GB2519920A - Combined active and passive emergency shutdown system and method - Google Patents
Combined active and passive emergency shutdown system and method Download PDFInfo
- Publication number
- GB2519920A GB2519920A GB1504153.6A GB201504153A GB2519920A GB 2519920 A GB2519920 A GB 2519920A GB 201504153 A GB201504153 A GB 201504153A GB 2519920 A GB2519920 A GB 2519920A
- Authority
- GB
- United Kingdom
- Prior art keywords
- reactor
- boron
- injection
- emergency shutdown
- emergency
- Prior art date
- Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
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Classifications
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G21—NUCLEAR PHYSICS; NUCLEAR ENGINEERING
- G21C—NUCLEAR REACTORS
- G21C9/00—Emergency protection arrangements structurally associated with the reactor, e.g. safety valves provided with pressure equalisation devices
- G21C9/02—Means for effecting very rapid reduction of the reactivity factor under fault conditions, e.g. reactor fuse; Control elements having arrangements activated in an emergency
- G21C9/027—Means for effecting very rapid reduction of the reactivity factor under fault conditions, e.g. reactor fuse; Control elements having arrangements activated in an emergency by fast movement of a solid, e.g. pebbles
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G21—NUCLEAR PHYSICS; NUCLEAR ENGINEERING
- G21C—NUCLEAR REACTORS
- G21C9/00—Emergency protection arrangements structurally associated with the reactor, e.g. safety valves provided with pressure equalisation devices
- G21C9/02—Means for effecting very rapid reduction of the reactivity factor under fault conditions, e.g. reactor fuse; Control elements having arrangements activated in an emergency
- G21C9/033—Means for effecting very rapid reduction of the reactivity factor under fault conditions, e.g. reactor fuse; Control elements having arrangements activated in an emergency by an absorbent fluid
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G21—NUCLEAR PHYSICS; NUCLEAR ENGINEERING
- G21C—NUCLEAR REACTORS
- G21C7/00—Control of nuclear reaction
- G21C7/06—Control of nuclear reaction by application of neutron-absorbing material, i.e. material with absorption cross-section very much in excess of reflection cross-section
- G21C7/08—Control of nuclear reaction by application of neutron-absorbing material, i.e. material with absorption cross-section very much in excess of reflection cross-section by displacement of solid control elements, e.g. control rods
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G21—NUCLEAR PHYSICS; NUCLEAR ENGINEERING
- G21C—NUCLEAR REACTORS
- G21C7/00—Control of nuclear reaction
- G21C7/06—Control of nuclear reaction by application of neutron-absorbing material, i.e. material with absorption cross-section very much in excess of reflection cross-section
- G21C7/22—Control of nuclear reaction by application of neutron-absorbing material, i.e. material with absorption cross-section very much in excess of reflection cross-section by displacement of a fluid or fluent neutron-absorbing material, e.g. by adding neutron-absorbing material to the coolant
-
- Y—GENERAL TAGGING OF NEW TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS; GENERAL TAGGING OF CROSS-SECTIONAL TECHNOLOGIES SPANNING OVER SEVERAL SECTIONS OF THE IPC; TECHNICAL SUBJECTS COVERED BY FORMER USPC CROSS-REFERENCE ART COLLECTIONS [XRACs] AND DIGESTS
- Y02—TECHNOLOGIES OR APPLICATIONS FOR MITIGATION OR ADAPTATION AGAINST CLIMATE CHANGE
- Y02E—REDUCTION OF GREENHOUSE GAS [GHG] EMISSIONS, RELATED TO ENERGY GENERATION, TRANSMISSION OR DISTRIBUTION
- Y02E30/00—Energy generation of nuclear origin
- Y02E30/30—Nuclear fission reactors
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- Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Plasma & Fusion (AREA)
- General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- High Energy & Nuclear Physics (AREA)
- Structure Of Emergency Protection For Nuclear Reactors (AREA)
Abstract
Disclosed are a combined active and passive emergency shutdown system and method, comprising a control rod emergency shutdown sub-system and an emergency boron injection sub-system, wherein a shutdown circuit breaker of the control rod emergency shutdown sub-system is connected to a reactor protection system, and the emergency shutdown sub-system receives an emergency shutdown signal emitted by the reactor protection system and enables the dropping of the control rods; and the emergency boron injection sub-system comprises a concentrated boron storage tank and an injection pump on an injection pipeline, the concentrated boron storage tank being connected to a reactor pressure vessel and a reactor core via the injection pipeline, and an injection pump control system and the reactor protection system being connected, and the emergency boron injection sub-system receives a signal indicating inability to achieve emergency shutdown or a signal indicating high reactor neutron flux emitted by the reactor protection system and injects concentrated boron into the reactor pressure vessel and the reactor core, achieving emergency reactor shutdown.
Description
COMBINED ACTIVE AND PASSIVE EMERGENCY SHUTDOWN
SYSTEM AND METHOD
Technical Field
The present invention relates to reactor design technology, and more particularly, to a combined active and passive emergency shutdown system and method.
Description of Related Art
In the event of an accident of a nuclear power plant, emergency shutdown is essential for ensuring the safety of the reactor. For a pressurized water reactor system, emergency shutdown is mainly achieved by inserting control rods consisting of neutron poison into the reactor core to shift the reactor to subcritical state immediately. This emergency shutdown process by virtue of control rods is detailed as follows: the reactor protection system performs logic operation to generate reactor emergency shutdown driving signals which cause the reactor trip breaker to become de-energized; as result, the reactor trip breaker is opened resulting in the control rod drive mechanism (CRDM) power supply being lost, and, consequently, the control rods drop to shut down the reactor. However, this emergency shutdown method is disadvantageous in that there is a potential that the control rods fail to drop thus leading to failure of the emergency shutdown.
In the most unfavorable accident condition where both the main feedwater and offsite power source are lost and, consequently, the emergency shutdown fails, it is essential to start up the auxiliary feedwater system which is coupled with the accident mitigation system which causes the steam turbines to stop thereby ensuring the reactor safety. Unfortunately, it is difficult to simultaneously meet the both conditions. In other words, in conventional design, there is less number of emergency shutdown means which are insufficient to ensure the safety of the reactors, necessitating the use of multiple reactor shutdown means having different operating mechanisms to achieve safe shutdown of the reactors.
The reactivity control of a pressurized-water reactor power plant comprises a chemical and volume control system which adds boric acid into the coolant to adjust the boron concentration in primary coolant thereby achieving the reactivity control. Today, a conventional chemical and volume control system can neither promptly supply emergency boron injection, nor achieve high-concentration boric acid injection. As such, it can only be used as a means for reactor power adjustment instead of an emergency shutdown means.
Brief Summary of the Invention
The objective of the present invention is to address the weakness of the prior art by providing a combined active and passive emergency shutdown system and method which is able to increase the reliability of the emergency shutdown system of the reactors thereby to enhance the safety of the reactors.
To achieve the objective described above, the present invention employs the technical solutions below: A combined active and passive emergency shutdown system, comprising a control rod emergency shutdown subsystem, of which a reactor trip breaker is connected with a reactor protection system to receive reactor emergency shutdown signals issued by the reactor protection system and to cause control rods to drop; further comprising an emergency boron injection subsystem which comprises a concentrated boron tank, the concentrated boron tank being connected with a reactor pressure vessel and core through an injection line, an injection pump being disposed on the injection line and connected with the reactor protection system; upon receiving emergency protection signals indicating failure of emergency shutdown or excessive neutron flux that are issued by the reactor protection system, the injection pump injects concentrated boron into the reactor pressure vessel and core.
Further, the combined active and passive emergency shutdown system, wherein an electric heating element is disposed in the concentrated boron tank to allow a solution temperature not lower than boron precipitation temperature.
Further, the combined active and passive emergency shutdown system, wherein the injection line has one end connected at bottom of the concentrated boron tank and the other end connected with an injection piping of a cold leg of a reactor safety injection system.
Further, the combined active and passive emergency shutdown system, wherein the emergency boron injection subsystem comprises two trains independent of each other, each of which being respectively provided with one concentrated boron tank and one injection line and being able to supply 100% injection capacity of concentrated boron.
Further, the combined active and passive emergency shutdown system, wherein the concentrated boron tank is connected with a reactor boron and water make-up system.
Further, the combined active and passive emergency shutdown system, wherein the concentration of boron solution in the concentrated boron tank is in the range of 7000-9000 ppm and the ambient temperature of a room housing a boron injection tank is higher than the precipitation temperature limit of 9000 ppm boric acid solution.
A combined active and passive emergency shutdown method, wherein a reactor protection system issues to a reactor trip breaker of a control rod emergency shutdown subsystem reactor emergency shutdown signals under accident conditions which cause coils of the reactor trip breaker to become dc-energized and, consequently, the reactor trip breaker is opened, resulting in the power supply of control rods being lost and dropping of the control rods; in case of failure of the control rods to drop in place, the reactor protection system issues signals to an emergency boron injection subsystem indicating failure of emergency shutdown or excessive neutron flux; upon receiving the signals, the emergency boron injection system starts up an injection pump which injects concentrated boron into a reactor pressure vessel and core, thus achieving emergency shutdown.
The advantageous effects of the present invention are as follows: The present invention discloses a system and method for combined active and passive emergency shutdown whereby, in the event of an accident condition where the need for emergency shutdown arises, not only control rods can be inserted under the effect of gravity of the control rods themselves to achieve emergency shutdown in a passive manner, but also in case of failure of the passive means concentrated boric acid can be injected in an activc manner causing emergency shutdown, thus contributing to significant increase of the reactor safety.
Brief Description of the Several Views of the Drawings Fig.1 is a schematic diagram depicting the composition and control logic of a system of the present invention.
In the figure, reference numeral 1 identifies a reactor pressure vessel and core, reference numeral 2 a steam generator, reference numeral 3 a pressurizer, reference numeral 4 a main pump, reference numeral 5 a control rod driving system, reference numeral 6 a reactor trip breaker, reference numeral 7 an emergency boron injection system, reference numeral 8 a concentrated boron tank, reference numeral 9 an electric heating element, reference numeral 10 an injection pump, reference numeral 11 an injection line and reference numeral 12 a containment.
Detailed Description of the Invention
The combined active and passive emergency shutdown system of the present invention provides an additional emergency active reactor shutdown means implemented through an emergency boron injection system. It is based on the proven design philosophy of the second-generation nuclear power plant safety system and risk-guided design means through optimizing the prior-art emergency shutdown means in which control rods are inserted under the effect of gravity once the power supply is lost. This configuration allows a combination of active and passive safety measures, enabling safe reactor shutdown not only by means of passive dropping of control rods but also by means of active emergency injection of boron. Therefore, redundant and additional emergency shutdown means are made available, contributing to increased safety of reactors.
The combined active and passive emergency shutdown system of the present invention comprises a control rod emergency shutdown subsystem and an emergency boron injection subsystem. A reactor trip breaker of the control rod emergency shutdown subsystem is connected with a reactor protection system to receive reactor emergency shutdown signals issued by the reactor protection system and to cause control rods to drop. The emergency boron injection subsystem comprises a concentrated boron tank in which an electric heating element is disposed to keep the solution temperature not lower than boron precipitation temperature. The concentrated boron tank is connected with a reactor pressure vessel and core through an injection line. The injection line has one end * connected at bottom of the concentrated boron tank and the other end connected * with an injection piping of a cold leg of a reactor safety injection system. There is disposed on the injection line an injection pump which is connected with the reactor protection system. Upon receiving emergency protection signals indicating failure of emergency shutdown or excessive neutron flux that are issued by the reactor protection system, the injection pump injects concentrated boron into the reactor pressure vessel and core. The concentrated boron tank is connected with a reactor boron and water make-up system.
The said system employs a combined active and passive emergency shutdown method as follows: a reactor protection system issues to a reactor trip breaker of a control rod emergency shutdown subsystem reactor emergency shutdown signals under accident conditions which cause coils of the reactor trip breaker to become dc-energized and, consequently, the reactor trip breaker is opened, resulting in the power supply of control rods being lost and dropping of the control rods; in case of failure of the control rods to drop, the reactor protection system issues to an emergency boron injection subsystem signals indicating failure of emergency shutdown or excessive neutron flux; upon receiving the signals, the emergency boron injection system starts up an injection pump which injects concentrated boron into a reactor pressure vessel and core, thus achieving emergency shutdown.
Below is a detailed description of the present invention in connection with the accompanying drawings and the preferred embodiments.
Embodiment: As shown in Fig. 1, a conventional pressurized water reactor used for a nuclear power plants comprises a reactor core 1, a steam generator 2, a pressurizer 3, a main pump 4 and a control rod emergency shutdown subsystem 5. Furthermore, the nuclear power plant design includes a reactor protection system consisting of associated measuring instrumentation and control systems. Once an accident occurs, the reactor protection system perfonns logic operation to issue reactor emergency shutdown signals (automatic shutdown protection signals or manual shutdown signals) which actuate a control rod driving system 5 of the emergency shutdown system, causing coils of a reactor trip breaker 6 to become de-energized and opening of the reactor trip breaker 6. This will result in the power supply of the control rods being lost and consequent dropping of the control rods to shut down the reactor. If the control rods fail to drop, the reactor protection system confirms the failure of the control rods to achieve emergency shutdown (ATWS) by monitoring the parameters including reactor neutron flux density and then issues signals to an emergency boron injection system 7 indicating failure of emergency shutdown (ATWS signals) or excessive neutron flux thus activating the emergency boron injection system 7.
In this embodiment, the emergency boron injection system 7 consists of two independent trains, each having a 100% injection capacity. Each train comprises a concentrated boron tank 8 in which an electric heating element 9 is disposed to allow a solution temperature not lower than boron precipitation temperature. The concentrated boron tank 8 is connected with the reactor pressure vessel and reactor core through an injection line 11 which has one end connected at bottom of the concentrated boron tank 8 and the other end connected with an injection piping of a cold leg of a reactor safety injection system. An injection pump 10 is disposed on the injection line 11. The concentrated boron tank 8 is connected with a reactor boron and water make-up system. After entering a containment 12, two boron injection lines of the two trains are combined into one injection header which may be divided into three injection lines that are respectively connected to three cold legs of a reactor coolant system through an injection piping of cold legs of the safety injection system. It should be appreciated that the connection method in this embodiment is simply for exemplary purpose and those skilled in the art can employ other connection methods whereby concentrated boron is injected into the reactor pressure vessel and reactor core.
The emergency boron injection system may be initiated either automatically or manually to inject concentrated boron solution in the concentrated boron tank into the primary circuit of the reactor. Once the control rods fail to insert in place, the emergency boron injection system will receive ATWS signals to inject concentrated boron into the reactor pressure vessel and reactor core thereby causing emergency shutdown. Furthermore, in case of accident conditions, for example, rupture of the main steam line, in order to assure the shutdown margin and prevent recriticaiity of the reactor, the emergency boron injection system is initiated simultaneously in response to the reactor protection signals upon insertion of the control rods, thus ensuring that the reactor is maintained at safe shutdown state.
During normal operation of a nuclear power plant, the control rod cluster is in normal position and the emergency boron injection pump is in standby state.
Once an reactor emergency shutdown signal is triggered, the control rods are inserted to cause emergency shutdown. In case of failure of the control rods to drop into place, the signals indicating ATWS or excessive neutron flux of the reactor will start up the emergency boron injection pump to draw water from the concentrated boron tank. The boron injection pump is designed with a head sufficient to inject boric acid solution into the reactor under any pressure of the primary circuit, causing safe shutdown of the reactor.
Further, the present invention may be provided with a boric acid recirculation line to periodically circuit boric acid solution in the concentrated boron tank. The lines and valves for make-up of water and boric acid solution may be disposed on the concentrated boron tank.
The present invention provides two means for emergency shutdown which cooperate with each other during operation, significantly increasing the overall reliability of the emergency shutdown, and consequently, the safety of the reactors.
The above disclosure is related to the detailed technical contents and inventive features thereof People skilled in this field may proceed with a variety of modifications and replacements based on the disclosures and suggestions of the invention as described without departing from the characteristics thereof Nevertheless, although such modifications and replacements are not fully disclosed in the above descriptions, they have substantially been covered in the following claims as appended.
Claims (7)
- Claims 1. A combined active and passive emergency shutdown system, comprising a control rod emergency shutdown subsystem (5), of which a reactor trip breaker (6) is connected with a reactor protection system to receive reactor emergency shutdown signals issued by the reactor protection system and to cause control rods to drop, characterized by further comprising an emergency boron injection subsystem (7) which comprises a concentrated boron tank (8), the concentrated boron tank (8) being connected with a reactor pressure vessel and core (1) through an injection line (11), an injection pump (10) being disposed on the injection line (11) and connected with the reactor protection system; upon receiving emergency protection signals indicating failure of emergency shutdown or excessive neutron flux that are issued by the reactor protection system, the injection pump (10) injects concentrated boron into the reactor pressure vessel and core.
- 2. The combined active and passive emergency shutdown system as claimed in claim 1, wherein an electric heating element (9) is disposed in the concentrated boron tank (8) to allow a solution temperature not lower than boron precipitation temperature.
- 3. The combined active and passive emergency shutdown system as claimed in claim 1 or claim 2, wherein the injection line (11) has one end connected at bottom of the concentrated boron tank (8) and the other end connected with an injection piping of a cold leg of a reactor safety injection system.
- 4. The combined active and passive emergency shutdown system as claimed in claim 1 or claim 2, wherein the emergency boron injection system (7) comprises two trains independent of each other, each of which being respectively provided with one concentrated boron tank (8) and one injection line (11) and being able to supply 100% injection capacity of concentrated boron.
- 5. The combined active and passive emergency shutdown system as claimed in claim 4, wherein the concentrated boron tank (8) is connected with a reactor *boron and water make-up system.
- 6. The combined active and passive emergency shutdown system as claimed in claim 1 or claim 2, wherein the concentration of boron solution in the concentrated boron tank is in the range of 7000-9000 ppm and the ambient temperature of a room housing a boron injection tank is higher than the precipitation temperature limit of 9000 ppm boric acid solution.
- 7. A combined active and passive emergency shutdown method, wherein a reactor protection system issues to a reactor trip breaker of a control rod emergency shutdown subsystem reactor emergency shutdown signals under accident conditions which cause coils of the reactor trip breaker to become dc-energized and, consequently, the reactor trip breaker is opened, resulting in the power supply of control rods being lost and dropping of the control rods; in case of failure of the control rods to drop in place, the reactor protection system issues signals to an emergency boron injection subsystem indicating failure of emergency shutdown or excessive neutron flux; upon receiving the signals, the emergency boron injection system starts up an injection pump which injects concentrated boron into a reactor pressure vessel and core, thereby achieving emergency shutdown.
Applications Claiming Priority (2)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| CN201210374796.8A CN102881340B (en) | 2012-09-27 | 2012-09-27 | A kind of active and non-active last moment emergency shut-down of combining and method |
| PCT/CN2013/084045 WO2014048291A1 (en) | 2012-09-27 | 2013-09-24 | Combined active and passive emergency shutdown system and method |
Publications (3)
| Publication Number | Publication Date |
|---|---|
| GB201504153D0 GB201504153D0 (en) | 2015-04-29 |
| GB2519920A true GB2519920A (en) | 2015-05-06 |
| GB2519920B GB2519920B (en) | 2018-08-08 |
Family
ID=47482632
Family Applications (1)
| Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
|---|---|---|---|
| GB1504153.6A Active GB2519920B (en) | 2012-09-27 | 2013-09-24 | Combined active and passive emergency shutdown system and method |
Country Status (5)
| Country | Link |
|---|---|
| CN (1) | CN102881340B (en) |
| GB (1) | GB2519920B (en) |
| MY (1) | MY171943A (en) |
| WO (1) | WO2014048291A1 (en) |
| ZA (1) | ZA201502771B (en) |
Cited By (2)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| US20170140842A1 (en) * | 2015-11-12 | 2017-05-18 | Westinghouse Electric Company Llc | Subcritical Reactivity Monitor Utilizing Prompt Self-Powered Incore Detectors |
| RU184861U1 (en) * | 2018-04-10 | 2018-11-13 | Акционерное общество "Центральный конструкторско-технологический институт арматуростроения" | NUCLEAR STEAM PRODUCTION UNIT |
Families Citing this family (10)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN102881340B (en) * | 2012-09-27 | 2015-09-23 | 中国核电工程有限公司 | A kind of active and non-active last moment emergency shut-down of combining and method |
| CN104332207B (en) * | 2013-07-22 | 2017-01-18 | 中国核动力研究设计院 | Method for automatically stopping coolant pump under reactor coolant loss accident condition |
| US10304575B2 (en) | 2013-12-26 | 2019-05-28 | Nuscale Power, Llc | Actuating a nuclear reactor safety device |
| CN106887259A (en) * | 2015-12-15 | 2017-06-23 | 中国核动力研究设计院 | A kind of nuclear power plant fast and safely reactor shut-off system |
| CA3046993A1 (en) | 2016-12-30 | 2018-07-05 | Nuscale Power, Llc | Control rod damping system |
| CN109427422A (en) * | 2017-08-29 | 2019-03-05 | 华北电力大学 | A kind of dense boric acid injected system of emergency is as second set of reactor shut-off system of presurized water reactor |
| US11105526B1 (en) | 2017-09-29 | 2021-08-31 | Integrated Global Services, Inc. | Safety shutdown systems and methods for LNG, crude oil refineries, petrochemical plants, and other facilities |
| CN109473185B (en) * | 2018-11-13 | 2022-07-29 | 中国核动力研究设计院 | Testing device and testing method for automatic chemical reactor shutdown system |
| CN109686465A (en) * | 2018-11-27 | 2019-04-26 | 中广核研究院有限公司 | A kind of diagnostic method of reactor shutdown failure |
| CN116313178B (en) * | 2023-04-13 | 2024-03-22 | 中国原子能科学研究院 | Reactor and reactivity control system thereof |
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| JPH03279892A (en) * | 1990-03-29 | 1991-12-11 | Toshiba Corp | Setup method for trip level of control rod extraction monitor device |
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| CN101206928A (en) * | 2006-12-21 | 2008-06-25 | 数据系统及解决技术公司 | System for operating control mechanisms of rods in a nuclear reactor |
| CN102881340A (en) * | 2012-09-27 | 2013-01-16 | 中国核电工程有限公司 | Emergency shut-down system and method combining activeness and passiveness |
| CN202887744U (en) * | 2012-09-27 | 2013-04-17 | 中国核电工程有限公司 | Combined active and passive emergency shut-down system |
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| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
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| JPS61118692A (en) * | 1984-11-13 | 1986-06-05 | ウエスチングハウス エレクトリック コ−ポレ−ション | Method of operating generation system of pressurized water type reactor |
-
2012
- 2012-09-27 CN CN201210374796.8A patent/CN102881340B/en active Active
-
2013
- 2013-09-24 MY MYPI2015700869A patent/MY171943A/en unknown
- 2013-09-24 WO PCT/CN2013/084045 patent/WO2014048291A1/en active Application Filing
- 2013-09-24 GB GB1504153.6A patent/GB2519920B/en active Active
-
2015
- 2015-04-23 ZA ZA2015/02771A patent/ZA201502771B/en unknown
Patent Citations (6)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| JPH03279892A (en) * | 1990-03-29 | 1991-12-11 | Toshiba Corp | Setup method for trip level of control rod extraction monitor device |
| CN1447342A (en) * | 2003-04-04 | 2003-10-08 | 清华大学 | Second shutdown system of absorption ball applicable to gas-cooled reactor |
| CN1783353A (en) * | 2004-12-03 | 2006-06-07 | 大亚湾核电运营管理有限责任公司 | Method for improving integrated reliability of nuclear power station safety injection system |
| CN101206928A (en) * | 2006-12-21 | 2008-06-25 | 数据系统及解决技术公司 | System for operating control mechanisms of rods in a nuclear reactor |
| CN102881340A (en) * | 2012-09-27 | 2013-01-16 | 中国核电工程有限公司 | Emergency shut-down system and method combining activeness and passiveness |
| CN202887744U (en) * | 2012-09-27 | 2013-04-17 | 中国核电工程有限公司 | Combined active and passive emergency shut-down system |
Cited By (3)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| US20170140842A1 (en) * | 2015-11-12 | 2017-05-18 | Westinghouse Electric Company Llc | Subcritical Reactivity Monitor Utilizing Prompt Self-Powered Incore Detectors |
| US11430578B2 (en) | 2015-11-12 | 2022-08-30 | Westinghouse Electric Company Llc | Subcritical reactivity monitor utilizing prompt self-powered in-core detectors |
| RU184861U1 (en) * | 2018-04-10 | 2018-11-13 | Акционерное общество "Центральный конструкторско-технологический институт арматуростроения" | NUCLEAR STEAM PRODUCTION UNIT |
Also Published As
| Publication number | Publication date |
|---|---|
| GB2519920B (en) | 2018-08-08 |
| MY171943A (en) | 2019-11-08 |
| ZA201502771B (en) | 2016-02-24 |
| CN102881340A (en) | 2013-01-16 |
| GB201504153D0 (en) | 2015-04-29 |
| WO2014048291A1 (en) | 2014-04-03 |
| CN102881340B (en) | 2015-09-23 |
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