EP4074005A1 - Transaktionsauthentifizierungsverfahren, server und system mit zwei kommunikationskanälen - Google Patents

Transaktionsauthentifizierungsverfahren, server und system mit zwei kommunikationskanälen

Info

Publication number
EP4074005A1
EP4074005A1 EP20845185.6A EP20845185A EP4074005A1 EP 4074005 A1 EP4074005 A1 EP 4074005A1 EP 20845185 A EP20845185 A EP 20845185A EP 4074005 A1 EP4074005 A1 EP 4074005A1
Authority
EP
European Patent Office
Prior art keywords
transaction
terminal
bank
code
communication channel
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Pending
Application number
EP20845185.6A
Other languages
English (en)
French (fr)
Inventor
David Naccache
Marc Beunardeau
Aisling CONNOLLY
Rémi GERAUD
Hiba KOUDOUSSI
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Banks and Acquirers International Holding SAS
Original Assignee
Banks and Acquirers International Holding SAS
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Banks and Acquirers International Holding SAS filed Critical Banks and Acquirers International Holding SAS
Publication of EP4074005A1 publication Critical patent/EP4074005A1/de
Pending legal-status Critical Current

Links

Classifications

    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/08Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
    • H04L63/0853Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities using an additional device, e.g. smartcard, SIM or a different communication terminal
    • GPHYSICS
    • G06COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06QINFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/38Payment protocols; Details thereof
    • G06Q20/40Authorisation, e.g. identification of payer or payee, verification of customer or shop credentials; Review and approval of payers, e.g. check credit lines or negative lists
    • G06Q20/401Transaction verification
    • GPHYSICS
    • G06COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06FELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/30Authentication, i.e. establishing the identity or authorisation of security principals
    • G06F21/45Structures or tools for the administration of authentication
    • G06F21/46Structures or tools for the administration of authentication by designing passwords or checking the strength of passwords
    • GPHYSICS
    • G06COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06QINFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/38Payment protocols; Details thereof
    • G06Q20/386Payment protocols; Details thereof using messaging services or messaging apps
    • GPHYSICS
    • G06COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06QINFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q40/00Finance; Insurance; Tax strategies; Processing of corporate or income taxes
    • G06Q40/02Banking, e.g. interest calculation or account maintenance
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/06Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network
    • H04L63/067Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network using one-time keys
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/18Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security using different networks or channels, e.g. using out of band channels
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L2463/00Additional details relating to network architectures or network communication protocols for network security covered by H04L63/00
    • H04L2463/082Additional details relating to network architectures or network communication protocols for network security covered by H04L63/00 applying multi-factor authentication
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L2463/00Additional details relating to network architectures or network communication protocols for network security covered by H04L63/00
    • H04L2463/102Additional details relating to network architectures or network communication protocols for network security covered by H04L63/00 applying security measure for e-commerce

Definitions

  • the present invention relates to a transaction authentication method using two communication channels as well as to a server and a bank transaction system implementing the method. More particularly, the invention relates to the use of a second communication channel to secure a transaction carried out from a first communication channel.
  • the electronic payment transactions which are the subject of this document relate to payment transactions carried out online.
  • An online payment is made when selling or purchasing goods or services, whether by businesses, households, individuals, governments or other organizations, public or private, over interconnected networks of computers, such as the internet. Goods and services are ordered over these networks, but payment and final delivery of the good or service can be made online or offline.
  • bank customers regularly carry out wire transfer payment transactions using Internet banking services. More and more consumers are using electronic commerce, to find and purchase goods and services over electronic networks such as, for example, the Internet. Payment is generally made by entering a debit and / or credit card number, or bank card, or using other financial information in the respective fields of a form on the merchant's site. line.
  • Transactions can also be made using online or mobile payment service providers, such as those offered, for example, by PayPal, Inc., of San Jose, California.
  • electronic payment systems often use agglomerated security solutions such as those identified by the “3Dsecure”, “Verified by Visa”, or other brands.
  • Such payment services and payment security solutions can make transactions easier and / or more secure for the parties involved. Buying with the help of a payment service provider from a portable mobile device is one of the main reasons why online and mobile shopping is growing so rapidly.
  • TAN from English Transaction Authentication Numbers
  • a customer uses a device, usually internet-enabled, to select goods, services or other forms of payment transaction on the merchant's website. or online banking, and performs a first step of the payment transaction by completing the forms provided by said websites with required payment information, such as card and / or bank account number, name and address. 'cardholder's address, etc.
  • a bank, payment solution provider, or credit card issuer sends a one-time transaction authentication code to a second cardholder device.
  • the authentication code is entered manually by the cardholder and then sent via the network to the bank, to the payment solution provider or to the credit card issuer, so that the code can be compared with the code. authentication issued. If the comparison is correct, the payment transaction will be successful, otherwise the payment transaction will be refused, possibly with notification to the cardholder.
  • An authentication code is generally an alphanumeric string of a certain length.
  • the length of the chain is defined a priori by a payment scheme and is the same for all transactions.
  • the present invention aims to remedy the inconveniences mentioned above when using an authentication code in a two-factor security procedure.
  • the invention proposes to improve the aforementioned two-factor authentication system by adapting the complexity of the authentication code, in particular its length, to the amount paid during the transaction.
  • the invention provides a transaction authentication method using two data communication channels for a user using a first terminal connected to at least one bank transaction server via a first communication channel and a second terminal connected to the at least one bank transaction server via a second communication channel at least logically distinct from the first communication channel.
  • the process includes:
  • the bank transaction server receives the copied code from the first terminal, and compares the verification code with the copied code and sends to the first terminal a transaction validation message if the codes are identical or a message transaction invalidation if the codes are different.
  • the length of the verification code can increase when the amount of the transaction increases. Short authentication codes can be assigned to transactions involving small payment amounts, while longer and more complex codes, i.e. more difficult for malicious people to guess, can be assigned to payment amounts. larger payments.
  • the length of the verification code can be between a minimum value and a maximum value.
  • the user experience during electronic payment transactions is improved in two ways. First of all, and especially for small amount transactions, the work of manually copying the authentication code from one device to another is lightened, which is faster and reduces the risk of error for the user. . For transactions involving larger sums, longer and more complex authentication codes allow the user to appreciate that second factor authentication, even if it weighs down and slows down the transaction, it increases the security of the transaction, thus playing a reassuring role.
  • the transaction information can include identification information of the account holder and at least one redundant information related to the identification of the bank account to be debited.
  • the second step may include a preliminary step which verifies a concordance between the identification of the bank account to be debited, the identification information of the holder and the at least one redundant information. The second step can only be performed if the match is established.
  • the length of the verification code may also depend on a risk factor determined using one or more parameters included among: the time of the transaction, the date of the transaction, information relating to the card holder, the number of transactions carried out in a predetermined period preceding the transaction.
  • the invention provides a bank transaction server comprising a processing unit, a program memory, at least one communication interface capable of communicating via a first communication channel and via a second channel. communication at least logically distinct from the first communication channel.
  • the program memory contains instructions cooperating with the processing unit so that the server is configured for:
  • the invention provides a bank transaction system comprising at least one bank transaction server, a first terminal of a user connected to the at least one bank transaction server via a first channel communication, and a second terminal of an account holder and / or a bank card connected to the at least one bank transaction server via a second communication channel at least logically distinct from the first communication channel.
  • the first terminal is configured to send, at the user's request, to the at least one bank transaction server, a transaction request comprising at least one transaction amount, and an identification of the account and / or of the card. banking.
  • the bank transaction server is configured to, upon receipt of the transaction request, establish a verification code whose length depends on the amount of the transaction, determine the second terminal according to the identification of the bank account to be debited, then send, on the one hand, a confirmation request requesting the verification code to the first terminal via the first communication channel and, on the other hand, the verification code to the second terminal via the second communication channel.
  • the second terminal is configured to display, to the holder of the bank account, the verification code sent by the bank transaction server.
  • the first terminal is configured to send back to the bank transaction server a code copied by the user from the verification code displayed on the second terminal.
  • the bank transaction server is configured to, upon receipt of the copied code, compare with the verification code with the copied code and send to the first terminal a transaction validation message if the codes are identical or a transaction invalidation message if the codes are different.
  • FIG.1 shows a two-factor authentication bank transaction system
  • FIG.2 shows a commercial transaction system on an open network with two authentication factors
  • FIG.3 illustrates a transaction on the system of Figure 1 according to the invention
  • FIG.4 illustrates a transaction on the system of Figure 2 according to the invention
  • FIG.5 shows an operating flowchart of an authentication server according to the invention
  • Figures 1 and 2 show two transaction systems performed through an open network, such as the internet, for example, using two-factor authentication.
  • the same references correspond to the same elements or to similar elements.
  • These two figures correspond to two-factor security transaction schemes as used in the prior art and according to the invention.
  • Open network By “open network”, it is necessary to understand a communication network allowing interconnections between one or more computer machines accessible to any person wishing to do so.
  • This type of network can be the Internet but could correspond to other types of networks as long as the connection remains open to everyone.
  • Open networks have the advantage of making it easier to connect people, thereby increasing the possibilities for business transactions between people connected to the network.
  • a downside of open networks is the risk of interacting with machines owned by malicious people.
  • FIG. 1 corresponds to a banking transaction system allowing a user to carry out transaction operations with his bank, such as for example to make a bank transfer or to purchase securities online or any other type of operation for which the user transfers money from his bank account.
  • the user 1 interacts with a first terminal 2 connected to an open network 3, such as for example the Internet, in order to communicate with a banking services server 4 to carry out an operation corresponding to a banking transaction that is that is, a money transfer from a bank account.
  • an open network 3 such as for example the Internet
  • the first terminal 2 is for example a fixed or portable personal computer, a tablet or a smartphone having a processing unit, at least one volatile and / or non-volatile memory, a communication interface. making it possible to connect to the open network 3, a man-machine interface making it possible to view and enter information, such as for example a display screen, a touch screen, a keyboard, a mouse or the like.
  • the first terminal has an open network navigation program 3, allowing it to connect to and interact with websites, in particular to consult web pages or to complete and send. forms corresponding to transaction requests.
  • the first terminal 2 can have a specific program allowing it to connect through the open network 3 to the banking services server 4.
  • the banking services server 4 is for example a computer having one or more processing units, at least one volatile and mass memory, and at least one communication interface allowing it to connect to the open network 3.
  • the mass memory stores, among other things, a database containing all the information relating to the bank accounts of the customers of the bank to which it belongs.
  • the banking services server 4 comprises programs stored in memory allowing it to make available to terminals connected, through the open network 3, searchable web pages which make it possible to interact with users via forms contained in said web pages.
  • the forms once completed and returned by the user, are then processed by the processing unit for validation.
  • the processing unit uses the first terminal 2 to connect to the banking services server 4.
  • a web page is then transmitted to the first terminal 2 by the banking services server 4.
  • the web page can include information to be displayed on the first terminal 2, as well as commands to be executed as a function of the choice made by the user via the man-machine interface.
  • a transaction for example a bank transfer
  • a transaction form is presented to user 1, the form being able to be included in the web page or transmitted by the banking services server 4 after receipt of a message indicating the user's choice. 1 from the first terminal 2.
  • the user 1 then fills out the form with the information necessary for the transaction which may include the identification of the bank account to be credited, the identification of the bank account to be debited, the amount of the transaction.
  • a lot of other information may also be required, such as redundant identifiers of the user and / or of the bank account or of its holder, a secret known only to the bank and the holder, a transaction identifier or any other information that is in connection with the transaction.
  • user 1 sends the completed form to the banking services server 4 via the first terminal 2.
  • the form can be accompanied by the time and date of sending and also identifiers specific to the first one. terminal 2.
  • the banking services server 4 verifies the information contained in the form and in particular whether the requested transaction can be authorized or not. To this end, the banking services server 4 queries its database to check whether the account to be debited is still in service and whether the credit of the account to be debited can make it possible to authorize the transaction. Optionally, the server can verify the correctness of redundant identifiers or information on the holder of the bank account. This first check corresponds to a first safety factor. However, the transaction was transmitted by the open network 3 and, despite this first check, it is possible that this transaction came from a misappropriation of the form and / or information relating to the bank account by a malicious third party.
  • the communications on the open network 3 can be intercepted and possibly replayed in a modified manner.
  • any encrypted message can be decrypted after a certain period of time, making it possible to retrieve an exchanged form and reuse the information it contains.
  • the fact that the network is open allows malicious people to spread viruses on the machines connected to it and in particular the first terminal 2. Among the viruses, some can intercept the information exchanged on the man-machine interfaces. and send them back to another machine, also rendering the confidentiality of encrypted messages inoperative.
  • a second security factor can be added by using a second communication channel to send a one-time code.
  • the banking services server 4 has a second communication interface capable of communicating via the second communication channel with a second terminal 5 which belongs to a bank account holder.
  • the second terminal 5 is identified in the database of the banking services server 4 in relation to the bank account to be debited.
  • the second terminal 5 can be, conventionally, a mobile telephone of the holder of the bank account, but can also be any other type of device connected to a communication network, such as, for example, a box connected to a supplied mobile telephone network. by the bank or even a tablet or a computer connected to the Internet.
  • the important thing is that the second communication channel is at least logically distinct from the first communication channel used for sending the transaction form.
  • the banking services server 4 retrieves, in its database, the identifier of the second terminal 5 to send it a one-time verification code.
  • the identifier of the second terminal 5 is, for example, a mobile telephone number and the message is, for example, sent by a short message of the SMS type (English Short Message Service).
  • the message can also indicate the amount of the transaction and / or the beneficiary of the transaction, so that the account holder can verify that the current transaction conforms to a desired transaction.
  • the banking services server 4 sends to the first terminal 2 a confirmation request requesting the single-use code.
  • User 1 if he corresponds to the holder of the bank account, can then read the one-time code on the second terminal 5 and copy it into a response form attached to the confirmation request in order to send it back to the service server. banking 4.
  • the banking services server 4 compares the code present in the form with the one-time code sent to the second terminal 5. If the two codes are identical, then the banking services server 4 validates the transaction and sends a message to the first terminal 2 to inform it of the acceptance of the transaction. If the two codes are different, then the transaction is refused and the banking services server 4 sends a message to the first terminal indicating that the transaction is refused. Optionally, the banking service server 4 can reiterate the sending of a new one-time verification code to the second terminal 5 and a request to the first terminal 2.
  • FIG. 2 corresponds to a commercial transaction system allowing a user 1 to make a purchase on a merchant site 6.
  • the merchant site 6 is a server-type computer which is connected to the open network 3 in order to provide web pages which offer products and / or services to users connecting to them using an appropriate terminal.
  • the user 1 connects to the merchant site 6 using the first terminal 2 via the open network 3.
  • the merchant site 6 sends a transaction form to the first terminal 2.
  • the transaction form is pre-filled by the merchant site 6 with the identification of the seller, his bank account and the amount of the transaction.
  • the transaction form is presented to user 1 by the first terminal 2, asking the latter to complete with an account or bank card identification.
  • user 1 sends the form to the merchant site 6 via the first terminal 2.
  • the form can be accompanied by the time and date of sending and also identifiers specific to the first terminal 2 such that, for example, its address on the open network 3.
  • the merchant site 6 receives the form and transmits it to an acquirer service server 7 which corresponds to its bank.
  • the acquirer services server 7 is a computer having one or more processing units, at least one volatile and mass memory, at least one communication interface allowing it to connect with the merchant site 6 and 'at least one communication interface for connecting to a secure network dedicated to banking services.
  • the communication interface communicating with the merchant site 6 can correspond to a specific secure link or to an open network implementing encrypted communication.
  • the acquirer services server 7 then transmits the transaction form, via the secure network, to a debtor services server 4 ’which corresponds to the issuer of the bank card.
  • Debit service server 4 "is similar to bank service server 4.
  • Debit service server 4" can be the cardholder's bank server or the server of a credit card issuer.
  • the debtor service server 4 On receipt of the transaction form, the debtor service server 4 'checks the information contained in the form and, in particular, whether the requested transaction can be authorized or not. To this end, the debtor services server 4 'queries its database to check whether the account or the bank card is still in service, if any redundant information is in conformity with the card or the bank account and if the amount of the payment. transaction corresponds to an authorized amount. This first level of security verification having been carried out, the debtor services server 4 'carries out a verification according to a second security level similar to that described in relation to FIG. 1 with some differences.
  • the debtor service server 4 ' identifies in its database the second terminal 5 in relation to the card or the bank account to be debited and a second communication channel distinct, at least logically, from the communication channel with the first terminal 2.
  • the debtor services server 4 ′ sends a message comprising a one-time verification code to the second terminal 5.
  • the message can also indicate the amount of the transaction and / or the beneficiary of the transaction, so that the holder of the account can verify that the current transaction conforms to a desired transaction.
  • the debtor service server 4 sends to the first terminal 2 a confirmation request requesting the one-time code.
  • This request can be sent to the first terminal 2 via the acquirer service server 7 and the merchant site 6 via the open network 3 or directly by the debtor service server 4 ′ via the open network 3.
  • the user 1 if it corresponds to the card or bank account holder can then read the single-use code on the second terminal 5 and copy it into a response form attached to the confirmation request, in order to send it back to the debtor services server 4 'using the same communication channel.
  • the debtor service server 4 On receipt of the response form, the debtor service server 4 'compares the code present in the form with the one-time code sent to the second terminal 5. If the two codes are identical, then the banking services server 4 validates the transaction and sends a message to the acquirer services server 7 which records the transaction and transmits a validated payment message to the merchant site 6. The merchant site 6 then informs the first terminal 2 that the payment is accepted and delivers the service or initiates a procedure for delivering product (s) which will not be detailed in this document. If the two codes are different, then the transaction is refused and the debtor service server 4 'sends a message to the acquirer service server 7 which is retransmitted to the merchant site 6, then to the first terminal 2 indicating that the transaction is refused and therefore not completed.
  • the debtor services server 4 ′ can reiterate the sending of a new one-time verification code to the second terminal 5 and of a new request to the first terminal 2 via one of the paths indicated above.
  • FIGS. 3 and 4 illustrate the steps of the transaction methods carried out according to the invention respectively on the transaction systems described in relation to FIGS. 1 and 2.
  • the flowchart of FIG. 5 details the steps of the processing method. transaction verification performed according to the invention by the banking services server 4 or the debtor services server 4 'during the exchanges carried out in accordance with FIG. 3 or FIG. 4.
  • the steps common between FIGS. 3, 4 and 5 bear the same references and the description of FIG. 5 is made in conjunction with the descriptions of FIGS. 3 and 4.
  • the steps prior to a choice of transaction by user 1 are not detailed in Figures 3 and 4 which begin after a transaction decision, corresponding to the making of a payment, has been validated by the user 1 of the first terminal 2.
  • the banking services server 4 sends to the first terminal 2 a transaction form corresponding to the choice of user 1 in a first step 301 of the transaction process.
  • the user 1 takes note of the form received by the first terminal 2, for example using a display screen of the first terminal 2.
  • the user fills in the form with the information requested during a third step 303 of the transaction method, for example using a keyboard of the first terminal 2.
  • the user validates the form in order to send it.
  • a fourth step 304 of the transaction method corresponds to the sending of the form by the first terminal 2 to the banking services server 4 via the open network 3.
  • This fourth step 304 of the transaction method corresponds to a first verification step 501 of the banking services server 4.
  • the banking services server 4 receives an incoming message R1 arriving via the first communication channel.
  • the incoming message R1 contains credentials ID of a bank account and a transaction amount TA.
  • the identification information ID includes at a minimum the bank account number, but may include redundant information such as, for example, one or more of: a password, a PIN code, one or more information of the identity of the user. Bank account owner.
  • the identification information ID can also include parameters specific to the transaction, such as for example the time, date or place where the first terminal 2 is located, as well as an identifier of said first terminal 2.
  • a second verification step 502 the banking services server 4 verifies that the bank account exists and that it is not blocked. Optionally, other checks can be performed to verify that any redundant information complies with that corresponding to the bank account. Further, the banking service server 4 can also verify that the amount to be debited is consistent with an authorized debit from the bank account.
  • the banking services server 4 calculates a length L of verification code in a third verification step 503 where the length L corresponds to a number of digits of said code.
  • the length L is determined as a function of the amount of the transaction TA, so that the verification code takes into account the amount of the transaction as a risk factor.
  • the following formula can be used:
  • identification information ID can be taken into account in determining the number of digits.
  • the parameters A and B can be stored in the database of the bank service server 4 and accessed using the identification of the account number.
  • the parameters A and B can be defined according to a risk accepted by the user or by his account manager, B corresponding to a minimum number of digits and A being determined according to an amount for which a financial risk seems acceptable.
  • the verification code length L being determined, the banking service server 4 then calculates a verification code AC during a fourth verification step 504.
  • the verification code AC can be generated in different ways, preferably using a random or pseudo-random number generated by the processing unit of the banking service server 4. A As a simple example, the following formula can be used to determine the verification code:
  • H corresponding to a cryptographic hash function, for example a SHA-3, performed on the concatenation of the random number Seed, the amount of the transaction TA and one or more identification information IDs.
  • a cryptographic hash function for example a SHA-3
  • a fifth verification step 505 is performed by the banking services server 4.
  • the fifth verification step 505 consists in sending an outgoing message S1, by the first communication channel, to the destination from the first terminal 2, the outgoing message containing a Req request asking the user 1 of the first terminal 2 to return a verification code in a response form.
  • the banking services server 4 performs a sixth verification step 506.
  • the sixth verification step 506 consists of send an outgoing message S2 by the second communication channel to the second terminal 5.
  • the second terminal 5 is, prior to sending, identified in the database of the banking services server 4 in association with the bank account to be debited.
  • the outgoing message S2 contains the verification code AC calculated during the fourth verification step.
  • the fifth verification step 505 corresponds to a fifth step 305 of the transaction method and the sixth verification step 506 corresponds to a sixth step 306 of the transaction method.
  • the first terminal 2 having received the request Req, it is presented to the user 1 during a seventh step 307 of the transaction method, the response form being to be completed by the user 1.
  • an eighth step 308 of the transaction method consists in the presentation of the verification code AC by the second terminal 5 to the user 1.
  • the copied verification code AC ′ is sent to the banking services server 4 in a tenth step 310 of the transaction process.
  • the tenth step 310 of the transaction method corresponds to a seventh verification step 507 carried out by the banking services server 4.
  • the banking services server 4 receives an incoming message R1 arriving from the first communication channel having for content the copied code AC ' .
  • An eighth verification step 508 then consists in comparing the copied code AC ’with the verification code AC calculated during the fourth verification step 504.
  • the banking services server 4 performs a ninth verification step 509 during which it validates and records the completion of the transaction. Then, a tenth verification step 510 is carried out to send an outgoing message S1 via the first communication channel to the first terminal 2 to indicate that the transaction has been carried out.
  • the banking services server 4 performs an eleventh step 511 during which it cancels the transaction. If, during the second verification step 502, the banking services server 4 has not found the bank account or has found the bank account but that it is blocked or even if other verifications have shown that any redundant information is not not in accordance with those corresponding to the bank account, the second verification step 502 can lead directly to the eleventh verification step 511 and also cancel the transaction. After the eleventh verification step 511, a twelfth verification step 512 is performed to send an outgoing message S1 via the first communication channel to the first terminal 2 to indicate that the transaction is canceled.
  • the tenth verification step 510 or the twelfth verification step 512 corresponds to an eleventh step 311 of the transaction method in which the first terminal 2 receives the outgoing message S1 to display it to the user 1 during a twelfth step 312 of the transaction method.
  • user 1 is informed of the completion or cancellation of the requested transaction.
  • Figure 4 discloses a transaction process carried out from the merchant site 6. After the user has chosen to make a purchase, the merchant site 6 sends to the first terminal 2 a transaction form in a first step 401 of the transaction process. In a second step 402 of the transaction method, the user 1 takes note of the form received by the first terminal 2. The user 1 fills in the form with the information requested during a third step 403 of the transaction method.
  • the form contains ID credentials of a card or bank account and a TA transaction amount.
  • the identification information ID includes at a minimum the number of card or bank account but can include redundant information such as, for example, one or more elements among: a password, a PIN code, a CW code, one or more. several identity information of the account holder.
  • the identification information ID can also include parameters specific to the transaction such as, for example, the time, date or place where the first terminal 2 is located or else an identifier of said first terminal 2.
  • a fourth step 404 of the transaction method corresponds to the sending of the form by the first terminal 2 to the merchant site 6 via the open network 3.
  • the merchant site 6 retransmits the form to the acquirer service server 7 during a fifth step 405 of the transaction method.
  • the acquirer service server 7 determines a corresponding debit service server 4 ′, in order to retransmit the form to it during a sixth step 406 of the transaction method. .
  • This sixth step 406 of the transaction method corresponds to the first verification step 501, performed by the debtor service server 4 ′, corresponding to the reception of the incoming message R1 arriving from the first communication channel.
  • the debtor services server 4 ′ then performs the second verification step 502, in order to verify that the account or the bank card exists and that it is not blocked.
  • other checks can be carried out to verify that any redundant information complies with that corresponding to the account or the bank card.
  • the debtor service server 4 ’ can also verify that the amount to be debited complies with an authorized debit from the account or bank card.
  • the debtor service server 4 ’performs the third verification step 503 and calculates a length L of verification code AC corresponding to a number of digits of said code.
  • the length L is determined as a function of the amount of the transaction TA so that the verification code AC takes into account the amount of the transaction as a risk factor as previously described.
  • the length L of the verification code may also incorporate other risk factors such as a transaction hour and / or a number of recently completed transactions. For example, such an integration can result in the following formula:
  • Nb representing the number of transactions carried out in the last twenty-four hours with the same account number or the same bank card
  • T representing the time of the transaction
  • R (T) being a risk coefficient depending on the time T
  • the coefficient R (T) being for example read in a correspondence table produced from statistics on the time of execution of fraudulent transactions.
  • the debtor services server 4 ’then calculates the verification code AC during the fourth verification step 504 as previously described.
  • the fifth and sixth verification steps 505 and 506 are then performed in parallel.
  • the fifth verification step 505 consists in sending an outgoing message S1 via the first communication channel to the first terminal 2 which contains a confirmation request Req asking the user 1 of the first terminal 2 to send back a verification code in a response form.
  • the sixth verification step 506 consists in sending an outgoing message S2 via the second communication channel, to the second terminal 5, the second terminal 5 having been previously identified from the database of the debtor services server 4 'in association with the account or bank card to be debited.
  • the outgoing message S2 contains the verification code AC calculated during the fourth verification step 504.
  • the fifth verification step 505 corresponds to a seventh step 407 of the transaction method.
  • the debtor service server 4 ′ transfers an outgoing message containing the request S1 (Req) to the acquirer service server 7.
  • the acquirer service server 7 transfers this message to the merchant site 6 during the process.
  • an eighth step 408 of the transaction method The merchant site 6 then retransmits the request to the first terminal 2 in a ninth step 409 of the transaction method.
  • the sixth verification step 506 corresponds to a tenth step 410 of the transaction method during which the second terminal 5 receives the verification code AC.
  • the first terminal 2 having received the request Req, it is presented to the user 1 during an eleventh step 411 of the transaction method, the response form being to be completed by the user 1.
  • a twelfth step 412 of the transaction method consists in the presentation of the verification code AC, by the second terminal 5, to the user 1.
  • User 1 having the verification code AC, fills out the response form by copying the verification code AC into the response form during a thirteenth step 413 of the transaction process.
  • the copied verification code AC ′ is sent to the merchant site 6 in a fourteenth step 414 of the transaction process.
  • the merchant site 6 transmits the response form to the acquirer service server 7.
  • the acquirer service server 7 transmits the completed form to the debtor services server 4 '.
  • the sixteenth step 416 of the transaction method corresponds to the seventh verification step 507 performed by the debtor services server 4 ′.
  • the debtor services server 4 ’ receives an incoming message R1 arriving by the first channel, having for content the copied code AC’.
  • the debtor service server 4 "compares the copied code AC" with the verification code AC calculated during the fourth verification step 504.
  • the debtor service server 4 ’performs the ninth step 509 during which it validates and records the completion of the transaction. Then, the tenth verification step 510 is carried out to send an outgoing message S1 via the first communication channel, to the first terminal 2, to indicate that the transaction has been carried out.
  • the debtor service server 4 ′ performs the eleventh step 511 during which it cancels the transaction. If, during the second verification step 502, the debtor services server 4 'has noted that the account or the bank card is blocked or if other verifications have shown that any redundant information does not comply with that corresponding to the account or the bank card, the second verification step 502 can lead directly to the eleventh verification step 511 and also cancel the transaction. After the eleventh verification step 511, a twelfth verification step 512 is performed to send an outgoing message S1, via the first communication channel, to the first terminal 2 to indicate that the transaction is canceled.
  • the tenth verification step 510 or the twelfth verification step 512 correspond to a seventeenth step 417 of the transaction method in which the acquiring service server 7 receives the outgoing message S1.
  • the acquirer service server 7 records the completion or cancellation of the transaction and transmits the outgoing message to the merchant site 6 during an eighteenth step 418 of the transaction process.
  • the merchant site 6 notes the validation or cancellation of the transaction. If the transaction is validated, the merchant site 6 delivers the service or triggers the delivery of the purchased product.
  • the merchant site 6 sends a transaction confirmation or cancellation message to the first terminal 2.
  • the first terminal 2 displays the confirmation message to the user 1 during a transaction.
  • twentieth step 420 of the transaction process Thus, user 1 is informed of the completion or cancellation of the purchase made.
  • the seventh to ninth steps 407 to 409 of the transaction method described in relation to FIG. 4 can be replaced by a first alternative step 421 which directly transmits the request for a confirmation code from the debtor services server 4 ′ to the first terminal 2 via the open network 3.
  • a second alternative step 422 can replace the fourteenth to sixteenth steps 414 to 416 of the transaction method to directly transmit the verification code copied AC 'from the first terminal 2 to the debtor services server 4 '.
  • the first terminal 2 is a computer connected to the Internet and the second terminal 5 is a mobile telephone.
  • the first and second terminals 2 and 5 can be any type of connected device which can exchange data with a remote server. According to one variant, the first and second terminals 2 and 5 can be one and the same physical terminal. The important thing is that the first and second communication channels are at least logically separated from each other so that malicious interception of the first channel does not automatically lead to malicious interception of the second channel.
  • the first and second terminals can be one and the same personal computer with a first communication channel comprising internet browsing software and a second communication channel comprising messaging software, the identification of the second communication channel using an email address.
  • the first and second communication channels are logically distinct from each other, although the physical connection of the terminals uses the same communication interface, namely the same network connection card.
  • the verification code sent by the second channel is not directly accessible by the navigation software and it is necessary for the user to act on a man-machine interface of the personal computer to view and copy said code.
  • only software that intercepts actions performed on the human-machine interface can intercept the verification code.
  • this type of interception can also be achieved when the two communication channels are physically distinct and therefore the logical differentiation constitutes the same level of security as a physical differentiation of the communication channels.
  • an electronic transaction is carried out between two bank accounts belonging to two different holders who have two banks. different each having their own server.
  • the seller and the buyer have a bank account in the same bank.
  • the debtor 4 ′ and acquirer 7 service servers form one and the same server, which makes it possible to reduce the number of exchanges.
  • one or more intermediary service providers can also be interposed between the debtor 4 ’and acquirer service servers 7. This is particularly the case when credit cards are used. The link is not made directly from bank to bank, but goes through a card provider who can replace the cardholder's bank or simply act as an intermediary in an online transaction.
  • the banking service servers 4, debtors 4 ’and acquirers 7 can be distributed servers. Given the volume of banking data and the number of transaction requests, several independent computers connected to a network can perform the role of each of the banking services 4, debtors 4 'and acquirers 7 servers. Each computer constituting one of the servers can perform all the operations of a transaction or only a part, the different transaction operations being performed on different computers.

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EP20845185.6A 2019-12-13 2020-12-11 Transaktionsauthentifizierungsverfahren, server und system mit zwei kommunikationskanälen Pending EP4074005A1 (de)

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FR1914346A FR3104760B1 (fr) 2019-12-13 2019-12-13 Procede, serveur et systeme d’authentification de transaction utilisant deux canaux de communication
PCT/FR2020/052398 WO2021116627A1 (fr) 2019-12-13 2020-12-11 Procede, serveur et systeme d'authentification de transaction utilisant deux canaux de communication

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SK5232001A3 (en) * 2001-04-18 2002-03-05 Blue Orange S R O Method of safety transactions by means of public networks
EP1756995A4 (de) * 2004-05-21 2012-05-30 Emc Corp Verfahren und system zur betrugsreduktion
US7657489B2 (en) * 2006-01-18 2010-02-02 Mocapay, Inc. Systems and method for secure wireless payment transactions
US20090307140A1 (en) * 2008-06-06 2009-12-10 Upendra Mardikar Mobile device over-the-air (ota) registration and point-of-sale (pos) payment
US8661258B2 (en) * 2009-10-23 2014-02-25 Vasco Data Security, Inc. Compact security device with transaction risk level approval capability
EP3090377B1 (de) * 2013-12-31 2020-01-22 OneSpan International GmbH Verfahren und vorrichtung zur bereitstellung von client-seitiger scorebasierter authentifizierung
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CA3161325A1 (fr) 2021-06-17
US20230009385A1 (en) 2023-01-12

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