JP2002118550A - Person confirming system using computer - Google Patents

Abstract

PROBLEM TO BE SOLVED: To solve the difficulty that a cipher code cannot be prevented from being illegally reused when the cipher code is stolen because the cipher code is fixed in a conventional cipher code collation system in person confirming processing for using a computer system. SOLUTION: An equation designed personally by a user is registered as a cipher, and cipher verification numbers satisfying the equation are inputted at the time of person confirming processing so that person confirmation can be realized. Also, random numbers are used as the variables of the equation, and the cipher verification numbers to be inputted are designed so as to be changed each time so that the cipher verification numbers can be prevented from being reused even when the cipher verification numbers are stolen. Also, the cipher verification numbers which can not be reused are printed on a slip so that whether or not the person confirmation is legally realized can be easily verified in the transaction. Also, targeted cipher equations for facilitating countermeasures to any threat or illegal use or the like are registered, and the cipher verification numbers satisfying those equations are inputted so that it is possible to facilitate countermeasures to any threat or illegal use.

Description

DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE INVENTION

[0001]

BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION 1. Field of the Invention The present invention relates to a personal identification system using a computer.

[0002]

2. Description of the Related Art A conventional personal identification system using a computer will be described with reference to FIG. A conventional personal identification system using a computer is a system in which an authorized user of the computer system uses an encrypted number or an encrypted character (hereinafter referred to as an "encryption code") registered in advance in the computer and uses the computer system. This is an identity verification system that uses a computer to determine that the user is the identity (S704) by matching the encryption code that is input every time (S703) for confirmation.

[0003]

However, according to the technology of the personal identification system using a computer based on the conventional cryptographic code collation, the cryptographic code is used for the user himself / herself, such as date of birth, wedding anniversary, telephone number, employee number, etc. Those that are easy to remember tend to be selected. Such a cryptographic code that is easy for the user to memorize can be easily known or guessed by a third party, and illegal use has occurred.

[0004] Further, even if the authorized user of the computer system does not have any negligence, when the computer system happens to be used on a terminal equipped with a data eavesdropping device, the input encryption code is stolen, and the code is stolen. In some cases, illegally used encrypted codes have been used.

This is because the stolen code can be reused because the code is a fixed number (or character). For this reason, unauthorized use cannot be prevented until the computer system operator is contacted and the stolen encryption code is suspended. In addition, since the stolen object is not an object but data, there is a problem that the user is unaware that the stolen object has been stolen until the data is illegally used and damage occurs.

[0006] Further, even if the identity verification processing is performed against the intention of the person due to intimidation or the like, the conventional technology cannot determine whether the identification processing has been performed against the intention of the person as long as the encryption code matches. No effective action could be taken.

Therefore, the present invention provides: 1. Even if a cryptographic verification number input for identification is stolen, the stolen cryptographic verification number cannot be reused.

[0008] 2. Even if a slip trouble relating to the transaction occurs at a later date, it can be easily verified whether or not the identity verification has been properly performed.

3. A computer capable of coping with a crisis situation in which the identity is confirmed against the will of the individual due to intimidation or the like, or capable of detecting theft when the cryptographic equation is stolen. Is an identity verification system using

[0010]

Means for Solving the Problems In order to solve the above problems, the invention according to claim 1 uses an equation registered in advance by an authorized user of the computer system in the computer system for encrypting the identity, In other words, use a computer that uses as a cryptographic equation and confirms that the user is an authorized user by entering a cryptographic verification number that is a solution of the cryptographic equation when using a computer system. This is an identity verification system.

According to a second aspect of the present invention, in the personal identification system using the computer according to the first aspect of the present invention, a system variable that can be created by a computer is used as a variable constituting a cryptographic equation. This is an identity verification system using a computer, wherein a cryptographic verification number for an identity verification entered by an authorized user when using a computer system changes each time.

According to a third aspect of the present invention, in the personal identification system using a computer according to the second aspect, a cryptographic verification code obtained by combining a cryptographic verification number and a system variable is issued in a transaction using a computer system. By using a computer, it is possible to verify whether or not the identity verification process was properly performed in the voucher transaction by reversing the printed encryption confirmation code by printing on the voucher. It is an identity verification system.

According to a fourth aspect of the present invention, there is provided an identity verification system using a computer according to the first aspect, wherein a cryptographic equation associated with a purpose of use is registered in advance for each purpose of use, and when a computer system is used. An identity verification system using a computer characterized in that a computer performs a process according to a purpose of use by inputting a cryptographic verification number that is a solution of a cryptographic equation related to a purpose of use function.

[0014]

DESCRIPTION OF THE PREFERRED EMBODIMENTS The present invention can be realized in various embodiments. First, the characteristic configuration of the present invention will be described in detail. 1, a cryptographic equation system in which equations are encrypted instead of the conventional cryptographic code system in which codes are encrypted, and a user who is authorized to design this cryptographic equation is uniquely designed and registered in a computer in advance.

2. In order to prove that the user of the computer system knows the cryptographic equation, instead of inputting the cryptographic equation itself at the time of the identity verification process, a number which is the solution of the cryptographic equation, ie, Confirm the identity by entering the cryptographic verification number.

(3) A random number or a system variable such as a date or a time which can be created by a computer, such as a date or a time, is used as an independent variable constituting a cryptographic equation. The cryptographic equation is designed so that the cryptographic verification number is a dependent variable derived from this system variable. As a result, the cryptographic verification number becomes a variable that changes each time the identity verification process is performed.

4. When a system variable, such as a random number, whose value is not known even to the authorized user, is used as a system variable constituting the cryptographic equation, the computer calculates the cryptographic verification number each time the identity verification process is performed. The value of the system variable is output to the terminal as information for the operation. Since the authorized user knows the cryptographic equation, it substitutes the numerical value of the output system variable into the cryptographic equation, calculates and inputs the cryptographic verification number.

5. As described above, since the cryptographic verification number becomes a variable every time the identity verification process is performed, even if the cryptographic verification number is stolen, it cannot be reused.

6. However, even if the cryptographic verification numbers themselves cannot be reused, if the cryptographic verification numbers in multiple transactions of the same authorized user are stolen by eavesdropping or the like, if the cryptographic equation is simple, these It may not be impossible to infer a cryptographic equation from multiple cryptographic verification numbers in. To prevent this, use the second and third system variables in the cryptographic equation, or increase the number of variables by arbitrarily dividing these variables and using the divided partial numbers as variables, or used in cryptographic equations Design your own functions. By thus complicating the cryptographic equation, it is possible to make it sufficiently difficult for a third party to infer the cryptographic equation from the cryptographic verification number.

7. If it is sufficiently difficult to infer the cryptographic equation from the cryptographic verification number and if the cryptographic verification number cannot be reused, the cryptographic verification number should not be hidden from a third party, but should be contradictory to a computer. By printing it on a voucher created when using the system (for example, a transaction voucher for credit card transactions), if a trouble occurs around this voucher at a later date, this voucher is a valid voucher. No, it can be easily verified.

8. Here, the combination of the system variable and the cryptographic verification number used in the identity verification process is not printed on the slip as it is, but the computer encrypts it by a pre-installed encryption method and encrypts the code. If it is printed on a slip, it becomes more difficult to guess the cryptographic equation from the cryptographic confirmation code. On the other hand, whether or not the encryption confirmation code printed on the voucher satisfies the cryptographic equation can be easily determined by decrypting the encryption, and whether or not the voucher is a voucher that has been properly verified. Can be determined.

9. In addition, a plurality of cryptographic equations are registered in advance in addition to the normally used cryptographic equations for each purpose of use, and a cryptographic verification number which is a solution of the cryptographic equation for each purpose of use is input at the time of identity verification processing. This enables the computer to perform processing corresponding to the purpose of use.

10. For example, a crisis response purpose encryption equation is registered in preparation for threats. If an authorized user is forced to perform identity verification processing against the will of the individual due to intimidation, etc., if a cryptographic verification number that satisfies the cryptographic equation for crisis response purpose is entered, the computer will be used for authorized use Knows that the person is in a crisis state, and performs a crisis response process associated with the crisis response purpose cryptographic equation.

[11] Alternatively, it is sufficiently difficult to guess the cryptographic equation from the cryptographic verification number input at the time of the identity verification process, but it is not without possibility that the cryptographic data itself registered in the computer is stolen by any method. Absent. When the cryptographic equation itself is stolen like this,
The plagiarism detection purpose cryptographic equation is registered as a dummy so that the plagiarism can be recognized. If the criminal does not know which cryptographic equation is a dummy among a plurality of cryptographic equations of the stolen cryptographic data and which cryptographic equation is genuine, for example, if one cryptographic equation for the purpose of plagiarism detection is registered, a valid cryptographic equation can be registered. Is 50% used. If two plagiarism equations for plagiarism detection are registered, the probability of using a valid cryptographic equation is 33.3%. In this case, if a function for detecting plagiarism is incorporated if a cryptographic verification number which is a solution of the plagiarism detection purpose cryptographic equation is input, plagiarism can be detected with a probability of 66.6%.

12. Of course, such a purpose-specific processing function must be incorporated in the system in advance in association with the purpose-specific cryptographic equation. This is an identity verification system that uses a computer with a characteristic configuration. The following specifically describes, with reference to the drawings, how to carry out the present invention specifically.

[0026]

First Embodiment In a first embodiment, an embodiment of the present invention will be described by taking a computer system using a card such as a credit card, a cash card, and a David card as an example.

FIG. 1 shows a processing flow for initially registering, in a computer, cryptographic data composed of system variables, cryptographic verification numbers, and cryptographic equations uniquely designed by an authorized user.

First, in a computer system using such a card, even authorized users are users who have different accounts but have different interests. Therefore, the encrypted data for personal identification is set in association with the user (card) ID (S101). Note that (SXXX) in the figure is a code for representing a processing block in the flowchart.

Next, system variables are defined (S102).
System variables are used as independent variables in cryptographic equations. First, define what to use as system variables. It may be a random number that can be generated by a computer, a calendar date (hereinafter referred to as a system date), a timer time (hereinafter referred to as a system time), or other system variables. It is desirable that the variable be changed each time the identity verification process is performed.

If a random number is adopted as a system variable, the system variable changes every time the personal identification processing is performed. However, if the system date is adopted, the system variable does not change in the personal identification processing within the same date. Therefore, the cryptographic verification number, which is a dependent variable of the system variable, does not change in the identity verification process on the same date.

If the system date is used as a system variable, it becomes impossible to prevent unauthorized reuse within the same date if the cryptographic verification number is stolen. Therefore, when using the system date as a system variable, it is necessary to take measures to prevent reuse within the same date, such as using it in combination with the system time.

Further, when using the system date and system time in the cryptographic equation, there is another problem that when using the computer system in a foreign country, the cryptographic verification number must be calculated in consideration of the time difference.

System variables can be any number of digits. System variables need to be named for use in cryptographic equations. At that time, the whole system variable may be defined as one number and named, or may be divided into several numbers and named.

In the example of FIG. 2, the system variable is defined as a six-digit random number. Then, this 6-digit random number is converted to 2 digits by 3
It is divided into two numbers and named XX1, XX2, XX3. Note that this division may be divided into six divisions, one digit at a time, three digits,
It can be divided arbitrarily, such as by dividing it into three digits of one digit or one digit, but consistency in the cryptographic equation is required.

Next, the cryptographic verification number is defined (S103).
The cryptographic verification number is used as a dependent variable in the cryptographic equation.
The cryptographic verification number can be any number of digits. The cryptographic verification numbers need to be named for use in cryptographic equations. The entire cryptographic verification number may be defined as a single number and given a name, or may be divided into several numbers and given names.

In the example of FIG. 3, the cryptographic verification number is defined as a six-digit number. Then, this 6 digit number is converted to 2 digits by 3
Divided into two numbers and named YY1, YY2, and YY3. Note that this division may be divided into six divisions, one digit at a time, three digits,
It can be divided arbitrarily, such as by dividing it into three digits of one digit or one digit, but consistency in the cryptographic equation is required.

Next, the encryption equation is defined (S104). One cryptographic equation may be used, or a plurality of cryptographic equations may be registered for each purpose of use. When a plurality of registrations are registered for each purpose of use, a cryptographic equation for each purpose of use is registered in association with a processing function for achieving the purpose.

The cryptographic equation is composed of an equation or a group of equations using a system variable as an independent variable and a cryptographic verification number as a dependent variable. System variables and constants such as random numbers, system dates, and system times can be used arbitrarily in cryptographic equations. The operator of the cryptographic equation can be arbitrarily designed.

In the example of FIG. 4, a cryptographic equation for normal processing is a cryptographic equation for normal processing, and a cryptographic equation for crisis response which is used when the identity verification processing must be performed against the will of the principal due to intimidation. And a cryptographic equation for plagiarism detection purpose.

Normally, a cryptographic verification number is divided into three numbers YY1, YY2, and XX1, XX2, and XX3, which are obtained by dividing a system variable, which is a random number, into three parts, and three constants.
Defines an equation group consisting of three equations that derive YY3. The function ABS () used here is a function that returns the absolute value of the operation result in ().

A number YY1, YY2, YY3 obtained by dividing a cryptographic verification number into three using three constants as a crisis response purpose cryptographic equation.
Is defined as a group of equations composed of three equations that derive. At the same time, when the cryptographic verification number, which is the solution to the crisis response purpose cryptographic equation, is input, the computer is set to execute the crisis response function.

As a plagiarism detection purpose cryptographic equation, numbers XX1, XX2, XX3 obtained by dividing a system variable, which is a random number, into three, and three numbers YY1, YY2, obtained by dividing a cryptographic verification number into three using three constants.
Defines an equation group consisting of three equations that derive YY3. At the same time, when the cryptographic verification number, which is the solution of the plagiarism detection purpose cryptographic equation, is input, the computer is set to execute the plagiarism handling function. This completes the initial registration of the encrypted data.

Next, an identification processing flow when using a computer system will be described with reference to FIG. Note that the personal identification processing flow in this embodiment is based on the premise that the computer of the computer system operator and the point-of-sale terminal of the retail store using the computer are connected online.

Since the first embodiment uses user-specific encryption as described above, the computer system user inputs a user (card) ID into the computer by reading a card from the terminal (S501).

After checking the user (card) ID, the computer is a 6-digit random number based on the encrypted data associated with the user (card) ID that the authorized user initially registered in FIGS. A system variable 324587 is created and returned to the terminal to request input of a cryptographic verification number (S50
2).

If the computer system user who has received the system variable 324587 is a valid authorized user and is performing identity verification processing in a normal state, he or she has initially registered a cryptographic equation for normal processing (FIG. 4) Since we know that ABS (XX1-54) = YY1 ABS (XX2-67) = YY2 ABS (XX3-23) = YY3, substituting the currently received system variable 324587 gives ABS (32- 54) = 22 ABS (45-67) = 22 ABS (87-23) = 64, and it can be calculated that the cryptographic verification number becomes 222264. Then, this 222264 is input as a cryptographic verification number (S503).

The computer to which 222264 has been input as the cryptographic verification number substitutes the cryptographic verification number 222264 and the system variable 324587 into the cryptographic equation. Then, ABS (32-54) = 22 ABS (45-67) = 22 ABS (87-23) = 64, and it is found that the input cryptographic verification number 222264 is a solution of the normal processing purpose cryptographic equation (S504). .

As a result, the computer determines that the user of the computer system is the authorized user in the normal state (S505) and performs the normal processing (S506).

Next, an encryption confirmation code is prepared and printed on a slip to prevent trouble at a later date (S507). The process of producing the encryption confirmation code and printing it on the slip will be described with reference to FIG. 6 using numerical examples. The system variable 324587 and the cryptographic verification numeral 222264 are cryptographically converted (S601) using the cryptographic table (T601) to generate an encryption confirmation code DCEFIHCCCCGE and print it on the slip. This encryption method may be arbitrary.

When a trouble occurs in this transaction at a later date, it is determined whether or not the identity verification process has been properly performed by decrypting the encryption confirmation code DCEFIHCCCCGE printed on the voucher, thereby obtaining a system variable 324587 and a cryptographic verification number 222264. Can be verified by decrypting it and applying it to a cryptographic equation.

Transactions using a card such as a credit card are not only performed at a business office operated by a computer system operator, but are often performed at a retail store affiliated with the computer system operator. In this case, the person in charge of the third party, the retailer, performs identity verification processing, and thus it is a basic requirement for fraud prevention to be able to easily verify whether the identity verification has been properly performed. .

Next, the use of the cryptographic equation for each purpose of use will be described by taking as an example a case where a user authorized by threats or the like confirms the user's identity against his / her will and a case where the cryptographic equation is stolen.

When a user authorized by threats or the like confirms his / her identity against his / her own intention, he / she has registered YY1 = 99 YY2 = 99 YY3 = 99 as the crisis response purpose cryptographic equation, so that the cryptographic verification number is 999999. Is input (S503).

The computer to which 999999 is input as the cryptographic verification number determines that the authorized user is in a crisis state (S505) because the cryptographic verification number is a solution of the crisis-purpose cryptographic equation (S504). Then, a crisis response processing function associated in advance is executed (S506).

Next, a case where a cryptographic verification number satisfying the plagiarism detection purpose cryptographic equation is input will be described. Authorized users usually use the cryptographic equation for processing purposes and do not use the cryptographic equation for plagiarism detection. Therefore,
If the input cryptographic verification number is 201131, ABS (32-12) = 20 ABS (45-34) = 11 ABS (87-56) = 31 It is a solution, meaning that someone else is plagiarizing the cryptographic equation. Then, the computer executes a plagiarism handling processing function registered in association with the plagiarism detection purpose cryptographic equation.

Here, it is assumed that the culprit stealing the cryptographic equation does not know which of the plurality of registered cryptographic equations is the normal processing purpose cryptographic equation and which is the cryptographic detection purpose cryptographic equation. Then, the probability that the criminal uses the cryptographic detection purpose cryptographic equation, that is, the plagiarism detection rate is N / (N +
1).

Now, the computer using the card
Although the embodiment of the present invention has been described using a system as an example, a user directly inputs a user ID instead of a card input without using a card, or a terminal of a user personal terminal
If the ID is entered as a user ID or the like, it is the same as the embodiment in the computer system using the card.

[0058]

[Embodiment 2] An IC chip built into an electronic device which has recently become popular has a processor function of a computer,
It has a memory function and some input / output functions. Therefore, the functions performed by the computer in the first embodiment
By substituting chips for these electronic devices,
The present invention can be implemented to prevent unauthorized use by a person.

In the initial registration of the encrypted data, the data registered in the computer in the first embodiment is built in the electronic device.
Except for the registration in the IC chip, it is the same as that described in the first embodiment with reference to FIGS.

The personal identification processing flow when using an electronic device has been described in the first embodiment with reference to FIGS. 5 and 6, except that an IC chip built in the electronic device is used instead of the computer. The description is omitted because it is the same as the above. However, if there is no slip, there is no need for an encryption confirmation code.

A specific example in which the second embodiment is applied to an automobile will be additionally described. In the prior art, a key was used to lock a car door or start an engine, so the key was stolen or copied, so that the car was stolen or stolen using the copied key An accident has occurred. In addition, there is no effective preventive measure against hijacking of a vehicle due to so-called carjacking.

Therefore, a method for preventing such crimes by using the personal identification system using the computer of the present invention instead of the key in the prior art will be described. First, an IC chip is mounted on a car, and the encrypted data is registered in the IC chip in advance as shown in FIGS. Then, when driving the car, the door is not opened and the engine is not started unless the identity is confirmed as shown in FIG. The engine is automatically turned off when the driver leaves the seat.

In this case, since there is no physical key, the key is neither stolen nor copied. Don't forget to leave your car with the key attached. In addition, even if the cryptographic verification number in place of the key is stolen, it cannot be reused. Then, it is possible to cope with hijacking of a vehicle by inputting a cryptographic verification number that satisfies a crisis response purpose cryptographic equation. As one of the crisis coping functions, for example, a carjacker can transmit a SOS by radio to notify a crisis state as if the carjacker seems to be following the criminal's request. Thus, by using the present invention, it is possible to construct a system with higher security than the key in the conventional technology.

[0064]

Third Embodiment In the first and second embodiments, it is assumed that an authorized user of a computer system initially registers encrypted data originally designed.
In order to reduce the burden on authorized users of the system, the computer system operator prepares a plurality of encrypted data prototypes in advance, and from among them, the authorized user of the computer system You can select a data prototype and use it as is, or customize it with some modifications.

A specific example of the encrypted data prototype will be described with reference to FIGS. The cryptographic data prototype example 1 shown in FIG. 8 is obtained by converting the two-digit partial numbers XX1, XX2, and XX3 of the six-digit system variable (a) to the two-digit partial numbers DD1, DD2, and DD3 of the six-digit system date (b). Calculate the absolute value of the answer and calculate the two-digit partial number YY1, YY of the six-digit cryptographic verification number (d)
2. This is a cryptographic equation that derives YY3.

The encrypted data prototype example 2 in FIG. 9 is a one-digit partial number XX1, XX2, XX of a six-digit system variable (a).
3, XX4, XX5, XX6 6-digit system date (b) 1-digit partial digits DD1, DD2, DD3, DD4, DD5, and DD6 are subtracted, and the absolute value of the answer is obtained to obtain a 6-digit cryptographic verification number ( d) 1
This is a cryptographic equation for deriving the partial digits YY1, YY2, YY3, YY4, YY5, and YY6.

FIG. 10 shows an encrypted data prototype example 3
Is the two-digit partial number XX1, XX2, of the six-digit system variable (a)
XX3 and 6-digit system date (b) 2-digit partial digits DD1, DD
2. This is a cryptographic equation that derives 2-digit partial numbers YY1, YY2, and YY3 of a 6-digit cryptographic verification number (d) using a function AFRZ () uniquely created from DD3.

Note that the function AFRZ (A + B) independently created is A + B
Is defined as a function that ignores the excess when the answer exceeds the larger number of digits in A or B. For example, the answer 44 of 32 + 12 is 2 digits, so the answer of AFRZ (32 + 12) is 44 as it is, but the answer of 87 + 27 is 114, 3 digits, so ignore the third digit
The answer for AFRZ (87 + 27) is 14.

Example 4 of encrypted data prototype in FIG.
Is a one-digit partial number XX1, XX2, of a six-digit system variable (a)
XX3, XX4, XX5, XX6 and the 6-digit system date (b) The 1-digit partial digits DD1, DD2, DD3, DD4, DD5, DD6 and the 6-digit cryptographic verification number (d ) Is a cryptographic equation for deriving one-digit partial numbers YY1, YY2, YY3, YY4, YY5, and YY6.

Example 5 of Encrypted Data Prototype in FIG.
Is the two-digit partial number XX1, XX2, of the six-digit system variable (a)
XX3 is subtracted from each of the constants 83, 36, and 28 to find the absolute value of the answer, and the 2-digit partial number Y of the 6-digit cryptographic verification number (d)
This is a cryptographic equation that derives Y1, YY2, and YY3. As for this constant, an authorized user may initially register an arbitrary number.

Example 6 of Encrypted Data Prototype in FIG.
Is a one-digit partial number XX1, XX2, of a six-digit system variable (a)
Constants 8, 3, 3, 6, 2, 8 from XX3, XX4, XX5, XX6
And the absolute value of the answer is obtained, and the one-digit partial number YY1, YY2, YY3, YY4, YY5, YY6 of the six-digit cryptographic verification number (d)
Is a cryptographic equation that derives

Example 7 of Encrypted Data Prototype in FIG.
Is a one-digit partial number XX1, XX2, of a six-digit system variable (a)
XX3, XX4, XX5, and XX6 are cryptographic equations for deriving one-digit partial numbers YY1, YY2, YY3, YY4, and YY5 of a six-digit cryptographic verification number (d). Here, YY6 in FIG. 14D is indicated as X, but is not used in the cryptographic equation. Therefore, the sixth digit of the cryptographic verification number may or may not be inserted. It is represented using X. By inserting such useless digits, it becomes more difficult to infer a cryptographic equation from a cryptographic verification number.

Although the system variables output from the computer due to the division of the number of digits of the variables handled, operators, or differences in the equations are the same 324587, the cryptographic verification numbers that are the solutions of the cryptographic equations are the same as those in FIG. Prototype Example 1 203760 FIG. 9 Encrypted Data Prototype Example 2 204360 FIG. 10 Encrypted Data Prototype Example 3 445314 FIG. 11 Encrypted Data Prototype Example 4 444304 FIG. 12 Encrypted Data Prototype Example 5 510959 FIG. 13 Encrypted Data Prototype example 6 ... 511161 FIG. 14 Encrypted data Prototype example 7 ... 12131 X The numbers are completely different.

As described above, even in only seven cases, even if a third party eavesdrops on a system variable output from a computer and a cryptographic verification number input by an authorized user, it is possible to infer a cryptographic equation from the data. It turns out to be difficult enough.

Although only seven examples of encrypted data prototypes have been illustrated here, any number of other encrypted data prototypes can be created.

Therefore, even if the authorized user of the computer system does not have to design the encrypted data by himself, the computer system operator can obtain the encrypted data as shown in the encrypted data prototype examples 1 to 7.
Prepare a sufficient number of prototypes and let the authorized user of the computer system select their own encrypted data prototype and use it as it is, or customize it with some modifications It is possible to build an identity verification system that uses a computer with high crime prevention.

As described above, if the computer system operator prepares an encrypted data prototype, an identity verification system using a computer which is easy to handle for a user who is authorized to use the computer system and has high security can be constructed. .

[0078]

As described above, according to the present invention, the following effects can be obtained. 1. Even if the cryptographic verification number input for identification is stolen, the cryptographic verification number cannot be reused.

2. It is difficult to analogize the cryptographic equation, which is a cryptographic code, from system variables that may be eavesdropping or the like and cryptographic verification numbers.

3. Even if a trouble occurs with respect to the transaction slip at a later date, it can be easily verified whether or not the identity verification processing has been properly performed by verifying the encryption check code printed on the slip.

4. By registering a cryptographic equation for each purpose of use, it is possible to use a computer system according to the purpose of, for example, responding to a crisis or detecting plagiarism.

[Brief description of the drawings]

FIG. 1 is a block diagram showing a processing flow for initially registering encrypted data in a computer or an IC chip.

FIG. 2 is a diagram illustrating a definition example for using a system variable in a cryptographic equation.

FIG. 3 is a diagram showing a definition example for using a cryptographic verification number in a cryptographic equation.

FIG. 4 is a diagram showing a definition example of a cryptographic equation.

FIG. 5 is a block diagram illustrating a flow of personal identification processing when using a computer system, using a numerical example.

FIG. 6 is a block diagram illustrating an encryption confirmation code production and printing flow in the personal identification processing flow.

FIG. 7 is a block diagram illustrating an identification processing flow when a computer system in a conventional system is used.

FIG. 8 is a first example of encrypted data prototype.

FIG. 9 is an encrypted data prototype example 2;

FIG. 10 is an encrypted data prototype example 3;

FIG. 11 is an encrypted data prototype example 4;

FIG. 12 shows an encrypted data prototype example 5;

FIG. 13 is an encrypted data prototype example 6;

FIG. 14 is an encrypted data prototype example 7;

Claims (4)

[Claims] 1. An encryption system, which is a solution of a cryptographic equation when a computer system is used by using an equation registered in advance in a computer system by an authorized user of the computer system as a cryptogram for identity verification, that is, a cryptographic equation. An identity verification system using a computer, characterized by confirming that a user is an authorized user by entering a verification number. 2. An authorized user of a computer system according to claim 1, wherein in the personal identification system using the computer according to claim 1, a system variable that can be created by a computer is used as a variable constituting a cryptographic equation. A personal identification system using a computer, characterized in that a cryptographic verification number entered for personal identification when using a computer system changes each time. 3. A computer-based identity verification system according to claim 2, wherein a cryptographic verification code obtained by combining a cryptographic verification number and a system variable is printed on a slip issued in a transaction using a computer system. A personal identification system using a computer, which can verify whether or not the personal identification processing was properly performed in the voucher transaction by following the printed encryption verification code in reverse. 4. The personal identification system using a computer according to claim 1, wherein a cryptographic equation associated with the purpose function is registered in advance for each purpose of use, and the cryptographic equation associated with the purpose purpose function is used when using the computer system. A personal identification system using a computer, wherein a computer performs processing according to a purpose of use by inputting a cryptographic verification number that is a solution of a cryptographic equation.