GB2280290A - Commodity metering apparatus - Google Patents

Commodity metering apparatus Download PDF

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Publication number
GB2280290A
GB2280290A GB9319757A GB9319757A GB2280290A GB 2280290 A GB2280290 A GB 2280290A GB 9319757 A GB9319757 A GB 9319757A GB 9319757 A GB9319757 A GB 9319757A GB 2280290 A GB2280290 A GB 2280290A
Authority
GB
United Kingdom
Prior art keywords
meter
consumer
fraud
metering apparatus
energy
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Granted
Application number
GB9319757A
Other versions
GB9319757D0 (en
GB2280290B (en
Inventor
Michael Paxton-White
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Siemens Metering Ltd
Original Assignee
Siemens Measurements Ltd
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Siemens Measurements Ltd filed Critical Siemens Measurements Ltd
Publication of GB9319757D0 publication Critical patent/GB9319757D0/en
Priority to ITMI941388A priority Critical patent/IT1270060B/en
Publication of GB2280290A publication Critical patent/GB2280290A/en
Application granted granted Critical
Publication of GB2280290B publication Critical patent/GB2280290B/en
Anticipated expiration legal-status Critical
Expired - Fee Related legal-status Critical Current

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Classifications

    • GPHYSICS
    • G01MEASURING; TESTING
    • G01RMEASURING ELECTRIC VARIABLES; MEASURING MAGNETIC VARIABLES
    • G01R22/00Arrangements for measuring time integral of electric power or current, e.g. electricity meters
    • G01R22/06Arrangements for measuring time integral of electric power or current, e.g. electricity meters by electronic methods
    • G01R22/061Details of electronic electricity meters
    • G01R22/066Arrangements for avoiding or indicating fraudulent use
    • GPHYSICS
    • G01MEASURING; TESTING
    • G01DMEASURING NOT SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR A SPECIFIC VARIABLE; ARRANGEMENTS FOR MEASURING TWO OR MORE VARIABLES NOT COVERED IN A SINGLE OTHER SUBCLASS; TARIFF METERING APPARATUS; MEASURING OR TESTING NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G01D4/00Tariff metering apparatus
    • G01D4/002Remote reading of utility meters
    • GPHYSICS
    • G06COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06MCOUNTING MECHANISMS; COUNTING OF OBJECTS NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06M3/00Counters with additional facilities
    • G06M3/06Counters with additional facilities for printing or separately displaying result of count
    • YGENERAL TAGGING OF NEW TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS; GENERAL TAGGING OF CROSS-SECTIONAL TECHNOLOGIES SPANNING OVER SEVERAL SECTIONS OF THE IPC; TECHNICAL SUBJECTS COVERED BY FORMER USPC CROSS-REFERENCE ART COLLECTIONS [XRACs] AND DIGESTS
    • Y02TECHNOLOGIES OR APPLICATIONS FOR MITIGATION OR ADAPTATION AGAINST CLIMATE CHANGE
    • Y02BCLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION TECHNOLOGIES RELATED TO BUILDINGS, e.g. HOUSING, HOUSE APPLIANCES OR RELATED END-USER APPLICATIONS
    • Y02B90/00Enabling technologies or technologies with a potential or indirect contribution to GHG emissions mitigation
    • Y02B90/20Smart grids as enabling technology in buildings sector
    • YGENERAL TAGGING OF NEW TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS; GENERAL TAGGING OF CROSS-SECTIONAL TECHNOLOGIES SPANNING OVER SEVERAL SECTIONS OF THE IPC; TECHNICAL SUBJECTS COVERED BY FORMER USPC CROSS-REFERENCE ART COLLECTIONS [XRACs] AND DIGESTS
    • Y04INFORMATION OR COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES HAVING AN IMPACT ON OTHER TECHNOLOGY AREAS
    • Y04SSYSTEMS INTEGRATING TECHNOLOGIES RELATED TO POWER NETWORK OPERATION, COMMUNICATION OR INFORMATION TECHNOLOGIES FOR IMPROVING THE ELECTRICAL POWER GENERATION, TRANSMISSION, DISTRIBUTION, MANAGEMENT OR USAGE, i.e. SMART GRIDS
    • Y04S20/00Management or operation of end-user stationary applications or the last stages of power distribution; Controlling, monitoring or operating thereof
    • Y04S20/30Smart metering, e.g. specially adapted for remote reading

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  • Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Theoretical Computer Science (AREA)
  • Power Engineering (AREA)
  • Arrangements For Transmission Of Measured Signals (AREA)

Abstract

A consumer meter 2 is located at a consumer's premises and a fraud meter 4 is located remotely therefrom. Supplied energy is first metered by the remote fraud meter 4 and is then measured by the consumer meter 2. The fraud meter 4 requests from the consumer meter 2 an identity code and key which it uses to encrypt the value of the measured energy prior to transmitting it to the consumer meter at the request of the consumer meter. In this way the communications link being in digital form is immune to RF interference and possible tampering by the use of RF devices. The energy values stored in the consumer's meter 2 and the fraud meter 4 may be read directly from the meters or may be transmitted, for example, via mains signalling back to the energy supply for analysis. <IMAGE>

Description

COMMODITY METERING APPARATUS The present invention relates to commodity metering apparatus, and in particular to metering apparatus for identifying the amount of energy supplied by an energy generating company and used by a consumer.
The energy supplied may, for example, be electricity, and the problem with any metered supply is that the user may tamper with the meter in such a manner to defraud the energy supplier so that a quantity of the commodity is supplied without being registered by the meter.
There are many known methods of defrauding the energy suppliers, the basis of most being either to effect the registration of power on the consumer meter or to obtain power from a point prior to the place where the consumed energy is registered. To overcome this problem it is known to provide means for metering the energy in two locations, however due to the simplicity of the dual metering system it is still quite easy to defraud such a system. A further problem experienced is that the second meter must be located dose to the consumer meter so that the connection therebetween is not effected by external RF fields or fraud devices which utilise an RF field. These type of systems can also be defrauded by removing the power supply to the consumer meter.
It is an object of the present invention to overcome these problems by providing a form of dual metering system in which the communication between the two metrological systems is provided in a secure manner.
According to the present invention there is provided commodity metering apparatus comprising a first metrological unit located at or near consumer's premises, and a second metrological unit located remotely from the consumer's premises, the first and second metrological units being connected by a communications link, and means for controlling communication between the two metrological units in a manner which allows each unit to verify the integrity of the other, and permit secure communication between the first and second units.
Preferably the first metrological unit is a consumer meter and the second metrological unit is a fraud meter and the communication between each meter via the communications link is in digital form.
Preferably the data transmitted over the communications link is in encoded form.
Preferably in the event that the consumer meter is interfered with in order to give a false consumption reading, the fraud meter simultaneously registers the amount of commodity supplied to the user and when the consumer's meter is returned to normal operation the second fraud meter updates the commodity supplied reading in the consumer meter to register the correct amount of energy supplied to the consumer.
Preferably the fraud meter is arranged to be interrogated independently of the consumer meter to attain a value of energy consumed.
An embodiment of the present invention will now be described with reference to the accompanying drawings wherein, FIGURE 1 shows a block diagram of metering apparatus having a first metrological unit and a second metrological unit being connected to a power supply and including a secure communications link, FIGURE 2 shows a block diagram of the second metrological unit, FIGURE 3 shows a block diagram of establishing an identity code between the two metrological units, and FIGURE 4 shows a block diagram of a way in which a first metrological unit is set up in order to communicate with the second metrological unit.
Referring to Figure 1, the commodity metering apparatus comprises a first metrologic unit 2 which represents a consumer meter which would be located at the consumer's premises in order to meter the amount of a commodity supplied to the user such as, for example, electricity. The electricity is supplied to the meter over live and neutral cables 8, 10 connected to the electricity generating supplier and to an input of a second metrological unit which comprises a fraud meter 4 which includes a fuse 20. The fraud meter has its live and neutral outputs connected to an input of the consumer meter 2 via lines 12 and 14 and an output is provided from the consumer meter 2 over lines 16 and 18 which respectively connect the live and neutral supply to a load. A communications link 6 is connected between the fraud meter 4 and the consumer meter 2 the purpose of which will be described in detail later.
Referring to Figure 2, a block diagram of the second metrological unit, the fraud meter 4 is shown. The parts that are common to Figure 1 have been given the same numerical designation. The live and neutral supply is connected to the fraud meter 4 over lines 8 and 10 respectively, and the load is drawn from the fraud meter via the consumer's meter 2 over the lines 12 and 14 respectively. The fraud meter 4 comprises a meter element 22 having a first input connected to the live cable 8 and a second input connected to the neutral cable 10. The live cable 8 is connected to an input of the fuse 20, the output of which is connected to cable 12. A current sensor 24 comprises a toroid coil which surrounds the live cable 8. The coil winding is connected to the metering element 22. An intelligent fraud processor 26 receives element pulses over link 28 and also receives a signal from the fuse 20 over link 30 whenever the door covering the container in which the fuse is housed is interfered with. The intelligent fraud processor 26 is connected to the consumer's meter 2 via the communications link 6 shown in Figure 1 and depicted also as 6 in Figure 2, which comprises a two wire system one of which is used to carry data from the intelligent fraud processor 26 to the consumer's meter 2, and data from the consumer's meter 2 to the intelligent fraud processor. The intelligent fraud processor 26 is also connected to a zero volt line 32.
It will be appreciated that the consumer meter 2 also includes processing means not shown similar to the intelligent fraud processor 26, the function of which will readily be appreciated by those skilled in the art.
When the consumer meter 2 is first installed and powered up, a random number is generated at such a rate that at no time could any person know that value. The installation engineer issues a command to the consumer meter and the current value of the random number is transmitted to the fraud meter 4. This process is shown in Figure 3 where like elements have been the same designation as in Figure 1 and Figure 2. The identity code is stored in storage means within the processing means of the fraud meter. The processing means is arranged to return the identity code back to the consumer meter to confirm that it has been registered correctly.
The consumer meter 2 has, for example, an opto port 36 through which the installation engineer can communicate to the processing means within the consumer meter in order to generate the identity code 34.
After the fraud meter has re-transmitted the value of the identity code back to the consumer meter, the consumer meter 2 issues a command to the fraud meter to keep this value as an encryption key 38 for data interchange between the two meters.
Failure of the return data to be verified would indicate a fault in the system installation. In this way the two meters will be locked together with a code unknown to any third party. Communication between the fraud meter and the consumer meter will from now on be attained using the code as an encryption key.
The use of encryption prevents pre-recorded data over a communicating link being used to feed the consumer's meter which may have been disconnected to defraud the energy supplier.
The fraud meter 4 will keep a record of the number of energy units it has accumulated in the energy register 40 and will, at the request of the consumer meter 2, transmit this value as encrypted data 42. When power is removed from the fraud meter 4, the value stored in its register relating to consumption will be saved for use when power is restored.
In order that the value of the energy units registered by the fraud meter 4 can be compared with the value of the consumed energy measured by the consumer meter 2, the meter 2 may request transmission of the registered energy units. To do this the consumer meter 2 generates the random key 38 and sends a request message with the random key appended to it and this is shown as step 1 and 2 in Figure 4. The fraud meter 4 strips out the code key 38 and mixes it with the encryption key known only to the two meters. This is shown as step 3 in Figure 4. The two keys are used to encrypt the count of the registered energy units and the encrypted data 42 is transmitted to the consumer meter 2. This is shown as step 4 in Figure 4. As the consumer meter is aware of both the code key and the encryption key it is able to unscramble the value of the registered energy units from the message.
If it is unable to unscramble the message then the consumer meter 2 may assume that it is talking to a fraud meter which has been tampered with. If the registered energy value is in discrepancy with the metered value by a pre-defined value then the consumer unit will be able to register a fraud attempt. By changing one part of the encrypting key for each read of the energy register, the unit is protected from being fed with prerecorded data streams from a device intercepting the communications link.
The communications link 6 between the consumer meter 2 and the fraud meter 4, as already described, is a bi-directional nature and can be direct electrical, fibre optical, radio or mains communicating, for example. By having a bi-directional data link both the fraud meter and the consumer meter are able to verify that they are both powered up, fully operational and are matched to each other. The fraud meter 4 provides a pulse output which represents units of consumed power in a manner similar to the operation of the visible LED indication on known electronic meters. However, as a simple pulse transmission between the fraud element and consumer meter is subject to tampering, the pulse data is encoded using the encryption key known only to the fraud meter 4 and the consumer meter 2. The transmission of the data between the fraud meter 4 and the consumer meter 2 is in a digital form which overcomes the problem of external RF interference which could effect the metrological information. By overcoming problems of metrology being effected by noise, a much tighter check may be made between the two metered values, and fraud definition may be made at much lower levels of energy discrepancy.
The basis of the fraud detection described above is that the energy supplier is able to analyse the consumption of the user and determine whether the consumed power is outside of the accepted limits for that consumer or that a fraud has been detected.
The analysis is achieved by monitoring the power consumption patterns of the consumer and fed back information.
The information fed back may be via prepayment tokens or communication systems such as mains signalling or intelligent tokens which could signal that a fraud has been registered within the meter.
The main advantage of the fraud meter 4 is that it can be located in a safe location for which the fraudulent consumer would have to go considerable lengths to tamper with. The safe location could, for example, be at the branch point of the main supply under the road, outside the consumer residence or within a fraud resistant enclosure such as a potted fuse crutch cover.
Communication of power consumption between the fraud meter and the consumer meter is achieved in a manner which is both highly immune to electrical interference and also very difficult to defraud using cheap non-sophisticated equipment. The types of fraud that the invention as described above may detect are as follows: The connection of a black box across the metering terminals of the consumer meter will result in a measured energy discrepancy between the supplied energy and the measured energy.
An application of a wire link across the metering terminals to shunt some of the supplied energy without being metered will result in a discrepancy between the supplied energy and the measured energy.
The cutting of the neutral terminal to the consumer meter will switch the unit off and it will no longer measure the consumed power. The fraud meter 4, however, will continue to register the supplied power and when the consumer meter is eventually reconnected the value of energy units supplied will be in discrepancy with that of the measured energy and will be identified as a fraud.
If the communications link 6 is cut, then failure of the fraud meter 4 to respond to a request for transmission of the supplied energy registered will be noted by the consumer meter and this will be flagged as a fraud.
If the communications link is cut and the meter neutral wire is disconnected, the consumer meter will be switched off and fail to register the consumed power. The fraud element, however, will continue to register the consumption of supplied energy. When the consumer meter is reconnected then the first value read from the fraud element will show a discrepancy with the value stored in the consumed energy register in the consumer meter and this will be flagged as a fraud.
If the fraud meter 4 is destroyed or interfered with in some way and fails to respond to the request to transmit the supplied energy register then this will be noted by the consumer meter and will be flagged as a fraud.
If the fraud element and the consumer meter is destroyed, simultaneous destruction of both units will allow energy consumption without registration. However, the consumption patterns of the consumer will be altered and noted by the power supplier.
If the consumer meter is destroyed, energy consumption will not be registered by the consumer meter. However, the consumption patterns of the consumer will be altered and noted by the power supply and will be noted as a fraud. The energy supplier will, however, with suitable equipment be able to read the value of the supplied energy register within the fraud meter and be able to ascertain the quantity of energy which has been supplied but not registered by the consumer meter.
If the fraud meter 4 is replaced with another unit measuring a reduced power consumption, when the consumer meter 2 attempts to communicate with the fraud meter 4 to which it has not been matched it will result in the energy register value being returned from the fraud meter in a form in which it is not able to read due to a mismatch between the identity code stored in the two units, and this will be flagged as a fraud.
If the consumer fuse 20 is removed, the opening of the fuse cover will be registered by the fraud meter and transmitted to the consumer unit and flagged as a fraud.
If a dummy fuse is inserted with power tapped off at Main, the fraud meter will continue to register the supplied power and when the consumer meter next reads the value there will be a discrepancy between the supplied energy and the commodity energy and this will be flagged as a fraud.
It will be appreciated by those skilled in the art that various implementations of the invention are possible which fall within the spirit and scope of the present invention.

Claims (10)

1. Commodity metering apparatus comprising a first metrological unit located at or near consumer's premises, and a second metrological unit located remotely from the consumer's premises, the first and second metrological units being connected by a communications link, and means for controlling communication between the two metrological units in a manner which allows each unit to verify the integrity of the other, and permit secure communication between the first and second units.
2. Commodity metering apparatus as claimed in Claim 1, wherein the first metrological unit is a consumer meter and the second metrological unit is a fraud meter and the communication between each meter via the communication link 6 is in digital form.
3. Commodity metering apparatus as claimed in Claim 2, wherein the data transmitted over the communications link is in encoded form.
4. Commodity metering apparatus as claimed in Claims 1,2 or 3, wherein if the meter at the consumer's premises is interfered with in order to give a false consumption reading, the second metrological unit simultaneously registers the amount of commodity supplied to the user and when the consumer meter is returned to normal operation the second metrological unit updates the commodity supplied reading in the consumer meter to register the correct amount of energy supplied to the consumer.
5. Commodity metering apparatus as claimed in any preceding claim, wherein the fraud meter is arranged to be interrogated independently of the consumer meter to attain a value of energy consumed.
6. Commodity metering apparatus as claimed in any preceding claim, wherein the fraud meter includes a fuse connected in the live supply and is provided with sensing means for indicating when the fuse or its housing is tampered with.
7. Commodity metering apparatus as claimed in any preceding claim, wherein the fraud meter includes processing means for communicating with the consumer meter via the communications link.
8. Commodity metering apparatus as claimed in any preceding claim, wherein the consumer meter is provided with processing means for generating an identity code which is transmitted to the fraud meter when the consumer meter is installed, said fraud meter is arranged to store the identity code and transmit the identity code back to the consumer meter to verify that the communications link is operational.
9. Commodity metering apparatus as claimed in Claim 8, wherein the consumer meter is arranged to generate a key which is transmitted to the fraud meter together with the identity code and is used to encrypt the contents an energy register provided in the processing means of the fraud meter which is transmitted to the consumer meter over the communications link, and said consumer meter is arranged to use the identity code to decrypt the data received from the fraud meter to obtain a value of the energy registered in the fraud meter.
10. Commodity metering apparatus substantially as hereinbefore described with reference to the accompanying drawings.
GB9319757A 1993-07-19 1993-09-24 Commodity metering apparatus Expired - Fee Related GB2280290B (en)

Priority Applications (1)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
ITMI941388A IT1270060B (en) 1993-07-19 1994-07-04 Apparatus for measuring a quantity of product

Applications Claiming Priority (1)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
GB939314934A GB9314934D0 (en) 1993-07-19 1993-07-19 Anti-fraud metering

Publications (3)

Publication Number Publication Date
GB9319757D0 GB9319757D0 (en) 1993-11-10
GB2280290A true GB2280290A (en) 1995-01-25
GB2280290B GB2280290B (en) 1997-06-11

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Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
GB939314934A Pending GB9314934D0 (en) 1993-07-19 1993-07-19 Anti-fraud metering
GB9319757A Expired - Fee Related GB2280290B (en) 1993-07-19 1993-09-24 Commodity metering apparatus

Family Applications Before (1)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
GB939314934A Pending GB9314934D0 (en) 1993-07-19 1993-07-19 Anti-fraud metering

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Cited By (8)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
GB2300723A (en) * 1995-05-06 1996-11-13 Siemens Measurements Ltd Improvements in utility meters
GB2300720A (en) * 1995-05-06 1996-11-13 Siemens Measurements Ltd Improvements in utility meters
EP0742442A2 (en) * 1995-05-06 1996-11-13 Siemens Measurements Limited Improvements in or relating to modulised utility meters
EP0897116A1 (en) * 1997-08-13 1999-02-17 ITF-EDV Fröschl GmbH Monitoring utility meters
EP0980002A1 (en) * 1998-07-13 2000-02-16 Powercom Control Systems Ltd. A device for detecting and reporting theft of electric power
GB2424286A (en) * 2005-03-18 2006-09-20 Polymeters Response Internat L Tamper proof utility metering
EP1963804B2 (en) 2005-12-20 2016-10-26 Sensus Spectrum LLC Consumption meter
WO2019186422A1 (en) * 2018-03-28 2019-10-03 Kamata Online Protection Services (Kops) Limited A monitoring and protection device

Families Citing this family (1)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
CN110503819A (en) * 2019-09-04 2019-11-26 杭州海兴电力科技股份有限公司 A kind of offline kilowatt meter reading-out system, method and device

Citations (2)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
GB1199395A (en) * 1968-04-16 1970-07-22 Scheidt & Bachmann Gmbh Apparatus for Monitoring Registers.
GB2260434A (en) * 1991-10-07 1993-04-14 Yamatake Honeywell Co Ltd Remote data read system

Patent Citations (2)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
GB1199395A (en) * 1968-04-16 1970-07-22 Scheidt & Bachmann Gmbh Apparatus for Monitoring Registers.
GB2260434A (en) * 1991-10-07 1993-04-14 Yamatake Honeywell Co Ltd Remote data read system

Cited By (16)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
GB2300723B (en) * 1995-05-06 2000-02-09 Siemens Measurements Ltd Improvements in or relating to electricity meters
GB2300720A (en) * 1995-05-06 1996-11-13 Siemens Measurements Ltd Improvements in utility meters
EP0742442A2 (en) * 1995-05-06 1996-11-13 Siemens Measurements Limited Improvements in or relating to modulised utility meters
EP0742444A2 (en) * 1995-05-06 1996-11-13 Siemens Measurements Limited Improvements in or relating to electricity meters
EP0742443A2 (en) * 1995-05-06 1996-11-13 Siemens Measurements Limited Improvements in or relating to electricity meters
EP0742442A3 (en) * 1995-05-06 1997-01-29 Siemens Measurements Ltd Improvements in or relating to modulised utility meters
EP0742444A3 (en) * 1995-05-06 1997-01-29 Siemens Measurements Ltd Improvements in or relating to electricity meters
EP0742443A3 (en) * 1995-05-06 1997-01-29 Siemens Measurements Ltd Improvements in or relating to electricity meters
GB2300723A (en) * 1995-05-06 1996-11-13 Siemens Measurements Ltd Improvements in utility meters
GB2300720B (en) * 1995-05-06 2000-02-09 Siemens Measurements Ltd Improvements in or relating to electricity meters
EP0897116A1 (en) * 1997-08-13 1999-02-17 ITF-EDV Fröschl GmbH Monitoring utility meters
EP0980002A1 (en) * 1998-07-13 2000-02-16 Powercom Control Systems Ltd. A device for detecting and reporting theft of electric power
GB2424286A (en) * 2005-03-18 2006-09-20 Polymeters Response Internat L Tamper proof utility metering
GB2424286B (en) * 2005-03-18 2009-07-01 Polymeters Response Internat L Tamper proof utility metering
EP1963804B2 (en) 2005-12-20 2016-10-26 Sensus Spectrum LLC Consumption meter
WO2019186422A1 (en) * 2018-03-28 2019-10-03 Kamata Online Protection Services (Kops) Limited A monitoring and protection device

Also Published As

Publication number Publication date
GB9314934D0 (en) 1993-09-01
GB9319757D0 (en) 1993-11-10
GB2280290B (en) 1997-06-11

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PCNP Patent ceased through non-payment of renewal fee

Effective date: 19970924