Classifications

• • H—ELECTRICITY
  • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
  • H04K—SECRET COMMUNICATION; JAMMING OF COMMUNICATION
  • H04K3/00—Jamming of communication; Counter-measures
  • H04K3/20—Countermeasures against jamming
  • H04K3/28—Countermeasures against jamming with jamming and anti-jamming mechanisms both included in a same device or system, e.g. wherein anti-jamming includes prevention of undesired self-jamming resulting from jamming
• • H—ELECTRICITY
  • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
  • H04K—SECRET COMMUNICATION; JAMMING OF COMMUNICATION
  • H04K3/00—Jamming of communication; Counter-measures
  • H04K3/40—Jamming having variable characteristics
  • H04K3/42—Jamming having variable characteristics characterized by the control of the jamming frequency or wavelength
• • H—ELECTRICITY
  • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
  • H04K—SECRET COMMUNICATION; JAMMING OF COMMUNICATION
  • H04K3/00—Jamming of communication; Counter-measures
  • H04K3/60—Jamming involving special techniques
  • H04K3/62—Jamming involving special techniques by exposing communication, processing or storing systems to electromagnetic wave radiation, e.g. causing disturbance, disruption or damage of electronic circuits, or causing external injection of faults in the information
• • H—ELECTRICITY
  • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
  • H04K—SECRET COMMUNICATION; JAMMING OF COMMUNICATION
  • H04K2203/00—Jamming of communication; Countermeasures
  • H04K2203/10—Jamming or countermeasure used for a particular application
  • H04K2203/22—Jamming or countermeasure used for a particular application for communication related to vehicles
• • H—ELECTRICITY
  • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
  • H04K—SECRET COMMUNICATION; JAMMING OF COMMUNICATION
  • H04K2203/00—Jamming of communication; Countermeasures
  • H04K2203/30—Jamming or countermeasure characterized by the infrastructure components
  • H04K2203/34—Jamming or countermeasure characterized by the infrastructure components involving multiple cooperating jammers
• • H—ELECTRICITY
  • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
  • H04K—SECRET COMMUNICATION; JAMMING OF COMMUNICATION
  • H04K3/00—Jamming of communication; Counter-measures
  • H04K3/80—Jamming or countermeasure characterized by its function
  • H04K3/90—Jamming or countermeasure characterized by its function related to allowing or preventing navigation or positioning, e.g. GPS
• • H—ELECTRICITY
  • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
  • H04K—SECRET COMMUNICATION; JAMMING OF COMMUNICATION
  • H04K3/00—Jamming of communication; Counter-measures
  • H04K3/80—Jamming or countermeasure characterized by its function
  • H04K3/92—Jamming or countermeasure characterized by its function related to allowing or preventing remote control

Definitions

• the invention relates to a method of remote interfering with electronic devices by using electromagnetic waves, and, more particularly, with a method for neutralizing electronic equipment by using remote generation of radio signals and their accurate transmission to the targeted equipment.
• UAVs unmanned aerial vehicles
• electronic UAV neutralization measures are also used among the others. Their operation is based on sending sufficiently powerful radio signals to the UAVs at the frequencies at which the systems using radio communication (navigation, telemetry, control, video transmission, radar) operate in order to interfere with operation of these systems. Because these systems operate over a very wide frequency range, several transmitters and several appropriate antennas are typically used. However, when suppressing UAV communication equipment by multi-frequency and/or broadband signals, there is a risk of affecting other aircrafts entering the signal interference area.
• GNSS satellite navigation
• the existing interference systems emit GNSS frequencies, and this possibility of not affecting regular aircrafts is ensured only minimally - as far as the capabilities of the directional antennas allow.
• U.S. Pat. US10,451 ,388B1 discloses a method of neutralizing aircraft by using high power energy density pulses. This method allows generation of extremely strong electric fields at a certain distance from the signal transmission antenna, reaching the air penetration limit. Such a strong electric field is enough to destroy any electronic hardware.
• the main disadvantage of this system is that n generators are needed to achieve such fields, which can generate ultra-wideband pulses with a duration not exceeding 1 ns. A very strong and wide signal is also generated, which can also affect the operation of the surrounding electronic devices.
• U.S. Pat. US8905176B2 describes a device and a method for remotely stopping vehicles by using a modulated microwave signal.
• the patent proposes the use of a system consisting of a vehicle identification device, a database, a microwave signal modulator, and an amplifier.
• the following modulator parameters would be selected from the data in the database: microwave frequency (within the L frequency range 1 .2 to 1.7 GHz), amplitude modulation, pulse duration and repetition rate at which the lowest power of the microwave pulse is sufficient to stop the vehicle.
• microwave frequency within the L frequency range 1 .2 to 1.7 GHz
• amplitude modulation amplitude modulation
• pulse duration repetition rate at which the lowest power of the microwave pulse is sufficient to stop the vehicle.
• the main disadvantage of this method is that, according to the selected vehicle type, the neutralizing signal is generated in the neutralizing device and can damage not only that specific vehicle but also similar vehicles.
• a database is also needed to selectively affect certain vehicles.
• U.S. Pat. US7865152B2 describes a method and an apparatus for remotely neutralizing electronic devices by using microwave signals.
• the device consists of two microwave signal generators generating different frequencies. These two different signals are fed to the antenna where they add up to each other: the unmodulated signal of one frequency is combined with the unmodulated signal of the other frequency, thus giving the overall signal amplitude modulation with a suppressed carrier without the use of a mixer or a modulator.
• the main disadvantage of this method is that the interaction of these two signals results in a modulated, pre-prepared control / communication frequency pulse of the electronic devices at the antenna output, which does not selectively neutralize the target.
• the invention does not have the above-mentioned drawbacks related to the large width of the neutralization signal beam of the electronic equipment and the non-selective effect on the targets. Short description of the invention
• the invention discloses the remote neutralization of electronic devices, in particular aircraft or other vehicle electronic devices, by electromagnetic waves.
• the method comprises using at least two signal generators and supplying such generated signals to the antenna.
• the signals are selected according to the principles of generating additional frequencies in nonlinear circuits. Second and higher order nonlinearity can be used. Two or more frequencies can also be used.
• Interference signal frequencies are selected to take into account the following criteria:
• the generated signals are of different frequencies and remain such until they reach the target.
• signals excite nonlinear frequency mixing processes in semiconductor components of electronic devices characterized by the phenomenon of nonlinearity (when the voltage and current do not vary according to the linear principle of Ohm). Such processes include: harmonic generation, cumulative / differential frequency generation, and so on.
• signals of additional frequencies that are different from the frequencies of the original signals are obtained.
• the signals are generated in the electronic circuit of the device itself, which we aim to influence.
• the method also includes emitting spectral interference signals at a narrow angle by emitting at least two frequency bands at high frequencies.
• Fig. 1 shows the generation of additional frequencies in electronic equipment having nonlinear (when the voltage and the current do not vary according to the linear
• Fig. 2 shows a schematic diagram of the method for interference of an unmanned aerial vehicle communication system with the external electromagnetic radiation of different frequencies.
• Fig. 3 is a graph showing the change in the number of frequencies generated due to the nonlinearity effect when the device is irradiated with two and three external radiation frequencies.
• the amplitudes shown are for illustrative purposes only, the amplitudes actually generated may differ from those shown in the figure.
• Fig. 4 shows a specific case of electronic communication (Wi-Fi and telemetry) and GNSS navigation equipment interference, combining direct interference (Wi-Fi equipment interference) and interference by using the second order (0.4 GHz telemetry equipment interference) and the third order (GNSS equipment interference) nonlinearities.
• Fig. 5 shows a schematic diagram in which one of the signals generated is a broadband signal and the other is a narrowband signal. Due to the interaction of these two signals, the signal generated in the nonlinear element is also a broadband signal.
• Fig. 6 shows a schematic diagram of instance when two narrowband signals are generated. Their frequencies are changed synchronously in such a way that the signal of the interference generated in the nonlinear element is a phase-modulation signal and the signal spectrum is of the desired width.
• Labeling of items: ".... number.n" indicates an item from the specified minimum to the maximum.
• the method according to the invention is intended to remotely interfere with the operation of electronic equipment in a wide frequency range by emitting relatively narrow-band high frequency signals in a narrow beam.
• the method involves the use of at least two different frequency signal sources (2.1 , 2.2, ...2.n) of remote signal interference system to generate at least two interference signals (1.1 , 1 .2,...1 .n) of different frequencies f2.i , f2.2,...f2.n.
• the generated interference signals (1.1 , 1.2, ... 1 .n) are sent to at least one antenna (3.1 , 3.2, ... 3.n), which is preferably directional, for radiating said signals to the target (4).
• the interference signals (1.1 , 1.2, ... 1.n) reach the target (4) essentially unchanged (except for the reduced amplitude due to the natural propagation losses of electromagnetic waves in space).
• a more compact interference system can be obtained.
• Using separate antennas (3.1 , 3.2, .. 3.n) for each signal (1.1 , 1.2, ... 1 .n) of different frequencies f2.i, f2.2, ... k.n would make the interference system larger, compared to a single antenna system (3.1), but in a system with more than one antenna (3.1 , 3.2, ... 3.n) isolation between different transmitters (2.1 , 2.2, ... 2.n) is not required. Isolation between two transmitters (2.1 , 2.2) in a single antenna system (3.1 ) can be implemented by using different signal polarizations or by using frequency filters.
• the interference signals (1.1 , 1.2, ... 1.n) are selected according to the principles of generating additional frequencies fi.i,...fi. n in nonlinear circuits. Second and higher order nonlinearity can be used.
• two signals (1.1 , 1.2) of different frequencies f2.i, f2.2 are generated in the first and in the second signal generators (2.1 , 2.2) of remote signal interference system.
• Such signals (1.1 , 1.2) are sent via the antenna (3.1 ) or antennas (3.1 , 3.2, ... 3.n) to the target (4) and reach the electronic components (5) of its communication / control system in the unchanged spectrum, where due to nonlinear effects of the second and the third order, the second or the third order harmonics are generated, respectively.
• /2.1/2.2 TG
• m is the order of the harmonics generated.
• the frequencies of fe .y or 2.2 will be two or more times lower than f .i, so better spatial selection will not be achieved.
• f2.i and f2.2 may be significantly higher than fi.i.
• the frequencies f2.2 and f2.i can be very different, but in practice there may be frequencies where extraneous radiation may be particularly undesirable, but due to the ambiguous dependence of fi .1 on f2.i and f2.2, it is possible to avoid radiation at those unwanted frequencies.
• one generated interference signal (1 .3) is of the same frequency f2.i as one of the operating frequencies of the communication / control system fi .2, i.e., is a direct interference signal.
• the frequency f2.2 of the other radiated interference signal (1 .4) differs from the frequency f2.i of the direct interference signal (1 .3) and from any other operating frequency fi .i , fi .2...fi .n of the communication / control system.
• the frequency f2.2 will not change, but, depending on the rate of change of frequencies f2.i and f2.2, the spectrum of fi .1 will expand due to the resulting phase modulation.
• the rate of change of frequencies f2.i and f2.2 By varying the rate of change of frequencies f2.i and f2.2, the spectrum of fi.i of the desired width can be obtained.
• radio signal beams (1.5, 1.6) with frequencies of 2 GHz and 2.4 GHz are directed to the aircraft.
• the 1 .6 GHz frequency is approximately the L1 frequency range for GNSS systems. This is particularly true for GNSS systems, as they are used by many users on the ground and in the air, including regular passenger aircrafts.
• the Wi-Fi range is wide - about 100 MHz
• GNSS is narrow - about 1 MHz.
• a broadband (say, 100 MHz bandwidth) 2.4 GHz signal (1.10) and a monochrome 2 GHz signal the response generated in nonlinear elements will be broadband, reducing GNSS interference efficiency.
• a narrowband but variable frequency (varying within 100 MHz) signal should be used for interference in the 2.4 GHz Wi-Fi band. Frequent frequency hopping within 100 MHz range can suppress signals over the entire Wi-Fi range.
• GNSS low noise signal
• hopping the rate of frequency change
• one or more additional signals with frequencies suitable for the electronic equipment elements (5) of the target (4) would be generated in the remote electronic-equipment interference system by one or more signals generators (2.1 , 2.2), so due to the nonlinearity of the volt-ampere characteristics in the target elements differential / cumulative and combination signals (6.1 , 6.2, ... 6.n) of interference frequencies fi .i , fi .2...fi .n will be generated.
• the characteristics of the interference signals are calculated in the same way as above, according to formulas (7) to (14).

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• Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
• Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
• Signal Processing (AREA)
• Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
• Electromagnetism (AREA)
• Radar, Positioning & Navigation (AREA)
• Remote Sensing (AREA)
• Radar Systems Or Details Thereof (AREA)
• Noise Elimination (AREA)
• Control Of Position, Course, Altitude, Or Attitude Of Moving Bodies (AREA)
• Selective Calling Equipment (AREA)

Applications Claiming Priority (2)

Publications (1)

Family

ID=76859653

Family Applications (1)

Country Status (3)

Families Citing this family (1)

Family Cites Families (3)

• 2020
  • 2020-07-03 LT LT2020532A patent/LT6913B/lt unknown
• 2021
  • 2021-06-10 EP EP21740194.2A patent/EP4176543A1/en active Pending
  • 2021-06-10 WO PCT/IB2021/055098 patent/WO2022003456A1/en active Application Filing

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