JP2003110552A - Card authentication system, information recording card, and card authenticating method - Google Patents

Abstract

PROBLEM TO BE SOLVED: To prevent the forgery of an information recording card by enciphering data to be used for authentication in a card authentication system. SOLUTION: In the card authentication system composed of the information recording card storing identification data for identifying a user and a first cryptographic key and an authentication terminal, which has a connection part capable of loading this information recording card, for outputting an authentication request to the information recording card, the authentication terminal transmits an authentication request containing a second cryptographic key generated at random through the connection part to the information recording card and afterwards, in response to the authentication request, the information recording card enciphers the identification data a plurality of times by using the first and second cryptographic keys and returns data for authentication generated by such enciphering processing to the connection part of the authentication terminal.

Description

Detailed Description of the Invention

[0001]

BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION 1. Field of the Invention The present invention relates to a card authentication system, and more particularly to a card authentication system for authenticating information recorded on an information recording medium such as a magnetic card using an encryption key.

[0002]

2. Description of the Related Art In cash cards and credit cards, specific fixed data is recorded in advance using a magnetic card or the like, and at the time of card authentication, the fixed data is read out and collated with the data managed by the card company. By doing so, the card is authenticated.

Further, in the IC card, the password is stored in advance and the collation process is performed in the card. I
When the C card is attached to the terminal and the password is entered from the terminal, the entered password is read into the IC card, and the entered password and the password previously stored in the IC card are authenticated in the IC card. Performs and returns the authentication result to the terminal. In addition, in an authentication system using a smart card, PIN (Personal Identificat
Ion number) is input, authentication is performed as to whether the PIN entered on the smart card is correct, and the authentication result is returned to the terminal.

Further, Japanese Patent Application Laid-Open No. 6-40189 discloses that
In order to prevent counterfeiting and falsification of cards, a concealing layer that does not transmit visible light and a hologram layer are laminated in this order on the printed information printed on a card substrate such as a cash card and irradiated with infrared light. Then, the card and the authentication method for reading the print information which cannot be visually inspected to identify the individual card are shown.

Further, in Japanese Patent Laid-Open No. 11-212459, the encrypted secret information is decrypted, raster data is created and then saved, the created raster data is printed, and then the print information is read to read the raster data. Has been created and the two raster data are compared with each other to improve the confidentiality and security when the data is printed and compared.

[0006]

However, in the conventional magnetic card in which fixed data is simply recorded, it is necessary to make a card reader capable of reading the fixed data or to take out the fixed data from the card and duplicate the card. Is easy, and it cannot be said that sufficient security measures are taken into consideration for card forgery.

Further, in the conventional IC card, since the password is authenticated by the IC card itself, if the result of authentication OK is returned to the terminal regardless of the password read by the forged IC card, it is always easy. There is a problem that the authentication is lost. Even in the conventional authentication system using a smart card, if the smart card is forged in the same way and the result of the authentication is returned no matter what PIN is input, the security is easily broken.

Even if a card as disclosed in Japanese Patent Laid-Open No. 6-40189 is used, if the card reader is modified, it cannot be determined whether the card is an unauthorized card. Further, in the device described in Japanese Patent Application Laid-Open No. 11-212459, since the authentication depends on the print data verification device side, if this device is tampered with so that it is always authenticated, the card and verification device If both are abused, this authentication system makes no sense.

Therefore, the present invention has been made in consideration of the above circumstances, and by encrypting the data used for authentication, the card cannot be illegally copied or counterfeited, which is safe and secure. It is an object of the present invention to provide a card authentication system that enables reliable transactions.

[0010]

According to the present invention, there is provided an information recording card storing identification data for identifying a user and a first encryption key, and a connecting portion to which the information recording card can be mounted. A card authentication system comprising an authentication terminal that outputs an authentication request to an information recording card, wherein the authentication terminal records an authentication request including a randomly generated second encryption key via a connection unit. After transmitting to the card, the information recording card responds to the authentication request,
The identification data is encrypted a plurality of times by using the first and second encryption keys, and the authentication data generated by this encryption process is returned to the connection unit of the authentication terminal. It provides a card authentication system that does. According to this, since the information recorded on the information recording card cannot be easily taken out, the information recording card cannot be illegally copied or forged.

Further, the present invention comprises a storage section for storing user-specific information, a control section for writing or reading information to and from the storage section, and a connection section for inputting / outputting information to / from an external device. The storage unit stores identification data for identifying a user, a first encryption key made up of at least two keys issued only to the user, and a control program for performing public key encryption processing. When the control unit confirms that the authentication request including the second encryption key different from the first encryption key given through the connection unit is received, the control unit activates the control program to identify the identification data. With the second encryption key and the first encryption key stored in the storage unit to generate authentication data, and output the authentication data to an external device via the connection unit. Information recording card equipped with It is intended to provide. According to this
Since the storage unit cannot be accessed directly from an external device, the information in the storage unit of the information recording card cannot be illegally retrieved or analogized.Therefore, it is impossible to illegally copy or forge the information recording card. Can not.

Further, the present invention is an information recording card,
A method of authenticating a card authentication system comprising an authentication terminal to which this information recording card can be attached, wherein the authentication terminal is randomly generated when the information recording card is attached to the authentication terminal. The authentication request including the encryption key is transmitted to the information recording card, and when the information recording card receives the authentication request, the identification recorded in advance and encrypted by encrypting predetermined user identification information Data is encrypted a plurality of times using a first encryption key recorded in advance and the second encryption key, and the authentication data generated by this encryption process is sent to the authentication terminal. In response, the authentication terminal pairs the returned authentication data in advance with a first decryption key that is previously stored therein and that forms a pair with the first encryption key, and the second encryption key. With the second decryption key Authentication is performed by decrypting using the third decryption key generated when the identification data is created and stored in the authentication terminal, and by collating the decrypted data with the user identification information. An authentication method for a card authentication system is provided. According to this, since the encryption key included in the authentication request sent from the authentication terminal and the authentication data sent from the information recording card have different contents for each authentication procedure, the information recording card and the authentication terminal send and receive. Even if the data is intercepted, it is not possible to carry out illegal transactions using the forged information recording card, and it is possible to carry out commercial transactions safely and surely.

Further, according to the present invention, there is provided a storage section for storing user-specific information, identification data for identifying a user, and a first encryption key consisting of at least two keys issued only to the user. A program of an information recording card having a control unit for writing or reading information to or from a storage unit and a connection unit for inputting or outputting information to or from an external device, the program being provided via the connection unit. The function of causing a control unit to confirm that an authentication request including a second encryption key different from the first encryption key has been received,
Of generating the authentication data by encrypting it using the encryption key of No. 1 and the first encryption key stored in the storage unit, and a function of outputting the generated authentication data to an external device via the connection unit. And a program of an information recording card for making a computer realize.

A program of an authentication terminal for authenticating the information recording card, wherein when the information recording card is attached to the computer, the information request including the randomly generated second encryption key is recorded. A function of transmitting to the card, a first encryption key prerecorded in the information recording card, and identification data generated by encrypting predetermined user identification information inside the information recording card, and the second encryption key.
The function of receiving the authentication data generated by performing the encryption process a plurality of times using the encryption key from the information recording card, and the received authentication data is stored in advance in the inside and A first decryption key paired with the first encryption key, a second decryption key paired with the second encryption key, and a second decryption key generated when the identification data was created and stored inside the authentication terminal. A program for decrypting using the third decryption key and realizing a function of collating the decrypted data with the user identification information is provided.

Further, the program is a program of a card issuing terminal for issuing an information recording card for each user, and the user specifying information inputted in advance in the computer is encrypted by using the randomly generated first encryption key. Function to generate encrypted user data, a second encryption key that is randomly generated and consists of at least two keys, the user identification information, the encrypted user data, and an encryption executed in the information recording card. And a function of storing the user identification information, and a function of writing the computerized software to the information recording card, a first compound key and a second compound key paired with the first encryption key and the second encryption key, respectively. It provides a program for. Further, the present invention also provides a computer-readable recording medium in which the above program is recorded.

[0016]

BEST MODE FOR CARRYING OUT THE INVENTION In the present invention, from the viewpoint of improving security, it is preferable that the first encryption key stored in the information recording card comprises at least two different encryption keys. Further, it is preferable that the second encryption key included in the authentication request transmitted by the authentication terminal is composed of information that is different every time the previous transmission is performed.

Further, the identification data recorded on the information recording card is data obtained by encrypting predetermined user identification information with a third encryption key, and the authentication terminal performs the authentication process of the information recording card. An authenticating unit for executing the authentication, the authenticating unit including the user identification information, a first decryption key paired with the first encryption key, and a third decryption key paired with the third encryption key.
And a second decoding key and a third decoding key that form a pair with the first decoding key and the second decoding key. May be used for decoding, and a judgment unit for judging whether or not the decoded data and the user identification information match.

Further, the authentication terminal includes user identification information, identification data obtained by encrypting the user identification information, a randomly generated first encryption key, and card type data.
A control program for encryption processing is written on the information recording card, and the user identification information, a first decryption key paired with the first encryption key, and a third decryption key paired with the third encryption key. A card issuing unit for storing the decryption key of No. 3 in the storage unit for each user may be further provided.

The encryption key used in the present invention is 3
Although there are types, it is preferable in terms of security that the first encryption key is composed of two or more encryption keys. As the number of keys increases, the encryption process takes longer, but the security improves. The key used in this invention is
It is used in public key cryptosystems such as RSA, and is composed of an encryption key and a decryption key that are paired with each other.

Therefore, the first, second and third encryption keys are paired with the first, second and third decryption keys respectively, but like the ordinary public key encryption system, they are encrypted. It is assumed that the key and the decryption key are stored in different places. In the following embodiments, the first encryption key is represented by encryption keys CL and DL, and the second encryption key is represented by encryption key B-.
L, and the third cryptographic key is cryptographic key A-L. Further, the first decryption key is represented by decryption keys C-U and D-U,
The second decryption key is represented as a decryption key BU, and the third decryption key is represented as a decryption key AU.

Here, the first encryption key (CL, DL)
Is stored in an information recording card, and the first decryption key (C-U, D-U) paired with the information recording card is installed at a place where a portion for performing authentication processing of an authentication terminal is installed, for example, a card issuing company or Stored in a trusted CA database. Second
Encryption key B-L is the only key that is passed from the authentication terminal to the information recording card, and the second decryption key B-L that is paired therewith.
U is temporarily used only in the certification terminal and is not stored in the database of the certification authority. Third encryption key AL
And the third decryption key A-U are generated to generate the user identification data, and only the third decryption key A-U is stored in the database of the certificate authority. Third encryption key A
-L is used to encrypt the user identification information, and is discarded and not stored after the user identification data is generated.

In the present invention, the "user specifying information" means a name, address, number, card number, etc. for specifying the user, and data provided when the user applies for card issuance and card issuance. It refers to the information given at times. The “identification data” is data (hereinafter, DA) obtained by encrypting the information to be recorded on the information recording card among the user identification information by using a randomly generated encryption key.
(Denoted as T-1).

The authentication terminal is generally installed in a store that purchases merchandise, but in the following embodiments of the present invention, a portion corresponding to the connection unit of the authentication terminal is installed in the store, and the authentication unit for authenticating the card is It is preferable that the card issuance company or a certificate authority is installed, and further, the card issuance unit is also installed in the card issuance company. In this case, the part corresponding to the connection part of the authentication terminal is a terminal device (reference numeral 5-4 in FIG. 7) such as a so-called card reader, and a device installed in a card issuing company having a terminal device and an authentication part. And are connected via a communication line.

The operation of the card authentication system, the information recording card, the authentication terminal and the operation of the card authentication method described above are realized by a program for causing the processing required for authentication to function. The subject of the invention may be the program itself or a computer-readable recording medium storing the program.

First, in the present invention, the recording medium may be a memory necessary for the processing to be executed by the microcomputer, for example, a program medium such as a ROM, or an external storage device such as a program reading device. It may be a program medium that is provided and can be read by inserting a recording medium therein.
In either case, the stored program may be directly accessed by the microcomputer or executed, or in any case, the reading program reads the program and the read program is the microcomputer. The program may be loaded into the program storage area of and the program may be executed by the microcomputer. It is assumed that this reading program is stored in the main body device in advance.

Here, the program medium is a recording medium which can be separated from the main body, and is a tape system such as a magnetic tape or a cassette tape, a magnetic disk such as an FD (flexible disk) or HD (hard disk), or a CD.
-Disk systems for optical disks such as ROM / MO / MD / DVD, card systems such as IC cards (including memory cards) / optical cards, or mask ROM, EPROM, EE
It may be a medium that fixedly carries the program, including a semiconductor memory such as a PROM or a flash ROM.

Further, since the present invention has a system configuration that can be connected to a communication network including the Internet, it may be a medium that carries the program fluidly so as to download the program from the communication network. When the program is downloaded from the communication network in this way, the download program may be stored in the apparatus main body in advance, or may be installed from another recording medium. The content stored in the recording medium is not limited to the program and may be data.

Next, in the present invention, the program itself is
It may be the process itself executed by the microcomputer, or it may be captured by or access to a communication network including the Internet. Further, it may be a result of processing in the authentication terminal, that is, a generated one, based on the loaded program.

The present invention will be described in detail below based on the embodiments shown in the drawings. The present invention is not limited to this.

<Structure of Information Recording Card> FIG. 1 is a schematic explanatory view of the structure of the information recording card of the present invention (hereinafter referred to as a card) and the data to be input / output.

In FIG. 1, a card 1-1 is a card having a portability similar to that of a generally used credit card, and mainly has a CPU 1-
3, an IC chip 1-2 including a memory 1-4 and an I / O interface section 1-7 is mounted. CPU 1-3
Is a so-called microcomputer including a ROM, a RAM, an arithmetic circuit, a communication control unit, etc.
Or based on the control program stored in RAM,
It executes processing such as authentication, encryption, and data communication.

The memory 1-4 is composed of a writable and readable semiconductor recording element such as a RAM, and stores user-specific information such as authentication data and an encryption key, and other data such as the type of card and encryption software. It is a thing.

The I / O interface section 1-7 is a CPU
It is composed of a communication control unit 1-3 and some terminals for performing data communication between an external authentication terminal (a terminal device described later) into which the card 1-1 is inserted. However, in the case of non-contact communication, a dedicated IC chip having a wireless communication function may be used instead of the terminal. Request information 1-5 is input from an external authentication terminal via the I / O interface unit 1-7, and a processing result 1-6 such as authentication is output to the external authentication terminal.

In such a configuration, only the CPU 1-3 is supposed to write data to the memory 1-4 in the card and read data from the memory. That is, the logic circuit is designed so that the external authentication terminal can access the CPU 1-3 through the I / O interface unit 1-7, but cannot directly access the memory 1-4.

<Data Recorded on Card> FIG. 2 shows an embodiment of the contents of data stored in the memory 1-4. Reference numeral 2-1 is a data storage area, in which an encryption key (CL) 2-2, an encryption key (DL) 2-3, encrypted user data (DAT-1) 2- 4, unencrypted user data (DAT-2) 2-5, data representing card type (DAT-3) 2-6, program 2-7 for executing encryption processing, this data storage area 2
At least seven pieces of information, that is, a write flag 2-8 for determining whether data can be written in -1 are stored.

Here, after all the data other than the write flag 2-8 has been written once, it cannot be rewritten or overwritten except for the complete initialization process. For example, when an initialization instruction is given as the request 1-5, the CPU 1-3 initializes (erases) the data in the memory 1-4 and sets the write flag 2-8 to zero. Then, when the write command is given next time, if the write flag 2-8 is zero, the write flag 2-8 is set to 1 after writing predetermined data. That is,
When the write flag 2-8 is 1, the CPU 1-3 returns the error result 1-6 even if the write command is given,
Do not perform write processing. Further, the write flag 2-8 is rewritten to zero only when an initialization instruction is given, and is not rewritten by other instructions.

As described above, once the data is written on the card, the data cannot be overwritten.
By writing the data in the card, it becomes impossible to illegally decrypt the internal data. Further, even if the initialization process is illegally performed, all the data in the memory 1-4 is erased, and even if the process of writing arbitrary data to the card after the initialization is performed, The card cannot be used illegally because it has no relationship.

As the encryption software 2-7 and the two encryption keys shown in FIG. 2, those used in the public key encryption system currently used (for example, RSA) can be used. Further, in the present invention, the encryption key stored in the card is two encryption keys (C
-L) 2-2 and (D-L) 2-3, which are stored in the memory 1-4 of the card. As a key for decryption, a key different from this encryption key is used, and two decryption keys (C-U) and (D-U) 4-2 are used as shown in FIG. 4 described later.
0 is stored in the database 4-5 of the card company. These encryption key and decryption key are a pair of keys.

Requests 1-5 sent from the authentication terminal to the card 1-1 are "card initialization request", "data write request", "card type data read request",
It consists of five requests, "user data request" and "authentication request". Conversely, the result 1-6 transmitted from the card 1-1 to the authentication terminal 3-1 is data having a predetermined return value for each of the above five requests.

First, the "card initialization request" is to initialize all data in the memory 1-4 of the card and clear the write flag 2-8 (set zero). As a result, data corresponding to “success” or “failure” is transferred from the card 1-1 to the terminal 3-1.
Will be replied to.

The "data write request" is a request for sending data to be written in the card, and the CPU 1-3 of the card which has received this request sends the data to the memory 1-4.
After writing to, set write flag 2-8 to 1,
"Success" or "Failure" as a result of this request
To the authentication terminal 3-1. The data sent to the card together with this request include the encryption key CL, the encryption key DL, the encrypted user data DAT-1, the user data DAT-2, and the encryption software 2-7 as shown in FIG. , Card type data DAT-3.

In the "card type data request", the card type data DAT-3 recorded on the card is sent to the authentication terminal 3-
This request is for requesting a reply to the No. 1 side, and the CPU 1-3 of the card that has received this request returns the card type data DAT-3 to the authentication terminal 3-1.

The "user data request" is a request for requesting the transmission of the user data DAT-2 recorded on the card to the authentication terminal 3-1 side, and the CPU1-of the card that has received this request. 3 returns the user data DAT-2 to the authentication terminal 3-1. Here, the user data DAT-2 is, for example, a user-specific card number, name, expiration date, and the like.

The "authentication request" is the encryption of the user data DAT-1 recorded on the card and the authentication data DAT-.
4 is a request for a transmission request, and the CPU 1-3 of the card that has received this request performs predetermined encryption processing to generate authentication data DAT-4, and sends it back to the authentication terminal 3-1. This encryption processing is performed using the encryption software 2-7 recorded on the card. The data sent with the authentication request includes the encryption key (BL) 3-3,
The CPU 1-3 has three encryption keys (BL) 3-3, (C
-L) 2-2, (D-L) 2-3 are used to encrypt the user data DAT-1 (2-4) to generate authentication data DAT-4.

<Outline of Authentication Processing> FIG. 3 is a schematic explanatory view of the processing executed between the information storage card 1-1 and the authentication terminal 3-1 in the present invention. Authentication terminal 3-1
The (terminal device) is a computer having a function similar to that of a so-called personal computer, and includes a microcomputer including a CPU, a ROM, a RAM, etc., a card interface section for inserting the card 1-1 and inputting / outputting data,
A card information control unit that writes and reads authentication data and the like to and from a card, and an information recording unit that stores data and the like necessary for authentication processing. Also, the authentication terminal 3-1
May be configured to supply power to the card 1-1, and in this case, power is sent to the card via the mutual interface unit. When power is not supplied, the battery may be built in the card 1-1.

In FIG. 3, the authentication terminal 3-1 has the authentication data request 3-including the encryption key (BL) 3-3.
After sending 2 (authentication request) to card 1-1, card 1
CP from -1 to sending back authentication data DAT-4
A series of processing of U1-3 (steps S31 to S36) is shown.

When the card 1-1 is inserted into the authentication terminal 3-1, the authentication terminal request 3-1 and the data of the encryption key 3-3 are transmitted from the authentication terminal 3-1 to the card 1-1. When these data are received, CP of card 1-1
U1-3 activates the program of the authentication process (step S31). Next, the CPU 1-3 reads the encrypted user data 2-4 and the encryption software 2-7 in the memory 1-4 (step S32).

Next, the CPU 1-3 causes the encryption software 2-
The encryption process is executed using 7 (step S33).
At this time, the read data (DAT1-1) 2-4
Is encrypted using the received encryption key (BL) 3-3. This encrypted data is DAT-1 '.
Further, the CPU 1-3 encrypts the data DAT-1 ′ encrypted in step S33 using the encryption key (CL) 2-2 stored in the memory 1-4 (step S34). . This encrypted data is DAT-1 ″.

Further, the CPU 1-3 is step S34.
The data DAT-1 ″ encrypted in (1) is encrypted using the encryption key (DL) 2-3 stored in the memory 1-4 (step S35). Steps S34 and S35
Also, the same encryption software 2-7 is used.

As described above, the data 2-4 read from the memory 1-4 has three encryption keys (BL) 3-3.
The data generated as a result of being encrypted by (C-L) 2-2 and (D-L) 2-3 is the authentication data (DAT-
4) is transmitted to the authentication terminal 3-1 (step S3).
6).

By performing the above-described three encryption processes, it becomes almost impossible to decipher the data contained in the card, and it is difficult to illegally copy the card. This is for the following reasons. In order to illegally copy the card, the five data (2-2, 2-3, 2-4, 2-5, 2-6) recorded in the memory 1-4 of the card and the encryption software are used. It is necessary to decipher 2-7.

Of these, encryption software 2-7, card type data (DAT-3) 2-6, user data (DA
Since T-2) 2-5 can be generally known, it can be easily copied. However, the three pieces of data of the encrypted user data (DAT-1) 2-4, the encryption key (CL) 2-2, and the encryption key (DL) 2-3 are directly accessed from the outside to the memory 1-4. You cannot do it, so you cannot know it from the outside. Therefore, in order to decode these three data, it is necessary to carry out a trial and error test by using the data given to the card from the outside and the data (return value) read from the card.

For example, when an authentication request is issued to the card, an appropriate encryption key BL is given, the authentication data DAT-4 returned as a reply to this is read, and these data (BL, L, It is necessary to decode three data (DAT-1, CL, DL) from DAT-4). If the encrypted user data (DAT-1) 2-4 of the three data is already known, the data DAT-1 ′ after encryption using the encryption key BL is performed.
Then, by using the read authentication data DAT-4, the encryption key (CL) 2-2 and the encryption key (D-L) 2-3 are tried by trying all combinations of these data.
You have to decipher the two.

Here, since the encryption is performed three times inside the card, the number of combinations of the encryption keys increases exponentially, and the encryption is almost impossible in real time. Further, since the encrypted data DAT-1 is used as the user data, the user data is recorded in the card as random number data instead of a fixed format, and the user data DA
Decoding T-1 is difficult.

The above is the authentication terminal 3-1 to the card 1-1.
Is a flow of a series of processing in which an authentication request is issued to and the authentication data DAT-4 encrypted on the card side is transmitted to the authentication terminal side 3-1. As described above, since the encryption processing is performed in the card 1-1, the data required for the authentication cannot be duplicated and the security is ensured.

<Card Issuing Process> Next, an embodiment of the card issuing process in a card issuing company that issues cards will be described. FIG. 4 shows an outline of the configuration of the card issuing terminal installed in the card company according to the present invention and a flowchart of the card issuing process. In the present invention, the card issuing company is responsible for creating the user data, writing the user data and the like to the card, issuing the card, and managing the decryption key.

The card issuing company is equipped with a card issuing terminal 4-1. The card issuing terminal 4-1 is mainly a database 4
-4 and a card issuing unit 4-3. The card issuing unit 4-3 includes a microcomputer including a CPU, ROM, RAM, I / O controller, etc., an input device, an output device, etc., and is stored in the RAM, ROM, etc. to create a key for authentication. This is the part that issues cards using encryption software.

The database 4-4 stores the information unique to the user of the card holder, and the personal information 4 such as the user's name and address is stored in the storage area 4-5 for each user, for example. -7, decryption key (AU) 4-
13, two decryption keys (C-U) and (D-U) 4-20
Is stored.

From the user 4-2, the card application form 4-6
When personal information 4-7 such as name and address is sent to the card company by mail, the card company 4-1 inputs this information into the card issuing terminal 4-1 and performs the card issuing process. .

Here, the personal information 4-7 is stored in the database 4
-4 is stored in the storage area 4-5 for each individual, and part of the information such as name and address is given to the card issuing unit 4-3 as user data 4-8.
Further, the card issuing unit 4-3 generates the card medium itself for the applicant and a user identification number (hereinafter referred to as a card number) 4-9.

The data 4-10 shown in FIG. 4 indicates the data written to the card including the card number 4-9 and the user data 4-8. That is, the user data (DAT-2) 2-5 shown in FIG.
-10 is the same data.

The card issuing unit 4-3 mainly performs the four processes (steps S41 to S44) shown in FIG. User data (DAT-1) encrypted here 2-
4, user data (DAT-2) 2-5, card type data (DAT-3) 2-6, encryption key (CL, D-
L) 5 data of 2-2 and 2-3 and encryption software 2
Before performing the processing S44 of writing -7 and 7 to the card, the random key issuing processing for each user (steps S41 and S43) and the encryption processing of the data 4-10 (step S42) are performed.

First, in step S41, data 4
Random key issue processing for each user for encrypting -10 is performed. At this time, the encryption key (AL) 4-12 and the decryption key (AU) 4-13 used at the time of authentication are generated. The decryption key (AU) 4-13 is stored in the user-specific storage area 4-5.

Next, in step S42, the data 4-10 is encrypted using the encryption key (AL) 4-12. By this encryption processing, user data (D
AT-1) 2-4 is generated. After this encryption, the encryption key AL (4-12) is discarded to ensure security.

Next, in step S43, a random key issuing process for each user for generating the encryption keys (CL, DL) written in the card is performed. Here, at least two decryption keys (CU,
D-U) 4-20 and the encryption key (C-L,
D-L) 2-2, 2-3 are issued. These two decryption keys (CU, DU) are, as shown in FIG.
Since it is used for the authentication processing in the card issuing company, it is stored in the user-specific storage area 4-5. On the other hand, the two encryption keys (CL, DL) 2-2 and 2-3 are written on the card as they are.

Further, as the data to be written on the card, there are card type data (DAT-3) 2-6 and encryption software 2-7. These are unique to the card company and are previously stored in the card issuing unit. The stored data and software may be used.

The above steps S41, S42 and S43
After the processing of, the five data (2-2, 2
-3, 2-4, 2-5, 2-6) and encryption software 2-
And 7 are written on the card (step S44). Thereafter, the created card 4-22 is sent to the card applicant by mail or the like.

As described above, at the card issuing company,
Since the encryption and decryption keys are issued and managed, it is almost impossible to illegally copy the card. For example, even if the database 4-4 of the card company is illegally accessed from the outside and user data is leaked to the outside, the leaked database is different because the encryption key and the decryption key are different in the public key cryptosystem. The encryption key AL cannot be generated only by obtaining the decryption key in 4-4.
Therefore, the user data DAT-1 cannot be issued because there is no encryption key A-L, and the encryption keys C-L and D-L stored in the card are also undecipherable. It is impossible to duplicate a card.

If the user loses the card,
The card issuer will reissue all keys as soon as they are contacted for loss. At this time, steps S41 and S
In 43, a key different from the encryption key and decryption key when issued last time is issued, so even if the lost card is used illegally, after the key is reissued, the key issuer's authentication process does not match the key. Is detected, authentication is not performed correctly, and unauthorized use can be prevented.

<Authentication Process When Using Card> Next, the authentication process when the user uses the card in the store will be described. FIG. 5 is a conceptual diagram of the overall configuration of the authentication system of the present invention, FIG. 6 is a schematic processing flowchart of the terminal device installed in the store, and FIG. 7 is an explanatory diagram of the data flow and processing contents of the authentication system of the present invention. Show.

Here, the user 12-2 is in the store 12-3.
Go to, and the card issued by the card issuing company 12-1 1-
Consider the case of using 1 to purchase a product in the store.

First, as described above, the user 12-2
Makes a card application to the card issuing company 12-1 and the card 1 in which encrypted user data and the like are written
Suppose you have issued -1.

At the store 12-3 where the product is purchased, an authentication device 5-5 of the card issuing company and a terminal device 5-4 connected to the communication line are installed. This terminal device 5
-4 corresponds to the authentication terminal 3-1 shown in FIG. The authentication device 5-5 may be also used as the card issuing terminal 4-1 or may be another device, but the database 4-4 is shared and used.

FIG. 8 shows a terminal device 5-4 of the present invention.
The external view of one Example is shown. For example, terminal device 5
-4 is composed of a POS terminal 8-1 and a card reader 8-2 as shown in FIG. 8, and is connected to an authentication device 5-5 of a card company via a communication line. FIG. 9 shows a schematic diagram of an embodiment of the internal configuration of the card reader 8-2. The card reader 8-2 has a contact portion 8 with the inserted card 1-1.
-3 and an input / output control unit 8-4. The contact portion 8-3 is provided with a plurality of terminals, and includes, for example, a power supply terminal for the card 1-1 and a data transmission / reception terminal.

Next, the outline of the processing of this system will be described with reference to FIG. When the user 12-2 uses the card to purchase the product in the store 12-3, the user 12-2
Gives his card 1-1 to the clerk. The store clerk inserts the card into the terminal device 5-4 installed in the store (step S50). After that, the terminal device confirms the card type (step S51), connects to the card issuing company through the communication circuit, and sends an authentication request to the card issuing company 12-1 (step S52).

Upon receipt of this authentication request, the card issuing company generates an encryption key BL (3-3) for authentication (step S53) and sends it to the terminal device 5-4 of the store (step S54). The terminal device 5-4 uses the encryption key B
When -L is received, an authentication request including this encryption key (BL) 3-3 is output to the card 1-1 (step S5).
5).

Next, the CPU 1-3 of the card creates authentication data (DAT-4) and transfers it to the terminal 5-4 (step S56). The terminal 5-4 collectively transfers the authentication data (DAT-4) and the payment data of the separately input product to the card company (step S).
57). The card company uses the transferred authentication data (DAT-4) and the data stored in the database 4-4 to perform decryption processing for authentication and perform user authentication processing (Fig. 6 Steps S58 to S6
1).

When the card issuing company completes the user authentication, the card issuing company sends the result of the authentication to the terminal device 5-4 of the same store.
(Step S63). Upon receiving the authentication result, the terminal device determines whether the authentication is successful or unsuccessful from the authentication result (step S64). If it fails,
A terminal error is displayed and the process ends (step S65).

If the terminal device 5-4 determines that the user data has succeeded, it sends the user data (DAT-
2) Request 2-5 (step S66). Card 1-
1 sends the user data (DAT-2) to the terminal device 5-4 in response to this request. Terminal device 5-4
However, when the user data (DAT-2) is received (step S67), a receipt is issued and the process is ended (step S68). The above is the general flow of the authentication process when the card is used, centered on the terminal device installed in the store.

Next, the detailed flow of the authentication process when using the card will be described with reference to FIG. When the card 1-1 is inserted into the terminal device 5-4, power is supplied to the card 1-1 via the terminal portion 8-3. After that, when the operator operates the terminal device 5-4 for the authentication process, the card type confirmation process of step S51 is performed on the card 1-1. Here, the CPU 1-3 of the card uses the card type data (DAT-3) 2
-6 is read from the memory 1-4 and the terminal device 5
Reply to -4.

Since the terminal device 5-4 stores in advance information about the card company that can perform the authentication process and information about the card type, the returned card type data (DAT-3) 2-6. By comparing the stored information with the stored information, it is determined whether the inserted card is an authenticable card.

Next, when the card type is correctly verified, the terminal device 5-4 issues an authentication request for starting a transaction to the authentication device 4-1 of the card issuing company via the communication line. And transmits (step S52). At this time, the authentication request data includes data such as card type, transaction type, and store name. The authentication device 5-5 of the card company that has received the authentication request issues a random key (step S53). This random key is issued for each transaction even if the same user. The random keys issued here are the encryption key (B-L) 3-3 and the decryption key (B-U) 5-12, and these keys are provided if the authentication for each transaction is completed. It is discarded and is not stored in the authentication device 5-5 of the card issuing company.

Next, of the issued keys, the encryption key (B-
L) Only 3-3 is the terminal device 5 of the same store 5-1.
-4 is returned (step S54). When receiving the encryption key (BL), the terminal device 5-4 sends the authentication request 3-2 to the card as shown in FIG. 3 (step S55).

Thereafter, the card 1-1 performs the processing shown in FIG. 3 (steps S31 to S36), creates authentication data (DAT-4), and sends it back to the terminal device 5-4 (step S56). ).

Since the payment data (payment amount, payment method (division etc.), product name, store name, etc.) of the product is separately input to the terminal device 5-4 by the operator, the received authentication data (DAT). -4) and the payment data are both transferred to the authentication device 5-5 of the card company via the communication line (step S57).

When the authentication device 5-5 of the card issuing company receives these data, the processing from steps S58 to S61 is performed in order to confirm whether the authentication data (DAT-4) is normal.

First, in step S58, the received authentication data DAT-4 is decrypted for the first time using the decryption key (CU, DU) of the user stored in the database 4-4. do. Here, after the decryption process with the decryption key C-U, the second decryption process with the decryption key D-U is further performed.

Next, the data decrypted in step S58 is decrypted with the decryption key (BU) generated when the random key is issued.
5-12 is used to perform the third decoding (step S59). Further, the data decrypted in step S59 is decrypted for the fourth time by using the decryption key (AU) 4-13 stored in the database 4-4 for each user (step S60). ). By this decryption, the user data (DAT) at the time of card creation shown in FIG.
-2) 4-10 should have been generated.

Therefore, the data generated in step S60 is collated with the user data (DAT-2) of the user stored in the database 4-4 for each user to check whether they match. (Step S6
1).

If they match, it means that the authentication of the user card 1-1 has succeeded, so the authentication device 5-5 of the card company updates the payment data 53 of the user in the database 4-4. The authentication result indicating that the authentication is successful is transferred to the terminal device 5-4 (step S62). On the other hand, if the authentication fails, the result indicating the failure is transferred to the terminal device 5-4. Here, the authentication result includes data indicating success and failure, and details of the failure (reason) in the case of failure, confirmation of payment method / charge, and the like.

Next, when the terminal device 5-4 receives this authentication result, the terminal device 5-4 judges the authentication result as described above (step S64), proceeds to step S65 if unsuccessful, or proceeds to step S66 if successful. The steps S67 and S68 are executed, and the whole authentication process is ended.

In such an authentication process when using the card, the data input / output to / from the terminal device 5-4 is
Card type data DAT-3, authentication data (DAT-
4), the encryption key (BL), the authentication result and the payment data only, but even if these are copied or tapped on the communication line, the authentication itself is not illegally performed. Therefore, even if the terminal device 5-4 itself is connected to a personal computer or the like of an individual user's home and the same authentication processing is performed to purchase a product using a card, unauthorized authentication cannot be performed. You can purchase products safely and securely.

[0093]

According to the present invention, it is difficult to retrieve the data recorded in the card necessary for copying the card, and it is almost impossible to illegally forge the card. In addition, even if the data sent and received via the communication line is stolen during the authentication process when using the card, it is not possible to use the sent and received data alone to carry out illegal transactions such as forgery of the card. You can secure commerce through.

[Brief description of drawings]

FIG. 1 is a schematic configuration diagram of an information recording card of the present invention.

FIG. 2 is an explanatory diagram of an embodiment of data stored in the information recording card of the present invention.

FIG. 3 is a schematic explanatory diagram of a process executed between the authentication terminals of the information recording card of the present invention.

FIG. 4 is an explanatory diagram of a card issuing terminal of the present invention and its issuing processing.

FIG. 5 is a conceptual diagram of the overall configuration of the card authentication system of the present invention.

FIG. 6 is a schematic flowchart of processing of the terminal device of the present invention.

FIG. 7 is an explanatory diagram of a data flow and processing contents of the card authentication system of the present invention.

FIG. 8 is an external view of an embodiment of the terminal device of the present invention.

FIG. 9 is a schematic view of an embodiment of the internal configuration of the card reader of the present invention.

[Explanation of symbols]

1-1 Information recording card 1-2 IC chip 1-3 CPU 1-4 memory 1-5 Request information 1-6 Processing result 1-7 I / O interface section 2-1 Data storage area 2-2 Cryptographic key CL 2-3 Encryption key DL 2-4 Encrypted user data (DAT-1) 2-5 User data (DAT-2) 2-6 Card type data (DAT-3) 2-7 Encryption software 2-8 Write flag 3-1 Authentication terminal 3-2 Authentication request 3-3 Encryption key BL 3-4 Authentication data (DAT-4) 4-1 Card issuing terminal (authentication device) 4-3 Card issuing department 4-4 Database 4-5 Storage area for each user 4-6 Application Form 4-7 Personal information 4-8 User data 4-9 Card number 4-10 data 4-12 Encryption key AL 4-13 Decryption Key AU 4-20 Decryption Keys C-U, D-U 4-22 card 5-4 Terminal device 5-5 Authentication device 5-12 Decryption key 5-23 Payment data 8-1 POS terminal 8-2 Card reader 8-3 Contact part 8-4 Input / output control unit 12-1 Card issuing company 12-2 User 12-3 stores

─────────────────────────────────────────────────── ─── Continuation of front page (51) Int.Cl. ⁷ Identification code FI theme code (reference) H04L 9/08 G06K 19/00 R H04L 9/00 601C F term (reference) 5B017 AA03 BA07 CA05 CA14 5B035 AA13 BB09 BC00 CA11 5B058 CA27 KA01 KA04 KA11 KA35 YA20 5B085 AA08 AE11 AE29 5J104 AA07 AA16 KA01 KA21 NA02 NA35 NA36 NA37

Claims (13)

[Claims] 1. An information recording card storing identification data for identifying a user and a first encryption key, and a connection part to which the information recording card can be attached, and an authentication request to the information recording card. A card authentication system comprising an authentication terminal for outputting the information, the authentication terminal transmitting an authentication request including a randomly generated second encryption key to the information recording card via the connection unit, and thereafter recording the information. In response to the authentication request, the card performs an encryption process on the identification data multiple times using the first and second encryption keys, and authenticates the authentication data generated by this encryption process. A card authentication system characterized by replying to the connection part of the terminal. 2. The card authentication system according to claim 1, wherein the first encryption key stored in the information recording card comprises at least two different encryption keys. 3. The card authentication system according to claim 1, wherein the second encryption key included in the authentication request transmitted by the authentication terminal is composed of different information for each transmission. 4. The identification data recorded on the information recording card is data obtained by encrypting predetermined user identification information with a third encryption key, and the authentication terminal executes authentication processing of the information recording card. And a third decryption key that is paired with the third encryption key, the first identification key that is paired with the first encryption key, and the third identification key that is paired with the third encryption key. Using a storage unit storing the above, and the authentication data returned from the information recording card, using a second decryption key and a third decryption key paired with the first decryption key and the second encryption key. The card authentication system according to claim 1, further comprising: a determination unit that determines whether the decrypted data and the user identification information match. 5. A control program for the authentication terminal to perform user-specific information, identification data obtained by encrypting the user-specific information, a randomly generated first encryption key, card type data, and encryption processing. And the user identification information, the first decryption key paired with the first encryption key, and the third decryption key paired with the third encryption key. The card authentication system according to claim 4, further comprising: a card issuing unit that stores the storage unit in the storage unit for each user. 6. A storage unit that stores user-specific information, and a control unit that writes or reads information to or from the storage unit,
A connection unit for inputting / outputting information to / from an external device is provided, and in the storage unit, identification data for identifying a user and a first encryption key including at least two keys issued only to the user. A control program for performing public key encryption processing is stored, and the control unit receives an authentication request including a second encryption key which is given through a connection unit and is different from the first encryption key. When the confirmation is confirmed, the control program is activated, the identification data is encrypted using the second encryption key and the first encryption key stored in the storage unit, and authentication data is generated, An information recording card having a function of outputting authentication data to an external device via a connection unit. 7. An authentication method of a card authentication system comprising an information recording card and an authentication terminal to which the information recording card can be attached, wherein the authentication is performed when the information recording card is attached to the authentication terminal. The terminal transmits an authentication request including the randomly generated second encryption key to the information recording card, and when the information recording card receives the authentication request, the information is pre-recorded inside and predetermined user identification information. The identification data generated by encrypting is encrypted by performing a plurality of encryption processes using a first encryption key recorded in advance and the second encryption key, and is generated by this encryption process. The authentication data returned to the authentication terminal, the authentication terminal, the returned authentication data, a first decryption key that is stored in advance therein and is paired with the first encryption key, The second The second decryption key paired with the encryption key of No. 3 and the third decryption key generated when the identification data is created and stored inside the authentication terminal are used for decryption, and the decryption is performed. An authentication method for a card authentication system that performs authentication by matching data with user identification information. 8. A storage unit storing user-specific information, identification data for identifying the user, and a first encryption key consisting of at least two keys issued only to the user, and a storage unit. A program for an information recording card, comprising: a control unit for writing or reading information to and from the external device; and a connection unit for inputting and outputting information to and from an external device, the program being provided via the connection unit A function of causing the control unit to confirm that an authentication request including a second encryption key different from the encryption key has been received, and the identification data, the second encryption key, and the first encryption stored in the storage unit. A program for an information recording card that causes a computer to realize a function of encrypting with a key to generate authentication data and a function of outputting the generated authentication data to an external device via a connection unit. 9. A computer-readable recording medium on which the program according to claim 8 is recorded. 10. A program of an authentication terminal for authenticating an information recording card, wherein an information request for authentication including a randomly generated second encryption key is recorded when the information recording card is attached to a computer. A function of transmitting to a card, and a first encryption key recorded in advance and a second encryption key recorded in advance in the information recording card for identification data generated by encrypting predetermined user identification information. A function of receiving authentication data generated by performing encryption processing a plurality of times using the encryption key from the information recording card, and the received authentication data is stored in advance in the inside and A first decryption key paired with the first encryption key, a second decryption key paired with the second encryption key, and a second decryption key generated when the identification data was created and stored inside the authentication terminal. Third
A program for implementing a function of decrypting the decrypted data using the decryption key of 1. and collating the decrypted data with the user identification information. 11. A computer-readable recording medium in which the program according to claim 10 is recorded. 12. A program of a card issuing terminal for issuing an information recording card for each user, wherein user identification information previously input to a computer is encrypted using a randomly generated first encryption key. A function to generate encrypted user data, a second encryption key that is randomly generated and consists of at least two keys, the user identification information, the encrypted user data, and an encryption executed in the information recording card. And a first encryption key that forms a pair with the first encryption key and the second encryption key.
A program for realizing a function of storing a compound key and a second compound key, and user identification information. 13. A computer-readable recording medium in which the program according to claim 12 is recorded.