EP3979103B1 - Vorrichtung, verfahren und computerprogramme - Google Patents

Vorrichtung, verfahren und computerprogramme

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Publication number
EP3979103B1
EP3979103B1 EP21198798.7A EP21198798A EP3979103B1 EP 3979103 B1 EP3979103 B1 EP 3979103B1 EP 21198798 A EP21198798 A EP 21198798A EP 3979103 B1 EP3979103 B1 EP 3979103B1
Authority
EP
European Patent Office
Prior art keywords
domain
network
scp
network entity
request
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Active
Application number
EP21198798.7A
Other languages
English (en)
French (fr)
Other versions
EP3979103A3 (de
EP3979103A2 (de
Inventor
Thomas Belling
Bruno Landais
Saurabh Khare
Anja Jerichow
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Nokia Technologies Oy
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Nokia Technologies Oy
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Publication of EP3979103A2 publication Critical patent/EP3979103A2/de
Publication of EP3979103A3 publication Critical patent/EP3979103A3/de
Application granted granted Critical
Publication of EP3979103B1 publication Critical patent/EP3979103B1/de
Active legal-status Critical Current
Anticipated expiration legal-status Critical

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Classifications

    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/60—Protecting data
    • G06F21/62—Protecting access to data via a platform, e.g. using keys or access control rules
    • G06F21/6218—Protecting access to data via a platform, e.g. using keys or access control rules to a system of files or objects, e.g. local or distributed file system or database
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W60/00—Affiliation to network, e.g. registration; Terminating affiliation with the network, e.g. de-registration
    • H04W60/04—Affiliation to network, e.g. registration; Terminating affiliation with the network, e.g. de-registration using triggered events
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/60—Protecting data
    • G06F21/604—Tools and structures for managing or administering access control systems
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/20—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for managing network security; network security policies in general
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L67/00—Network arrangements or protocols for supporting network services or applications
    • H04L67/2866—Architectures; Arrangements
    • H04L67/30—Profiles
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L67/00—Network arrangements or protocols for supporting network services or applications
    • H04L67/50—Network services
    • H04L67/52—Network services specially adapted for the location of the user terminal
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L67/00—Network arrangements or protocols for supporting network services or applications
    • H04L67/50—Network services
    • H04L67/56—Provisioning of proxy services
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/08—Access security
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W8/00—Network data management
    • H04W8/005—Discovery of network devices, e.g. terminals
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W84/00—Network topologies
    • H04W84/02—Hierarchically pre-organised networks, e.g. paging networks, cellular networks, WLAN [Wireless Local Area Network] or WLL [Wireless Local Loop]
    • H04W84/04—Large scale networks; Deep hierarchical networks
    • H04W84/042—Public Land Mobile systems, e.g. cellular systems

Definitions

  • the present disclosure relates to apparatus, methods, and computer programs, and in particular but not exclusively to apparatus, methods and computer programs for network apparatuses.
  • a communication system can be seen as a facility that enables communication sessions between two or more entities such as user terminals, access nodes and/or other nodes by providing carriers between the various entities involved in the communications path.
  • a communication system can be provided for example by means of a communication network and one or more compatible communication devices.
  • the communication sessions may comprise, for example, communication of data for carrying communications such as voice, electronic mail (email), text message, multimedia and/or content data and so on.
  • Content may be unicast or multicast to communication devices.
  • FIG. 1 shows a schematic representation of a 5G system (5GS) 100.
  • the 5GS may comprise a user equipment (UE) 102 (which may also be referred to as a communication device or a terminal), a 5G access network (AN) (which may be a 5G Radio Access Network (RAN) or any other type of 5G AN such as a Non-3GPP Interworking Function (N3IWF)/a Trusted Non3GPP Gateway Function (TNGF) for Untrusted / Trusted Non-3GPP access or Wireline Access Gateway Function (W-AGF) for Wireline access) 104, a 5G core (5GC) 106, one or more application functions (AF) 108 and one or more data networks (DN) 110.
  • UE user equipment
  • AN which may also be referred to as a communication device or a terminal
  • AN which may be a 5G Radio Access Network (RAN) or any other type of 5G AN such as a Non-3GPP Interworking Function (N3IW
  • the 5G RAN may comprise one or more gNodeB (gNB) distributed unit functions connected to one or more gNodeB (gNB) centralized unit functions.
  • the RAN may comprise one or more access nodes.
  • the 5GC 106 may comprise one or more access management functions (AMF) 112, one or more session management functions (SMF) 114, one or more authentication server functions (AUSF) 116, one or more unified data management (UDM) functions 118, one or more user plane functions (UPF) 120, one or more unified data repository (UDR) functions 122, one or more network repository functions (NRF) 128, and/or one or more network exposure functions (NEF) 124.
  • AMF access management functions
  • SMF session management functions
  • AUSF authentication server functions
  • UDM unified data management
  • UPF user plane functions
  • UPF user plane functions
  • URF unified data repository
  • NRF network exposure functions
  • NRF 128 is not depicted with its interfaces, it is understood that this is for clarity reasons and that NRF 128 may have a plurality of interfaces with other network functions.
  • An NRF maintains an updated repository of 5G elements available in the operator's network, along with the services provided by each of the elements in the 5G core that are expected to be instantiated, scaled and/or terminated without, or with minimal manual intervention.
  • the NRF maintains a record of available NF instances and their supported services.
  • the NRF allows other NF instances to subscribe and be notified of registrations from NF instances of a given type.
  • the NRF may support service discovery, by receipt of Discovery Requests from NF instances and details which NF instances support specific services. Therefore, NF Service consumers or Service Communication Proxies (SCPs) (which obtain NF services on behalf of another network entity) may discover NF service producers by performing for example, an NF Discovery procedure towards the NRF.
  • SCPs Service Communication Proxies
  • an SCP may implement an individual Service Agent for respective network functions. This allows for indirect communications between 5G core components in the Service-based architecture of 5G.
  • the Service Agent may perform tasks that are peripheral to the primary role that the network function was designed to perform, for example interworking, service segmentation, service-centric access control and load balancing.
  • the Service Agent can implement global access control lists that prevent unauthorized communications between network functions. Consequently, rather than individual Internet Protocol (IP) address blocklists or allowlists, for example, the Service Agent can implement a rule that simply identifies network functions and is applicable regardless of the IP network address ranges those network functions employ.
  • IP Internet Protocol
  • SCPs may also provide a centralized configuration file that can be called-on by all similar functions. This may dramatically reduce the potential for errors and makes system-wide updates and upgrades much easier
  • SCP profiles may comprise a number of different types of identifying and categorizing information that may be used for discovery purposes.
  • an SCP profile may comprise any of: an SCP ID, an FQDN or IP address of the SCP, an indication that the profile is of an SCP (e.g. NF type parameter set to type SCP), SCP capacity information, current SCP load information, SCP priority information, location information for the SCP, served location(s), Network Slice related Identifier(s), identification of remote PLMNs reachable through the SCP, endpoint addresses accessible via the SCP, interconnected SCP IDs, interconnected NF IDs, NF sets of NFs served by the SCP, and SCP Domains the SCP belongs to. If an SCP belongs to more than one SCP Domain, the SCP may be able bridge these domains, i.e. sending messages between these domains.
  • the SCP profiles may also be used to identify those SCPs that interconnect domains. Moreover, an SCP can then use this profile information to discover the next hop SCP to which received signaling is to be routed. This can be useful to route a service request from a consumer to a producer via one or more SCPs.
  • FIG. 5 illustrates an example network in which SCP domains are shown.
  • the second SCP domain 501b comprises the first SCP 502a, a second SCP 502b, a third SCP 502c, a fourth SCP 502d and a fifth SCP 502e.
  • the third SCP domain 501b comprises the second SCP 502b, the fourth SCP 502d and a sixth SCP 502f. Together, these three SCPs are directly connected to the third NF 503c, a fourth NF 503d and a fifth NF 503e.
  • the fourth SCP domain 501d comprises the third SCP 502c, a seventh SCP 502g and an eighth SCP 502h. Together, these three SCPs are directly connected to a sixth NF 503f, a seventh NF 503g and an eighth NF 503h.
  • the fifth SCP domain 501e comprises the fifth SCP 502c, the seventh SCP 502g, the eighth SCP 502h, a ninth SCP 502i and a tenth SCP 503j.
  • the sixth SCP domain 501f comprises the sixth SCP 502f and the ninth SCP 502i. Together, these two SCPs are directly connected to a ninth NF 503i, a tenth NF 503j and an eleventh 503k.
  • the seventh SCP domain 501g comprises the tenth SCP 502j, which is directly connected to a twelfth NF 503l, a thirteenth NF 503m and to a fourteenth NF 503n.
  • a technical domain may be defined in any of a plurality of different ways. For example, a technical domain may be defined based on compute center boundaries. As another example, a technical domain may be based on operators of subnetworks. As another example, a technical domain may be based on regions/jurisdictions. Technical domains may also be defined in dependence on a combination of different factors, such as combinations of the presently listed examples.
  • Trust/security has been considered in communication networks in other contexts.
  • security been considered in relation to Security Edge Protection Proxy (SEPP) communication protocols.
  • SEPP Security Edge Protection Proxy
  • SEPPs which relate to different PLMNs
  • these mechanisms are not relevant to communications within a single PLMN, such as between SCPs and between NFs and SCPs.
  • SEPP communications protocols apply to inter-PLMN communications, they do not apply to intra-PLMN communications.
  • SCPs do provide some security features. For example, authentication and authorization between SCPs is described in 3GPP TS 33.501. However, this communication protocol currently only relates to authentication, while authorization between SCPs is described as being for further study (see clause 13.3.7 of 3GPP TS 33.501).
  • the NRF may enforce whether SCP domains registered by SCPs or NFs are correct. For example, if an SCP registers, the registering SCP may provide an identifier of the SCP domain to which the registering SCP wants to register. The NRF can then check whether the registered SCP is authorized to be part of this SCP domain. If SCP has provided an incorrect domain (i.e. an SCP domain identifier for which the registering SCP is not authorized), then registration is aborted by the NRF.
  • SCPs may discover the boundaries of trust domains in any of a plurality of different ways. For example, an SCP may determine its own trust domain based on an SCP domain from which a request is received and/or that it forwards a request to. As another example, an SCP may determine its trust domain based on previously configured knowledge of the relationship of trust or technical domains and SCP domains. Based on this information, the SCP may thus determine whether the request is allowed to traverse a boundary between trust/technical domain. The SCP may also use such information to determine whether any extra policing of the request is required.
  • a bridging SCP may perform policing of traffic between trust domains. For example, a bridging SCP may perform extra policing of a received communication if that bridging SCP discovers that the received communication has traversed a boundary between trust/technical domain.
  • Figure 6 shows how the concept of trust domains may be applied to the SCP domain example of Figure 5 .
  • Figure 6 shows a first SCP domain 601a, a second SCP domain 601b, a third SCP domain 601c, a fourth SCP domain 601d, a fifth SCP domain 601e, a sixth SCP domain 601f and a seventh SCP domain 601g.
  • the second SCP domain 601b comprises the first SCP 602a, a second SCP 602b, a third SCP 602c, a fourth SCP 602d and a fifth SCP 602e.
  • the third SCP domain 601c comprises the second SCP 602b, the fourth SCP 602d and a sixth SCP 602f. Together, these three SCPs are directly connected to the third NF 603c, a fourth NF 603d and a fifth NF 603e.
  • the fourth SCP domain 601d comprises the third SCP 602c, a seventh SCP 602g and an eighth SCP 602h. Together, these three SCPs are directly connected to a sixth NF 603f, a seventh NF 603g and an eighth NF 603h.
  • the fifth SCP domain 601e comprises the fifth SCP 602c, the seventh SCP 602g, the eighth SCP 602h, a ninth SCP 602i and a tenth SCP 603j.
  • the sixth SCP domain 601f comprises the sixth SCP 602f and the ninth SCP 602i. Together, these two SCPs are directly connected to a ninth NF 603i, a tenth NF 603j and an eleventh 603k.
  • the seventh SCP domain 601g comprises the tenth SCP 602j, which is directly connected to a twelfth NF 603l, a thirteenth NF 603m and to a fourteenth NF 603n.
  • the extra policing of the communication performed by the bridging SCPs at the trust domain border may comprise at least one action of a plurality of different actions, depending on the exact implementation.
  • One example action may be rejecting messages or message requests based on a blacklist (i.e. not allowed list).
  • a blacklist may be, for example, configured by the operator, or an SCP can dynamically create a blacklist to restrict the traffic.
  • An SCP may dynamically create the blacklist in a number of different ways. For example, an SCP may create a blacklist based on there being heavy traffic originating from a single NF/Domain (where heavy originators would be blocked), wrongly formulating the URI, and/or using an expired authentication token. Variations of these are also discussed below.
  • One example action may be checking whether (or not) a target Uniform Resource Indicator (URI) is on, for example, a whitelist (i.e. allowed list) (and therefore signalling allowed to go enter the trust domain) or a blacklist (and is therefore not allowed to enter the trust domain).
  • Another example action may be checking delegated discovery parameters such as services and locations.
  • Delegated discovery may refer to delegating the discovery and associated selection of NF instances or NF service instances to an SCP. Therefore, in the case of Indirect Communication with Delegated Discovery, the SCP may discover and select a suitable NF instance and NF service instance based on discovery and selection parameters provided by the requester NF and optional interaction with the NRF. Thus, an SCP may be said to be performing discovery of behalf of NFs, using discovery parameters that may be provided from the NFs. These discovery parameters may be checked by use of an appropriate whitelist or a blacklist, such as those mentioned above.
  • Another example action may be enforcing message or payload size limitations. For example, when a received message is above a predefined size, the bridging SCP may discard the received message. In contrast, when a received message is below a predefined size, the bridging SCP may allow the received message to enter the trust domain.
  • Another example action may be policing the number of requests issued from a certain trust/technical domain. In such a case, when the number of requests reaches a predetermined number (and/or a predetermined frequency of requests) then the requests may be automatically rejected.
  • Another example action may be to perform protocol interworking.
  • the bridging SCP may interwork between HTTP/2 and HTTP/3.
  • Another example action may be applying different security mechanisms.
  • One example security mechanism that currently exists is Transport Layer Security. However, it is understood that other security mechanisms may be applied.
  • Another example action may be to enforce whole path validation based on trust domain. This means that a bridging SCP may validate the whole path (from NFs to SCPs) along which signaling is made in terms of trust of domains of the different NFs and SCPs.
  • Another example action may be to inject an additional Token when further communication is required with other Domain SCP. This may be useful, for example, when there is more than one domain to be passed. In such a case, one domain SCP can only get an authentication token (or the like) for the next domain. Therefore, if the next domain is not the ultimate target domain, this next domain would need to request another token.
  • Figure 7 illustrates potential signaling between a bridging SCP 701 and a network repository function 702.
  • SCP 701 receives signaling from an SCP trust domain relating to a message.
  • This signaling may comprise an access point identifier for a target Service-Based Identifier.
  • This signaling may also comprise possible discovery parameters for discovering a next-hop location for the message.
  • the next-hop location may be an SCP.
  • the next-hop location may be a network function.
  • the next-hop SCP may be determined by: analyzing the request target in the possibly received header of the signaling of 7001, and/or by selecting a request target and/or next hop SCP (if any), and/or by using the NF discovery service of the NRF to obtain SCP and/or NF profiles that can contain the SCP domain, and/or based on possibly cached profiles obtained previously via the NF discovery service, and/or based on configured information about the mapping of destination domain names (such as FQDNs) or IP addresses or address ranges to SCP domains
  • destination domain names such as FQDNs
  • the NRF 702 may signal a discovery response to the SCF 701.
  • the response may comprise identifiers of different network functions and a respective SCP domain in which that network function may be found.
  • the SCF 701 may receive a first NF profile for NF1 that includes an indication of a first SCP domain, and a second NF profile for NF2 that includes an indication of a second domain.
  • the SCP 701 selects NF2 as a service provider and directs forwarding of incoming signaling to NF2 and the second SCP Domain 2 as an outgoing SCP domain.
  • the SCP 701 receives a request comprising a header containing a URI, and selects to route the signaling towards a contained URI without other SCP and select outgoing SCP domain based on URI in that header.
  • the SCP 701 selects a next-hop SCP (possibly using NF Discovery Service to query for SCPs), and determines an outgoing SCP domain as SCP domain to connect to next-hop SCP.
  • the SCP determines, based on the incoming and outgoing SCP domain and configured knowledge of the relationship of trust/technical domains and SCP domains, whether the received request traverses a boundary between trust/technical domain. If so, the SCP 701 performs extra policing of the request, such as described above.
  • the SCP 701 signals a request towards the outgoing SCP domain via NRF 702.
  • the SCP 701 performs any extra policing required (e.g. such as when the received request is determined to traverse a boundary between trust domains.
  • the SCP 701 responds to the signaling of 7001.
  • the presently described systems allow for several trust regions to exist within a PLMN and allows traffic to be restricted between those trust domains to provide extra security. It leverages the existing the already existing concepts of SCP domains to avoid that extra information needs to be stored in the NRF.
  • the at least one domain may comprise one or more service communication proxy domains.
  • the first service communication proxy may receive, from a first network entity associated with the first domain, a request to communicate.
  • the first service communication proxy may determine a second network entity to which to send the request.
  • the first service communication proxy may determine that the second network entity is associated with a second domain in the communication network.
  • the determining the second network entity, and the determining that the second network entity is associated with the second domain may comprise: using addressing information comprised within the received request to determine the second network entity; and determining the second domain based on the addressing information.
  • the addressing information may comprise a target uniform resource identifier comprised within a Hypertext Transfer Protocol header.
  • the HTTP header may be an Sbi-Target-apiRoot HTTP.
  • the first service communication proxy may further send a registration request to a registration entity in the communication network, wherein the registration request identifies at least one domain with which the apparatus is trusted. Therefore, the request may identify multiple domains. Therefore, in the present case, the registration request may identify both the first and second domains.
  • the second network entity may be one of a second network function and a third service communication proxy.
  • Figure 9 illustrates potential actions that may be performed by a registration entity in the communication network, such as an NRF.
  • the presently described NRF may interact with the apparatuses described in relation to Figures 8 and 10
  • the registration request may comprise at least one of: a service communication proxy identifier; a Fully Qualified Domain Name of the first service communication proxy; an Internet Protocol address of the first service communication proxy; an indication that the profile is of a service communication proxy; capacity information for the first service communication proxy; current load information for the first service communication proxy; priority information for the first service communication proxy; location information for the first service communication proxy; served location(s); Network Slice related Identifier(s); an identification of remote Public Land Mobile Networks reachable through the first service communication proxy; endpoint addresses accessible via the first service communication proxy; identifiers of service communication proxies interconnected with the first service communication proxy; identifiers of network functions interconnected with the first; network function sets of network functions served by the first service communication proxy; and service communication proxy Domains to which the first service communication proxy belongs.
  • the apparatus determines whether the first network entity is trusted and whether the first network entity is entitled to register the identified domain.
  • the apparatus registers the first network entity for discovery.
  • the apparatus may be caused to: receive a request for discovering at least one service network entity; and respond to the request with information relating to the first network entity.
  • the first network entity may be one of a service communication proxy and a network function.
  • Figure 10 illustrates potential actions that may be performed by a network entity in the communication network, such as an SCF (whether acting for itself or on behalf of an NF) or an NF.
  • the presently described NRF may interact with the apparatuses described in relation to Figures 8 and 9 .
  • the apparatus sends, to a registration entity, a registration request to register with the apparatus, the request identifying at least one domain in which the apparatus is trusted, wherein the apparatus comprises a first service communication proxy.
  • the at least one domain with which the apparatus is trusted may be smaller than a public land mobile network in which the apparatus operates.
  • the at least one domain may comprise one or more service communication proxy domains.
  • the registration request may comprise at least one of: a service communication proxy identifier; a Fully Qualified Domain Name of the first service communication proxy; an Internet Protocol address of the first service communication proxy; an indication that the profile is of a service communication proxy; capacity information for the first service communication proxy; current load information for the first service communication proxy; priority information for the first service communication proxy; location information for the first service communication proxy; served location(s); Network Slice related Identifier(s); an identification of remote Public Land Mobile Networks reachable through the first service communication proxy; endpoint addresses accessible via the first service communication proxy; identifiers of service communication proxies interconnected with the first service communication proxy; identifiers of network functions interconnected with the first; network function sets of network functions served by the first service communication proxy; and service communication proxy Domains to which the first service communication proxy belongs.
  • Figure 2 shows an example of a control apparatus for a communication system, for example to be coupled to and/or for controlling a station of an access system, such as a RAN node, e.g. a base station, gNB, a central unit of a cloud architecture or a node of a core network such as an MME or S-GW, a scheduling entity such as a spectrum management entity, or a server or host, for example an apparatus hosting an NRF, NWDAF, AMF, SMF, UDM/UDR etc.
  • the control apparatus may be integrated with or external to a node or module of a core network or RAN.
  • base stations comprise a separate control apparatus unit or module.
  • control apparatus can be another network element such as a radio network controller or a spectrum controller.
  • the control apparatus 200 can be arranged to provide control on communications in the service area of the system.
  • the apparatus 200 comprises at least one memory 201, at least one data processing unit 202, 203 and an input/output interface 204. Via the interface the control apparatus can be coupled to a receiver and a transmitter of the apparatus.
  • the receiver and/or the transmitter may be implemented as a radio front end or a remote radio head.
  • the control apparatus 200 or processor 201 can be configured to execute an appropriate software code to provide the control functions.
  • a possible wireless communication device will now be described in more detail with reference to Figure 3 showing a schematic, partially sectioned view of a communication device 300.
  • a communication device is often referred to as user equipment (UE) or terminal.
  • An appropriate mobile communication device may be provided by any device capable of sending and receiving radio signals.
  • Non-limiting examples comprise a mobile station (MS) or mobile device such as a mobile phone or what is known as a 'smart phone', a computer provided with a wireless interface card or other wireless interface facility (e.g., USB dongle), personal data assistant (PDA) or a tablet provided with wireless communication capabilities, or any combinations of these or the like.
  • MS mobile station
  • PDA personal data assistant
  • a mobile communication device may provide, for example, communication of data for carrying communications such as voice, electronic mail (email), text message, multimedia and so on. Users may thus be offered and provided numerous services via their communication devices. Non-limiting examples of these services comprise two-way or multi-way calls, data communication or multimedia services or simply an access to a data communications network system, such as the Internet. Users may also be provided broadcast or multicast data. Non-limiting examples of the content comprise downloads, television and radio programs, videos, advertisements, various alerts and other information.
  • a wireless communication device may be for example a mobile device, that is, a device not fixed to a particular location, or it may be a stationary device.
  • the wireless device may need human interaction for communication, or may not need human interaction for communication.
  • the terms UE or "user" are used to refer to any type of wireless communication device.
  • a wireless device 300 is typically provided with at least one data processing entity 301, at least one memory 302 and other possible components 303 for use in software and hardware aided execution of tasks it is designed to perform, including control of access to and communications with access systems and other communication devices.
  • the data processing, storage and other relevant control apparatus can be provided on an appropriate circuit board and/or in chipsets. This feature is denoted by reference 704.
  • the user may control the operation of the wireless device by means of a suitable user interface such as key pad 304, voice commands, touch sensitive screen or pad, combinations thereof or the like.
  • a display 307, a speaker and a microphone can be also provided.
  • a wireless communication device may comprise appropriate connectors (either wired or wireless) to other devices and/or for connecting external accessories, for example hands-free equipment, thereto.
  • Figure 4 shows a schematic representation of non-volatile memory media 400a (e.g. computer disc (CD) or digital versatile disc (DVD)) and 400b (e.g. universal serial bus (USB) memory stick) storing instructions and/or parameters 402 which when executed by a processor allow the processor to perform one or more of the steps of the methods of Figure 10 .
  • non-volatile memory media 400a e.g. computer disc (CD) or digital versatile disc (DVD)
  • 400b e.g. universal serial bus (USB) memory stick
  • instructions and/or parameters 402 which when executed by a processor allow the processor to perform one or more of the steps of the methods of Figure 10 .
  • some embodiments may be implemented in hardware or special purpose circuits, software, logic or any combination thereof.
  • some aspects may be implemented in hardware, while other aspects may be implemented in firmware or software which may be executed by a controller, microprocessor or other computing device, although embodiments are not limited thereto.
  • firmware or software which may be executed by a controller, microprocessor or other computing device, although embodiments are not limited thereto. While various embodiments may be illustrated and described as block diagrams, flow charts, or using some other pictorial representation, it is well understood that these blocks, apparatus, systems, techniques or methods described herein may be implemented in, as non-limiting examples, hardware, software, firmware, special purpose circuits or logic, general purpose hardware or controller or other computing devices, or some combination thereof.
  • the embodiments may be implemented by computer software stored in a memory and executable by at least one data processor of the involved entities or by hardware, or by a combination of software and hardware. Further in this regard it should be noted that any procedures, e.g., as in Figure 10 , may represent program steps, or interconnected logic circuits, blocks and functions, or a combination of program steps and logic circuits, blocks and functions.
  • the software may be stored on such physical media as memory chips, or memory blocks implemented within the processor, magnetic media such as hard disk or floppy disks, and optical media such as for example DVD and the data variants thereof, CD.
  • the memory may be of any type suitable to the local technical environment and may be implemented using any suitable data storage technology, such as semiconductor-based memory devices, magnetic memory devices and systems, optical memory devices and systems, fixed memory and removable memory.
  • the data processors may be of any type suitable to the local technical environment, and may include one or more of general purpose computers, special purpose computers, microprocessors, digital signal processors (DSPs), application specific integrated circuits (ASIC), gate level circuits and processors based on multi-core processor architecture, as non-limiting examples.
  • circuitry may be configured to perform one or more of the functions and/or method steps previously described. That circuitry may be provided in the base station and/or in the communications device.
  • circuitry may refer to one or more or all of the following:
  • circuitry also covers an implementation of merely a hardware circuit or processor (or multiple processors) or portion of a hardware circuit or processor and its (or their) accompanying software and/or firmware.
  • circuitry also covers, for example integrated device.

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Claims (9)

  1. Vorrichtung, die Mittel zum Durchführen von Folgendem umfasst:
    Empfangen (801) einer Anforderung zum Kommunizieren von einer ersten Netzwerkentität, die mit einer ersten Domäne in einem Kommunikationsnetzwerk verknüpft ist;
    Bestimmen (802) einer zweiten Netzwerkentität, an die die Anforderung zu senden ist
    Bestimmen (803), dass die zweite Netzwerkentität mit einer zweiten Domäne im Kommunikationsnetzwerk verknüpft ist; und
    Durchsetzen (804) von mindestens einer Zugriffsrichtlinie zum Routen der Anforderung zur zweiten Netzwerkentität;
    wobei die Vorrichtung ein erster Dienstkommunikationsproxy ist, der sowohl in der ersten als auch in der zweiten Domäne vertrauenswürdig ist.
  2. Vorrichtung nach Anspruch 1, wobei die Mittel ferner dazu ausgelegt sind, Folgendes durchzuführen:
    Senden einer Registrierungsanforderung an eine Registrierungsentität im Kommunikationsnetzwerk, wobei die Registrierungsanforderung mindestens eine Domäne identifiziert, in der die Vorrichtung vertrauenswürdig ist.
  3. Vorrichtung nach Anspruch 1 oder Anspruch 2, wobei die Mittel ferner dazu ausgelegt sind, die zweite Netzwerkentität zu bestimmen, und durch Folgendes zu bestimmen, dass die zweite Netzwerkentität mit der zweiten Domäne verknüpft ist:
    Senden einer Entdeckungsanforderung an eine Registrierungsentität im Kommunikationsnetzwerk;
    Empfangen einer Antwort auf die Entdeckungsanforderung, wobei die Antwort einen oder mehrere Kandidaten für eine zweite Netzwerkentität und für jeden Kandidaten einer zweiten Netzwerkentität eine Anzeige der zweiten Domäne umfasst; und
    Verwenden der Antwort, um die zweite Netzwerkentität aus dem einen oder den mehreren Kandidaten für eine zweite Netzwerkentität zu bestimmen, und um zu bestimmen, dass die zweite Netzwerkentität mit der zweiten Domäne verknüpft ist.
  4. Vorrichtung nach einem der vorhergehenden Ansprüche, wobei die Mittel ferner dazu ausgelegt sind, die zweite Netzwerkentität zu bestimmen, und durch Folgendes zu bestimmen, dass die zweite Netzwerkentität mit der zweiten Domäne verknüpft ist:
    Verwenden von Adressierungsinformationen, die in der empfangenen Anforderung umfasst sind, um die zweite Netzwerkentität zu bestimmen; und
    Bestimmen der zweiten Domäne auf Basis der Adressierungsinformationen.
  5. Vorrichtung nach Anspruch 4, wobei die Adressierungsinformationen eine einheitliche Zielressourcenkennung umfassen, die in einem Hypertexttransferprotokollheader umfasst ist.
  6. Vorrichtung nach einem der vorhergehenden Ansprüche, wobei sich die mindestens eine Zugriffsrichtlinie auf mindestens eines von Folgendem bezieht:
    Bestimmen, ob sich mindestens ein Parameter in einer Weißliste zum Erleichtern des Zugriffs auf eine Netzwerkentität befindet, die mit der zweiten Domäne im Kommunikationsnetzwerk verknüpft ist;
    Bestimmen, ob sich mindestens ein Parameter in einer Schwarzliste zum Erleichtern des Zugriffs auf eine Netzwerkentität befindet, die mit der zweiten Domäne im Kommunikationsnetzwerk verknüpft ist;
    Zurückweisen von Nachrichten mit einer größeren Größe als ein Schwellwert;
    Prüfen und/oder Modifizieren des Inhalts einer Nachricht, die zu einer Netzwerkentität zu kommunizieren ist, die mit der zweiten Domäne im Kommunikationsnetzwerk verknüpft ist;
    Prüfen des Vorhandenseins einer Zugriffsberechtigung eines Zugriffstokens oder eines Clients in einer Nachricht, die zu einer Netzwerkentität zu kommunizieren ist, die mit der zweiten Domäne im Kommunikationsnetzwerk verknüpft ist;
    Anfordern einer Zugriffsberechtigung eines Zugriffstokens oder eines Clients im Namen einer Netzwerkentität, die mit der ersten Domäne im Kommunikationsnetzwerk verknüpft ist;
    Zurückweisen einer Anforderung, wenn eine Zugriffsberechtigung eines Zugriffstokens oder eines Clients in einer Nachricht nicht umfasst ist, die zu einer Netzwerkentität zu kommunizieren ist, die mit einer zweiten Domäne im Kommunikationsnetzwerk verknüpft ist, eine Zugriffsberechtigung eines Zugriffstokens oder eines Clients durch eine Netzwerkentität einzubinden ist, die mit einer zweiten Domäne im Kommunikationsnetzwerk verknüpft ist, und die Vorrichtung eine Zugriffsberechtigung eines Zugriffstokens oder eines Clients nicht im Namen einer Netzwerkentität erhalten kann, die mit der ersten Domäne im Kommunikationsnetzwerk verknüpft ist;
    Zurückweisen einer Anforderung, wenn es mehr als eine vorbestimmte Anzahl und/oder eine vorbestimmte Häufigkeit von Anforderungen von Netzwerkentitäten, die mit einer ersten Domäne im Kommunikationsnetzwerk verknüpft sind, bei Netzwerkentitäten gegeben hat, die mit einer zweiten Domäne im Kommunikationsnetzwerk verknüpft sind; und
    Validieren eines Pfades, auf dem die Nachricht von einer Netzwerkentität, die mit der ersten Domäne im Kommunikationsnetzwerk verknüpft ist, zu einer Netzwerkentität zu leiten ist, die mit der zweiten Domäne im Kommunikationsnetzwerk verknüpft ist.
  7. Vorrichtung nach einem der vorhergehenden Ansprüche, wobei die Mittel mindestens einen Prozessor und mindestens einen Speicher, der Computerprogrammcode beinhaltet, umfassen, wobei der mindestens eine Speicher und der Computerprogrammcode dazu ausgelegt sind, mit dem mindestens einen Prozessor die Durchführung der Vorrichtung zu veranlassen.
  8. Verfahren für eine Vorrichtung, das Folgendes umfasst:
    Empfangen (801) einer Anforderung zum Kommunizieren von einer ersten Netzwerkentität, die mit einer ersten Domäne in einem Kommunikationsnetzwerk verknüpft ist;
    Bestimmen (802) einer zweiten Netzwerkentität, an die die Anforderung zu senden ist;
    Bestimmen (803), dass die zweite Netzwerkentität mit einer zweiten Domäne im Kommunikationsnetzwerk verknüpft ist; und
    Durchsetzen (804) von mindestens einer Zugriffsrichtlinie zum Routen der Anforderung zur zweiten Netzwerkentität;
    wobei die Vorrichtung ein erster Dienstkommunikationsproxy ist, der sowohl in der ersten als auch in der zweiten Domäne vertrauenswürdig ist.
  9. Computerlesbares Medium, das Programmanweisungen zum Veranlassen einer Netzwerkvorrichtung, mindestens Folgendes durchzuführen, umfasst:
    Empfangen (801) einer Anforderung zum Kommunizieren von einer ersten Netzwerkentität, die mit einer ersten Domäne in einem Kommunikationsnetzwerk verknüpft ist;
    Bestimmen (802) einer zweiten Netzwerkentität, an die die Anforderung zu senden ist
    Bestimmen (803), dass die zweite Netzwerkentität mit einer zweiten Domäne im Kommunikationsnetzwerk verknüpft ist; und
    Durchsetzen (804) von mindestens einer Zugriffsrichtlinie zum Routen der Anforderung zur zweiten Netzwerkentität;
    wobei die Vorrichtung ein erster Dienstkommunikationsproxy ist, der sowohl in der ersten als auch in der zweiten Domäne vertrauenswürdig ist.
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