GB2409057A

GB2409057A - Access protected storage component for a computer system

Info

Publication number: GB2409057A
Application number: GB0328441A
Authority: GB
Inventors: Philip Frederick James Haylor
Original assignee: Individual
Current assignee: Individual
Priority date: 2003-12-08
Filing date: 2003-12-08
Publication date: 2005-06-15
Also published as: GB0328441D0

Abstract

Components of a computer system are protected by requiring input of security authentication before they can be used. Storage devices such as hard drives or solid state memory (eg RAM) may block access to stored data without the input of security authentication. Upon entering the wrong authentication code beyond a prescribed number of times the stored data can be encrypted or deleted. In the case of hard drive storage a degaussing element may be used to destroy the stored data. The system may also have varying levels of access rights.

Description

1 2409057 Access-Protected Component for a Computer and Method for

Protecting Access to such a Component The invention relates to components for computers, such as data storage units, processors and the like.

As the use of computers has become more and more widespread, the need for securing components within a computer and for securing data that may be stored in those components has increased. Presently known solutions include encrypting data that is to be transmitted between computers or encrypting the data before storing it in a data storage device. Alternative solutions have been to require a password on start- up of a computer. However, these known solutions have several drawbacks. For example, encrypting data increases the time taken to record data to a data storage medium and requires increased processing power. Furthermore, provisions for password protection on start-up of a computer provide little protection if the computer is stolen. In the latter case, the thief may remove components from the stolen computer and install them in another computer, thus avoiding the password requirement. Therefore an improved security solution is required.

It is an object of the present invention to provide such a solution. According to a first aspect of the present invention there is provided an access-protected component for a computer, comprising: input means for receiving input of a security authentication; and control means for only permitting a user to use the component if said input matches a predetermined value stored within the component.

According to a second aspect of the present invention there is provided a method for protecting access to a component for a computer, the method comprising: receiving a security authentication input from a user; and only permitting the user to use said component if the input matches a predetermined value stored within the component.

Accordingly, a user must have the correct security authentication in order to use the component, including accessing any data stored within the component. Even if a computer is stolen and the thief removes the component and inserts it into another computer, the security authentication, matching that stored within the component, will still be required before using the component.

Preferably the component comprises a data storage medium for storing data.

In this case, even if the component is removed from the computer, it will still not be S possible to access the data stored in the data storage medium without the correct security authentication. Therefore, the security of the data in the data storage medium is ensured without requiring encryption of the data as it is being saved. Of course, the component may also be other elements of a computer such as a processor or a drive for a removable memory medium (e.g. CD-ROM, DVD-ROM, etc). In this case, the component will be of no value without the security authentication.

Consequently, if the computer is stolen, the components in it will be of no value to a thief even when removed from the computer, thus reducing the incentive to steal the computer in the first place.

Where the component is a data storage medium, the predetermined value for comparing with the security authentication may be stored on the data storage medium. Alternatively or additionally (especially in the case were the component is not a data storage device), the predetermined value may be stored in the control means. Advantageously, if the predetermined value is stored in both the data storage medium and the control means, the user may only gain access to the component if the security authentication input matches both the predetermined value stored in the control means and the predetermined value stored on the data storage medium. In this case, a thief would not be able to access stored data, even by removing the data storage medium from the component and installing it in a corresponding component with a predetermined value for the security authentication, known to the thief, stored in the control means.

Additional security may be provided by responding to an input of a security authentication that does not match the predetermined value. This may occur at the first instance or may occur after a set number of times, for example if the incorrect security authentication is input three times. In this case, the component may respond by encrypting at least part of the data already stored in the data storage means (thus making it harder for someone to access the data but not slowing the save-rate when the data is first stored) or may erase at least part of the data already stored in the data storage means.

Conveniently, the memory storage medium may be one of a hard disk and a solid stage memory. Where the component contains a plurality of such data storage mediums, the input of one security authentication may provide access to all of the data storage mediums.

In the case of a hard disk, the at least part of the data stored on it can conveniently be deleted, if required, by providing a degaussing element around the data storage medium. When an electric current is provided to the element, it generates a degaussing field that irradiates over and through the medium and randomly disrupts the data magnetically recorded on the storage medium, thereby deleting it.

In the event of an unrecognizable security authentication being input (or input a specified number of times), the interface between the component and a computer may be disabled for users, thus preventing the component from being used.

Alternatively or additionally, the component may contain a means for damaging itself such that it can no longer function in the event of the input of unrecognised security authentication. Such arrangements provide an additional level of security for the device.

The components may be provided with dual level security. For example, if a user enters an unrecognized security authentication, the component may be disabled for users. If, however, subsequently an administrator enters an override security authentication, the component or, for example, the interface between the component and the computer, may be re-enabled. If an incorrect override security authentication is provided, the component may then activate a means for damaging itself such that the component can no longer function or may erase the data.

The component may be provided with a plurality of predetermined values for comparing with security authentications. In this case, input of different security authentications may provide access for the user to perform different functions with the component or access different data stored within the component.

The security authentication provided to the component may take the form of a numerical combination and/or password and/or a biometric identification (including, for example, a fingerprint scan, voice pattern recognition, facial geometry recognition, retinal scan or signature).

The invention will now be further described by way of non-limitative example with reference to the attached drawings in which: Figure 1 is a schematic representation of a component according to the present invention; Figure 2 is the schematic representation of a variant of the component shown in Figure 1; and Figure 3 is a schematic representation of an arrangement for deleting data stored on a hard disk.

As shown in Figure 1, a component 1 according to the present invention is made up of an input unit 5 and a main unit 2 that contains a control unit 3, an active unit 4, and an optional disabling unit 6.

The active unit 4 performs the primary function of the component 1. For example, if the component is an data storage unit, then the active unit 4 will be one or more data storage mediums. The control unit 3 contains micro-code, also known as firmware, which is used to control the active unit 4 and the information flow 7 between the component 1 and a computer in which it is installed.

The input unit 5 receives an input security authentication and passes it to the control unit 3. The input unit may be part of the component itself or, in most cases, it will be part of the computer. In this case, the component 1 will have input terminals for receiving an input security authentication from the computer. The input unit may, for example, be a keyboard for input of a password. Alternatively, it may be a means for making a biometric identification. In this case the input unit may be a scanner for scanning a fingerprint of the user, a scanner for making a retinal scan of the user, a camera for performing facial geometry recognition, a microphone for performing voice pattern recognition or an input pad for electronically recording a signature.

On input of a security authentication, the control unit 3 compares the input to a predetermined value or to a number of predetermined values if there are to be a polarity of authorised users, each with their own security authentication. If the input matches one of these predetermined values, then the user is permitted to use the component and/or access data stored therein.

The predetermined value(s) may be stored within the micro-code of the control means. Alternatively, if the active unit 4 is a data storage medium, the predetermined value(s) may be stored on the data storage medium. In a preferred arrangement, the predetermined value(s) is stored in both the control unit 3 and the data storage medium 4. In this arrangement, the user is only permitted use of the component 1 if the security authentication input matches a value stored in both the control unit 3 and the data storage medium 4. Thus, if a thief were to steal a component 1, he would not be able to gain access to the data stored on the data storage medium merely by removing it from the component and inserting it in an equivalent component in which the predetermined value in the control means 3 is known.

Where the active unit 4 is a data storage medium, the control unit 3 may take active steps to protect the data stored in the data storage medium if an unrecognized security authentication is entered. This may take place immediately upon entry of an unrecognised security authentication or may occur after a predetermined number of attempts at entering the security authentication. For example, the control means may allow three attempts before activating means for securing the data. It will be appreciated, however, that it may be set to allow any given number of attempts.

The control means 3 may, after the predetermined number of failed attempts to enter a correct security authentication, erase the data stored in the data storage medium. Alternatively, it may re-record the data in encrypted form. It will be appreciated that the control means may be arranged to only erase and/or encrypt a portion of the data stored in the data storage medium. For example, data may be stored in two classifications; secure data which is erased or encrypted on entry of an unrecognised security authentication; and non-secure data which is not erased or encrypted on incorrect entry of the security authentication (but which the user still cannot access unless the correct security authentication is provided).

Data stored in a component such as a hard disk may be erased by means of a degaussing arrangement such as that shown in Figure 3. The degausser consists of a loop 22 of iron based material or a material of similar properties. The loop is located within the hard disk enclosure and arranged around the platter 20 (the data storage medium). If the hard disk contains more than one platter, it may have one loop arranged around all of the platters or may have a plurality of loops (for example, one per platter). In addition to a simple loop the degausser may have a coiled wire running along all or part of the loop. A flow of electrical current through the loop (and/or coiled wire) generates a degaussing field. The degaussing field irradiates over and through the platter and randomly disrupts the magnetically recorded information stored on the media, thus deleting the stored information. By arranging the loop over the inner most radial recording track of the platter 22 (as shown), all of the recording areas of the recording tracks of the data storage medium will pass under the degausser twice per revolution of the platter (namely once under each end of the loop). Typical rotation speeds of platters in hard disks are, for example, 5400, 7200,10000 or 15000 rpm. Consequently, the degaussing scheme shown in Figure three is very efficient because the entire length of each of the recording tracks is exposed to the degausser in a short amount of time. Furthermore, in this arrangement, all of the servo information and other gray code, recorded on the opposite recording surface (assuming a single platter implementation of a hard disk) or one of the recording surfaces of one of the platters (in a multi-platter implementation), is also exposed to the degausser. Consequently all of the servo information and other gray code is erased, rendering the hard disk unit inoperable.

Data stored on a hard disk can also be erased by enabling the processes already available in some hard disk units. Examples of such processes are the presently known Security Erase or Enhanced Security Erase Unit Commands processes. The Enhanced Security Erase Unit Commands, for example, were proposed to the X3T13 Technical Committee by International Business Machines Inc in 1997. The Enhanced Security Erase Unit Commands process is effected by data erasing code that makes recovery of previously written data impossible by writing data patterns to all recording sectors including those that have been reallocated.

However, the Enhanced Security Erase Unit Commands process can take in excess of 8 hours to complete and even the earlier Security Erase process can take in the region of 30 minutes to complete.

Instead of erasing the data in the component (or, as an initial step to erasing the data in order to ensure that the data cannot be accessed even if the sequence of erasing is not completed - for example, if the procedure is interrupted in an attempt to prevent it), the control unit 3 may delete the file allocation table on the data storage medium; the control unit 3 may delete the partition information or randomly change the partition information; or the control unit 3 may write random data to random portions of the data storage medium to corrupt the data. In order to completely erase the data it will be necessary to write test or random data to every sector of the data storage medium.

Similarly, in the case of encrypting the data stored in the data storage medium, the procedure may start with, or it may be sufficient to, encrypt just the file allocation table or the partition information.

Regardless of the type of component used (for example if the active unit 4 is a processor instead of a data storage medium), the component may have alternative means of securing the device. For example, the component I shown in Figure 1 has a disabling unit 6. If the security authentication is not recognised (or an unrecognised security authentication is entered the predetermined number of times), the disabling unit 6 (which may be a part of the control unit 3 rather than a separate unit as shown in Figure 1) disables the interface 7 between the component 1 and a computer to which it is attached. Therefore the component will have no value if stolen because it will not be able to perform any functions and, if the component is a data storage.unit, no access to the data will be possible.

If, for example the component is a processor, its functionality may be limited on incorrect entry of the security authentication. The Input/Output and Memory Maps typically use the same address lines. The disabling of some or all of the address lines would limit the functionality of the processor to an extent that it would render the computer as a whole inoperable. Typically, the addressable location of Firmware, Micro-code and Bootstrap loading processes reside in the lower portions of the addressable memory and with the architecture of the personal computer and personal computer compatibles for example, their lower portions of addressable memory are in the region below 1 Megabyte, which utilises address lines AD to Al9.

The component could effectively be destroyed by disabling address lines A20 to A25 which affect the Memory Map between 1 Megabyte and 64 Megabytes. The address lines could be disabled, for example, by asserting an over voltage to an inline fuse within the processor in the pathway of the address line. Alternatively, the address lines could be disabled by a reversible method. In this case, because the address lines AD to Al 9 have not been disabled, the processor would be able to function sufficiently to execute a password authentication process, allowing the user to enter a correct security authentication or a security authentication (discussed below) to re- enable the processor.

Figure 2 shows a component 10 with a further arrangement for securing the device. Instead of a disabling unit 6, the component has a device 1 1 which when activated damages the active unit 4 such that it can no longer function. For example if the active unit is a data storage medium such as a hard disk drive, the device 11 may destroy the read/write head with a high voltage. Alternatively, the device 11 could cause a head crash, there by damaging the storage medium of the hard disk drive. A yet further alternative for the device I I would be a device that generates a very high magnetic pulse. It will be appreciated that the means for causing damage may be a separate device as shown in Figure 2 but may, instead, be a part of the micro-code that is used by the control means to control the component 10. Other means of preventing the active unit 4 from functioning will also be apparent to the skilled person and these are to be considered within the scope of the present invention.

In order to prevent accidental loss of the data in a data storing component or damage of a component in the event of an authorised user accidentally entering an incorrect security authorization, a two-level security system may be provided. In such a system, the or each user has a security authentication which enables them to use the component when it is correctly entered. If, however, an incorrect security authentication is entered (or entered a predetermined number of times), the component is disabled by one of the non-permanent options discussed above (i.e. not erasing the data or damaging the active unit 4). An override security authentication is also provided but only, for example, to IT administrators or similar. On correct entry of the override security authentication, the component is re-enabled, namely the data is deencrypted or the interface is re-enabled, for example.

If the component has been disabled (or data has been encrypted, etc) due to incorrect entry of the security authentication and, subsequently an incorrect override security authentication is entered (or wrongly entered a predetermined number of times) then the control unit 3 may disable the chip by one of the additional, perhaps permanent, means not initially used. For example, in the case of a data storage component, failure to enter the security authentication may result in the data being encrypted and failure to enter the correct override security authentication may result in the data being erased. As an alternative example, failure to enter the security authentication may result in the interface between the component and a computer to which it is attached being disabled and failure to enter the correct override security authentication may result in the active unit 4 being damaged such that it can no longer function. It will be appreciated that any non-permanent means for restricting use may be used initially, followed by additional measures following a failure to correctly enter the override security authentication.

Claims

1. An access-protected component for a computer, comprising: input means for receiving input of a security authentication, and control means for only permitting a user to use the component if said input matches a predetermined value stored within the component.

2. An access-protected component for a computer according to claim 1, wherein said component comprises a data storage medium.

3. An access-protected component for a computer according to claim 2, further comprising means for encrypting at least part of the data already stored in the data storage means if security authentication not matching a predetermined value stored within the component is input a specified number of times.

4. An access-protected component for a computer according to claim 2 or 3, further comprising means for erasing at least part of the data already stored in the data storage means if security authentication not matching a predetermined value stored within the component is input a specified number of times.

5. An access-protected component for a computer according to any one of claims 2 to 4, wherein said memory storage medium is at least one of a hard disk and a solid-state memory.

6. An access-protected component for a computer according to claim 5, wherein the memory storage medium is a hard disk and the component further comprises a degaussing element arranged around the data storage medium such that a flow of electrical current through the element generates a degaussing field that disrupts at least a portion of the data magnetically recorded on the recording medium, thereby erasing said data.

7. An access-protected component for a computer according to any one of claims 2 to 6, wherein said component comprises a plurality of data storage mediums and said control means permits access to data in all said data storage mediums if said input matches a predetermined value stored within the component.

8. An access-protected component for a computer according to any one of claims 2 to 7, wherein said predetermined value is stored in said data storage 1 0 medium.

9. An access-protected component for a computer according to any one of the preceding claims, wherein said predetermined value is stored in said control means.

10. An access-protected component for a computer according to claims 8 and 9, wherein said control means is arranged to only permit a user to use the component if said input matches both a predetermined value stored on the data storage medium and a predetermined value stored on the control means.

11. An access-protected component for a computer according to any one of the preceding claims, further comprising means for causing damage to the component such that it can no longer function if security authentication not matching a predetermined value stored within the component is input a specified number of times.

12. An access-protected component for a computer according to any one of claims I to 10, further comprising disabling means for disabling the interface between the component and a computer if security authentication not matching a predetermined value stored within the component is input a specified number of times.

13. An access-protected component for a computer according to claim 12, comprising means for receiving input of an override security authentication; and means for re-enabling the interface between the component and a computer if the input of the override security authentication matches a second predetermined value stored within the component.

14. An access-protected component for a computer according to clam 13, further comprising means for causing damage to the component such that it can no longer function if an override security authentication not matching a second predetermined value stored within the component is input a specified number of times.

15. An access-protected component for a computer according to any one of the preceding claims, wherein said control means permits the user to perform different functions with the component and/or access different data stored within the component, depending on the security authentication that is input.

16. An access-protected component for a computer according to any one of the preceding claims, wherein the security authentication or the override security authentication comprises at least one of a numerical combination, a password and a biometric identification such as a fingerprint scan, voice pattern recognition, facial geometry recognition, retinal scan or signature.

17. An access-protected component for a computer according to any one of the preceding claims, wherein said control means is controlled by executing micro-code stored within the component.

18. An access-protected component for a computer according to any one of the preceding claims, wherein the component is one of a hard disk drive, a solid state memory unit, a temporary data storage unit such as a RAM unit, a processor and a drive for a removable memory medium.

l 9. A method for protecting access to a component for a computer, the method comprising: receiving a security authentication input from a user; and only permitting the user to use said component if the input matches a predetermined value stored within the component.

20. A method for protecting access to a component for a computer according to claim 19, wherein said component comprises a data storage medium.

21. A method for protecting access to a component for a computer according to claim 18, further comprising the step of encrypting at least part of the data already stored in the data storage means if security authentication not matching a predetermined value stored within the component is input a specified number of 1 5 times.

22. A method for protecting access to a component for a computer according to claim 20 or 21, further comprising the step of erasing at least part of the data already stored in the data storage means if security authentication not matching a predetermined value stored within the component is input a specified number of times.

23. A method for protecting access to a component for a computer according to any one of claims 20 to 22, wherein said memory storage medium is at least one of a hard disk and a solid state memory.

24. A method for protecting access to a component for a computer according to any one of claims 22 and 23, wherein the memory storage medium is a hard disk and said erasing step comprises providing an electric current to a degaussing element within said component to generate a degaussing field that disrupts at least a portion of the data magnetically recorded on the recording medium.

25. A method for protecting access to a component for a computer according to any one of claims 20 to 24, wherein said component comprises a plurality of data storage mediums and the user is permitted access to data all said data storage mediums if said input matches a predetermined value stored within the component.

26. A method for protecting access to a component for a computer according to any one of claim 20 to 25, wherein said predetermined value is stored on said data storage medium.

27. A method for protecting access to a component for a computer according to any one of claims 19 to 26, wherein said predetermined value is stored in a controller within and for controlling said component.

28. A method for protecting access to a component for a computer according to claims 26 and 27, wherein the user is only permitted to use said component if the input matches both a predetermined value stored on the data storage medium and a predetermined value stored in said controller.

29. A method for protecting access to a component for a computer according to any one of claims 19 to 28, further comprising the step of damaging the component such that it can no longer function if security authentication not matching a predetermined value stored within the component is input a specified number of times.

30. A method for protecting access to a component for a computer according to any one of claims 19 to 29, further comprising the step of disabling the interface between the component and a computer if security authentication not matching a predetermined value stored within the component is input a specified number of times. *

31. A method for protecting access to a component for a computer according to claim 30, further comprising the steps of receiving input of an override security authentication; and re-enabling the interface between the component and a computer if the input of the override security authentication matches a second predetermined value stored within the component.

32. A method for protecting access to a component for a computer according to claim 31, further comprising the step of damaging the component such that it can no longer function if override security authentication not matching a second predetermined value stored within the component is input a specified number of times.

33. A method for protecting access to a component for a computer according to any one of claims 19 to 32, wherein the user is permitted perform different functions with the component and/or access different data stored within the component, depending on the security authentication that is input.

34. A method for protecting access to a component for a computer according to any one of claims 19 to 33, wherein the security authentication or the override security authentication comprises at least one of a numerical combination, a password and a biometric identification such as a fingerprint scan, voice pattern recognition, facial geometry recognition, retinal scan or a signature.

35. A method for protecting access to a component for a computer according to any one of claims 19 to 34, wherein the step of permitting the user to use a component is controlled by a control unit within said component executing micro- code stored within the component.

36. A method for protecting access to a component for a computer according to any one of claims 19 to 3 5, wherein the component is one of a hard disk drive, a solid state memory unit, a temporary data storage unit such as a RAM unit, a processor and a drive for a removable memory medium.

37. An access-protected component for a computer substantially as hereinbefore described with reference to the accompanying drawings.

38. A method for protecting access to a component for a computer substantially has hereinbefore described with reference to the accompanying drawings.