JP2002259751A - Method for electronic auction and device therefor - Google Patents

Abstract

(57) [Summary] [PROBLEMS] To efficiently allocate goods by solving problems related to server overload, network congestion, and information disclosure. SOLUTION: When conducting a bidding auction for deciding product allocation and selling price when selling a product via a network 200, an auctioneer device 10 quickly fixes a maximum bid amount by an automatic proxy bidding agent. Whether or not to allow bidders to express their intent to perform a bid, and grant bonuses such as discounted payments and compensation payments to bidders who fix the highest bid early. .

Description

DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE INVENTION

[0001]

BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION 1. Field of the Invention The present invention relates to a method of an electronic auction for conducting auction auctions for allocating goods when selling goods via a network and determining a selling price thereof, and a method thereof. Related to the device.

[0002]

2. Description of the Related Art The most frequently used protocol for auctions on the Internet is a bidding auction with a set end time (English auction). The transaction procedure is as follows.

[0003] First, a seller registers a product (goods) on an auction site. The buyer can view the start time / end time of the goods and the auction via the network. At the start time, the buyer can place a bid. The new bid must be greater than the current highest bid value. Usually, the minimum bid value is set. All bids larger than the current highest bid value are open to other bidders. When the end time comes, the bidder who is bidding at the highest price at that time becomes the winner, gets the goods, and pays the seller an amount equal to his bid price.

Many auction sites on the Internet provide automatic proxy bidding agents (proxy agents). This is a system that places the lowest bid accepted on behalf of a person. All an individual bidder does is set a maximum bid, that is, the highest value the bidder is willing to pay for the good. If another person bids above his or her bid value, and within the maximum bid limit, the automated proxy bidding agent bids on the other person's bid plus the minimum bid. This allows buyers to
You no longer need to sit at the calculator and monitor your bids.

[0005] In the case where the player becomes the successful bidder by using the automatic proxy bidding agent, the payment amount is the sum of the highest bid price excluding the player and the minimum bid value. As a result, the user's true evaluation value for the good may be set as the highest bid amount.

[0006] This is because the payment amount is substantially determined by the bid price of the other party, and therefore the payment amount cannot be reduced even if the maximum bid amount is set low. Also, if the goods are not allocated when the true valuation value is set, if the maximum payment is set to be larger than the true valuation value in order to receive the goods, the payment amount will be This is because the value becomes equal to or higher than the evaluation value, resulting in loss in the transaction.

[0007]

The guide to the use of the Internet auction also states that the maximum bid amount of the automatic proxy bidding agent may be set as it is to the value that the agent is willing to pay. But,
In actual auctions, individual bidders changed the maximum bid setting many times, and bidding behavior was observed in which a significant portion of the bid was placed immediately before the end of the auction. I have.

[0008] This behavior includes "a problem of server overload and network congestion" and "a problem of revealing information about goods".
May be caused. When these problems arise, efficient allocation of goods cannot be achieved.

[0009] That is, if the concentration of bids occurs immediately before the end time, the auction server may fail to receive all the bids, that is, there is a problem of "withdrawal of bids". It should be noted that such a problem caused by the failure to receive a bid may be alleviated to some extent by distributing transactions using a plurality of servers.

[0010] The other problem, that of information disclosure, is a problem relating to the valuation of goods. The value of this good is usually more or less affected by the value of others.
In particular, when a bidder cannot judge the quality or authenticity of a good enough, the evaluation can be said to be more susceptible to the evaluation of others.

For example, in a picture auction, it is difficult to judge the authenticity of a picture unless the bidder is an expert in painting transactions. However, even if it is a normal buyer, if they see that others actively bid at a high price, the buyer can guess that the picture is genuine and make a bid according to the real picture it can.

[0012] Sharing of product evaluation information by information disclosure is an advantage of a public auction over a sealed auction. Here, the sealed type refers to a type in which all bids are not made public until the auction ends. On the other hand, the open type refers to a form in which all bids are open to all participants during the auction. Auction auction is one of the open type.

[0013] However, if bids are hardly made until immediately before the bid end time, the bidder cannot obtain information on the goods through the bidding action of others. Regarding this problem, it is not easy to solve the problem even if the server and the network equipment are sophisticated.

(Summary) In the auction with an end time set as described above, the following problems occur due to the concentration of bids immediately before the end time.

(1) A problem that bids are dropped due to server overload and network congestion.

(2) A problem that information on goods cannot be obtained due to failure to achieve information disclosure.

[0017] Due to these problems, efficient allocation of goods cannot be achieved.

Therefore, an object of the present invention is to solve the problems related to server overload, network congestion, and information disclosure, thereby enabling efficient allocation of goods.
It is an object of the present invention to provide an electronic auction method and a device thereof.

[0019]

SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION The present invention relates to a bidding auction method for deciding the allocation of goods and the selling price when selling the goods via communication means. Using an automatic proxy bidding agent that bids on behalf of the bidder within a range of the bid amount, allowing the bidder to express an intention to fix the maximum bid amount early by the automatic proxy bidding agent. The electronic auction method can be implemented by providing an early fixing permission setting step of setting whether or not and a privilege granting step of granting a predetermined privilege to a bidder who fixed the maximum bid amount early. provide.

The present invention relates to a bidder's device for conducting a bidding auction through a communication means, wherein an automatic proxy bidding for bidding on behalf of the bidder within a maximum bid amount set by the bidder. An agent and an automatic proxy bidding agent, an early fixing permission setting means for setting whether or not to allow a bidder to express an intention to fix the highest bid early, and a bid fixing the highest bid early An electronic auction apparatus may be configured by providing privilege providing means for providing a predetermined privilege to a person.

[0021] The present invention is a medium in which a computer records a program for performing control for deciding the allocation of goods and the selling price when selling the goods via communication means, and is set by a bidder. Within the maximum bid,
Using an automated proxy bidding agent that bids on behalf of the bidder, the control program allows the bidder to express a will to cause a computer to fix the maximum bid early by the automated proxy bidding agent. A medium in which an electronic auction control program is recorded is provided by giving a predetermined privilege to a bidder who has set whether or not to make the maximum bid amount fixed at an early stage.

The present invention is a program for performing control for deciding allocation of goods and selling price when selling goods via communication means, and the program is stored in a computer-readable recording medium. Using an automated proxy bidding agent that is on record and bids on behalf of the bidder within the maximum bid set by the bidder,
A step of setting whether or not to allow the bidder to express an intention to fix the highest bid early by the automatic proxy bidding agent, and for the bidder fixing the highest bid early. Provides an electronic auction control program by providing a predetermined privilege.

Here, the payment amount is discounted for the winner of the auction, and for the loser of the auction,
Of the bidders who fixed the maximum bid amount early, the highest bid amount may be set to the largest and the compensation may be paid.

During the period of the predetermined will of fixing the highest bid, a request for fixing the highest bid is based on the condition that the fixed value must be equal to or larger than a threshold value to fix the highest bid. Is accepted from each bidder, and after the period of will has passed, the highest bid is fixed if there are two or more bidders who wish to fix the highest bid, otherwise the highest bid is fixed. If there is no fixation and the maximum bid amount is fixed, compensation may be paid to the bidder who fixed the highest bid amount and who made the highest bid.

If the highest bidder is the winner of the auction and the second highest bidder at the auction also has the highest bid fixed, do not pay compensation to anyone. It may be.

[0026]

Embodiments of the present invention will be described below in detail with reference to the drawings.

[First Example] A first embodiment of the present invention will be described with reference to FIGS.

(Outline) First, the outline of the present invention will be described. The auction protocol according to the present invention allows the bidder to set the highest bid early by the automatic proxy bidding agent, and provides the following benefits to bidders who fix the highest bid early: If you win the auction, you will be discounted or paid compensation. ・ Even if you lose the auction, the highest bid is fixed among the bidders who fixed the highest bid early. The maximum setting is given a privilege that compensation is paid.

As described above, by giving a bidder a privilege to a person who fixed the maximum bid amount early,
The concentration of bids immediately before the end time can be reduced.

(Specific Example) Hereinafter, a specific example will be described.

<System Configuration> First, the configuration of a system applicable to the electronic auction according to the present invention will be described.

FIG. 2 shows an example of the configuration of the electronic auction system 1.

The present system 1 comprises a bidder device 10 as a server-side device and a seller / buyer 100 as a client-side device. These devices are connected by a communication network 200.

(Bidder Device) The bidder device 10 will be described. The participant management database (DB) 11 stores information about participants in the auction, that is, information such as contact information and past transaction history.

The merchandise management database (DB) 12 has information on the merchandise exhibited in the auction, that is,
Stores information such as seller, product type, number, start time, end time, and the like.

The bid management database (DB) 13 stores history information of bidders and bid amounts for each product.

Automatic proxy bidding management database (DB) 1
No. 4 stores information of a combination of a product and a highest bid amount of a bidder.

The participant registration unit 15 registers / changes information such as contact information for new or registered bidders from the participant who wishes to change registered information in the participant management database 11.

The merchandise registration section 16 registers the information on the merchandise desired by the seller input from the seller in the merchandise management database 12.

The product search unit 17 searches the product management database 12 to create a product list of the type specified by the participant, and gives the list to the participant.

The automatic proxy bidding processing unit 18 registers information on the product and the highest bid amount input by the bidder in the automatic proxy bidding management database 14.

The auction processing unit 19 performs the following (1) to
The processing of (4) is executed. (1) Obtain the product and the current highest bid amount from the bid management database 13. (2) The automatic proxy bidding database is searched to check whether or not the product has a maximum bid amount larger than the current maximum bid amount. (3) If there is a maximum bid setting in (2),
The sum of the current highest bid and the minimum bid is registered as a new highest bid in the bid management database together with the information of the bidder. (4) If there is no higher maximum bid setting, do nothing.

The auction processing section 19 repeats such processing until a bid end time for each product comes. When the end time comes, it notifies the successful bid processing means.

The successful bid processing section 20 obtains the highest bid amount from the bid management database 13, uses the bid amount as the payment amount, obtains the contact information of the seller / buyer from the participant management database 11, and obtains the result of the successful bid. Notice.

The control section 21 performs overall control of the entire system and executes the processing shown in the flowchart of FIG. 1 according to the present invention.

The communication unit 22 transmits and receives information to and from the seller device 100 and the buyer device 110.

(Seller / Buyer) The seller device 100 and the buyer device 100 will be described.

In this example, a single goods, single unit auction is handled. Assume that there are two types of buyers. One type of buyer looks at the goods,
The quality and authenticity can be known. The other type of buyer does not know the quality and authenticity of the goods by looking at them. The former is called an expert buyer and the latter is an ordinary buyer.

The quality of goods is also of high quality and low quality.
Assume that there are two types. Assume that the individual buyer's valuation of a good is linked to the other buyer's valuation. In the present invention, coordination of evaluations means that if the expert buyer has a higher evaluation value, the evaluation value of a normal buyer is more likely to be higher than lower. That is, if an ordinary buyer knows that a professional buyer has a high reputation for a good, the normal buyer assumes that the good is of high quality and gives the good give. However, for both professional and ordinary buyers, once the quality of the goods is known, the valuation of each buyer is independent of the valuation of others. Assume that the evaluation value of each buyer for a good is obtained from a probability distribution. This probability distribution is assumed to be known. If the goods are of high quality, the value of the goods

[0050]

[Outside 1]

When the good is of low quality, the evaluation value of the good is given by the above probability density function f (cumulative distribution function F).

[0052]

[Outside 2]

Assume that the above follows the probability density function g (cumulative distribution function G). In this article, to simplify the discussion,

[Outside 3]

Assume that

The utility of each buyer is defined as the difference between the true evaluation value and the payment amount when the buyer wins the auction, and is defined as 0 when the buyer loses the auction. However, if the payment is greater than the true valuation, the buyer has a very large negative utility. That is, it is assumed that each buyer is risk-neutral when the difference between the evaluation value and the payment amount is positive, but is risk-loving when the difference is negative.

Here, "risk-neutral" means that an action is determined in consideration of the magnitude of an expected value. In addition, risk lover means that if the amount of loss increases even slightly from 0, the decrease in utility becomes very large, but if the amount of loss becomes very large, even if the amount increases, Means that the degree of decrease is small.

Also assume that there are n specialist buyers and m ordinary buyers.

[0058]

[Outside 4]

Represents a list of evaluation values of the expert buyer,

[0060]

[Outside 5]

Represents a list of evaluation values of ordinary buyers. For high quality goods, the value q takes 1, for low quality goods the value q takes 2. further,

[0062]

[Outside 6]

And

[0064]

[Outside 7]

Is a list in which the evaluation values are arranged in descending order.

[0066]

[Outside 8]

Is

[0068]

[Outside 9]

In the k-th highest value,

[0070]

[Outside 10]

Is

[0072]

[Outside 11]

It is assumed that the value indicates the k-th highest value.

<System Operation> Next, the operation of the present system will be described.

In the present example, a bid auction protocol with a bid end time (British auction protocol) will be considered.

In this protocol, the new bid must be greater than the current highest bid value. Usually, the minimum bid value ε is set. All bids are immediately made available to other bidders. When the end time comes, the buyer who is bidding at the highest price at that time becomes the winner and gets the good. The payment amount is equal to the own bid price (the second highest bid price + ε in total).

In this example, it is assumed that an automatic proxy bidding agent (proxy agent) is used.

This automatic proxy bidding agent is a system for bidding the lowest value accepted on behalf of a person.
All an individual bidder does is set a maximum bid, the highest amount the bidder is willing to pay for the good.

Here, in order to handle auctions with a bid end time set, a time expression is introduced. Assuming a virtual time t, the auction takes place at time t = t _end
Suppose that it ends. The end time is announced before the auction starts and is not changed.

Also, in this example, it is assumed that the auction server can accept a sufficient number of bids for a bid from the automatic proxy bidding agent during time one. However,
Assume that time 1 is required for an individual bidder to change the maximum bid setting of the automatic proxy bidding agent.

In this example, it is assumed that the individual buyers are symmetric. This can be formulated as individual buyers observing private signals that determine their type.
Therefore, in the following discussion, we will examine symmetric equilibrium. There shall be no collusion between buyers.

Hereinafter, each case of an auction will be described.

<Definition 1 Strategy A:> Individual expert buyers observe the goods, and if the goods are of low quality, the true evaluation value for the low quality goods

[0084]

[Outside 12]

Is set to the highest bid of the automatic proxy bidding agent, and if the goods are of high quality, the true evaluation value for the high-quality goods

[0086]

[Outside 13]

Is set to the maximum bid amount of the automatic proxy bidding agent.

Each ordinary buyer initially has a true value for a low quality good.

[0089]

[Outside 14]

Is set to the maximum bid amount of the automatic proxy bidding agent. Then, by looking at the v ¹ or more of the bid, the upper limit of the automatic proxy bidding agent

[0091]

[Outside 15]

From the above, the true evaluation value for high quality goods

[0093]

[Outside 16]

Is changed to

(Auction example 1: Auction with no bid end time set) As an auction example 1, a bid auction with no bid end time set will be described.

Proposition 1) When a bid auction protocol without setting a bid end time is used, that is,
When t _end = ∞, the (n + m) set of strategies A is balanced.

Here, the strategy being balanced means that when other bidders ((n + m-1) people) follow the strategy, it is best for the self to follow the strategy. The states that appear in an actual auction can be considered balanced.

Proof 1) First, consider an expert buyer.

The expert buyer cannot control the number of bidders even if he delays the high bid. Therefore, even if the expert buyer sees the valuation of the other person's goods, his / her own valuation value does not change, so that if the maximum bid amount of the automatic proxy bidding agent is to be set, it should be set immediately.

Now, suppose that the expert buyer sets his true evaluation value to the maximum bid of the automatic proxy bidding agent. At this time, if the buyer becomes the winner of the auction, even if the buyer sets the maximum bid amount to a different value, the buyer cannot obtain greater utility. This is because the payment amount is the sum of the second largest bid price and the minimum bid price, and is substantially determined by the bid price of the other party (the second largest bid price). On the other hand, if the buyer loses the auction, the buyer will not be able to gain greater utility even if he sets the maximum bid to a different value. That's because if you set a higher maximum bid and win the auction, the payout will be greater than your rating. Thus, strategy A is the optimal response for the expert buyer.

Next, consider an ordinary buyer.

If the ordinary buyer knows the quality of the goods, it is optimal to set the true evaluation value according to the quality as the maximum bid amount of the automatic proxy bidding agent as in the case of the expert's discussion on the goods. Becomes

Here, when another buyer follows strategy A, v
^It is the expert buyer who makes ^one or more bids. Since the buyer of the experts it is possible to know the quality of goods, if you look at the bid ordinary buyer is higher than v ^1, the buyer can the goods is concluded that a high quality.

Here, before an ordinary buyer knows the quality of a good, the true evaluation value for the low-quality good

[0105]

[Outside 17]

Suppose a larger value is set for the highest bid. At this time, if the goods are found to be of low quality, the payment amount of the ordinary buyer may be larger than its own evaluation value. Therefore, if the quality of the goods is unknown, the ordinary buyer

[0107]

[Outside 18]

A larger value should not be set as the maximum bid amount. Thus, strategy A is the optimal response for ordinary buyers.

(Auction Case 2: Bid Auction with Bidding End Time Setting) Next, as auction case 2, a bidding auction with bidding end time setting will be described.

Proposition 2) When a bidding auction protocol with a bid end time is used and the goods are of high quality, for the expert buyer, a high-quality auction is performed at time t _end -1 immediately before the end time. Your true valuation of the good

[0111]

[Outside 19]

It is best to set the maximum bid for the automatic proxy bidding agent. In this case, ordinary buyers cannot win the auction.

Proof 2) Time of expert buyer

[0114]

[Outside 20]

If the true evaluation value of the user is set to the maximum bid amount of the automatic proxy bidding agent, the expert buyer
If you are a person or more, the bid value is more than v ^1. This means communicating the good quality information to the average buyer. Therefore, it is an auction between n + m bidders.

[0116] On the other hand, the buyers of the respective specialists have time t = t
If you want to set to _{end -1} own true of the evaluation value to the highest bid of the automatic proxy bidding agent, usually of the buyer can not carry out a larger bid than v ^1. This takes time 1 to change the maximum bid setting of the automated proxy bidding agent.
Is required.

Here, before knowing the quality of the goods, the average evaluation value of the low-quality goods

[0118]

[Outside 21]

Note that a larger bid may result in a negative profit for the buyer. Therefore,
In this case, the number of bidders is substantially n, which is only the expert buyer. A substantial reduction in the number of bidders will benefit professional buyers. We also assume that all bids from automated proxy bidding agents will be accepted,
Even if the highest bid is set at the time t = t _end −1, the expert buyer does not suffer any loss. Therefore, the proposition holds.

Now, the load on the server will be described. The number of bids accepted by the server immediately before the bid end time is
If the goods are of high quality,

[0121]

[Outside 22]

Is obtained.

(Auction example 3: Auction with fixed maximum bid amount) Next, auction example 3
A description will be given of a bidding auction with a fixed maximum bid amount.

When a bid auction protocol with a bid end time is used, information on the quality of goods is not transmitted to ordinary buyers during the auction, even though it is an open auction. this is,
When the number of expert buyers is less than the number of ordinary buyers, there is a problem that efficient allocation of goods cannot be achieved or that the seller's income does not increase.

One solution to this problem is for the bidder or seller to guarantee the quality of the goods to the buyer. In a general collaborative value model, it is dominant for auctioneers or sellers to provide honest guidance on the quality of goods. That is, when a good is of high quality, it indicates that the good is of high quality, and even if the good is of low quality,
It is said that the seller's expected income is increased by not hiding the information and notifying that the goods are of low quality. However, in auctions between consumers, sellers are not always specialists. In addition, even if they are experts, it is a complicated task to make specific agreements regarding quality assurance.

In this example, a new protocol is proposed to solve the problem caused by the concentration of bids immediately before the bid end time. The basic idea is that buyers who fix the maximum bid of the automated proxy bidding agent at the start of the auction will be discounted if they win the auction, and such buyers will not get the goods In some cases, this is to provide compensation. This gives buyers who do not need to look at others' bids the incentive to place large bids early.

(Auction Example 3: Flowchart)
This auction example 3 will be described based on a flowchart.

FIG. 1 shows a processing example of auction auction with a fixed maximum bid amount.

At step S1, the bidder informs the participants of the start time and end time of the auction.

[0130] In step S2, the threshold _{v t} and compensation _{p c}
To the participants.

In step S3, during the predetermined period of willingness to fix the maximum bid amount, the maximum bid amount is fixed based on the condition that the fixed value must be _{equal to} or more than the threshold value vt in order to fix the maximum bid amount. Accept requests from each bidder.

In step S4, if the intention expression period has elapsed, the bidder will inform that the highest bid is fixed if there are two or more bidders who wish to fix the highest bid. , The maximum bid is not fixed.

In step S5, after the guidance, a normal auction is performed in which only the bid amount larger than the highest bid amount at the present time is accepted.

In step S6, when the bid end time comes, goods are allocated with the highest bidder as the winner of the auction, and the bid price of that person is set as the payment amount.

In the step S7, it is checked whether or not "the maximum bid amount is fixed". If fixed, the process proceeds to step S8.

In step S8, among the bidders having fixed the highest bids, the winner A of the auction that has made the highest bid
Check whether or not. In the case of the auction winner A, the process proceeds to step S9, and in the case of the auction loser, the process proceeds to step S12.

In step S9, it is checked whether or not the person B who has made the second highest bid in the auction has also fixed the highest bid amount. If the person B who has placed the second highest bid has also fixed the highest bid, step S
The process proceeds to step S10, and if not fixed, proceeds to step S11.

In step S10, since the person B who made the second highest bid also fixes the maximum bid amount, the compensation amount p
_c is not paid to anyone.

[0139] In the step S11, the B person who made the high bid in the second, because it does not secure the highest bid, the winner A of the auction was the highest bid, pay compensation p _c.

In step S12, a compensation _pc is paid to the loser of the auction in which the maximum bid amount is fixed and the bid amount is the largest.

As can be seen from the above processing, the automatic proxy bidding agent allows the bidder to fix the highest bid early, and among the bidders who fixed the highest bid earlier, the winner of the auction To pay the compensation amount, such as discounting the payment amount, and also give the loser of the auction to the person with the highest maximum bid amount to pay the compensation amount, so that the end time It is possible to alleviate the concentration of bids immediately before.

(Auction Example 3: Specific Example) A specific example of the auction example 3 will be described to describe the features of the auction with a fixed maximum bid amount. This example is an extension of the auction protocol with a bid end time set.

[0143] a) auction people on the basis of the knowledge of the goods, to set the threshold _{v t.} When a buyer fixes the maximum bid of an automatic proxy bidding agent, the highest bid is a threshold v _t
It must be more than that. The threshold may be set to any value as long as it can sufficiently distinguish the quality of goods. In this _example, the ^v t = v ^1. The bidder guides this threshold before the auction starts.

[0144] b) auction who sets the compensation _{p c.} This value is

[0145]

[Outside 23]

The value must satisfy the following. The meaning of these values is explained in the proof of Proposition 3 below. The bidder informs the value of this compensation before the auction starts.

[0147]

(Equation 1)

[0148]

(Equation 2)

C) At the start of the auction, there is provided a period during which each buyer communicates to the bidder the intention of the automatic proxy bidding agent to fix the highest bid. This period need not be so long. For example, if the bidding period of a certain product is seven days, it is sufficient to set the intention expression period to one day. Note that a normal bid is accepted even during this period.

D) The bidder adds the bidder fixing the highest bid of the automatic proxy bidding agent to the set _Sixf .
The initial value of S _fix is an empty set.

After the period of expressing the intention to fix the highest bid has passed, the auctioneer informs whether there is a bidder who fixes the highest bid. This is called signal Q. If there are two or more buyers who wish to fix the highest bid, the bidder informs that the highest bid is fixed (Q = 1). Otherwise, the bidder informs that the highest bid is not fixed (Q = 0). If only one buyer wishes to fix the highest bid, the highest bid is not fixed. The value of the highest bid and the number of bidders who fixed the highest bid are not announced.

In the strategy B described below, the guidance that the highest bid amount is fixed means that the goods are of high quality.

E) After the period of expressing the intention to fix the maximum bid amount, a normal auction is conducted until the bid end time.

F) When the bid end time t = t _end comes,
The auction ends. At this point, the buyer with the highest bid wins, receives the goods, and pays an amount equal to his bid (the second highest bid + the minimum bid ε).

If there are a plurality of buyers having the highest evaluation value, the buyer who has received the highest bid before the auction server is the winner. Usually, in order to maintain fairness, a process such as giving priority to a bid from a specific seller is not performed, so that the winner is practically randomly selected from buyers having the highest evaluation value. The payment is your bid, that is, the highest evaluation value itself. (The second highest bid value is the highest evaluation value−the minimum bid value ε.) G) When the bidder indicates that the highest bid amount is fixed (Q =
1), the seller pays the compensation p _c to the buyer, which was the highest bid in the buyer included in the set S _{f ix.} However, if both the winner of the auction and the bidder who _{placed the} second highest bid are included in the set S _fix , no compensation is paid to anyone.

Here, a _description will be given of a case where there are a plurality of buyers who _fix the highest bid value in the set S _fix . In the present embodiment, as in the above-described winner determination, the (S _fix
Buyer with the highest bid (within) received by the auction server gets the right to get compensation. Normally, in order to maintain fairness, bidders from specific sellers are not prioritized, so buyers who can get compensation are essentially those who set the highest bid fixed. Will be chosen at random.

As another method, a method of using a time at which the highest bid price is fixed may be used. That is, when the highest bid price is fixed, information on the time is also transmitted to the auction server. Then, among the bids from the buyers included in the set S _fix , the bidder with the highest price set at the earliest time is prioritized. In this case, among the buyers who set the highest bid price, the buyer who has set the earliest time has the right to acquire the compensation.

<Definition 2 Strategy B:> (1) If the goods are of high quality, the expert buyer i is a true evaluation value for the high quality goods.

[0159]

[Outside 24]

Is set to the highest bid of the automatic proxy bidding agent, and the highest bid is fixed. Also, if the goods are of poor quality, the expert buyer will be

[0161]

[Outside 25]

Is set to the maximum bid amount of the automatic proxy bidding agent.

(2) An ordinary buyer j first obtains a true evaluation value for a low-quality good.

[0164]

[Outside 26]

Is fixed to the maximum bid amount of the automatic proxy bidding agent. After that, the signal Q with the highest bid fixed
If you look at = 1, the maximum bid amount of the automatic proxy bidding agent

[0166]

[Outside 27]

From the true evaluation value for high quality goods

[0168]

[Outside 28]

Is changed to If you see a signal Q = 0 without a fixed maximum bid, the value of the automatic bid agent's maximum bid remains unchanged.

[0170]

[Outside 29]

[0171]

(Auction Example 4: Auction Auction) Next, auction auction will be described as an auction example 4.

Proposition 3) The strategy B of the (n + m) set is equilibrium.

Proof 3) First, consider an expert buyer.

Assume that the goods are of high quality. If the expert buyer i does not fix the maximum bid of the automatic proxy bidding agent, then from Proposition 2, the true valuation value for the high quality goods at time t _end -1

[0176]

[Outside 30]

The optimal response is to set the highest bid price. At this time, the auction is substantially performed between n buyers. In this case, the expected utility is represented by equation (1).

In equation (1), n-1 | represents the number of potential buyers having the second highest bid. In order for the second highest bid value to be z, the evaluation value of the other n-2 buyers is z
Must be smaller. This probability is (F (z))
^It can be expressed as ^n-2 . In this case, the payment amount of the expert buyer i is z + ε. Here, the minimum bid value ε is assumed to be a very small amount and will be ignored in the following discussion.
Therefore, the utility of the expert buyer i is

[0179]

[Outside 31]

Is calculated. The probability that the buyer with the second highest bid will have an evaluation value of z is f (z). From these discussions, equation (1) is obtained.

On the other hand, when the expert buyer i fixes the maximum bid amount of the automatic proxy bidding agent, the maximum bid amount

[0182]

[Outside 32]

The optimal reaction is set as follows. The reason will be described below.

Assume that the expert buyer i has set a value larger than the true evaluation value. At this time, the victory buyer i experts in the auction, and, if the buyer was the high bid in the second is included in the set S _fix, buyer i experts can not get compensation. Therefore, in this case, the payment amount of the expert buyer i exceeds the true evaluation value. Here, since the buyer assumes that the difference between the evaluation value and the payment amount is negative, the buyer i obtains a very large negative utility.

[0185]

[Outside 33]

No larger value is set. In addition, since the payment amount is determined by the bid price of the other party, even if a value smaller than the own evaluation value is set as the maximum bid amount, the payment amount cannot be reduced.

Thus, when the expert buyer i fixes the maximum bid amount of the automatic proxy bidding agent, the expected utility is expressed by equation (2). Here, the first term represents the utility of winning the auction and obtaining the goods. Second
The term indicates the utility of obtaining compensation. The third section is a section corresponding to the case where compensation is not paid due to the exclusion rule.

[0188] compensation _{p c} is

[0189]

[Outside 34]

The setting is made so as to satisfy the following. Therefore, if the goods are of high quality,

[0191]

[Outside 35]

[0192] The fixation at is the optimal response for the expert buyer i.

Next, consider the case where the goods are of low quality.

If the expert buyer i sets a value greater than the true valuation value for the automatic proxy bidding agent's maximum bid, the buyer may get a negative utility, as in the high quality case discussion. Absent. Therefore, the expert buyer does not set a value larger than his own evaluation value as the maximum bid price. In this case, since the true evaluation value of the good is smaller than the threshold, the highest bid cannot be fixed. Also, if the user sets his true evaluation value to the highest bid and wins the auction, the payment amount will not decrease even if the value is set smaller than the true evaluation value of the highest bid. Therefore, if the goods are of low quality, the highest bid of the automated proxy bidding agent is

[0195]

[Outside 36]

The setting of は is an optimal response for the expert buyer i.

Next, consider a normal buyer.

Before looking at the signal Q indicating whether or not the maximum bid is fixed, suppose that an ordinary buyer fixes the maximum bid of the automatic proxy bidding agent. In this case, if the goods are of poor quality and the buyer wins the auction, the buyer's payment may exceed his true valuation.

Also, if the goods are of low quality, the expert buyer does not fix the maximum bid of the automatic proxy bidding agent. Therefore, since only one buyer wishes to fix the highest bid, the signal Q = 1 indicating that the highest bid has been fixed.
Will not be sent. In this case, no compensation will be paid to the ordinary buyer.

Therefore, since it is assumed that the buyer is risk-friendly for a negative difference between the evaluation value and the payment amount, the ordinary buyer fixes the maximum bid amount of the automatic proxy bidding agent. Take no action.

If the normal buyer does not take the action of fixing the highest bid, the true bid value of the automatic proxy bidding agent is set for the normal buyer in the same manner as the proof of Proposition 1. Can be proved to be the optimal reaction.

Proposition 3 implicitly assumes that the number of expert buyers and the number of ordinary buyers are common knowledge. This assumption may seem too strong. However, not all professional buyers need to take the action of fixing the maximum bid of the automatic proxy bidding agent. It is sufficient to have at least two expert buyers and a fixed maximum bid to communicate information about the quality of goods to ordinary buyers. Therefore, even if the amount of compensation is set using the values of n and m predicted by the auctioneer, it is considered that information disclosure can be achieved in many cases.

When using the auction protocol according to the present invention as compared to the auction protocol with a bid end time, it can be expected that a large amount of bids will appear earlier. This is because the expert buyer fixes the maximum bid for the automatic proxy bidding agent. As a result, the problems of server overload and network congestion immediately before the bid end time can be alleviated. (Calculation example of compensation money) Next, a calculation example of compensation money will be described.

Example 1) Uniform distribution

[0205]

[Outside 37]

Is assumed. By using the partial integration method, we obtain:

[0207]

(Equation 3)

[0208]

[Outside 38]

By calculating the same in the same manner,

[0210]

[Outside 39]

[0211] As the value _{p c} satisfying, obtain the following.

[0212]

(Equation 4)

Here, let p ′ _c be a value when the equality holds in the above equation,

[0214]

[Outside 40]

In the above,

[0216]

[Outside 41]

[0217] It is assumed that:

[0218]

[Outside 42]

In between,

[0220]

[Outside 43]

Since the function becomes an increasing function,

[0222]

[Outside 44]

Are all

[0224]

[Outside 45]

On the other hand, the condition

[0226]

[Outside 46]

The condition is satisfied.

[0228]

[Outside 47]

Is obtained as follows.

[0230]

(Equation 5)

[0231] Thus, as the value of p _c of bid up auction protocol according to the present invention, if the p _"c is the use, strategy B is balanced.

(Evaluation of Auction Protocol at Auction) Next, evaluation of performance of the auction protocol at auction in the present system will be described.

In this section, the performance of the auction protocol according to the present invention is evaluated by performing computer simulation.

Here, from the viewpoints of social surplus and seller's income, the auction protocol according to the present invention is compared with a normal auction protocol with a bid end time set. Here, the social surplus is calculated as the sum of the utilities of all the participants including the seller, and represents the social desirability of allocating goods.

If the goods are of low quality, the normal auction protocol with bid end time setting and the auction protocol according to the present invention give the same result. Therefore, it is sufficient to investigate only when the goods are of high quality. The experimental settings are shown below.

The evaluation value of each buyer for high-quality goods is a uniform distribution on the interval [1000, 2000].

[0237]

[Outside 48]

It is assumed that the above is obtained. Total number of bidders is 10
Set to 0. In this paper, the ratio of specialist buyers is changed from 0.1 to 0.1.
Change to 9. A ratio of 0.1 means that there are 10 expert buyers (100 × 0.1 = 10) and 90 ordinary buyers (100−10 = 90).
In addition, assume that the seller's goods have a valuation value of zero. This means that the utility of the seller is the difference between the selling price of the goods and the amount paid for the compensation. Threshold _{v t} is set to 1000, the value of the compensation formula of (3)

[0239]

[Outside 49]

Was set. For each case, 100 cases were generated and their average was calculated.

FIG. 3 shows the result of comparison regarding social surplus.

The abscissa represents the number of professional buyers among 100 participants. The vertical axis represents the average value of the social surplus obtained from 100 cases. A is an example based on the auction auction protocol according to the present invention. B is an example using a conventional protocol.

FIG. 4 shows a comparison result of the seller's income.

The horizontal axis represents the number of professional buyers among 100 participants. The vertical axis represents the average value of the seller's income obtained from 100 cases. C is an example based on the auction auction protocol according to the present invention. D is an example according to a conventional protocol.

From FIGS. 3 and 4, the following (1),
(2) is understood.

(1) The auction-auction protocol method according to the present invention increases social surplus.

The social surplus is determined by the true rating of the winner of the auction for the good. Therefore, if the number of bidders increases and buyers with higher evaluation values appear, the social surplus will increase.

FIG. 3 shows that when the ratio of specialists to buyers is small, the increase in social surplus increases.
This is because, in this case, the fixed maximum bid of the automatic proxy bidding agent will cause many ordinary buyers to participate in the auction of high quality goods.

(2) When the auction-auction protocol method according to the present invention is used, when the ratio of specialist buyers is small, the increase in seller's income increases, but as the ratio of specialist buyers increases. , The increase in the seller's income will be smaller.

The following is an intuitive description.

The auction protocol method according to the present invention uses the same level of utility to the expert buyers as to all the buyers from the buyer having the highest evaluation value among the expert buyers. Can be seen as delivering goods to the buyer with the highest valuation value. Thus, if the second highest valuation among all buyers is sufficiently large compared to the second highest valuation among experts, the seller will increase his auction revenue more than paying compensation. Is obtained. However, if the second highest rating among the experts is sufficiently large and close to the second highest rating among all buyers, the incremental revenue at the auction will be small. In this case, the increase in the seller's income is offset by the payment of the compensation.

In an auction between consumers, it can be expected that in many cases the proportion of specialist buyers will not be so large. Thus, the experimental results obtained suggest that in many cases the inventive method is advantageous to the seller.

[Second Example] Next, a second embodiment of the present invention will be described. The description of the same parts as those in the first example is omitted, and the same reference numerals are given.

In the first example described above, it has been assumed that if the payment amount becomes larger than the true evaluation value, the buyer obtains a large negative utility. In other words, if the buyer could lose,
It was assumed that such actions would not be chosen.

However, for example, if the expected value of the acquired profit is large, such as a company instead of an individual trader, it may be appropriate to assume a form of utility that allows a small loss. .

In this case, strategy B is not balanced in the inventive protocol described in the previous embodiment. It is for low quality goods

[0257]

[Outside 50]

For an ordinary buyer having an evaluation value close to
v Before you see ^one or more of the bid, better to a bid for the goods of high quality (v ¹ or more of the bid) it is, is because there is a case in which expected utility increases.

However, by making the following changes to the auction protocol according to the present invention, the evaluation value greatly differs depending on the quality of goods.

[0260]

[Outside 51]

[0261] If it is larger, strategy B is in equilibrium. This means that with this protocol, it is possible to achieve efficient allocation of goods and increase the seller's income.

The following two points are changed from the first example.
Is a point.

Modification 1) A dummy buyer is placed. As a buyer, set the highest bid value for automatic proxy bidding agent to v ^1, carry out the bid. If the dummy buyer wins, the dummy buyer withdraws the bid and the buyer with the second highest bid wins. The payment amount is the bid price of the user (third highest bid value + ε). The withdrawal of a bid is only permitted to dummy agents.

[0264] Among the agents that have fixed the highest bid value of the change point 2) Automatic proxy bidding agent, to bidders that the bid of the highest value, always pay compensation p _c.

From change 1,

[0266]

[Outside 52]

If the value is sufficiently large, that is, if the valuation value is significantly different depending on whether the good is high quality or low quality, the utility of the buyer always becomes the difference between the true valuation value of the good and the payment amount. Even if represented, a normal buyer will be best responsive to following strategy B.

Further, from the second change point, even if the utility of the buyer is always represented by the difference between the true valuation value of the goods and the payment amount, for the expert buyer, the true valuation value is determined by the maximum value of the automatic proxy bidding agent. Setting the bid value is the optimal response.

The following shows that it is optimal for a professional buyer to set a true evaluation value. Since the buyer is symmetric, the true evaluation value

[0270]

[Outside 53]

[0271] function to determine the highest bid value _{b i} according to the b
_i =

[0272]

[Outside 54]

Consider the following. At this time, the expected utility of the expert buyer when the bid price is fixed is expressed by Expression (6), similarly to Expression (2).

[0274] ^Here, note ^{B -1 (B (z))} = z become possible, by differentiating Equation (6) _{b i,}

[0275]

[Outside 55]

Thus, it can be seen that the expected utility is maximized.

[0277]

(Equation 6)

[0278]

As described above, according to the present invention,
At the time of the auction, which determines the allocation of goods and the selling price when the goods are sold through the network, the auctioneer device issues a statement by the automatic proxy bidding agent to fix the highest bid at an early stage, Set whether or not to allow bidders, and give predetermined benefits (benefits such as discounting of payment amount and payment of compensation) to bidders who fixed the maximum bid amount early. So
Avoiding the concentration of bids immediately before the closing time, mitigating server overload, network congestion, and information disclosure problems, and increasing social surplus (ie, the social preference of goods allocation). This makes it possible to achieve efficient allocation of goods.

[Brief description of the drawings]

FIG. 1 is a first and a second embodiment of the present invention;
It is a flowchart which shows the auction with fixed maximum bid amount.

FIG. 2 is a block diagram showing a configuration of an electronic auction system according to the present invention.

FIG. 3 is an explanatory diagram showing a social surplus in comparison with a conventional case.

FIG. 4 is an explanatory diagram showing a seller's income in comparison with the related art.

[Explanation of symbols]

 DESCRIPTION OF SYMBOLS 1 Electronic auction system 10 Auctioneer device 11 Participant management database (DB) 12 Product management database (DB) 13 Bid management database (DB) 14 Automatic proxy bidding management database (DB) 15 Participant registration part 16 Product registration part 17 Commodity search unit 18 Automatic proxy bidding processing unit 19 Auction processing unit 20 Successful bid processing unit 100 Seller device 110 Buyer device 200 Communication network

Claims (16)

[Claims] 1. A bidding auction method for determining a product allocation and a selling price when selling a product via a communication means, wherein the bidding price is within a maximum bid amount set by a bidder. Using an automatic proxy bidding agent that bids on behalf of the bidder, setting an early fixation setting whether or not to allow the bidder to express an intention to fix the highest bid early by the automatic proxy bidding agent An electronic auction method, comprising: a permission setting step; and a privilege granting step of granting a predetermined privilege to a bidder who fixed the maximum bid amount early. 2. The award granting step includes discounting a payment amount for a winner of an auction, and selecting a highest bid among losers of the auction among bidders who fixed the highest bid amount early. 2. The electronic auction method according to claim 1, wherein the compensation is paid to the largest amount. 3. A method for fixing a maximum bid amount based on a condition that a fixed value must be equal to or more than a threshold value for fixing the maximum bid amount within a predetermined period of the intention to fix the maximum bid amount. Is received from each bidder, and after the period of said intention has passed, the highest bid is fixed if there are two or more bidders who wish to fix the highest bid, otherwise the highest bid is fixed. The bid amount is not fixed, and if the maximum bid amount is fixed, the compensation is paid to the highest bidder among the bidders having fixed the maximum bid amount. The electronic auction method according to claim 1. 4. If the highest bidder is the winner of the auction and the second highest bidder in the auction also has the highest bid fixed, the compensation is paid to anyone. 4. The electronic auction method according to claim 3, wherein no payment is made. 5. A bidder's device for conducting an auction by bidding through communication means, comprising: an automatic proxy bidding agent for bidding on behalf of the bidder within a maximum bid amount set by the bidder. An early fixation permission setting means for setting whether or not to allow a bidder to express an intention to fix the highest bid early by the automatic proxy bidding agent, and fix the highest bid early An electronic auction apparatus comprising: a privilege granting means for granting a predetermined privilege to a bidder. 6. The award providing means discounts a payment amount for a winner of an auction, and provides a maximum bid amount to a loser of an auction among bidders who fixed the maximum bid amount early. 6. The electronic auction apparatus according to claim 5, wherein a compensation amount is paid to the largest amount. 7. A method for fixing a maximum bid amount based on a condition that a fixed value must be equal to or more than a threshold value for fixing the maximum bid amount within a predetermined period of intention to fix the maximum bid amount. Is received from each bidder, and after the period of said intention has passed, the highest bid is fixed if there are two or more bidders who wish to fix the highest bid, otherwise the highest bid is fixed. The bid amount is not fixed, and if the maximum bid amount is fixed, the compensation is paid to the highest bidder among the bidders having fixed the maximum bid amount. The electronic auction apparatus according to claim 5. 8. If the highest bidder is the winner of the auction and the second highest bidder in the auction also has the highest bid fixed, the compensation is paid to anyone. 8. The electronic auction device according to claim 7, wherein payment is not made. 9. A medium storing a program for controlling a computer to determine a product allocation and a selling price when the product is sold via a communication means, the highest bid set by a bidder. An automatic proxy bidding agent for bidding on behalf of the bidder within a range of amounts, the control program expressing an intention to cause a computer to fix the maximum bid amount early by the automatic proxy bidding agent; Media for recording an electronic auction control program characterized by allowing a bidder to set whether or not to allow the bidder, and to give a predetermined privilege to a bidder who fixed the maximum bid amount early. . 10. The method according to claim 10, wherein when the predetermined privilege is granted, a winner of the auction is discounted on a payment amount. 10. The medium according to claim 9, wherein the highest bid amount is set so that the highest bid amount is paid. 11. A method for fixing a maximum bid amount based on a condition that a fixed value must be equal to or more than a threshold value in order to fix the maximum bid amount within a predetermined period of intention to fix the maximum bid amount. After the expiration of the period of intention, if there are two or more bidders who wish to fix the highest bid, the highest bid is fixed. Makes the maximum bid amount unfixed, and if the maximum bid amount is fixed, the compensation is paid to the highest bidder among the bidders who fixed the maximum bid amount. A medium recording the electronic auction control program according to claim 9 or 10. 12. If the highest bidder is the winner of the auction and the second highest bidder at the auction also has the highest bid fixed, the compensation is paid to anyone. 2. The payment is not paid.
A medium in which the electronic auction control program according to 1 is recorded. 13. A program for performing control for determining product allocation and selling price when selling the product via communication means, said program being recorded on a computer-readable recording medium. Using an automatic proxy bidding agent that bids on behalf of the bidder within the maximum bid amount set by the bidder, and for the automatic proxy bidding agent to fix the maximum bid amount early. A step of setting whether or not to allow a bidder to express a will, and a step of granting a predetermined privilege to a bidder who fixed the maximum bid amount early. Electronic auction control program. 14. When granting the predetermined privilege, a discount is made on a payment amount for a winner of an auction, and among the bidders who fix the highest bid amount early on a loser of an auction, 14. The electronic auction control program according to claim 13, wherein the highest bid amount is set such that the highest bid is paid. 15. A method for fixing a maximum bid amount based on a condition that a fixed value needs to be equal to or more than a threshold value in order to fix the maximum bid amount within a predetermined period of an intention to fix the maximum bid amount. Is received from each bidder, and after the period of said intention has passed, the highest bid is fixed if there are two or more bidders who wish to fix the highest bid, otherwise the highest bid is fixed. The bid amount is not fixed, and if the maximum bid amount is fixed, the compensation is paid to the highest bidder among the bidders having fixed the maximum bid amount. An electronic auction control program according to claim 13. 16. If the highest bidder is the winner of the auction and the second highest bidder in the auction also has the highest bid fixed, the compensation is paid to anyone. 16. The electronic auction control program according to claim 15, wherein payment is not made.