FR2650094A1 - Device making safe and rationalising payments by cheques and banker's cards - Google Patents

Abstract

The invention relates to a self-contained apparatus establishing a formal identification between the user and the owner of a means of payment, by use of a confidential code related to the account number of the owner. The apparatus checks the compatibility between the code provided by the customer and a theoretical code calculated by the apparatus according to a secret algorithm corresponding to that which is used by the bank to set up the confidential code for the client. All the information which is indispensable for guaranteeing the validity of the payment are carried on a written marking and, in the case of the cheque, indications aiming to rationalise the processing of cheques are applied directly to the reverse of the cheque. The appliance is furthermore protected against attempts at fraudulent use. The device according to the invention is particularly intended to equip businesses as a means of protection against the use of stolen cheques and cards. It is of interest also to banking organisations, by the reduction in the cost of processing cheques.

Description

Device for checking and identifying bank checks
or postal Invention relates to a device allowing the formal identification of the issuer of a bank or postal shock with the account holder, in order to prohibit the use of stolen checks. During a transaction, the coincidence between the holder and the issuer will be confirmed by a whole trace (for example on the back of the check) prohibiting the scam on the part of the issuer and the merchant. The written trace can advantageously be used for the purpose of rationalizing the processing of the check.

The principle of verification is based on the use of a confidential code, and may be applied to payments by bank card.

There are two basic methods of protection against fraudulent use of lost or volt checks.

The oldest and most obvious is to verify the identity of the check issuer by comparison with the national identity card, driver's license or any other official document.

The limits as to the effectiveness of this method are based on the observation that check forms are very often stolen with identity documents, which considerably reduces the scope of such a check. To a lesser extent, it is also useful to mention the falsification of identity documents which further weakens this process.

The second method is based on the use of new communication techniques allowing the consultation of opposition files updated when entering declarations of loss or theft. The weaknesses of these systems appear in the impossibility of updating in real time, in the difficulty of setting up a national opposition file, and finally, in the fact that any person (including the fraudster) can easily access these services Let us add that the merchants or their employees do not carry out these controls in a systematic way (for reasons of commtlity or negligence, or more generally because they are "abused" by their customers), which contributes to limit the interest of these verifications.

The principle of using a confidential code to validate a transaction by check or bank card has already been the subject of studies or patent applications.

The banking institution calculates a confidential code for each of its customers, and communicates this code to them. The merchant is then supposed to have a device whose internal electronics is capable of calculating the said code using the same algorithm as the bank, and of notifying the merchant in the event of incompatibility between the theoretical code and the code proposed by the customer
The main handicaps mentioned in connection with the two methods mentioned above, namely identity theft and the non-updating of the stolen check file in real time, have been partially resolved. help to know the confidential code, and the simple fact of losing to lose, or to be stolen his checkbook prohibits any transaction if it is subjected to a control using the checking device (protection "in real time" ).

However, none of these products offer absolute security against the various forms of fraud that this system can induce. First, the account holder can knowingly give their PIN to a third party, and then declare their checkbook lost or stolen. Any purchase using this checkbook by the third person will be systematically accepted by a merchant provided with the verification device. The merchant will then have no way to prove that the check in question has been "accepted" by the device. It therefore appears essential to identify the transaction by a written statement containing sufficient information so that it cannot be doubted.

On the other hand, in the event of theft of the verifying device or dishonest use of the latter, no security device is offered during use for the purposes of exhaustive search of the confidential code of a number. account. The checking device must be designed according to a principle which does not allow this kind of exhaustive research.

The module calculating the confidential code must be inviolable. This requires the use of specific and secret electronic components in particular to calculate the confidential code. As such, it is completely excluded to use a program stored in memory to calculate the confidential code.

Finally, a storage unit can also record the history of payment transactions carried out over a given period of time, thereby enabling this information to be transferred to merchants and / or banking establishments, thereby facilitating the management of receivers.

The present invention, while incorporating functional elements already used in the studies mentioned above, provides a solution to the drawbacks mentioned, while emphasizing the functional and ergonomic aspect of the device. The protection of checks by the present invention goes through several phases. First of all, the bank calculates from the account number and according to a predefined algwithme, a confidential code for each holder of a bank account, and communicates this code to him. When issuing to a merchant, the issuer completes the check according to the usual methods. The merchant then inserts the check into the validation device (the validator), and invites the issuer to type his confidential code at the using a keyboard attached to the validator. The validator is equipped with an optical barcode reader, and allows simple and efficient entry of the bank account number (however, manual entry of this account number is also possible using the keyboard). compatibility between the calculated code and the code proposed by the customer and, in the event of success, written on the back of the check the account number, the date on the day of the transaction (the date input can be "manual" or be integrated in the electronics of the device). a statement attesting to the success of the operation (for example "CHECK
VALID "), as well as an authentication key calculated from the account number and the date by another secret algorithm. This key cannot be known to either the merchant or the holder of the checks and will prevail in the event of disputed opposition on a validated check.In case of failure (incompatibility between calculated code and proposed code), no validation entry is affixed to the check, and it is up to the merchant to decide the number of attempts he authorizes to client to arrive at a positive result.

However, each validator allows only a limited number of bad attempts, and must be reset by authorized personnel in the event that this limit is exceeded. The use of the validator for exhaustive research of the confidential code, thus offers only a very low probability of success. For example, for a five-digit code, and for a limit set at 5000 bad attempts, it is necessary to exhaust ten new validators to have a one in two chance of discovering the confidential code of a stolen checkbook. it is also possible to use a confidential merchant code to validate the validator.

Note that an invalid check does not mean that this check is used fraudulently, the conventional bank opposition procedure remaining essential on the part of the holder to prohibit payment. To improve the effectiveness of the protection, an interface is provided in order to communicate with an external IT environment. Consultation of an external body to decide on the validation or non-validation of a transaction is thus possible. The external organ can be, for example, a database relating to illegal account numbers.

The validator is in the form of a box comprising a certain number of internal and / or external functionalities. The external functionalities synthesize the interactions between the user and the validator, and are controlled internally by the microprocessor. According to the description giving the schematic diagram of the validator (Figurel), the means (9) and (15) of optical or magnetic reading allow automatic entry of the account number by using the bar codes affixed at the bottom of the checks, or by magnetic strip located on bank cards. These means concern the entire electromechanical device finalizing the automatic entry of the account number.

The means (4) allows complete communication between the user and the validator. This means can replace the means (9) and (15) described above to enter the account number. More generally, it allows the entry of all the information necessary for the check validation process, and is assumed, depending on the degree of sophistication desired, by a numeric or alphanumeric keyboard, as well as by validation and control keys. This keyboard may be integral or independent of the case.

All the information entered using means (4), (9) and (15), or contained in the validator (provided that their accessibility is permitted), can be viewed using means (5). This means is composed of an alphanumeric character display system, as well as indicator lights reporting the status of the validator.

The means (8) is responsible for providing proof of validation. It consists of a printer and its electromechanical environment, and can be used, in addition to recording validation, to "prepost mark" checks when they pass through the validator. For this purpose, remember that a non-negligible part of the cost of a check is made up by manual entry of the amount and the beneficiary's account number. Poorly drafted or illegible checks can cause ambiguity when entering data and increase the cost of processing accordingly.

 Lc means (2) is an additive memory allowing the storage of complementary information. This memory contains the information permanently, and the microprocessor5.'eur is authorized to modify the content at any time upon decision of the user. This memory can also be used to offer a more complete service to the user, including the possibility of managing all of the transactions passing through the validator.

 Lc means (1) constitutes the electrical supply of the device which operates from the voltage available on the electrical network. A battery is added to save the information contained in the means (2) as well as to provide power to the means (4), (5) and (12), thus allowing the use of the validator in the event of a power outage. .

The means (12) represents the microprocessor and its electronic environment allowing, according to an appropriate conversational protocol, the communication between the different resources of the validator.

The means (13) is a rechargeable power supply unit responsible for permanently supplying the unit (28) with the means (7) described below. Only the means (7) is affected by this saved supply. This supply will advantageously be integrated within the unit (7).

The means (14) is a unit making it possible to interface the validator with an external computer environment. This interface makes it possible, by means of an adequate programming of the microprocessor, to access an external intelligent unit, which can be, for example, a server of data relating to account numbers.

The means (7) is the key organ of the validator. An original integrated circuit supports all the functions described below. It contains all the coding and decoding functions relating to the calculation of the theoretical confidential code, and of comparison with the code proposed by the client. Figure 2 giving the block diagram of this integrated circuit, describes the internal operation of this means (MIXER). This means (7) contains a certain number of registers (20), (22), (24), (33), (36) initializable using the microprocessor according to a pre-established protocol, managed internally by the unit (31). The unit (20) is responsible for storing the account number, and the unit (36) for storing the date. A microprocessor control activates the transformation of the account number via the unit (21) in a new number constituting the theoretical confidential code which is stored in the register (22). After loading the code proposed by the client into the register (24), the microprocessor activates the unit (23) responsible for comparing the content of the two registers (22) and (24). The microprocessor then activates the units (28) and (30) which act in a contradictory manner as a function of the result of the comparison in the module (23). If the comparison is positive, the unit (28) is inhibited, and the unit (30) becomes active.The account number stored in the register (20) added to the additional information in the register (36) is then transformed into a another number via the unit (30), which is then stored in the register (33), and constitutes the authentication key for the validation of the check. If the comparison between theoretical and proposed code is negative, the unit (30) is inhibited, and the unit (28) becomes active. The unit (28) consists mainly of a down counter set to a maximum value by the manufacturer during an initialization sequence, and is decremented by a unit when a negative comparison appears at the output of the unit (23). A zero value in this down-counter is detected by the internal blocking unit (29) and all of the means (7) are then inhibited, preventing any new validation. The content of the counter is permanently saved using the saved power supply (13), and any interruption of this power supply has the effect of putting the down-counter to zero, and inhibiting the mixer (7). Depending on the degree of sophistication of the integrated circuit emulating the unit (7), the supply of the down-counter can be integrated into the circuit. The reset of the mixer (7) is permitted by means of the units (25), (26), and (27). The unit (25) consists of an initialization key wired inside the mixer (7) and is changeable. The unit (27) is a register making it possible to store a key of dimension identical to that contained in the unit (25). In case of equality between these two keys, a comparator (26) will authorize the loading of the counter (28) at a value chosen by the manufacturer.

The mixer (7) must be able to be easily detached from the validator to allow, if necessary, to change the algorithm without changing the validator. For this purpose, it will advantageously be mounted on a removable support also containing the unit (13). Connection pins will be used to connect the validator and the removable support. Thus, the change of algorithm, or more simply the re-activation of the down-counter (carried out by authorized personnel), will result in the extraction of a removable cartridge, and its replacement by a new cartridge. This manipulation will not present any difficulty, and can be carried out by the user himself.

Claims (2)

 mounted on a removable support allowing its interchangeability.  calculations are the expression of algorithms wired in the integrated circuit. This unit (7) is  calculation (7) from the account number of the issuer actually entered and the date. The  comparison is positive, an authentication key. This key is calculated by the unit of  code proposed by the client, and giving the result of the comparison as well as, if the  theoretical from the account number previously entered, comparing this code with a  - A calculation unit (7) based on an original and specific integrated circuit, calculating a code  bank from a bank document such as check or payment card  - Means for manual (4) and automatic (9) and (15) entry of an account number  any misuse of the device. This device is characterized by the fact that it comprises:  of payment and the holder of said means of payment, and ensuring self-protection against  bank card, making it possible to identify and formally confuse the issuer of the medium  1) Apparatus for checking means of payment by bank or postal check or by  when using the device.  - A temporary display means (5) allowing the monitoring of the various operations  back of the check.  equivalent in bar codes. In the case of payment by check, the paper medium is the  authentication. Registration is made both in legible characters and in  transaction, the account number of the issuer actually entered, as well as the key  - A permanent display means (8) writing on a paper medium, the date of the  - An asynchronous link (14) allowing communication with an outdoor unit.  2), 4 device for checking means of payment by checks  bank or post office or by bank card according to claim 1, prohibiting the use  of the device for malicious purposes, characterized in that the computing unit (7) contains  a counter (28) decremented during each negative comparison. This counter (28) is  permanently supplied by an autonomous power supply or by a power supply  internal (13) to the integrated circuit (7). A zero value in the counter (28) is detected by  the unit (29) which inhibits on this occasion the means (7) prohibiting any new validation.  loading the counter (28) in case of equality of the units (25) and (27).  reset. The means (26) compares the key (25) and the content of the register (27) and authorizes  for storing a key entered by a user during a  (27). The unit (25) is a key wired within the calculation means (7). Unit (27) is a register  The counter (28) can be initialized to a non-zero value using the units (25) (26) and