JP2002082611A - Method for maintaining transaction information and storage source computer - Google Patents

Abstract

PROBLEM TO BE SOLVED: To provide a technique enabling a third party certifier to store and transfer transaction information and disclose the truth. SOLUTION: This method comprises a step wherein a third party certifier receives the transaction information from an electronic transaction dealer and stores it, a step wherein the certifier transfers the transaction information to a specified customer, and a step wherein the certifier discloses the stored transaction information and presents the contents on receiving a request from the dealer or the customer.

Description

DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE INVENTION

[0001]

BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION 1. Field of the Invention The present invention relates to electronic commerce via the Internet, and stores the contents of transaction information sent in the original transaction by a third party storage organization (certification source) and transfers it to the customer. The present invention relates to a technology that is effective when applied to a business that certifies the contents of legitimate transaction information by disclosing it when necessary.

[0002]

2. Description of the Related Art Conventionally, when conducting electronic commerce using the Internet, the legitimacy of transaction information (prevention of falsification of contents and subsequent denial of transaction fact) is guaranteed by using digital signature technology. ing. Specifically, an electronic certificate for certifying the identity of the transaction source is attached to the transaction information, or the value obtained by compressing (hashing) the transaction information and summarizing (digesting) the secret key of the public key cryptosystem is used. And then attach it together with the transaction information, or encrypt the transaction information with a common encryption key common to the transaction source and the business partner and send it.

[0003] Conventional methods for certifying transaction information include, for example, the following.

(A) E-mail transmission contents certifying system (Japanese Patent Laid-Open No. 11-234330) A third party certifies the exchange of e-mail between trading parties, so that the contents are not directly transmitted to the other party but transmitted. Is sent to the computer center once, the contents of the transmission are recorded, and then transmitted from the center to the other party, and at a later date when necessary, it is proved to the third party on behalf of the party.

(B) Apparatus and method for transaction certification in a network environment (Japanese Patent Laid-Open Publication No. Hei 10-187836) A transaction document exchanged between users is sent to a notary public with a digital signature of each of the transaction parties. To keep the content of the transaction objectively proved.

[0006]

However, such a conventional method has the following problems. That is, in the electronic commerce via the Internet using the conventional digital signature technology, it is based on the trust in security technology that it is difficult to perform a correct electronic signature on the contents of the transaction information besides the transaction source. . However, the security technology and the hacking technology that attempts to break it (hacking) are developing so-called tricks, and there is a problem that it cannot be said that there is no possibility that a digital signature is forged.

If the electronic signature of the transaction source is forged,
In fact, the contents of the transaction information sent by the transaction source are falsified and it is assumed that different transaction contents have been applied, and an unfair price is charged, or the transaction source falsifies fictitious transaction information and loses social trust There is a problem that fits the damage such as doing.

Further, the above-described conventional fraud prevention method has, for example, the following problem.

In the electronic mail transmission content certifying system (Japanese Patent Laid-Open No. 11-234330), the communication means is electronic mail. In recent years, spoofed emails by malicious third parties who falsify the source (address) have become a problem, but the e-mail transmission content proofing system cannot cope with this, and There is a problem that the computer center records and sends it to the other party.

[0010] In a transaction certifying apparatus and method in a network environment (Japanese Patent Laid-Open Publication No. Hei 10-187836), if a source of transaction information of a malicious third party forges an electronic signature, the transmission destination and the notary public will There is a problem that wrong transaction information is stored.

[0011] The object of the present invention is to solve the above problem, even if the electronic signature of the transaction source is falsified and the transaction information is falsified to false content or forged by a third party.
To provide a technology that can provide a service that certifies the authenticity of a transaction by sending a request to store the contents of the transaction information actually sent by the supplier to a third-party certification source and disclose it as necessary from the certification source. is there.

[0012]

SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION According to the present invention, in the case of electronic commerce via the Internet, when a transaction source judges that the contents of the transaction information need to be proved for a certain period of time, the transaction information is appropriately trusted. The storage institution, which is the certifying source of the third party, relays and stores the transaction information sent to the business partner, and when necessary, the certifying source discloses the contents of the transaction information.

In ordinary electronic commerce via the Internet, transaction information with an electronic signature or the like is directly sent from a transaction source to a business partner to establish a transaction between the two parties. Send the transaction information to a third-party certifying source so that the content of the information can be disclosed and have it stored. At this time, a unique identifier is assigned to the transaction source from the certification source and sent to the transaction source, so that the identity of the transaction source can be confirmed and the genuine transaction information stored in the certification source is identified To search,
You can disclose the contents.

Next, the transaction information is digitally signed by the certification source and transferred to the business partner, so that the business partner recognizes that the contents of the transaction information are transferred and stored by the certification source. Therefore, even if the security technology of the supplier's electronic signature used to prove the authenticity of the transaction information within the expiration date of the transaction may be broken,
The contents of the genuine transaction information transferred by the certifying source are stored, and it is guaranteed that the contents will be disclosed if necessary.

[0015] Even if a business partner or other third party can falsify the electronic signature of the transaction information of the transaction source and falsify or forge the content of the transaction information, the certification source discloses the original content of the transaction information. It is possible to guarantee that a fraudulent act cannot be performed on the transaction information transmitting side.

In the present invention, unlike the case of the electronic mail transmission content certifying system device (Japanese Patent Laid-Open No. 11-234330), transaction information is exchanged using the electronic signature of the transmission source. Is difficult to impersonate. Furthermore, a unique identifier of the storage information managed by the certification source is issued and given to the transmission source in advance, and the transmission source includes this identifier in the transaction information, encrypts it with the transmission source's private key, and requests the certification source to transfer it. Therefore, the certification source can confirm the identity of the sender by exchanging identifiers,
Since the sender has electronically signed the transaction data and transmitted the information including the identifier, it is possible to prevent a third party from impersonating the sender and transmitting the forged transaction information.

Further, according to the present invention, an apparatus and method for proving a transaction in a network environment (Japanese Patent Laid-Open No. Hei 10-1878)
36), the certifying source passes the identifier given to the transaction information to the sender, confirms the identity, digitally signs the transaction data of the sender, and partially transmits the transaction information to the sender. Encrypted with the secret key, transferred to the storage source and stored, and the storage source encrypts part of the transaction information with the storage source's secret key and sends it to the destination, so the source and storage source's private key It is doubly encrypted, making it almost impossible for a malicious third party to pretend to be a legitimate source and send forged transaction information to the destination.

As described above, according to the electronic signature transaction information certifying method for electronic commerce via the Internet of the present invention, there is no falsification or falsification of the electronic signature or other transaction information by a person other than the transaction source. Establishes a provable e-commerce.

Further, each computer creates an electronic signature including time information such as the transmission / reception time of the transaction information.
Further, the time information is prevented from being falsified by encrypting with the secret key, and it is possible to prove the time when and where the transaction information is transmitted and received by what route.

[0020]

BEST MODE FOR CARRYING OUT THE INVENTION In the following, a third party certification source receives and stores transaction information from a transaction information transmission source, and then encrypts a part of the transaction information from a certification source before trading. An electronic transaction information content certifying method according to an embodiment will be described in which the content of the transaction information transferred to the business partner is disclosed as necessary by the certifying source to the customer.

FIG. 1 is a diagram showing the configuration of the entire system of the present embodiment. As shown in FIG. 1, the storage institution C computer 101 (certification source) is a transaction source A computer 111.
(Transaction source) issues an identifier C for uniquely identifying transaction information to be stored and transferred from now on.

Next, the supplier A computer 111 transmits the acquired identifier C and a certificate A for certifying the identity of the supplier A.
Is attached to the transaction information, the transaction information A 112 is electronically signed and sent to the storage institution C computer 101, and the transaction information A 112
Storage of 112 and supplier B computer 121 (supplier)
Request transfer to.

The storage institution C computer 101 stores the transmitted transaction information A 112 in the storage database 102, encrypts a part of the transaction information A 122, and transfers it to the supplier B computer 121.

The supplier B computer 121 stores the transaction data A1 encrypted by the depository C computer 101.
Then, the transaction information A112 is obtained by decrypting the transaction information A22 and decrypting the transaction information with the encryption and the electronic signature of the transaction source A computer 111.

Then, the storage institution C computer 101
If necessary, the transaction information A 112 stored in the storage database 102 is disclosed, and the transaction source A computer 11
1 presents the contents of the transaction information of the transaction information A112 actually sent.

Although not shown in the figure, there is an implicitly fourth substantially reliable certificate authority computer to supplement the mechanism of the public key infrastructure (PKI) used in the present invention. Manages the public key and the certificate of each of them, and discloses the public key as necessary, respectively.
Computer 101 and supplier B computer 121
Obtains the information on the public key of the communication partner. Further, the certificate authority computer is a storage institution C computer 10
It may be the same as 1.

Similarly, although not shown in the figure, with respect to charging of the content proof service performed by the certifying source, a membership fee is collected as a member-based service to the transaction source (storage request source) or a storage request is received. Charges are made according to the usage amount such as the number of transaction information, the data amount, the storage period, etc., and the encryption when the transaction information is encrypted while being stored in the storage institution C computer 101 as an option for strengthening security. It is possible to charge according to the strength (the length of the encryption key, the encryption method, the frequency of updating the encryption key to be used, etc.) and to collect the fee when disclosing the stored transaction information It is.

Although not described in the present embodiment, the transaction information A 112 is encrypted with a secret key such as a common key cryptosystem shared between the transaction source A computer 111 and the business partner B computer 121. Institution C
If the computer 101 keeps it confidential, it is possible to store the transaction information A112 in a format that cannot be decrypted by the storage institution C computer 101 alone in the storage institution C computer 101. It is also possible to increase. in this case,
At the time of the storage information disclosure processing by the storage institution C computer 101, it is necessary to add processing such as separately obtaining a secret key of a common key encryption for decryption from the supplier A computer 111 or the supplier B computer 121.

FIG. 2 shows a certification source (storage institution C) of this embodiment.
FIG. 3 is a diagram illustrating an example of the contents of a management table group included in a computer 101). As shown in FIG.
2 has table information that can be classified into the following four types.
First, a storage data management table 200 for managing the transaction information to be stored, second, a control data management table 220 for managing the control data of the transaction information A 112 to be transferred to the supplier B computer 121, and third, a supplier B computer 1
21, a transaction data management table 230 for managing actual detailed transaction content information (product name, quantity, price, delivery date, etc.) of the transaction information A 112 to be transferred; 9 is a public key encryption C management table 240 for managing encryption information.

The first storage data management table 200 includes:
Storage identifier 2 for uniquely identifying transaction information to be stored
01, the public key A owned by the supplier A computer 111
Certificate A 202 certifying such information, a source A address 203 for indicating the location of the transaction source A computer 111, and a transmission for indicating the location of the transaction B computer 121 to which the transaction information is transferred. Destination B address 2
04, a storage expiration date 205 for designating how long the transaction information should be stored in the storage institution C computer 101, and a transfer time for indicating the date and time when the storage information was transferred from the storage institution C computer 101 to the supplier B computer 121. Stamp 206, customer B computer 12
1, control data size 207 for indicating the size of the control data of the transaction information to be transferred to
The transaction data size 208 for indicating the size of the information of the actual detailed transaction contents of the transaction information to be transferred to 21, the control data address 209 for indicating the position of the control data of the transaction information in the control data management table 220, the transaction Transaction data address 2 for indicating the position of actual detailed transaction content information of transaction information in data management table 230
10. Decrypt the electronic signature A221 (information for confirming the validity of the sender and the contents of the transaction data A231) included in the encrypted control data in the transaction information from the transaction source A computer 111. Public key A211 of transaction source A computer 111 (actually, public key A211 is obtained from certificate A202 attached to control data of transaction information transmitted by transaction source A111), and business partner B The public key B212 of the supplier B computer 121 used for encrypting the transmission data encryption key 204 to be transferred to the computer 121 (delivery of the transmission key), and the public key used when transferring transaction information to the supplier B computer 121 Public key cryptography C address 2 for indicating the position of information of public key cryptography C in cryptography C management table 240
13. The storage institution C computer 101 is a certificate C214 attached to the control data sent from the storage institution C computer 101 to transmit the information of its own public key C216 to the supplier B computer 121, and a registrant of the certificate C214. It is composed of a registrant name C215 representing the name of the storage institution C computer 101, a public key C216 of the public key encryption of the storage institution C computer 101, and a certificate C expiration date 217 which is an expiration date of the certificate C214.

The second control data management table 220
A group of control data of transaction information that is actually transferred to the supplier B computer 121.
Sent to the storage institution C computer 101, the storage identifier 201 (same as the identifier C), the certificate A2
02, an electronic signature A221 of the transaction data A231 sent by the supplier A computer 111 to the storage institution C computer 101, and a transmission time stamp indicating the date and time when the supplier A computer 111 transmitted the transaction information to the storage institution C computer 101 222, an encryption option 223 for specifying whether or not to encrypt the transaction information during transmission and specifying which encryption method to use, and a transmission data encryption for specifying an encryption key for encrypting with the encryption option 223 It consists of a group of keys 224 or more.

The third transaction data management table 230 includes:
Transaction data A2 which is data of actual detailed transaction contents of the transaction information actually transferred to the supplier B computer 121
It consists of 31 groups. The transaction data A 231 is a transmission data encryption key 224 if the encryption option 223 is specified.
Is encrypted.

Fourth public key encryption C management table 240
Is composed of a collection of the public keys C241, secret keys C242, and public key cryptography C expiration dates 243 used to represent the expiration dates of the public key cryptography C used by the storage institution C computer 101. The public key C241 is used by the supplier B computer 121 to decrypt (confirm the transfer source) the control data encrypted and transferred from the storage institution C computer 101. The secret key C242 is used for decrypting the transmission data encryption key 224 transmitted from the transaction source A computer 111, and for controlling the transmission data encryption key 224 from the storage organization C computer 101 to the transaction destination B computer 121 for both security of the transmission data and proof of the transmission source. Is used to encrypt

FIG. 3 is a diagram showing an example of the contents of the management table group of the supplier A computer 111 of the present embodiment. As shown in FIG. 3, the supplier A computer 111 has the following two pieces of table information. First, a transmission data management table 30 for managing the contents of transaction information to be transmitted
0, secondly, a public key cryptography A management table 3 for managing information on successive public key cryptography of the supplier A computer 111
It is 10.

The first transmission data management table 300 includes:
Storage identifier 2 to be transmitted to the storage institution C computer 101
01, a certificate A202, a registrant name A301 for indicating the identification name of the owner of the certificate A202, a public key A211, a certificate A expiration date 302 for indicating the expiration date of the certificate A202, and a transmission source A address 203. , Destination B address 2
04, storage expiration date 205, control data size 207, transaction data size 208, electronic signature A221, transmission time stamp 222, encryption option 223, transmission data encryption key 224, transaction data representing detailed transaction contents of actual transaction information A231, Storage Institution C Computer 101
And a public key C 241 for indicating the position of the information of the public key A 211 in the public key encryption A management table 310 used when transferring the transaction information to the client B computer 121 and the public key C 241. It consists of.

Second public key encryption A management table 310
Are the public keys A211 used by the transaction source A computer 111, and the secret key A31 used to generate the electronic signature A221 transmitted to the depository C computer 101.
1, a public key cryptography A expiration date 312 for indicating the expiration date of the public key A, and a collection of the above.

FIG. 4 is a diagram showing an example of the contents of a management table group included in the supplier B computer 121 of this embodiment. As shown in FIG. 4, the supplier B computer 121 has the following two pieces of table information. First, a received data management table 40 for managing the contents of the transaction information to be transmitted
0, secondly, a public key encryption B management table 4 for managing information on successive public key encryptions of the supplier B computer 121
It is 10.

The first received data management table 400 is
A certificate C214, a storage identifier 201, a certificate A202, a transfer time stamp 206, and a transaction source A computer 111 attached to the storage institution C computer 101 for decrypting the encrypted control data are stored in the storage institution C computer 101. Electronic signature A22 transferred via
1, transmission time stamp 222, encryption option 22
3, a transmission data encryption key 224, transaction data A231, and a public key A211.

Second public key encryption B management table 410
Represents the successive public keys B212 used by the supplier B computer 121, the secret key B411 used to decrypt the transmission data encryption key 224 transferred from the storage institution C computer 101, and the expiration date of the public key encryption B. Public key cryptography B expiration date 412, and a group of the above.

FIGS. 5 to 7 are for simply supplementing the outline of the mechanism of the electronic signature used in the electronic commerce. In this description, the form of an electronic signature in a general two-party electronic commerce is omitted, and the source A indicates the source A computer 111 and the destination B indicates the destination B computer 121. The processing of the storage institution C computer 101 according to the present invention mediates transaction information from the supplier A computer 111 to the supplier B computer 121, and will be described separately.

FIG. 5 is a diagram schematically showing an example of processing for generating a digital signature according to the present embodiment. FIG. 5 shows a part of the process for certifying that the transaction data is definitely sent from the source A using the mechanism of the public key cryptosystem and the electronic signature and that the contents are not falsified. First, the transmission source A compresses (hashes) the transaction data A231 into short data to obtain a message digest A501. Next, the digital signature A 221 is obtained by encrypting using the secret key A 311 of the transaction source A.
Then, the digital signature A 221 is sent to the transmission destination B, and is decrypted using the public key A 211 of the transmission source A to obtain a message digest A 501 again.

FIG. 6 is a diagram schematically showing an example of processing for encrypting and decrypting a certificate according to the present embodiment. FIG. 6 shows a process in which the certificate authority certifies the validity of the certificate A202 by the authentication process of the certificate authority using the public key cryptosystem. First, the sender A has a registrant name A301, a public key A211 and a certificate A
Information constituting the certificate A 202 including the expiration date 302 (actually including more information) is provided after being encrypted by the private key 601 of the certificate authority, and is provided by the transmission source A. . Next, source A has its own public key A21.
In order to pass 1 to the destination B, the certificate A 202 encrypted by the certificate authority is sent. Next, at the destination B, the certificate A202 is decrypted using the public key 602 of the certificate authority, the contents of the information of the certificate A202 are decrypted, and the public key A2 of the source A is decrypted.
11 is acquired. These processes prove that the certificate A202 is indeed a legitimate one issued by a certificate authority, and that its contents are guaranteed.

FIG. 7 shows the transaction data of the present embodiment encrypted and
It is a figure which shows the outline of the example of a process to decode. In FIG. 7, transaction data is acquired using a data compression technique (hash), which is a part of the common key cryptosystem and the electronic signature.
In addition, it represents a process for certifying that there is no falsification of the contents sent from the transmission source A without doubt. First, the transmission source A encrypts the transaction data A 231 with the transmission data encryption key 224 according to the common key encryption method and sends it to the transmission destination B. Although not shown in the figure, the secret key (transmission key) of the common key cryptosystem is generally transmitted from the transmission source to the transmission destination after being encrypted with the public key of the public key encryption of the transmission destination, and the transmission destination is the transmission key. Is securely obtained by decrypting with the private key of the public key encryption of the transmission destination.

The transmission destination B is the transmission data encryption key 224
The transaction data A230 is decrypted using
231 is ready to be read and used. Further, the transaction data A231 is compressed (hashed) in the same manner as performed by the transmission source A in FIG. 5 to obtain a message digest A501,
If the result is the same as the message digest A501 obtained by the transmission destination in FIG. 5, it is proved that the contents of the transaction data A231 are not falsified and that the transmission source of the transaction data A231 is correct to the transmission source A. You.

FIG. 8 shows the certification source (storage institution C
It is a flowchart which shows the processing procedure of the process which the computer 101) issues a storage identifier.

First, in step 801, the storage institution C computer 101 receives a request for issuing the storage identifier 201 from the transaction source A computer 111.

In step 802, the storage institution C computer 101 issues a unique storage identifier 201 in the storage database 102 upon request and notifies the transaction source A computer 111. The storage identifier 201 is information serving as a selection key when requesting disclosure of transaction information stored in the storage institution C computer 101. Also, the storage identifier 201 is returned to the transaction source A computer 111, which is the legitimate transmission source requesting the issuance, so that the third party modifies the transmission source address and impersonates the storage identifier 20.
Even if an issuance request is issued, since the storage identifier 201 is not returned to the impersonating third party, it is guaranteed that only the authorized supplier A computer 111 can obtain the storage identifier 201.

FIG. 9 shows a certification source (storage institution C) of this embodiment.
It is a flowchart which shows the processing procedure of the process which the computer 101) stores and transfers transaction information to a business partner.

First, in step 901, the transaction information storage from the supplier A computer 111 and the supplier B computer 1
21 is requested to be transferred.

In step 902, the transmission data encryption key 2 is obtained from the storage identifier 201 of the transmission data management table 300 shown in FIG.
Up to 24 various management / control data and transaction data A23
1 (transaction data A230 obtained by encrypting the transaction data A231 with the transmission data encryption key 224 from the encryption option 223 using the encryption option 223), and stores the transaction information such as the storage data management table 200, the control data management table 220, and the transaction data in the storage database 102. It is stored in each of the data management tables 230.

It is assumed that data excluding a part (storage identifier 201, certificate A202) of the control data management table 220 has been encrypted by the transaction source A computer 111 with the secret key A311. Further, the transmission data encryption key 224
Indicates that the storage institution C computer 10 is to be transmitted from the supplier A computer 111 to the storage institution C computer 101.
By encrypting and transmitting with the public key C241 of No. 1,
The risk of leakage to third parties shall be eliminated. The transaction data A 231 is the transaction data management table 2 shown in FIG.
Store in 30. If the transaction data A 231 sent from the transaction source A computer 111 is encrypted with the transmission data encryption key 224, the transaction data A 231 stored in the transaction data management table 230 is also stored in an encrypted state.

The control data management table 220 and the transaction data management table 230 are information stored in the storage institution C computer 101 and transferred to the supplier B computer 121.

In step 903, the transmission data encryption key 224 of the control data stored in the control data management table 220 is set to the public key B 21 of the supplier B computer 121.
By encrypting and transmitting in step 2, the risk of leakage to a third party is eliminated. Further, the control data management table 220 is stored in the secret key C of the
The storage data management table 20 is stored in the control data so as to be encrypted at 242 and decrypted at the supplier B computer 121.
0 certificate C214 is attached.

In step 904, the control data stored in the control data management table 220 and the transaction data A 231 stored in the transaction data management table 230 are transferred to the supplier B computer 121. If the transaction data A 231 has been encrypted with the transmission data encryption key 204 to prevent eavesdropping on a third party by designating the encryption option 223 of the transaction source A computer 111, the transaction data A 231 remains encrypted and transmitted to the business partner B computer 121. Forward. In the storage institution C computer 101, the transaction source A computer 1
11 and the public key C241, the transmission data encryption key 224
Is stored in the control data management table 220. Therefore, when it is necessary to disclose the transaction data A231, the transaction data A231 is decrypted using the transmission data encryption key 224. Is possible.

FIG. 10 is a flowchart showing a processing procedure of a process of disclosing transaction information stored by the certification source (the storage institution C computer 101) according to the present embodiment. FIG. 10 shows a processing procedure in the case where a request for disclosure of the transaction information specified by the storage identifier 201 stored by the storage institution C computer 101 is received and the relevant transaction information is disclosed with the approval of the supplier A computer 111. Represents.

First, in step 1001, a transaction information storage data management table 200, a control data management table 220, and a transaction information disclosure request included in the transaction data management table 230 stored in the storage database 102 of the storage organization C computer 101 are stored. The identifier 201 is received as key information for a target search. The information included in the disclosure request includes, in addition to the storage identifier 201, the name of the disclosure request source, the reason for the disclosure request, and the like. The disclosure request method is not only an electronic communication message to the storage institution C computer 101 connected via a network, but also a physical method such as an e-mail or a mail including an electronic signature of a requester. You may.

In step 1002, it is determined whether or not the disclosure request source is the transaction source A computer 111 that is the source of the transaction information. If the transaction source A computer 111 is used, it is not necessary to inquire whether disclosure is possible, and the process proceeds to step 1005. In the case of a computer other than the supplier A computer 111, the process proceeds to the next step 1003, and an inquiry is made to the supplier A computer 111 as to whether or not to disclose the transaction information. In step 1002, the storage institution C computer 101 checks the source of the disclosure request as the source address in the electronic message of the request for disclosure, the content of the electronic signature attached in the electronic mail, and the transmission written in the email. Judgment is made based on the original name (which can be confirmed including the address and contact information), and in the case of a letter, the name of the sender (which can be confirmed including the address and contact information).

In step 1004, if the transaction source A computer 111 responds to the request to disclose the information, the disclosure request is notified to the disclosure requesting source, and the process is terminated without disclosing the transaction information. If the answer is a disclosure permission, the process proceeds to the next step 1005.

In step 1005, it is first determined from the information in the storage data management table 200 whether or not there is storage data in the storage database 102 of the storage institution C computer 101, and if there is no search target data, the process returns from step 1007. If there are no more records in the storage data management table 200 to be searched, a notification that there is no target record (transaction information corresponding to the storage identifier 201) is sent to the disclosure request source, and the process ends. As long as there is stored data, the process proceeds to the next step 1006.

In step 1006, transaction information having the storage identifier 201 to be requested for disclosure is searched.

In step 1007, if the transaction information having the currently searched storage identifier 201 does not match the storage identifier 201 to be searched and is not applicable, the process returns to step 1005, and if the storage identifier 201 matches and corresponds, the next Proceed to step 1008.

In step 1008, the transaction information corresponding to the search target requested to be disclosed is disclosed, and the process ends.

FIG. 11 shows a transaction source (trade source A) of this embodiment.
It is a flowchart which shows the processing procedure of the process which the computer 111) requests | requires storage and transfer of transaction information to a certification source (storage organization C computer 101).

First, at step 1101, the storage institution C computer 101 is requested to issue a storage identifier 201 for identifying transaction information for which storage and transfer are to be requested, and obtains it.

In step 1102, transaction data A231, which is information of actual detailed transaction contents, is created or prepared in advance.

In step 1103, step 1102
The electronic signature A221 of the transaction data A231 created in step 1102 is created using the compression (hash) technique and the currently valid private key A311 of the public key encryption A management table 310.

At step 1104, transaction data A23
1 is encrypted with the transmission data encryption key 224 according to the designation of the encryption option 223.

In step 1105, control data is created based on information from the storage identifier 201 to the transmission data encryption key 224 on the transmission data management table 300.

In step 1106, step 1105
The transmission data encryption key 224 is encrypted with the public key C241 of the storage institution C computer 101 in the control data created in step 1, and the entire control data except for the storage identifier 201 and the certificate A202 is transferred to the secret key A311 of the transaction source A computer 111. To increase security and prove the identity of the sender.

In step 1107, step 1102
The transaction data A 231 created in step 1 and the control data created in steps 1103 to 1106 are stored in the storage facility C.
The transaction information is transmitted to the computer 101, and a request is made to store the transaction information and transfer it to the supplier B computer 121.

FIG. 12 is a flowchart showing the processing procedure of the processing source (transaction source A computer 111) in response to an inquiry from the certification source (storage institution C computer 101) as to whether or not information can be disclosed.

First, in step 1201, an inquiry as to whether or not to disclose transaction information using a specific storage identifier 201 as key information is received from the storage institution C computer 101.

In step 1202, in response to the inquiry about whether or not to disclose the transaction information accepted in step 1201 according to the judgment of the supplier A computer 111, the storage institution C computer 101 is returned with a response of permission of disclosure or permission of disclosure. In determining whether to permit or disallow the disclosure of transaction information, the necessity of the person who is present at the transaction source A computer 111 in consideration of the relationship between the disclosure request source and the situation where disclosure is required is considered. . For example, a request from a legitimate business partner, a request from a third party who has an interest indirectly involved in a legitimate transaction, or requires cooperation in performing public affairs such as an administrative execution agency. In some cases, it may be necessary to falsify the transaction information for self-defense from a malicious third party who is trying to gain profit.

FIG. 13 shows a business partner (business partner B) of this embodiment.
It is a flowchart which shows the processing procedure of the process by which the computer 121) acquires transaction information.

First, in step 1301, the control data management table 2 transferred from the storage institution C computer 101
Control data having the information configuration indicated by reference numeral 20 and the transaction data A 231 in the transaction data management table 230 are received. The control data is the secret key C242 of the public key encryption C management table 240 of the storage institution C computer 101 which is currently valid.
The transaction data A 231 is encrypted with the transmission data encryption key 224 of the control data management table 220 according to the encryption option.

In step 1302, the encrypted control data of the storage facility C computer 101 is stored in the public key C obtained from the certificate C 214 of the received data management table 400.
Decoding is performed at 241. Further, when the transaction data A 231 is specified to be encrypted by the encryption option 223, the transmission data encryption key 224 is encrypted by the public key B 212 of the supplier B computer 121 by the storage institution C computer 101, so that the secret key B 411 is used. And decrypt it.

In step 1303, the transaction source A computer 111 sends the secret key A 3 in the public key encryption A table 310.
Public key A21 obtained from the certificate A202 in the received data management table 400
Decrypt with 1. If the transaction data A231 has been decrypted, the transaction data A231 is decrypted using the transmission data encryption key 224 of the control data decrypted in step 1302.
Is decrypted. Here, as schematically described in FIGS. 5 and 7, the transaction data A231 is stored in the transaction source A computer 111.
And that the content is not falsified that the control data could be decrypted with the public key A211;
It can be seen from the fact that the value obtained by compressing (hashing) the electronic signature A221 of the decrypted control data and the transaction data A231 matches.

FIG. 14 shows a transaction source (trade source A) of this embodiment.
It is a flowchart which shows the processing procedure of the process which the computer 111), the business partner (the business partner B computer 121), or the other third party (it calls a disclosure request source together) requests information disclosure.

First, in step 1401, the disclosure request source requests the storage institution C computer 101 to disclose transaction information using the specific storage identifier 201 as key information.

At step 1402, whether the disclosure requesting source is the supplier A computer 111 is determined. If the source is the supplier A computer 111, the process proceeds to step 1404. When the disclosure request source is other than the transaction source A computer 111, the process proceeds to the next step 1403.

In step 1403, when the transaction source A computer 111 denies the disclosure request source to the disclosure request source, the disclosure request source cannot obtain the information disclosure and ends the processing. Conversely, if the transaction source A computer 111 has permitted the disclosure to the disclosure request source, the process proceeds to the next step 1404.

At step 1404, the target data corresponding to the transaction information requested to be disclosed is stored in the storage institution C computer 1.
If it is not 01, the disclosure request source cannot obtain the disclosure of the information and ends the processing. On the other hand, if there is applicable data, the process proceeds to the next step 1405.

At step 1405, the data of the transaction information requested for disclosure stored in the storage institution C computer 101 is disclosed, and the disclosure request source can browse the contents. The method of disclosure by the storage institution C computer 101 includes printing the transaction contents as a document,
The electronic signature is attached to the computer 101 and then sent electronically to the disclosure destination.
Alternatively, it may be detached from the device No. 01 and recorded on a transportable storage medium and sent to the disclosure destination. The transaction information to be disclosed includes a transaction data management table 23 shown in FIG.
0, the electronic signature A 221, the certificate A 202, the transmission time stamp 222, and the storage data management table 200 in the control data management table 220.
Is possible.

Note that the storage institution C pretends to be the transaction source A,
The identifier sent to the supplier and the electronic signature of the supplier A may be forged. In that case, the transmission data encryption key 22
4 is not sent to the storage institution C, and only the transaction source A and the business partner B are aware, so that the storage institution C cannot impersonate the business source A and send the transaction data to the business partner B, thus ensuring security. it can.

As described above, even if a third party obtains the secret key A and forges the electronic signature, the third party cannot impersonate the transaction source A because the identifier has not been obtained. If the third party obtains the identifier and falsifies the electronic signature of the supplier A, the disclosure proves that the third party is not the supplier A. Further, in the case where the supplier A orders a product from the supplier B and rejects the order, the compulsory disclosure proves that the supplier A has ordered the product. Disclosure is also an effective means when a third party is a trading partner B and forgeries a selfish order by impersonating the trading partner A. Further, when the depository C impersonates the supplier A and forges the identifier sent to the supplier A and the electronic signature of the supplier A,
It is an effective countermeasure that the supplier A and the supplier B do not disclose the transmission data encryption key to the storage facility C.

Further, by including time information such as a transmission time stamp and a transfer time stamp as data to be encrypted with an electronic signature or a secret key according to the present invention, the effect of preventing tampering of time information is added, and transaction data is included. It is possible to provide a time proof as to when and where the transaction information is transmitted / received and on what route, or whether the time information is falsified. Further, by applying a hash to data including an electronic signature before encrypting the data with a secret key, there is an effect of further preventing tampering.

[0087]

According to the present invention, since the storage organization that stores the transaction information of the electronic commerce can disclose the contents of the transaction information when necessary, the soundness of the transaction in the electronic commerce via the Internet can be ensured. Thus, it is possible for the trading parties to execute non-face-to-face transactions with peace of mind.

[Brief description of the drawings]

FIG. 1 is a diagram showing an image of an entire system according to an embodiment.

FIG. 2 is a diagram illustrating an example of the contents of a management table group possessed by a certification source according to the embodiment;

FIG. 3 is a diagram showing an example of the contents of a management table group possessed by a transaction source according to the embodiment;

FIG. 4 is a diagram showing an example of the contents of a management table group of a business partner according to the embodiment.

FIG. 5 is a diagram schematically illustrating a processing example of generating an electronic signature according to the embodiment;

FIG. 6 is a diagram schematically illustrating an example of a process of encrypting and decrypting a certificate according to the embodiment;

FIG. 7 is a diagram schematically illustrating an example of a process for encrypting and decrypting transaction data according to the embodiment;

FIG. 8 is a flowchart illustrating a processing procedure of processing for issuing a storage identifier of a certification source according to the present embodiment.

FIG. 9 is a flowchart illustrating a processing procedure of processing for storing transaction information of a certification source and transferring the transaction information to a business partner according to the embodiment;

FIG. 10 is a flowchart illustrating a processing procedure of a process of disclosing transaction information stored in a certification source according to the embodiment;

FIG. 11 is a flowchart illustrating a processing procedure of a process in which a transaction source requests the certification source to store and transfer transaction information according to the present embodiment.

FIG. 12 is a flowchart illustrating a processing procedure of a process in response to an inquiry as to whether or not information can be disclosed from a certification source of a transaction source according to the embodiment;

FIG. 13 is a flowchart illustrating a processing procedure of a process of acquiring transaction information of a supplier according to the embodiment.

FIG. 14 is a flowchart illustrating a processing procedure of a process of requesting information disclosure by a business partner, a business partner, or a third party according to the embodiment;

[Explanation of symbols]

101: Storage institution C computer, 102: Storage database, 111: Transaction source A computer, 112: Transaction information A, 121: Customer B computer, 122: Transfer transaction data A, 200: Storage data management table, 20
1 ... storage identifier, 202 ... certificate A, 203 ... sender A
Address, 204: destination B address, 205: storage expiration date, 206: transfer time stamp, 207: control data size, 208: transaction data size, 209: control data address, 210: transaction data address, 211: public key A, 212 public key B, 213 public key encryption C address, 214 certificate C, 215 registrant name C, 215
... Public key C, 215 ... Certificate C expiration date, 220 ... Control data management table, 221 ... Electronic signature A, 222 ... Transmission time stamp, 223 ... Encryption option, 224 ...
Transmission data encryption key, 230 ... transaction data management table,
231, transaction data A, 240, public key encryption C management table, 241, public key C, 242, private key C, 243,
Public key cryptography C expiration date, 300: transmission data management table, 301: registrant name A, 302: certificate A expiration date,
303: Public key encryption A address, 310: Public key encryption A
Management table, 311: Private key A, 312: Public key encryption A expiration date, 400: Received data management table, 410
... Public key encryption B management table, 411 ... Private key B, 41
2: Expiration date of public key cryptography B, 501: Message digest A, 601: Private key of certificate authority, 602: Public key of certificate authority

──────────────────────────────────────────────────続 き Continued on the front page (51) Int.Cl. ⁷ Identification symbol FI Theme coat ゛ (Reference) G06F 17/60 512 G06F 17/60 512

Claims (6)

[Claims] 1. A method for securing transaction information when a plurality of computers are connected via a network and the transaction information is transmitted from a first computer to a second computer via a storage source computer, the method comprising: Creating, by the first computer, an electronic signature for identifier information, transmission time information, and transaction data created by the first computer, which are given in advance by the storage source computer in response to a request from the first computer; Transmitting the electronic signature, the transaction data, and the identifier information to the storage source computer; and transmitting the electronic signature, the identifier information, and the transaction data transmitted from the first computer by the storage source computer. Receiving and recording the time, the recorded time and the Encrypting a name with a secret key, storing the encrypted time and the electronic signature, transaction data, and the identifier information on the basis of the identifier information, and transferring the encrypted information to a second computer. And a method for preserving transaction information. 2. A storage source computer for receiving transaction information from a first computer via a network and transferring the transaction information to a second computer, wherein the storage source computer previously assigns identifier information, transaction data, and Means for receiving, from the first computer, an electronic signature created for the identifier information, transmission time information, and the transaction data, and recording time information; and a secret key for the time information and the electronic signature. Means for creating encrypted data by encrypting the data, means for storing the encrypted data and the transaction data based on the identifier information, and transferring the encrypted data and the transaction data to the second computer. Source computer having means. 3. A security method for transmitting transaction information from a transmission source computer to a transmission destination computer via a transaction information storage source computer, wherein an identifier generated by the storage source computer at the request of the transmission source computer is stored. Transmitting the electronic signature created based on the transaction data, the encrypted transaction data and the identifier from the transmission source computer to the storage source computer, and transmitting the electronic signature to the storage source computer; The electronic signature and the identifier are encrypted and transmitted to the destination computer, and the encrypted electronic signature and the identifier and the encrypted transaction data are stored and encrypted by the destination computer. Decrypting said electronic signature and said identifier, Serial transaction data to decode, preservation method of transaction information, characterized in that checking the comparison to tamperability the electronic signature decoding to hash removed and the hash of the transaction data. 4. The system according to claim 3, wherein the encrypted electronic signature and the identifier stored in the storage source computer and the encrypted transaction data are disclosed at the request of the disclosure request source. How to maintain transaction information. 5. A method for preserving transaction information by a storage computer that transfers transaction information received from a transmission source computer to a transmission destination computer, comprising: receiving an electronic signature, transaction data, and an identifier from the transmission source computer; Is created from the transaction data before encryption and is for checking whether the transaction data has been tampered with, the transaction data is encrypted transaction data, and the identifier is the transmission It is generated by the storage source computer at the request of the source computer, encrypts the received electronic signature and the identifier and sends it to the destination computer, and encrypts the electronic signature and the identifier, and Storing the transaction information, wherein the encrypted transaction data is stored. The whole way. 6. A system in which a plurality of computers transmit and receive data via a communication line, means for receiving data and recording a time, and encrypting the data including the time with a secret key using a secret key. A computer comprising: means for creating; and means for transmitting the encrypted data and the data.