JP2005267031A - Card reader, settlement terminal, and settlement processing system - Google Patents

Abstract

<P>PROBLEM TO BE SOLVED: To solve the problem that since an output signal itself from a card reader is not encrypted although it is the information of a card including significant personal information in a conventional skimming prevention measures, skimming is successful only when the signal is read somewhere in the transmission path of this signal. <P>SOLUTION: This card reader is provided with a magnetic head for reading the magnetic information of a magnetic card, a demodulating part for demodulating the information read by the magnetic head, an encryption part for encrypting the information demodulated by the demodulation part and a communication part for communicating with external equipment. At least the output part of the magnetic head and the input parts of the demodulation part and the encryption part are shielded by integral mold or a strong cover with resin. <P>COPYRIGHT: (C)2005,JPO&NCIPI

Description

  The present invention relates to prevention of skimming of a magnetic card reader.

  In recent years, card fraud by counterfeiting magnetic cards has increased.

  Although replacement of magnetic cards with IC cards that are difficult to counterfeit has already begun, magnetic cards are widespread all over the world, and it seems that it will take a long time before everything is replaced with IC cards. .

  Meanwhile, counterfeiting of magnetic cards is expected to continue mainly focusing on areas where replacement with IC cards is delayed, and more effective counterfeiting measures are desired.

  When forging a magnetic card, it is first necessary to obtain data of a magnetic card that can be used normally, and this action is generally called skimming because there is an image of collecting magnetic data. This skimming is performed on devices such as credit settlement terminals and POS (Point OfSales) registers installed in stores and the like.

  There are roughly two methods for skimming normal card data.

  One method is to open a case of a credit payment terminal which is an example of a device, add a branch circuit in parallel to an output terminal of a card reader built in the device, and read card data from this circuit. .

  FIG. 5A shows an external perspective view of the credit settlement terminal 11 and FIG. 5B shows an exploded perspective view of the credit settlement terminal 11. 1 is a card reader for reading information on the magnetic card 20, 15 is an upper case of the credit settlement terminal 11, 16 is a lower case of the credit settlement terminal 11, 17 is a control circuit of the credit settlement terminal 11, and 18 is credit settlement. A printer mounted on the terminal 11, 19 is an opening seal that is attached to the side of the credit payment terminal 11 in order to detect that the case of the credit payment terminal 11 has been opened.

  FIG. 6 shows a partial schematic diagram of a conventional card reader 1. As shown in FIG. 6, in the conventional card reader 1, the output terminal of the magnetic head 3 is exposed, and it is relatively easy to add a branch circuit thereto. Further, as shown in FIG. 7, since the information read by the magnetic head 3 is output from the transmission unit 6 without being encrypted, a branch circuit is added anywhere from the magnetic head 3 to the transmission unit 6. Was possible.

  Another method of skimming is compatible with the card reader 1 built in the device in terms of the card used, the form and shape of the output signal, etc., and a memory for storing data. A card reader 1 for skimming provided with a section is prepared in advance, the case of the credit settlement terminal 11 is opened, and the built-in regular card reader 1 and the card reader 1 for skimming are exchanged. It is.

  As a representative example of the conventional measures for preventing the skimming described above, first, when a case of a device having a card reader built therein is opened, a tamper mechanism for detecting this is provided to perform a skimming action. What provided the means to alert | report this is known (for example, refer patent document 1).

As another countermeasure, there is a method of covering only this terminal portion with a resin or the like so that the branch circuit is not easily connected to the terminal portion from which the card data is output even when the device is opened.
JP 2001-243543 A

  However, conventional skimming countermeasures have the following problems.

  With a tamper mechanism and measures to notify that the case of the device has been opened, the case where the card reader is stored is not opened with a sharp cutting tool so that the tamper mechanism does not work. There was a problem that the tamper mechanism did not work effectively by cutting it off.

  In addition, the measures to cover the output terminal with resin etc. are slightly more laborious than the method of soldering the circuit for branching to the exposed terminal, but skimming by processing and branching the signal cable etc. It had the problem of being done. In this method, since the output signal of the card reader is not encrypted, if the signal is branched even if it takes some time and effort, the subsequent work is easy and the effect of preventing skimming is small. Conceivable.

  As described above, the conventional anti-skimming measure is an unencrypted (so-called plaintext) signal output although the output signal itself from the card reader is information on the card including important personal information. For this reason, the skimming operation is almost completed simply by reading the signal somewhere in the signal transmission path.

  Considering the case where tamper resistance is the main countermeasure against skimming, giving tamper resistance to the entire case makes the structure very complicated both mechanically and electrically. As a result, the manufacturing cost of the device is greatly increased.

  And once the criminals discover a device that breaks the tamper structure, skimming will be performed on the same model one after another unless the tamper structure is changed.

  In addition, changing the tamper structure of equipment once installed in the market requires a very large cost and makes it difficult to take measures.

  In order to solve the above problems, a card reader according to the present invention includes a magnetic head for reading magnetic information of a magnetic card, a demodulator for demodulating information read by the magnetic head, and encrypting information demodulated by the demodulator. An encryption unit that performs communication with an external device, and at least an output part of the magnetic head, a demodulation unit, and an input part of the encryption unit are integrally molded with resin or concealed by a robust cover. .

  The payment terminal of the present invention includes a magnetic head that reads magnetic information of a magnetic card, a demodulator that demodulates information read by the magnetic head, an encryption unit that encrypts information demodulated by the demodulator, A storage unit that stores unique identification information and a communication unit that communicates with an external device, and at least an output part of the magnetic head, a demodulation part, and an input part of the encryption part are integrally molded with a resin or a robust cover A payment terminal equipped with a card reader concealed by the storage, wherein the payment terminal compares the payment terminal's own identification information with the payment terminal's identification information and the card reader's identification information. And a control unit that transmits information indicating a mismatch to the server device when they do not match.

  The payment processing system of the present invention includes a magnetic head for reading magnetic information of a magnetic card, a demodulator for demodulating information read by the magnetic head, and an encryption unit for encrypting information demodulated by the demodulator. A storage unit that stores unique identification information and encryption information, and a communication unit that communicates with an external device, and at least an output portion of the magnetic head, a demodulation unit, and an input portion of the encryption unit are integrally molded with resin. Or a card reader concealed by a robust cover, a payment terminal equipped with the card reader, and a server device connected to the payment terminal via a communication network. The payment terminal receives its identification information and encryption information. Comparing the storage unit for storing, the identification information of the payment terminal and the identification information of the card reader, if these do not match, A control unit that transmits information to the server device, and based on the information from the server device that has received the information indicating the mismatch, the encryption information stored in the storage unit of the card reader; The encryption information stored in the storage unit of the payment terminal can be changed.

  As described above, according to the card reader of the present invention, since the output part of the magnetic head, the decryption part, and the input part of the encryption part are physically concealed by integral molding, etc., the information that is not encrypted Can be prevented from being skimmed in the communication path from the magnetic head to the encryption unit.

  Hereinafter, embodiments of the present invention will be described with reference to FIGS.

(Embodiment 1)
FIG. 1 is a block diagram showing an outline of a state in which a card reader 1 capable of reading a magnetic card is mounted on a credit settlement terminal 11.

  In FIG. 1, 1 is a card reader mounted on the credit card payment terminal 11, 3 is a magnetic head for reading information on the magnetic card, 4 is a demodulator for demodulating information read by the magnetic head 3, and 5 is a demodulator 4. Reference numeral 6 denotes an encryption unit that encrypts the information demodulated in step 1, and reference numeral 6 denotes a transmission unit for transmitting the information encrypted by the encryption unit 5 to the reception unit 7 of the credit settlement terminal 11. Reference numeral 2 denotes a resin, which integrally molds the output part of the magnetic head 3, the entire demodulator 5 and the input part of the encryption part 5. FIG. 2 shows a schematic diagram of the card reader 1 in which the output part of the magnetic head 3, the entire demodulator 5 and the input part of the encryption part 5 are integrally molded.

  The operation of the card reader 1 configured as described above will be described.

  Information recorded as magnetism on the magnetic card is converted into an electric signal by moving the magnetic card in contact with the magnetic head 3, and this electric signal is decoded as digital data by the demodulator 5. The decrypted digital data is input to the encryption unit 5, encrypted, and transmitted to the reception unit of the credit card payment terminal 11 via the transmission unit 6.

  As described above, according to the present embodiment, since the output portion of the magnetic head 3, the entire demodulator 5 and the input portion of the encryption unit 5 are integrally molded, unencrypted information is transmitted. Thus, skimming can be prevented in the communication path from the magnetic head 3 to the encryption unit 5. That is, a person who attempts skimming work must open the case of the credit payment terminal 11 having a tamper function at the installation site of the credit payment terminal 11 or the like, and even if the case can be opened. Because it is molded with resin 2, it is not possible to easily attach a branch circuit for skimming. To attach it, the resin molded part with resin 2 must be precisely cut or melted. It is very difficult to perform in a short time, and it is difficult to perform skimming.

  Further, since the card reader 1 has an encryption function, a skimming technique in which the card reader 1 is simply replaced with another card reader 1 cannot be easily executed. That is, when the regular card reader 1 mounted in advance in the credit card payment terminal 11 is removed and replaced with the card reader 1 for skimming prepared in advance, the replaced card reader 1 operates correctly. It is necessary to analyze the encryption means of the card reader 1 and produce a card reader 1 that realizes exactly the same function as this, but the solution of the encryption means is not easy and the replacement of the card reader 1 is very It becomes difficult.

  In the present embodiment, the output part of the magnetic head 3, the entire demodulator 5 and the input part of the encryption part 5 are integrally molded with the resin 2 so as to be physically concealed. It may be configured to be physically concealed by covering with a solid metallic cover or the like. By using such a robust cover, it is necessary to cut the cover, and it is possible to make it difficult to perform work in the field in a short time.

  Further, in the present embodiment, the example in which the card reader 1 is mounted on the credit settlement terminal 11 has been described. However, the present invention is not limited to the example of the credit settlement terminal 11 and is mounted on any device that requires a function of reading a magnetic card. be able to.

(Embodiment 2)
In the present embodiment, the same parts as those in the first embodiment are denoted by the same reference numerals, and detailed description thereof is omitted.

  In FIG. 3, reference numeral 8 denotes a transmission / reception unit that is provided in the card reader 1 and transmits / receives information to / from the credit settlement terminal 11. A storage unit 9 is provided in the card reader 1, and stores a unique identification number assigned to the card reader 1, a program for operating the card reader 1, and the like. Reference numeral 10 denotes a control unit provided in the card reader 1, which compares the identification number of the card reader 1 stored in the storage unit 9 with the identification number of a credit settlement terminal 11 to be described later. Is a control unit that controls to delete the stored contents of the storage unit 9.

  A storage unit 12 is provided in the credit settlement terminal 11 and stores unique identification information attached to the credit settlement terminal 11. Reference numeral 13 denotes a control unit provided in the credit settlement terminal 11, which compares the identification number of the card reader 1 stored in the storage unit 9 with the identification number of the credit settlement terminal 11 stored in the storage unit 12. If they do not match, information indicating that they do not match is transmitted to a server device (not shown). The unique identification information stored in each storage unit is used for mutual authentication between the card reader 1 and the credit settlement terminal 11 on which the card reader 1 is mounted, for example, in the manufacturing process of the credit settlement terminal 11. Are associated with a pair.

  A payment processing system is configured by the credit payment terminal 11 on which the card reader 1 is mounted and a server device (not shown).

  The difference from the first embodiment is that a transmission / reception unit 8 for transmitting / receiving information to / from the credit settlement terminal 11 is provided instead of the transmission unit 6 of the card reader 1, and each of the card reader 1 and the credit settlement terminal 11 includes This is the point that a storage unit for storing unique identification information and a control unit for controlling each device by comparing these unique identification information are provided.

  Hereinafter, the card reader 1, the credit payment terminal 11, and the payment processing system of the present embodiment will be described.

  First, the operation of the card reader 1 when the credit settlement terminal 11 is turned on will be described.

  When the power of the credit settlement terminal 11 is turned on, the control unit 10 of the card reader 1 acquires identification information from the storage unit 9 and the storage unit 12 of the credit settlement terminal 11, compares them, and they match. If it does not match, it is determined that it has been removed from the legitimate credit payment terminal 11 and improved for skimming and attached to another credit payment terminal 11. All the stored information of 9 is erased and the operation as the card reader 1 is disabled.

  As described above, when the authentication result does not match, the card reader 1 is obtained from a certain credit settlement terminal 11 by a person who intends to perform skimming by having the function of erasing the contents of the storage unit 9. In order to analyze the communication protocol 1 and the like, when connected to a circuit corresponding to the pseudo credit payment terminal 11, the authentication result becomes inconsistent and the contents of its own storage unit 9 are erased. This makes analysis impossible and makes skimming difficult.

  Next, an operation of the credit settlement terminal 11 when the credit settlement terminal 11 is turned on will be described.

  When the power of the credit settlement terminal 11 is turned on, the control unit 13 of the credit settlement terminal 11 acquires identification information from the storage unit 12 and the storage unit 9 of the card reader 1, compares them, and they match. If this is not the case, the normal payment processing operation is continued, and if it does not match, an unauthorized card reader 1 that is not a regular card reader 1 is attached and a message to that effect is sent to the server device. It should be noted that the fact that the unauthorized card reader 1 is attached may be displayed on a display unit (not shown) provided in the credit settlement terminal 11, and this prevents skimming. it can.

  As described above, since the card reader 1 and the credit settlement terminal 11 equipped with the card reader 1 have an authentication function, replacement of the card reader 1 for skimming can be detected and skimming can be prevented. it can.

(Embodiment 3)
In the present embodiment, the same parts as those in the first embodiment are denoted by the same reference numerals, and detailed description thereof is omitted. In the present embodiment, in a payment processing system including a plurality of credit payment terminals 11 and one server device, information indicating that the above-described unauthorized card reader 1 is attached from one credit payment terminal 11 to the server device. The operation of the payment processing system when transmitted is described.

  FIG. 4 shows an outline of the payment processing system. In FIG. 4, reference numeral 21 denotes a server device that manages settlement processing, and is connected to each credit settlement terminal 11 installed in each store 22 via a communication network 23.

  Regarding the encryption of information by the encryption unit 5 provided in the card reader 1 mounted on the credit payment terminal 11, the storage unit 9 of the card reader 1 and the storage unit 12 of the credit payment terminal 11 have a plurality of corresponding ones. Pattern encryption means are stored, and one corresponding encryption means is selected.

  When the server device 21 receives information indicating that the unauthorized card reader 1 as shown in the second embodiment is attached from the credit settlement terminal 11 of the store A, the server device performs encryption / decryption that is currently selected. For the credit settlement terminals 11 of stores B, C, and D other than the credit settlement terminal 11 of the store A that has sent information that the unauthorized card reader 1 is attached, Information specifying an encryption means different from the encryption means whose security has been broken is transmitted. Then, the credit settlement terminal 11 that has received this information and the card reader 1 mounted thereon select and set an encryption means that is different from the selected encryption means.

  Explaining the above with an example, a plurality of credit settlement terminals 11 connected to the server device 21 store three patterns of encryption means A, B, and C, and currently all credit settlements are performed. Assume that the encryption means A is selected in the terminal 11. When the server device 21 receives information indicating that the unauthorized card reader 1 has been attached from one credit settlement terminal 11, the server device 21 has been compromised by the currently selected encryption means A. The credit settlement terminal 11 other than the credit settlement terminal 11 that has sent the information that the unauthorized card reader 1 is attached is instructed to change the encryption means to B, and receives this command. The credit settlement terminal 11 and the card reader 1 mounted thereon change the encryption means to B. As an example of encryption, there is an example in which the RSA method is used as an encryption method and a plurality of key data A, B, and C are provided.

  As described above, even if a certain credit settlement terminal 11 is damaged by skimming, an instruction to change the encryption unit is issued from the server device 21 to the other credit settlement terminal 11 via the communication network 23. By changing, it is possible to cope with other credit settlement terminals 11 being skimmed by the same means.

  Although the credit settlement terminal 11 has been described as an example in the present embodiment, the present invention is not limited to this, and any information terminal that has the card reader 1 and is connected to the server device 21 via the communication network 23. It can be applied to equipment.

  According to the card reader of the present invention, since the output portion of the magnetic head, the decryption portion, and the input portion of the encryption portion are integrally molded, the magnetic head from which unencrypted information is transmitted to the encryption portion. Skimming in the communication path can be prevented, and it is useful for preventing skimming of a credit card payment processing terminal (CAT), a POS register device having a credit card payment function, and the like.

The block diagram which shows the outline of the state by which the card reader which can read the magnetic card in Embodiment 1 was mounted in the credit payment terminal The figure which shows the outline of the card reader which integrally molded the output part of the magnetic head in Embodiment 1, the input part of a decoding part, and an encryption part. The block diagram which shows the outline of the state in which the card reader which can read the magnetic card in Embodiment 2 is mounted in the credit payment terminal The figure which shows the outline | summary of the payment processing system in Embodiment 3. (A) A perspective view of a conventional credit payment terminal (b) An exploded perspective view of a conventional credit payment terminal The figure which shows the conventional card reader A block diagram showing an outline of a state in which a card reader capable of reading a conventional magnetic card is mounted on a credit settlement terminal

Explanation of symbols

1 Card reader 2 Resin (physically concealed part)
DESCRIPTION OF SYMBOLS 3 Magnetic head 4 Demodulation part 5 Encryption part 6 Transmission part 7 Reception part 8 Transmission / reception part 9 Memory | storage part (card reader)
10 Control unit (card reader)
11 credit settlement terminal 12 storage unit (credit settlement terminal)
13 Control unit (Credit payment terminal)
15 Upper case (Credit payment terminal)
16 Lower case (Credit payment terminal)
17 Control Circuit 18 Printer 19 Opening Seal 20 Magnetic Card 21 Server Device 22 Store 23 Communication Network

Claims (7)

A magnetic head for reading magnetic information of a magnetic card; a demodulator for demodulating information read by the magnetic head; an encryption unit for encrypting information demodulated by the demodulator; and a communication unit for communicating with an external device A card reader in which at least an output portion of the magnetic head, an input portion of the demodulation unit, and an encryption unit are integrally molded with resin. A magnetic head for reading magnetic information of a magnetic card; a demodulator for demodulating information read by the magnetic head; an encryption unit for encrypting information demodulated by the demodulator; and a communication unit for communicating with an external device A card reader in which at least an output part of the magnetic head, an input part of the demodulator and an encryption part are concealed by a cover. The card reader according to claim 1 or 2, wherein the card reader is installed in a payment terminal having identification information.
The card reader is
A storage unit for storing identification information of the card reader itself;
A card reader comprising: a control unit that compares the identification information of the settlement terminal and the identification information of the card reader and erases the stored contents of the storage unit if they do not match. 4. The card reader according to claim 3, wherein a program for operating the card reader, read information, and the like are stored in the storage unit, and the storage unit becomes inoperable when the stored contents of the storage unit are erased. A magnetic head for reading magnetic information on a magnetic card;
A demodulator that demodulates information read by the magnetic head;
An encryption unit for encrypting the information demodulated by the demodulation unit;
A storage unit for storing unique identification information;
A communication unit that communicates with an external device,
A payment terminal equipped with a card reader in which at least the output part of the magnetic head, the input part of the demodulator and the encryption part are integrally molded with resin or concealed by a cover,
The payment terminal is
A storage unit for storing identification information of the payment terminal itself;
A payment terminal comprising: a control unit that compares the identification information of the payment terminal and the identification information of the card reader and transmits information indicating a mismatch when the identification information does not match to the server device. A magnetic head for reading magnetic information on a magnetic card;
A demodulator that demodulates information read by the magnetic head;
An encryption unit for encrypting the information demodulated by the demodulation unit;
A storage unit for storing unique identification information and encryption information;
A communication unit that communicates with an external device,
A card reader in which at least an output part of the magnetic head, an input part of the demodulator and an encryption part are integrally molded with a resin or concealed by a cover;
The payment terminal equipped with the card reader, and a server device connected to the payment terminal via a communication network,
The payment terminal has a storage unit for storing its identification information and encryption information;
A controller that compares the identification information of the payment terminal and the identification information of the card reader and transmits information indicating that they do not match to the server device if they do not match,
Based on the information from the server device that has received the information indicating the mismatch, the encryption information stored in the storage unit of the card reader and the encryption stored in the storage unit of the payment terminal Payment processing system that can change information. The payment processing system according to claim 6, wherein the encryption information stored in the storage unit of the card reader and the encryption information stored in the storage unit of the payment terminal are associated with each other.

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