JP2000011101A - Ic card and record medium - Google Patents

Abstract

PROBLEM TO BE SOLVED: To save an application program(AP) stored in an IC card according to the judgment of a user, and to prevent the illegal use of the saved AP. SOLUTION: An IC card 201 generates and manages an arbitrary cryptographic key, and enciphers an AP to be saved among APS stored in an internal memory by using this cryptographic key, and saves this AP through an IC card reader/writer 211 to a connected terminal equipment 221, and deletes the AP before encipherment. Also, at the time of restoring the saved AP, the IC card 201 decodes the AP received from the terminal equipment 221 by using the managed cryptographic key, and restores the AP in the internal memory.

Description

DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE INVENTION

[0001]

The present invention relates to a technology for operating and managing an IC card storing one or more data, and more particularly to a technology for presenting a solution to security needs.

[0002]

2. Description of the Related Art Conventionally, only data used by an application program (hereinafter, referred to as "AP") is stored in I
In general, the terminal device that stores the data in a C card and reads the data via an IC card reader / writer operates the AP.

On the other hand, in recent years, storing basic software (card OS) for operating an AP on an IC card on the IC card has increased the movement of storing the AP on the IC card.

[0004] Further, by storing a plurality of APs in one IC card and integrating the plurality of IC cards into one IC card, operability is improved and the cost of the IC card is reduced.
It is expected to be shared by P issuing agencies.

As an example of the card OS, MUL
TOS is known.

MULTOS is a registered trademark of Fuji-Keizai USA
As described in the document entitled "Trends and Future Direction of Electronic Advance Cards in Japan, the United States and Europe", various APs output to IC cards
In addition to checking whether the card is properly authorized to be loaded, the individual APs are recorded separately by a special firewall program to ensure that other APs do not interfere with the operation. Prior to loading the AP, the management organization verifies the validity of the AP and loads it only on the IC card of a legitimate user in order to check whether the loading on the IC card has been correctly authorized. Perform a process to ensure that Since the deletion of the AP loaded on the IC card is also performed after checking in the same manner as the loading, it is necessary for the management organization to guarantee the legitimacy of the deletion from the corresponding IC card.

[0007]

Since MULTOS cannot load an AP without the permission of the management organization into the IC card and can prevent the AP from being copied to the IC card without restriction, MULTOS is effective. Because management can be realized, it is spreading as a card OS.

[0008] However, such strict management,
In accordance with the usage status of the IC card, a flexible operation of temporarily saving only a specific AP from an IC card storing a plurality of APs is restricted by the user.

For example, when a third party temporarily uses an IC card, or when an AP that is not needed for a while is to be evacuated from the IC card and replaced with another AP that the user wants to use due to restrictions on the amount of memory, etc. , IC at the user's discretion
It is desired that the AP stored in the card be evacuated and invalidated, and the evacuated AP be recovered.

However, in the case of an IC card using MULTOS as the card OS, as described above, permission of the management organization is required even when the AP is deleted from the IC card. Operations that require evacuation cannot be performed.

An object of the present invention is to make it possible to save data stored in an IC card at the discretion of the user and to prevent unauthorized use of the saved data. is there.

[0012]

In order to achieve the above object, the present invention provides a method for storing data stored in an IC card.
The data is encrypted in the IC card using the encryption key generated in the IC card, and the encrypted data is saved from the IC card. When the generated encryption key is managed in the IC card and the saved data is recovered, the data is stored in the IC card using the encryption key managed in the IC card. It decrypts in the card.

That is, the present invention provides, as a first aspect,
An IC in which one or more data are stored in an internal memory
A means for externally receiving designation of data to be evacuated, a means for generating an arbitrary encryption key, and a method for encrypting data received as an evacuation target using the generated encryption key. Means for erasing data before encryption, means for storing the generated encryption key, means for saving the encrypted data to the outside, means for receiving the saved data from the outside, The present invention provides an IC card characterized by comprising means for decrypting encrypted data using a stored encryption key, and means for restoring the decrypted data in an internal memory.

According to the first aspect, the data evacuated from the IC card cannot be decrypted by an IC card other than the IC card which has encrypted the data, so that the data is not illegally used.

If it is not necessary to save the encrypted data from the IC card, the data before encryption may be replaced with the data after encryption.

That is, the present invention provides, as a second aspect,
An IC in which one or more data are stored in an internal memory
Means for externally receiving designation of data to be invalidated, means for generating an arbitrary encryption key, and encryption of data received as an invalidation target using the generated encryption key. Means for replacing data before encryption with data after encryption, means for storing a generated encryption key, means for externally accepting designation of data to be validated, and acceptance as data to be validated Means for decrypting the stored data using a stored encryption key.

The ICs of the first and second embodiments
Of course, in any of the cards, one or more data stored in the internal memory can include an AP.

[0018]

Embodiments of the present invention will be described below with reference to the drawings.

FIG. 2 is an overall configuration diagram of the IC card system according to the present embodiment.

As shown in FIG. 2, an IC according to this embodiment
The card system is an IC card 201 owned by the user.
And the terminal device 221 are connected to the IC card reader / writer 2
11 are connected.

The IC card 201 includes an MPU 203, a memory 202, and a transmission / reception IF 204.
The terminal device 221 includes an MPU 223, a memory 222,
Keyboard 224, display 225, transmission / reception I
F226.

Also, an IC card reader / writer 211
Is configured to include a transmission / reception IF 212 and a transmission / reception IF 213.

IC card 201 and terminal device 221
Performs transmission and reception via the IC card reader / writer 211, and the form of communication may be wired or wireless.

Next, the contents stored in the memory 202 of the IC card 201 will be described with reference to FIG.

As shown in FIG. 3, for example, credit or GSM (global) is stored in the memory 202 of the IC card 201.
one or more A such as system for mobile communication)
P is stored, but here, AP # 1 (321)
And AP # 2 (322) are stored.

Further, as shown in FIG.
In the first memory 202, a card identifier 311 which is a unique identifier for each IC card 201, a public key 312 of a certificate authority in asymmetric encryption, a secret key 313 of the IC card 201 in asymmetric encryption, and an IC
Public key 314 of card 201 and AP management information 315
And a password 316 for permitting access to the IC card 201 are stored.

FIG. 7 is a diagram showing an example of the AP management information 315.

The AP management information 315 contains the IC card 201
APs stored in the memory 202 (here, AP
# 1 (321) and AP # 2 (322). ) Is composed of the AP management data list 700 corresponding to each of them.

As shown in FIG. 7, the AP management data list 700 of AP # 1 (321) includes an AP identifier 701, which is an identifier of AP # 1 (321), and AP file information 7
02, a load counter 703 indicating the number of times AP # 1 (321) has been loaded into the IC card 201, and AP # 1
The delete counter 704 indicating the number of times (321) has been deleted from the IC card 201, the pointer 705 to the save data record 800 shown in FIG. 8, and the AP management data list 700 of the next AP, AP # 2 (322). And an entry pointer 706.

The AP management data list 700 of AP # 2 (322) has the same configuration.

The pointer 705 has a corresponding AP
Is not saved, "NULL" is set,
If the corresponding AP has been saved, a pointer to the saved data record 800 is set when the saving of the AP is completed. The details of the save data record 800 will be described later.

Returning to FIG. 3, the memory 202 of the IC card 201 stores an AP save program 303, an AP recovery program 304, an encryption key generation program 305,
A signature generation program 306, a symmetric encryption / decryption program 307, and an asymmetric encryption / decryption program 308 are stored.

Next, the contents stored in the memory 222 of the terminal device 221 will be described with reference to FIG.

As shown in FIG. 4, the memory 222 of the terminal device 221 stores a terminal identifier 411 which is a unique identifier for each terminal device 221, and a public key 412 of a certificate authority in asymmetric encryption.

Also, as shown in FIG.
In the memory 222, the AP save program 403 and A
P recovery program 404 and signature verification program 405
And a symmetric encryption / decryption program 406 and an asymmetric encryption / decryption program 407 are stored.

Various data stored in the memory 202 of the IC card 201 and the memory 222 of the terminal device 211 may be provided with a generation / issuance / management institution, respectively. It is assumed that various data including a public key authenticated by a certificate authority (a public key signed by the certificate authority) are already set.

Next, in the IC card system according to the present embodiment, the operation when the AP stored in the IC card 201 is evacuated to the terminal device 221 will be described with reference to FIG.

FIG. 1 is a diagram showing a flow of an operation at the time of evacuation of an AP in the IC card system according to the present embodiment.

In the terminal device 221, the AP evacuation program 40
3 is activated, and the IC card 201 is
When inserted into the writer 211, the IC card 201
The evacuation program 303 is activated, and the following processing is executed. The following processing is performed by the MPU of the IC card 201.
203 and the MPU 223 of the terminal device 221 are realized by executing the AP save program 303 and the AP save program 403.

First, the IC card 201 and the terminal device 2
11 performs mutual authentication (step 100, step 1)
10). Regarding mutual authentication, for example, ISO (ISO
9798-3) stipulates an authentication method using asymmetric key cryptography, and furthermore, ISO (ISO 9798-2)
Since an authentication method using symmetric key cryptography is specified, the details are omitted here.

Subsequently, the IC card 201 and the terminal device 211 perform personal authentication (step 101, step 111).

In the personal authentication, specifically, first, the terminal device 221 requests the user to input a password via the display 225, and the user inputs the password to the keyboard 22.
The password input from step 4 is transmitted to the IC card 201 (step 111).

Then, the IC card 201 is
When the password is received from the server 11, the received password is compared with the password 316 stored in the memory 202 to authenticate whether or not the user is correct (step 101). Note that the authentication result by the IC card 201 is notified to the terminal device 211.

If the user is authenticated as a correct user, the IC card 201 and the terminal device 211
The evacuation target AP is designated (step 102, step 112).

In specifying the evacuation target AP, first, the terminal device 221 obtains a list of APs stored in the IC card 201 from the IC card 201 and displays the list on the display 225. 2
The AP designated from 24 is notified to the IC card 201 as the evacuation target AP (step 112). The notification of the save target AP is performed by transmitting the AP designation data record 500 shown in FIG.

FIG. 5 is a diagram showing an example of the AP designation data record 500.

As shown in FIG. 5, the AP designation data record 500 includes an AP identifier 501 which is an identifier for uniquely designating an evacuation target AP, and a terminal identifier of the terminal device 221 (a terminal stored in the memory 222). Identifier 41
1) 502 and a time stamp 503 indicating the date and time when the terminal device 221 has received the designation of the evacuation target AP.

Then, the IC card 201 is
By receiving the AP designation data record 500 from the client 11, the designation of the evacuation target AP is accepted (step 10).
2).

Subsequently, upon receiving the AP designation data record 500, the IC card 201 activates the encryption key generation program 305 to generate an encryption key for encrypting the evacuation target AP (step 10).
3). Here, it is assumed that the save target AP is encrypted by symmetric encryption, and the generated encryption key is an encryption key (for example, a random number) in symmetric encryption.

Subsequently, the IC card 201 activates the symmetric encryption / decryption program 308 to encrypt the evacuation target AP using the encryption key generated in step 103 and to execute the encryption before the encryption. (Step 104).

Subsequently, the IC card 201 generates a signature by activating the signature generation program 306 (step 105).

In step 105, the IC card 201 stores the signature generation data record 90 shown in FIG.
0, an authenticator is generated using a hash function, and the asymmetric encryption encryption / decryption program 308 is started, whereby the IC card 20 stored in the memory 202 is activated.
Using the secret key 313 of 0, the generated authenticator is encrypted to generate a signature. For details of the hash function and signature generation, see, for example, “Modern Cryptography” by Tatsuaki Okamoto et al., Publication of Sankei Tosho.

FIG. 9 is a diagram showing an example of the signature generation data record 900.

As shown in FIG. 9, the signature generation data record 900 includes the AP identifier 901 of the evacuation target AP, the encrypted evacuation target AP 902, and the terminal identifier (in the AP designation data record 500 received from the terminal device 221). Terminal identifier 502) 903, a time stamp (the time stamp 503 in the AP designation data record 500 received from the terminal device 221) 904, and the IC card 201.
905 (a card identifier 313 stored in the memory 202).

Subsequently, the IC card 201 and the terminal device 211 transmit and receive the encrypted evacuation target AP (steps 106 and 113).

In transmission and reception of the encrypted evacuation target AP, first, the IC card 201 transmits the encrypted evacuation target AP to the terminal device 221 (step 106). The transmission of the encrypted evacuation target AP is performed by transmitting the evacuation AP data record 600 shown in FIG.

FIG. 6 is a diagram showing an example of the save AP data record 600.

As shown in FIG. 6, the evacuation AP data record 600 contains the AP identifier 60 of the encrypted evacuation target AP.
1 and the evacuation target AP 602 encrypted in step 104
, The card identifier of the IC card 201 (the card identifier 313 stored in the memory 202) 603, the signature 604 generated in step 105, and the public key 605 of the IC card 201 (the public key 3 stored in the memory 202).
14).

Then, the terminal device 221 is connected to the IC card 2
By receiving the evacuation AP data record 600 from Step 01, an encrypted evacuation target AP is received (Step 1).
13).

When the terminal device 221 receives the evacuation AP data record 600, the signature verification program 40
5, the evacuation AP data record 6
The signature 604 in the file No. 00 is verified (step 114).

In step 114, in detail, the terminal device 221 sends the asymmetric encryption / decryption program 407
Is activated, first, the public key 605 in the save AP data record 600 is decrypted by using the public key 412 of the certificate authority, and the public key 605 is verified. The signature 604 is verified by decrypting the signature 604 using the verified public key 605.

Then, the terminal device 221 executes Step 11
As a result of the verification performed by the evacuation AP data record 600, it is confirmed that the evacuation AP data record 600 has been transmitted from the IC card 201 and that the evacuation AP data record 600 has not been tampered with.
Is stored in the memory 222 or a disk device (step 115). Note that the terminal device 221 notifies the IC card 201 that the evacuation of the AP has been successful.

When the terminal device 221 notifies that the evacuation of the AP has succeeded, the IC card 201 updates the corresponding AP management data list 700 (step 107).

In step 107, specifically, the IC card 201 generates a save data record 800, and sets a pointer to the generated save data record 800 to a pointer 705 in the corresponding AP management data list 700. .

FIG. 8 is a diagram showing an example of the save data record 800.

As shown in FIG. 8, the save data record 8
00 is the terminal identifier (the AP received from the terminal device 221).
Terminal identifier 502 in designated data record 500) 80
1 and a time stamp (A received from the terminal device 221).
Time stamp 50 in P-designated data record 500
3) 802 and the encryption key 80 generated in step 103
3 and the signature 804 generated in step 105.

By the operation described above, the AP stored in the IC card 201 can be evacuated to the terminal device 221.

In the operation shown in FIG. 1, the evacuation target AP is encrypted by symmetric encryption. However, the evacuation target AP may be encrypted by asymmetric encryption. In this case, the IC card 201 returns to step 10
In 3, the encryption key corresponding to the asymmetric encryption algorithm is generated.

In the operation shown in FIG. 1, the IC card 201 and the terminal device 221 can share a temporary key in the mutual authentication process of step 100 and step 110, so that the evacuation AP data record 600
May be encrypted using the temporary key.

Further, in the operation shown in FIG. 1, the terminal device 221 allows the user to designate an evacuation place,
At the place specified by the user from the keyboard 224, the evacuation A
The P data record 600 may be stored.

In the operation shown in FIG. 1, the evacuation AP data record 600 is transmitted from the IC card 201 using a signature authentication technique in order to further enhance security. , Evacuation A
Although it is confirmed that the P data record 600 has not been tampered with, this does not limit the gist of the present invention.

Next, an operation of recovering the AP saved by the operation shown in FIG. 1 in the IC card system according to the present embodiment will be described with reference to FIG.

FIG. 10 is a diagram showing a flow of operation at the time of AP recovery in the IC card system according to the present embodiment.

In the terminal device 221, the AP recovery program 40
4 is started, and the IC card 201 is
When inserted into the writer 211, the IC card 201
The recovery program 304 is started, and the following processing is executed. The following processing is performed by the MPU of the IC card 201.
203 and the MPU 223 of the terminal device 221 are realized by executing the AP recovery program 304 and the AP recovery program.

First, the IC card 201 and the terminal device 2
11 performs mutual authentication (steps 100 and 110) and performs personal authentication (steps 101 and 111), similarly to the operation described with reference to FIG.

If the user is authenticated as a correct user, the IC card 201 and the terminal 211
Specifies the recovery target AP (step 1002, step 1012).

More specifically, in specifying the recovery target AP, first, the terminal device 221 stores a list of the evacuation APs among the APs stored in the IC card 201 in the IC card 201.
It acquires from the card 201 and displays it on the display 225, and notifies the IC card 201 of the AP designated by the user from the keyboard 224 as a recovery target AP (step 1012). The notification of the recovery target AP is the same as the notification of the evacuation target AP, as in the AP designation data record 500.
Is transmitted.

Then, the IC card 201 is
By receiving the AP designation data record 500 from the client 11, the designation of the AP to be recovered is accepted (step 100).
2).

Subsequently, when the IC card 201 receives the AP designation data record 500, the IC card 201
The management data list 700 and the save data record 800 indicated by the pointer 705 in the AP management data list 700 are extracted (step 1003).

Subsequently, the IC card 201 and the terminal device 211 transmit and receive the recovery target AP (step 10).
04, step 1013).

In transmission and reception of the recovery target AP, first, the terminal device 211 first stores the evacuation AP data record 6 stored in the memory 222 or the disk device or the like.
00 is transmitted to the terminal device 221 as a recovery target AP (step 1013). And the IC card 201
Receives the evacuation AP data from the terminal device 211, thereby receiving the recovery target AP (step 1004).

When the IC card 201 receives the evacuation AP data record 600, it checks whether the signature 604 in the evacuation AP data record 600 matches the signature 804 in the evacuation data record 800 extracted in step 1003. Is confirmed (step 1005).

When the IC card 201 confirms that they match, the IC card 201 activates the symmetrical encryption / decryption program 307 to receive the saved evacuation AP.
The encrypted AP 602 in the data record 600 is decrypted by using the encryption key 803 in the save data record 800 extracted in step 1003, and the decrypted recovery target AP is decrypted.
Is stored in the memory 20 according to the file information 702 in the AP management data list 700 extracted in step 1003.
2 (step 1006).

Further, the IC card 201 stores the recovery target A
The AP management data list 700 of P is updated (step 1007).

In step 1007, specifically, the IC
The card 201 deletes the save data record 800 extracted in step 1003, and sets “NULL” in the pointer 705 in the AP management data list 700 of the recovery target AP.
Set.

[0086] By the operation described above, the terminal device 2
The AP evacuated to 21 can be restored to the IC card 201.

As described above, according to the present embodiment,
According to the C card system, the AP stored in the IC card 201 can be evacuated from the IC card 201 to the terminal device 221 at the discretion of the user. Since the AP to be evacuated is encrypted using the encryption key generated in the IC card 201, the AP evacuated from the IC card 201 cannot be used except for the IC card 201 that has encrypted the AP. It cannot be decrypted and is not illegally used.

Therefore, in particular, the IC card 201
Even when the LTOS is a card OS, by performing the operation shown in FIG. 1, it is possible to realize a flexible operation such that the AP is temporarily saved at the discretion of the user.

By the way, in the IC card system according to the present embodiment, the AP stored in the IC card 201 is evacuated to the terminal device 221, but when there is room in the memory 202 of the IC card 201. For example, when it is not necessary to save the encrypted AP from the IC card 201, instead of saving the AP,
The AP can be temporarily invalidated in the C card 201.

The operation in such a case will be described below with reference to FIG.

FIG. 11 is a diagram showing a flow of operation when the AP is invalidated in the IC card system according to the present embodiment.

The operation shown in FIG. 11 is the same as the operation shown in FIG. 1, except that in step 1106 the IC card 201 stores the encrypted AP in the IC card 201. . Therefore, in the various data described above, nothing is set in a portion necessary for saving / restoring.

According to the operation shown in FIG. 11, the AP is not actually saved, but since the AP is encrypted in the IC card 201, it can be protected from the threat of a third party.

The operation for validating the invalidated AP is performed by the IC card 201 using the encrypted and invalidated AP using the encryption key used when encrypting the invalidated AP. Decoding.

When the operation shown in FIG. 11 is performed, it is necessary to allow the user to specify whether to save or invalidate the AP in the terminal device 221. is there.

The operation shown in FIG. 11 can be performed independently of the operation shown in FIG. That is, it is possible to construct an IC card system that performs only the operation shown in FIG.

In the above description, it is assumed that the data to be saved and the data to be invalidated are APs.
It goes without saying that data other than the AP may be used.

[0098]

As described above, according to the present invention,
The data stored in the IC card can be evacuated from the IC card at the user's discretion. Since the AP to be evacuated is encrypted using the encryption key generated in the IC card, the data evacuated from the IC card cannot be decrypted by an IC card other than the one that encrypted the data. , No unauthorized use.

[Brief description of the drawings]

FIG. 1 is an explanatory diagram showing a flow of an operation at the time of evacuation of an AP in an IC card system according to an embodiment;

FIG. 2 is an overall configuration diagram of an IC card system according to the embodiment of the present invention.

FIG. 3 is an explanatory diagram showing contents stored in a memory of the IC card according to the embodiment of the present invention.

FIG. 4 is an explanatory diagram showing contents stored in a memory of the terminal device according to the embodiment of the present invention.

FIG. 5 is an explanatory diagram showing an example of AP designation data according to the embodiment of the present invention.

FIG. 6 is an explanatory diagram showing an example of evacuation AP data according to the embodiment of the present invention.

FIG. 7 is an explanatory diagram showing an example of AP management information according to the embodiment of the present invention.

FIG. 8 is an explanatory diagram showing an example of save data according to the embodiment of the present invention.

FIG. 9 is an explanatory diagram showing an example of signature generation data according to the embodiment of the present invention.

FIG. 10 is an explanatory diagram showing an operation flow at the time of AP recovery in the IC card system according to the embodiment;

FIG. 11 is an explanatory diagram showing an operation flow when an AP is invalidated in the IC card system according to the embodiment;

[Explanation of symbols]

201: IC card, 211: IC card reader / writer, 221: terminal device, 202, 222: memory, 20
3,223: MPU, 204, 212, 213: transmission / reception IF, 224: keyboard, 225: display, 5
00: AP designation data record, 600: evacuation AP data record, 700: AP management data list, 800:
Save data record, 900 ... signature generation data record.

Continued on the front page (51) Int.Cl. ⁷ Identification symbol FI Theme coat II (reference) G06K 19/07 G06K 19/00 N (72) Inventor Masatoshi Haraguchi 5030 Totsukacho, Totsuka-ku, Yokohama-shi, Kanagawa Prefecture Hitachi, Ltd. F-term in the Software Development Division of the Works (reference) 5B035 AA13 BB09 BC03 CA29 CA38 5B058 CA27 KA01 KA04 KA35 YA13 5B065 BA09 PA16

Claims (5)

[Claims] 1. An IC card in which one or more data are stored in an internal memory, means for externally receiving designation of data to be evacuated, means for generating an arbitrary encryption key, Means for encrypting the data received as a save target using the generated encryption key, erasing the data before encryption, means for storing the generated encryption key, and transmitting the encrypted data to an external device. Means for saving the data, means for receiving the saved data from the outside, means for decrypting the received data using the stored encryption key, and means for restoring the decrypted data to the internal memory. An IC card comprising: means for storing. 2. An IC card in which at least one data is stored in an internal memory, a means for externally receiving designation of data to be invalidated, and a means for generating an arbitrary encryption key. Means for encrypting the data received as the object of revocation using the generated encryption key, and replacing data before encryption with data after encryption; means for storing the generated encryption key; An IC card comprising: means for externally receiving designation of data to be validated; and means for decrypting the data received for validation using a stored encryption key. 3. The IC card according to claim 1, wherein at least one data stored in an internal memory includes an application program.
card. 4. A recording medium on which a program installed in a terminal device connected to an IC card according to claim 1 via an IC card reader / writer is recorded, wherein one of said IC cards is stored in said IC card. Means for receiving designation of data to be saved among the above data, outputting the accepted designation content to the IC card, receiving the data saved from the IC card, and storing the data in the memory of the terminal device Means for receiving designation of data to be recovered among the data evacuated from the IC card and stored in the terminal device; and storing the data received as the recovery target in the IC card. A recording medium on which a program for causing the terminal device to operate is provided as output means. 5. A recording medium on which a program installed in a terminal device connected to an IC card according to claim 2 via an IC card reader / writer is recorded. Means for receiving the specification of the data to be invalidated among the above data, and outputting the received specification to the IC card; and means for validating the data among the data stored in the IC card. And a means for receiving the specification of the data and outputting the received specification content to the IC card.