GB2407189A - Preventing unauthorised access to a contact-less smart card - Google Patents

Preventing unauthorised access to a contact-less smart card Download PDF

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Publication number
GB2407189A
GB2407189A GB0323165A GB0323165A GB2407189A GB 2407189 A GB2407189 A GB 2407189A GB 0323165 A GB0323165 A GB 0323165A GB 0323165 A GB0323165 A GB 0323165A GB 2407189 A GB2407189 A GB 2407189A
Authority
GB
United Kingdom
Prior art keywords
smart token
smart
token
card
reader
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Withdrawn
Application number
GB0323165A
Other versions
GB0323165D0 (en
Inventor
Keith Edward Mayes
Susan Margaret Mayes
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Vodafone Group PLC
Original Assignee
CRISP TELECOM Ltd
Vodafone Group PLC
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by CRISP TELECOM Ltd, Vodafone Group PLC filed Critical CRISP TELECOM Ltd
Priority to GB0323165A priority Critical patent/GB2407189A/en
Publication of GB0323165D0 publication Critical patent/GB0323165D0/en
Publication of GB2407189A publication Critical patent/GB2407189A/en
Withdrawn legal-status Critical Current

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Classifications

    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04K—SECRET COMMUNICATION; JAMMING OF COMMUNICATION
    • H04K3/00—Jamming of communication; Counter-measures
    • H04K3/80—Jamming or countermeasure characterized by its function
    • H04K3/82—Jamming or countermeasure characterized by its function related to preventing surveillance, interception or detection
    • H04K3/825—Jamming or countermeasure characterized by its function related to preventing surveillance, interception or detection by jamming
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06K—GRAPHICAL DATA READING; PRESENTATION OF DATA; RECORD CARRIERS; HANDLING RECORD CARRIERS
    • G06K19/00—Record carriers for use with machines and with at least a part designed to carry digital markings
    • G06K19/06—Record carriers for use with machines and with at least a part designed to carry digital markings characterised by the kind of the digital marking, e.g. shape, nature, code
    • G06K19/067—Record carriers with conductive marks, printed circuits or semiconductor circuit elements, e.g. credit or identity cards also with resonating or responding marks without active components
    • G06K19/07—Record carriers with conductive marks, printed circuits or semiconductor circuit elements, e.g. credit or identity cards also with resonating or responding marks without active components with integrated circuit chips
    • G06K19/073—Special arrangements for circuits, e.g. for protecting identification code in memory
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06K—GRAPHICAL DATA READING; PRESENTATION OF DATA; RECORD CARRIERS; HANDLING RECORD CARRIERS
    • G06K19/00—Record carriers for use with machines and with at least a part designed to carry digital markings
    • G06K19/06—Record carriers for use with machines and with at least a part designed to carry digital markings characterised by the kind of the digital marking, e.g. shape, nature, code
    • G06K19/067—Record carriers with conductive marks, printed circuits or semiconductor circuit elements, e.g. credit or identity cards also with resonating or responding marks without active components
    • G06K19/07—Record carriers with conductive marks, printed circuits or semiconductor circuit elements, e.g. credit or identity cards also with resonating or responding marks without active components with integrated circuit chips
    • G06K19/073—Special arrangements for circuits, e.g. for protecting identification code in memory
    • G06K19/07309—Means for preventing undesired reading or writing from or onto record carriers
    • G06K19/07345—Means for preventing undesired reading or writing from or onto record carriers by activating or deactivating at least a part of the circuit on the record carrier, e.g. ON/OFF switches
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04K—SECRET COMMUNICATION; JAMMING OF COMMUNICATION
    • H04K3/00—Jamming of communication; Counter-measures
    • H04K3/40—Jamming having variable characteristics
    • H04K3/41—Jamming having variable characteristics characterized by the control of the jamming activation or deactivation time
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04K—SECRET COMMUNICATION; JAMMING OF COMMUNICATION
    • H04K3/00—Jamming of communication; Counter-measures
    • H04K3/80—Jamming or countermeasure characterized by its function
    • H04K3/86—Jamming or countermeasure characterized by its function related to preventing deceptive jamming or unauthorized interrogation or access, e.g. WLAN access or RFID reading
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04K—SECRET COMMUNICATION; JAMMING OF COMMUNICATION
    • H04K2203/00—Jamming of communication; Countermeasures
    • H04K2203/10—Jamming or countermeasure used for a particular application
    • H04K2203/20—Jamming or countermeasure used for a particular application for contactless carriers, e.g. RFID carriers

Abstract

To ensure that a contact-less smart card is not accessed by an unauthorised entity the card is disabled when not required. The card may be enabled by entry of a pin or scanning of a fingerprint. The card may alternatively be enabled by a photo diode, one or more pressure sensors, a heat or skin resistance sensor or an inertial sensor. Alternatively a jamming device may jam communication with adjacent smart cards or the smart card may be shielded by a metal plate in a wallet or purse.

Description

PREVENTING UNAUTHORISED ACCESS TO A
CONTACT-LESS SMART CARD
Background of the invention
The invention relates to contact-less RF (radio frequency) smart cards. Examples of contact-less smart card technology is described within ISO/IEC 14443 and ISO/IEC 15693 standards. These cards contain an in built inductive antenna that allows the card to exchange information with a card reader when the two are in sufficiently close proximity. The reader emits a RF signal to supply power to the card and communicate with it.
These cards are already extremely widespread in applications such as entry systems for buildings or as electronic tickets for entry to venue, public transport and toll fee collection points. They are also used in tagging systems such as in airport luggage handling where the smart cards can be read from several hundreds metros.
However there is also enormous interest in using contact- less cards as secure national identity cards and entitlement cards.
A hybrid form of contact-less smart cards has also been proposed as SIM (Subscriber Identity Module) in mobile technology and in aiding and facilitating transactions for commerce. The SIM is enhanced in this respect by the addition of an antenna built into the card, the mobile communicator or an accessory piece of equipment.
With the increase in value of the data which these cards hold it is important to protect the cards from unauthorized access.
A suitably placed or adapted reader would be able to exchange information with a card without the owner's permission. Sensitive data on the card could be stolen or changed. Indeed the card may participate in a sensitive or valuable transaction without the knowledge of the owner.
Current systems rely on some existing protection means.
The RF link between the card and reader is meant to be of limited range.
The communication between the card and the reader is encrypted.
Another known but not widely used system is to place a card in a metal enclosure that provides shielding to prevent RF access to the card.
These protection means have limitations.
Relying on range limitation is dangerous as specialist radio equipment may be used to extend the intended range.
Encryption can be effective, but it does not guard against unauthorized communication with a rogue reader (such as a genuine reader that has been stolen or a reader that has broken the encryption algorithm).
Efficient shielding is effective, but it is not user convenient as it requires the user to remember to place the card in the shield, also a user may have several such cards.
This invention is to provide other methods to ensure that a contact-less smart card is not accessed by an unauthorized entity.
Description of the invention
One method of ensuring that the smart card is not being accessed is to have the card disabled when not required.
The following are examples of how the card could be enabled and disabled as required.
Manual switching (requiring direct action by the user) These systems would be most useful when the card is required to be enabled for reasonably long periods of time.
For example when the card is a SIM for mobile terminal.
The card could automatically switch off when the reader is no longer communicating with it. These systems have the added advantage that the card cannot be enabled if it is stolen.
PIN entry - the card has an entry system for entering a PIN to enable the card. Examples of PIN entry system are shown in Figure 1a and 1b. Other systems of PIN entry could be used.
Biometric entry - It would be also possible to enable the card by taking a scan of a finger pant and comparing it to a print stored in the card's memory. If the print is confirmed to be of the authorised user the card is enabled. Such an example is shown in Figure 2. Other forms of biometric include voice recognition.
Automatic switching (requiring no direct action by the user) These system would be most useful when cards are only required for use for short periods of time. Examples are door entry system or in dealing with transactions.
Light sensor - e.g. a photo diode (a sensor that modifies an electric current when exposed to a light source) could act as a switch. The smart card would only be enabled when the card is exposed to light.
Hence when a card is in a wallet or pocket it is disabled.
Pressure sensor - a pressure sensor would act as a switch. The smart card would only be enabled when the user is physically holding the card. Hence when a card is in a wallet or pocket it is disabled. The pressure sensor may be combined with a fingerprint scanner.
The combined sensor could be set up to detect that it is an actual finger that is applying the pressure.
Alternatively the pressure sensor could be combined with an electrical resistance meter and used to detect that it is a human hand holding the card and applying pressure.
Heat sensors - another method of ensuring that the card is in a user's hand include using heat sensors.
Skin resistance sensor- as mentioned above a method of ensuring that the card is in a user's hand include using electrical resistance sensors.
Inertial sensors - an inertial sensor can be used to detect the fact that the user is moving the card around at a sufficient speed to indicate it is to be used. Inertial sensors can be based on micro-accelerators, these are commonly used in motion detectors for example in gaming and virtual reality/remote control systems.
General ambient sensors - the above switching solutions are based on changes in ambient conditions (e.g. light, pressure, heat, movement) from when a card is simply being stored to when a card is required to be active. The invention is not limited to the exemplary sensors described.
Non switching methods - Useful for single or multiple cards or where the card is not in a users possession (such as in tagging systems).
Jamming device - A contact-less card or electronic device that is designed to jam/disrupt the low level communications of all cards within the range of the jamming device. In stead of following an anti-collision protocol commonly used in contact-less smart card technology it attempts to create collisions and other forms of interference. The jamming device would have to be disabled or the cards removed from the proximity of the jamming device when authorised use of the card is required.
Round trip detector- To guard against access from RF fields that have been greatly extended the card has a round trip delay (time taken for a signal to travel from the card to the reader and back to the card) tester. It sends a test signal when the card is being probed and expects a response within a certain round-trip delay otherwise it will shut down or refuse to function.
Other methods.
Shielding methods - A purse or wallet can have a thin metal plate sewn into the fabric, as shown in Figure 6, in order to conveniently shield any cards placed in the walleVpurse A smart card may have any of the above systems implemented in any combination. For example a card may have a manual entry system and automatic entry system for both short and long periods of use. The system may work in parallel, hence the card would be enabled if the light sensor was activated or the PIN was entered. The system may work in series, hence for example the card would be enabled if the light sensor was activated and the PIN was entered.
I:)escription of the diagrams Figure 1a and 1b - PIN entry system Fig 1a shows a smart card (100) with an in-built inductive antenna (200) and a PIN entry system. Due to the size of a smart card (100) the PIN entry system consist of a small display (10) which shows the current number. An 'up' and down' button (11) will allow the user to go through the numbers and an 'enter' button (12) will allow the user to select number.
Fig 1b shows another PIN entry system is to use symbols printed on buttons (13) on the smart card (100) and the user must enter the symbol in the correct order.
Finure 2 -Biometric system Fig 2 shows a smart card (100) with an inbuilt inductive antenna (200) and a biometric system (20) for reading a finger print. The print is ideally compared to a previously taken print stored in the memory (30) of the smart card (100) or may just be judged as having the characteristics of a non- specific fingerprint.
Figure 3 - Light sensor system Fig 3 shows a smart card (100) with an inbuilt inductive antenna (200) and photo diode (40) that enable the card when the diode (40) is exposed to light. The smart card (100) may contain single or multiple photo diodes (40). To prevent accidental activation multiple photo diodes (40) may have to be activated to make the smart card (100) enabled.
Figure 4 - Pressure sensor Fig 4 shows a smart card (100) with an inbuilt inductive antenna (200) and pressure sensor (50) that enables the card when the card is being held. To prevent accidental activation multiple pressure sensors (50) may have to be activated to make the smart card (100) enabled. The card may contain multiple pressure sensor (50) on the same face of the smart card (100) or on the opposite face of the smart card (100). The smart card (100) may require a single hand to operate or two hands to operate.
Figure 5 - Inertial sensor Fig 5 shows a smart card (100) with an inbuilt inductive antenna (200) and an inertial sensor (60) that enables the card when the card is being waved around at a sufficient speed.
Figure 6 - Shielded wallet Fig 6 shows a walleVpurse (1) with metal shielding (2) that prevents RF signals reaching the smart card (100) held in the walleVpurse (l).

Claims (1)

  1. Clarions for Patent Application No CTB0323165.1 Claims for Patent
    Application No GB0323165.1 Date Lodged 03.10.2003 Title PREVENTING UNAUTHORISiED ACCESS TO A CONTACT-LESS SMART
    CARD
    Applicallt(s) Crisp Telecom Limited (01488686396 - 07767891161- keth. mayescnsptele.com) 1. A system consisting of one or more smart tokens plus one or more smart token reader devices where a smart token is able to communicate with a smart token reader without the use of direct electrical contact: and this communication is prevented except when the smart token is used in the intended manner and this prevention does not rely on the electromagnetic shielding of Be smart token.
    2. A system according to claim O whereby communication is prevented by a switching function 3. A system according to claim O whereby communication is prevented by a non-switching function 4. A system according to claun 2 whereby the switching control function requires an input or proper only known and or available to the legitimate smart token owner 5. A system according to claim 2 whereby the switching control function does not check the legitimacy of the mart token user 6. A system according to claim 4 whereby the smart token has means for PIN entry and comparison such that the entry of the PIN enables or disables the communications capability 7. A system according to claun 4 whereby the smart token has means for biometric sensing and comparison such that Be sensmg of Be correct biometric enables or disables the communications capability 8. A system according to claim 7 whereby the biometric sensor is a fingerprint reader.
    9. A system according to claim 5 whereby the smart token has means for sensing visible and or infra red and or ultra violet light such that the presence or absence of this light can be used to enable or disable the smart token communications capability 10. A system according to claim 9 whereby lighting is provided by a system located in the vicinity of the smart token reader system or integral to it.
    11. A system according to claim 9 whereby the card is shielded Trom light when not in authorised use 12. A system according to claim 11 whereby a normal wallet is used to shield the smart token from light when the card is not in authorised use 13. A system according to claim 12 whereby the wallet is substantially as shown in Figure 6.
    14. A system according to claim 12 whereby normal clothing is used to shield the smart token from light when the card is not in authorised use 15. A system according to claim 12 whereby a special purpose opaque sleeve or pocket is used to shield the smart token from light. when the card is not in authorised use 16. A system according to claim whereby the smart token has means for sensing pressure on the smart token such that the presence or absence of this pressure can be used to enable or disable the smart token comm; mcahons capability 17. A system according to claim 16 whereby the pressure is applied by the users hand and or fingers 18. A system according to claim 16 whereby the pressure is applied by the use of the smart token reader.
    19. A system according to claim 5 whereby the smart token has means for sensing heat such that the presence or absence of this heat can be used to enable or disable the smart token communications capability 20. A system aeeordlng to claim 19 whereby heating and or cooling is provided by a system located in the vicmlty of the smart token reader system or integral to it.
    Claims for Patent Application No GB0323 165.1 21. A system according to claim 19 whereby the heating and or cooling is prodded by the users hand and or fingers.
    22. A system according to claim 5 wherever the smart token has means for sensing resistance across an area of the smart token such that the value of this resistance can be used to enable or disable the smart token communications capability 23. A system according to claim whereby the smart token has means for sensing capacitance across an area of the smart token such that the value of this capacitance can be used to enable or disable the smart token communications capability 24. A system according to chim 5 Hereby the smart token has means for sensing inductance across an area of the smart token such that the value of this inductance can be used to enable or disable the smart token communications capability 25. A system according to claim whereby the smart token has means for sensing inertial changes such that the value of this inertial change can be used to enable or disable the smart token communications capability 26. A system according to claun 3 whereby the communication capability of the Retort token is rendered ineffective due to a jamming device.
    27. A system according to claim 26 whereby the jamming device is also a smart token.
    28. A system according to claim 26 whereby the jamming device is a shortrange electronic device that is not a smart token.
    29. A system according to claim 26 whereby the jamming device is a longrange electronic device.
    30. A system according to rem 5 whereby a sub system connected via a snout token reader has means to measure the time taken for the smart token communication protocol and depending on those measurements render the smart token communications capability logically valid or invalid.
    31. A method consisting of one or more smart tokens plus one or more smart token reader devices where a smart token is able to communicate with a smart token reader without the use of direct electrical contact and this communication is prevented except when the smart token is used in the intended manner and this prevention does not rely on the electromagnetic shielding of the smart token.
    32. A method according to claim 31 whereby conununication is prevented by a switching function 33. A method according to claim 31 whereby communication is prevented by a non- switching function 34. A method according to claim 32 whereby the switching control function requires an input or property only known and or available to the legitimate smart token owner 35. A method according to claim 32 whereby the switching control fimction does not check the legitimacy of the smart token user 36. A method according to clam, 34 whereby the smart token has means for PIN entry and comparison such that the entry of the PIN enables or disables the communications capability 37. A method according to claim 34 whereby the smart token has means for biometric sensing and comparison such that the sensing of the correct biometric enables or disables the Communications capability 38. A method according to claim 37 whereby the biometric sensor is a fingerprint reader.
    39. A method according to claim 35 whereby the smart token has means for sensing v isible and or infra red and or ultra violet light such that the presence or absence of this light can be used to enable or disable the smart token communications capability 4Q. A method according to claim 39 whereby lighting is provided by a system located in the vicinity of the smart token reader system or integral to *.
    41. A method according to claim 39 whereby the card is shielded fi om light when not in authorised use t <' Claims for Patent Application No GB0323 165.1 42 A method according to clang 41 whereby a normal wallet is used to shield the smart token from light when the card is not in authorised use 43. A method according to claim 42 whereby the wallet is substantially as shown in Figure 6.
    44. A method according to claim 42 whereby normal clothing is used to shield the smart token from light when the card is not in authorised use 45. A method according to claim 42 whereby a special purpose opaque sleeve or pocket is used to shield the smart token from light. when the card is not in authorised use 46. A method according to claim 3:S whereby the smart token has means for sensing pressure on the smart token such that the presence or absence of this pressure can be used to enable or disable the smart token communications capability 4?. A method according to claim 46 whereby the pressure is applied by the users hand and or fingers 48. A method according to elfin 46 whereby the pressure is applied by the use of the smart token reader.
    49. A method according to claim 5 whereby the smart token has means for sensmg heat such that the presence or absence of this heat can be used to enable or disable the smart token communications capability 50. A method according to claim 19 whereby headog and or cooling is provided by a system located in the vicinity of Me smart token reader system or integral to it.
    51. A system according to claim 19 whereby the healing and or cooling is provided by the users hand and or fingers.
    52. A method according to Skim 35 whereby the smart token has means for sensing resistance across an area of the smart token such that the value of this resistance can be used to enable or disable the smart token communications capability 53. A method according to Maim 35 whereby the smart token has means for sensing capacitance across an area of the smart token such that the value of this capacitance can be used to enable or disable the smart token communications capability 54. A method according to eLaim 35 whereby the smart token has means for sensing inductance across area of the smart token such that the value of this inductance can be used to enable or disable the smart token communications capability 55. A method according to Alan 35 whereby the smart token has means for sensing inertial changes such that the value of this martin change coo be used to enable or disable the smart token communications capability 56. A method according to Skim 33 whereby the cormmmcation capability of the smart token is rendered ineffective due to a jamming device.
    57. A method according to claim 56 whereby the jamming device is also a smart token.
    58. A method according to claim 56 whereby the jamming device is a shortrange electronic device that is not a smart token.
    59. A method according to claim 56 whereby the jamniing device is a lonrange electronic device.
    60. A method according to claim 35 whereby a sub-system connected via a smart token reader has means to measure the time traced for:e smart token communication protocol and depending on those; measurements render the smart token communications capability logically valid or invalid.
    61. A system according to any of the above clauns in which the smart token is a contact-less smart card 62. A system according to any of the above claims in which the smart token is an electronic chip with a radio frequency interface mounted insider a cattier device.
    63. A system according to any of the above claims in which the smart token is an electmnic chip with an optical coupling mounted insider a carrier device.
    64. A system according to any of the above claims in which the smart tolled is an electronic chip with a capacitive coupling mounted insider a carrier device.
    Claims for Patent Application No GB0323 165.1 65. A system according to any of the above claims in which the smart token is an electronic chip with an inductee coupling mounted insider a Gamer device.
    66. A system according to any of the above claims in which the smart token is substantially as shown in Figures 1 to 5.
    67. A system according to any of the above claims in which the smart token reader is a contact-less smart card reader.
    68. A method according to any of the above claims in which the smart token is a contact-less smart card 69. A method according to any of the above claims in which the smart token is an electronic chip with a radio frequency interface mounted insider a carrier device.
    70. A method according to any of the above claims in which the smart token is an electronic chip with an optical coupling mounted insider a carrier device.
    7] A method according to any of the abwe claims in which the smart token is an electronic chip with a capacitive coupling mounted insider a carrier device.
    72. A method according to any of Me above claims in which the smart token is an electronic chip with an inductive coupling mounted insider a carrier device.
    73. A method according to any of the above claims in which the smart token is substantially as shown in Figures 1 to 5.
    74. A method according to any of the above clamls in which the smart token reader is a contact-less smart card reader. lo
GB0323165A 2003-10-03 2003-10-03 Preventing unauthorised access to a contact-less smart card Withdrawn GB2407189A (en)

Priority Applications (1)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
GB0323165A GB2407189A (en) 2003-10-03 2003-10-03 Preventing unauthorised access to a contact-less smart card

Applications Claiming Priority (1)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
GB0323165A GB2407189A (en) 2003-10-03 2003-10-03 Preventing unauthorised access to a contact-less smart card

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GB0323165D0 GB0323165D0 (en) 2003-11-05
GB2407189A true GB2407189A (en) 2005-04-20

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