external device has a plurality of master keys, and the master key 110 of the IC card 100 is specified in the challenge request response message 210. It is also possible to use a method in which a key index is added and passed.

Next, when mutual authentication and key exchange can be performed correctly, the biometric authentication template 108 to be compared is used to verify the biometric information of the person to be authenticated in the personal authentication with the IC card 100 using an external device. A procedure for registration processing will be described.
First, after mutual authentication and key exchange are correctly performed between the external device and the IC card 100, the external device encrypts the biometric authentication template 108 to be registered using the session key generated by the key exchange. Then, a template registration request message 240 is transmitted from the external device to the IC card 100. The IC card 100 determines whether or not a session key has been generated by key exchange (S313). This is to determine whether the mutual authentication between the IC card 100 and the external device is successful before receiving the template registration request message 240.

  If the session key has already been generated (S313: YES), the signature 243 added to the template registration request message 240 is verified (S314). If the signature verification is correct (S314: OK), the IC card uses the session key 111 to decrypt the encrypted biometric information template 242 added to the template registration request message 240 (S315). . The decrypted biometric information template 108 is stored in the storage unit 107 in the IC card 100 (S316). After the storage, a registration result 252 indicating that the template has been registered is added to the template registration request response message 250 and transmitted to the external device (S317).

If the session key 111 has not been generated in step S313 (S313: NO), the mutual authentication between the IC card 100 and the external device has not succeeded, so the template is registered in an illegal procedure. Therefore, the process proceeds to fraud detection processing (S318). If the signature verification is invalid (S314: NG), the signature verification 314, the decryption of the encrypted biometric information template 242 and the storage unit 107 in the IC card 100 are not stored. Then, the process proceeds to step S317, and a registration result 252 that means registration failure of the biometric information template 242 is added to the template registration request response message 250 and transmitted to the external device (S317).
By performing the above procedure, a biometric information template for collating biometric information of a person to be authenticated can be registered from the external device to the IC card 100.

  Next, as the fraud detection process S318, for example, the processes of FIGS. First, an example of the processing procedure of the fraud detection processing S318 will be described with reference to FIG. When the IC card 100 moves to fraud detection processing S318 (S318), the fraud processing detection flag stored in the storage unit 107 in the IC card 100 is set (S401). Then, a registration result 252 signifying template registration failure is added to the template registration request response message 250 and transmitted to the external device (S317). At this time, a registration result 252 indicating that the template has been registered may be added to the template registration request response message 250 and transmitted to the external device (S317).

  Next, another example of the processing procedure of the fraud detection processing S318 will be described with reference to FIG. When the IC card 100 proceeds to the fraud detection process S318 (S318), the fraud process detection flag stored in the storage unit 107 in the IC card 100 is set in the same manner as the processing procedure illustrated in FIG. 4 (S401). Then, the biometric authentication template stored in the storage unit 107 is used instead of the encrypted biometric information template 242 for the data added to the template registration request message 240 transmitted from the external device in a state where mutual authentication has not been successful in advance. 108 is stored in the memory area. After the storage, a registration result 252 indicating template registration failure is added to the template registration request response message 250 and transmitted to the external device (S317). At this time, a registration result 252 indicating that the template has been registered may be added to the template registration request response message 250 and transmitted to the external device (S317).

  Next, another example of the processing procedure of the fraud detection processing S318 will be described with reference to FIG. When the IC card 100 moves to the fraud detection process S318 (S318), the fraud process detection flag stored in the storage unit 107 in the IC card 100 is set (S401) in the same manner as the processing procedure illustrated in FIG. Then, the biometric authentication template stored in the storage unit 107 is used instead of the encrypted biometric information template 242 for the data added to the template registration request message 240 transmitted from the external device in a state where mutual authentication has not been successful in advance. 108 is stored in the memory area. After storage, information related to personal information stored in the storage unit 107 in the IC card 100, for example, information relating to identification of individuals such as name, date of birth, etc. Rewrite the information with another value. For example, the memory area storing the personal related information is filled with 0xFF, or the memory area is simply deleted. Then, a registration result 252 signifying template registration failure is added to the template registration request response message 250 and transmitted to the external device (S317). At this time, a registration result 252 indicating that the template has been registered may be added to the template registration request response message 250 and transmitted to the external device (S317).

In addition, regarding step S402 and step S403, either processing may be prioritized regardless of the processing order.
In step S402, as in step S403, the memory area storing the biometric authentication template 108 in the storage unit 107 in the IC card 100 is rewritten with another value. For example, a method of filling with 0xFF or simply erasing the memory area may be used.

  FIG. 7 is a diagram illustrating an example of a message structure exchanged between the IC card 100 and an external device that requests the IC card 100 to authenticate the user. As shown in FIG. 7, the messages include a collation request message 700, a collation request response message 710, a fraud processing detection flag request message 720, and a fraud processing detection flag request response message 730, respectively. It has a configuration in which information data is added to the message identification code.

The verification request message 700 is a message from the external device requesting the personal authentication to the IC card 100 to which the external device requests the personal authentication. The verification request message 700 is a session key obtained by exchanging a message identification code 701 indicating the verification request message 700 and biometric information acquired from the person to be authenticated for personal authentication by mutual authentication in advance. In this configuration, encrypted verification data 702 that is encrypted using the signature and signature data 703 for ensuring the authenticity of the information added to the verification request message 700 are added.
The verification request response message 710 is a message sent as a response to the verification request message 700 from the IC card 100 to an external device that requests authentication, and includes a message identification code 711 indicating the verification request response message 710. The verification result 712 indicating the result of authentication using the biometric authentication processing unit 105 in the IC card 100 is added.

  The unauthorized processing detection flag request message 720 is a message requesting the unauthorized processing detection flag 109 stored in the storage unit 107 in the IC card 100 from the external device requesting the personal authentication to the IC card 100. is there. The unauthorized process detection flag request message 720 has a configuration having a message identification code 721 indicating that it is an unauthorized process detection flag request message 720.

  The fraud processing detection flag request response message 730 is a message sent from the IC card 100 to the external device that requests the user authentication as a response to the fraud processing detection flag request message 720, and the key is exchanged by the mutual authentication in advance. An unauthorized processing detection flag 732 encrypted using a session key and signature data 733 for ensuring the authenticity of information added to the unauthorized processing detection flag request response message 730 are configured.

Next, when the IC card 100 according to the present embodiment receives a request for personal authentication from an external device, the verification data is authenticated using the biometric authentication template 108 stored in the storage unit 107 in the IC card 100. The processing procedure up to will be described with reference to FIG.
When performing personal authentication, mutual authentication must be successful between the external device and the IC card 100 in advance. Since the mutual authentication process has been described with reference to the flowchart in FIG. 3, the description thereof is omitted here. Also, illustration of processes that overlap those in FIG. 3 is omitted.

  Next, a description will be given of a processing procedure for requesting personal authentication to the IC card 100 using an external device when mutual authentication and key exchange are correctly performed. First, after mutual authentication and key exchange are correctly performed between the external device and the IC card 100, the external device generates a biometric information obtained from the person to be authenticated for personal authentication by key exchange. A verification request message 700 to which verification data 702 encrypted using a key is added is transmitted. The IC card 100 determines whether a session key has been generated by key exchange (S801). This is to determine whether the mutual authentication between the IC card 100 and the external device is successful before receiving the verification request message 700. If the session key has been generated (S801: YES), the signature 703 added to the verification request message 700 is verified (S802). If the signature verification is correct (S802: OK), the IC card uses the session key 111 to decrypt the encrypted verification data 702 added to the verification request message 700 (S803).

  The decrypted verification data is subjected to verification processing by the biometric authentication template 108 stored in the storage unit 107 in the IC card 100 and the biometric authentication processing unit 105 (S804). After the collation, the collation result 712 is added to the collation request response message 710 and the collation result is transmitted to the external device (S805). Also, if the session key 111 has not been generated in step S801 (S801: NO), the mutual authentication between the IC card 100 and the external device has not been successful, so verification is requested in an unauthorized procedure. Then, the collation result 712 indicating the collation failure is added to the collation request response message 710 and transmitted to the external device (S805).

  If the signature verification is invalid (S802: NG), the encrypted verification data 702 is not decrypted and the verification process is not performed, and the process proceeds to step S805 to indicate a verification result indicating a verification process failure. 712 is added to the verification request response message 710 and transmitted to the external device (S805).

  Next, when registering the biometric authentication template in the IC card 100, the IC card 100 is used to determine whether mutual authentication and key exchange are correctly performed between the IC card 100 and the external device before the registration process. A processing procedure for requesting the unauthorized processing detection flag 109 stored in the storage unit 107 will be described. First, mutual authentication processing is performed between the IC card 100 and the external device in order to determine whether the external device requesting the fraud processing detection flag 109 is a legitimate device. The procedure of the mutual authentication process has been described with reference to FIG.

  First, the external device transmits an illegal processing detection flag request message 720 to the IC card. The IC card 100 determines whether or not a session key has been generated by key exchange (S806). This is for determining whether or not the mutual authentication is successful between the IC card 100 and the external device when receiving the unauthorized processing detection flag request message 720. If the session key has already been generated (S806: YES), the IC card encrypts the fraud detection flag 109 stored in the storage unit 107 using the session key 111 (S807). Then, signature data 733 for ensuring the authenticity of the information added to the unauthorized process detection flag request response message 730 is generated (S808), added to the unauthorized process detection flag request response message 730, and transmitted to an external device ( S809).

  In step S809, as the information to be added to the unauthorized process detection flag request response message 730, not only the encrypted unauthorized process detection flag 732 as shown in FIG. 9 but also the encrypted biometric authentication template 901 is added, Then, the fraud processing detection flag request response message 730 to which the signature data 733 for ensuring the authenticity of the information added to the fraud processing detection flag request response message 730 may be transmitted to the external device. In that case, although not shown, in FIG. 8, the biometric authentication template 108 stored in the storage unit 107 is stored in the storage unit 107 by the IC card between the session key generation determination (S806) and the signature generation (S808). Processing for encryption using the session key 111 is added.

  In addition, in the registration process of the biometric authentication template 108, using the template registration request message 240 and the template registration request response message 250 in the message shown in FIG. 2, the processing procedure from step S313 to step S317 shown in FIG. The biometric authentication template 108 is registered in the storage unit 107 in the IC card 100. Here, in the registration process of the biometric authentication template 108, the template registration request message 240 is transmitted simultaneously with the biometric authentication template 108. It is also possible to register a unique ID for identifying the external device to be used. Here, a terminal ID 1001 will be described as an example showing a unique ID for identifying an external device.

In the above case, as shown in FIG. 11, in the template registration request message 240, as information added to the message, a terminal that is a unique ID for identifying an external device together with the biometric information template 242 encrypted with the session key The message structure is such that ID 1001 is added and signature data 243 is added to ensure the authenticity of the information added to the template registration request message 240.
In the template registration process of FIG. 3 (from step S313 to step S317), although illustration is omitted, in step S317, the decrypted biometric information template 108 and the terminal ID 1001 are stored in the storage unit 107 in the IC card 100. (S316).

  Further, in step S809, as information to be added to the unauthorized process detection flag request response message 730, not only the encrypted unauthorized process detection flag 732 as shown in FIG. 12, but also the encrypted biometric authentication template 901 and the terminal ID 1001. And the fraud processing detection flag request response message 730 to which the signature data 733 for ensuring the credibility of the information added to the fraud processing detection flag request response message 730 may be transmitted to the external device. In that case, the terminal ID 1001 may be encrypted and added in the same manner as the other unauthorized processing detection flag 732 and the biometric authentication template 901. Although illustration is omitted, in FIG. 8, the terminal ID 1001 stored in the storage unit 107 is stored by the IC card shown in FIG. 10 between the session key generation determination (S806) and the signature generation (S808). Processing to encrypt using 111 is added.

  As described above, when the IC card of the present invention is to rewrite the biometric authentication template without following the predetermined procedure such as mutual authentication and key exchange between the IC card and the external device, It can be detected as an illegal process. In addition, when the biometric authentication template is to be rewritten without following the predetermined procedure, the biometric authentication template to be registered without following the predetermined procedure is stored in the IC card, so that mutual authentication, and Only when mutual authentication and key exchange are successful in a predetermined procedure such as key exchange, it is possible to read the fraud detection flag or the biometric authentication template.

  In addition, by using the fraud processing detection flag request message 720, it is detected whether there is any evidence that the target IC card 100 to be authenticated, that is, the IC card 100 connected to the external device, has illegally registered the template. I can do it. In addition, the biometric authentication template 108 and the terminal ID 1001 stored in the IC card 100 can be read only when the mutual authentication and key exchange are successful by a predetermined procedure such as mutual authentication and key exchange. Accordingly, it is possible to acquire the information content of the biometric authentication template to be illegally registered, and to identify the external device used for the illegal registration process from the unique ID for identifying the external device.

It is a figure which shows the structure of the IC card which concerns on embodiment of this invention. It is a figure which shows the example of each message structure in the registration process in this embodiment. 5 is a flowchart showing a processing procedure in registration processing in the IC card 100. 4 is a flowchart showing a processing procedure in unauthorized registration processing in the IC card 100. 4 is a flowchart showing a processing procedure in unauthorized registration processing in the IC card 100. 4 is a flowchart showing a processing procedure in unauthorized registration processing in the IC card 100. It is a figure which shows the example of each message structure in the collation process in this embodiment. 4 is a flowchart showing a processing procedure in a collation process in the IC card 100. It is a figure which shows the example of a structure of the unauthorized process detection flag request | requirement response message in this embodiment. It is a figure which shows the structure of the IC card which concerns on embodiment of this invention. It is a figure which shows the example of a structure of the template registration request message in this embodiment. It is a figure which shows the example of a structure of the unauthorized process detection flag request | requirement response message in this embodiment.

Explanation of symbols

100 IC card 101 arithmetic processing unit 102 connection unit 103 encryption processing unit 104 mutual authentication processing unit 105 biometric authentication processing unit 106 random number generation unit 107 storage unit 108 biometric authentication template 109 fraud processing detection flag 110 master key 111 session key 112 random number

Claims (9)

  A memory for storing a biometric authentication template that is a comparison target when collating with the biometric information of a person to be authenticated at the time of biometric authentication in an IC card that is used for biometric authentication that performs authentication using characteristics of the human body And a fraud detection flag indicating that the biometric authentication template has been registered in the storage means without successful mutual authentication processing, and the biometric authentication template is registered without following a predetermined procedure. An IC card characterized in that when trying to do so, the value of the fraud detection flag is changed and held.   The IC card according to claim 1, wherein when the biometric authentication template is to be registered without following a predetermined procedure, the biometric authentication template to be registered without following the predetermined procedure is stored in the storage unit. An IC card characterized by storing.   The IC card according to claim 1 or 2, wherein the biometric authentication template storage memory area in the storage unit is rewritten when an attempt is made to register a biometric authentication template without following a predetermined procedure. IC card characterized by   The information other than the biometric template stored in the storage unit when registering the biometric template without following a predetermined procedure in the IC card according to claim 1. IC card characterized by rewriting.   5. The IC card according to claim 1, wherein when the biometric authentication template is to be registered without following a predetermined procedure, the biometric authentication template registration request message received by the IC card is received. An IC card characterized by sending a response message indicating successful registration.   6. The IC card according to claim 1, wherein the fraud detection flag can be read only when mutual authentication and key exchange are successful in a predetermined procedure.   6. The IC card according to claim 1, wherein the biometric authentication template can be read only when mutual authentication and key exchange are successful in a predetermined procedure.   3. The IC card according to claim 2, wherein when storing a biometric authentication template without following a predetermined procedure, a unique ID for identifying an external device connected to the IC card is stored. An IC card that is stored in a card. 8. The IC card according to claim 7, wherein the unique ID for identifying an external device can be read only when mutual authentication and key exchange are successful in a predetermined procedure. .

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