EP3928463A1 - Procédé pour la configuration d'un module de sécurité avec au moins une clé déduite - Google Patents
Procédé pour la configuration d'un module de sécurité avec au moins une clé déduiteInfo
- Publication number
- EP3928463A1 EP3928463A1 EP20714915.4A EP20714915A EP3928463A1 EP 3928463 A1 EP3928463 A1 EP 3928463A1 EP 20714915 A EP20714915 A EP 20714915A EP 3928463 A1 EP3928463 A1 EP 3928463A1
- Authority
- EP
- European Patent Office
- Prior art keywords
- key
- derived
- runtime
- derivation
- security module
- Prior art date
- Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
- Pending
Links
- 238000000034 method Methods 0.000 title claims abstract description 50
- 238000009795 derivation Methods 0.000 claims abstract description 44
- 238000004590 computer program Methods 0.000 claims description 7
- 230000001960 triggered effect Effects 0.000 claims description 2
- 230000008569 process Effects 0.000 description 33
- 230000006870 function Effects 0.000 description 29
- 238000005259 measurement Methods 0.000 description 28
- 238000012545 processing Methods 0.000 description 15
- 230000015654 memory Effects 0.000 description 11
- 230000008859 change Effects 0.000 description 7
- 230000003068 static effect Effects 0.000 description 7
- 230000008901 benefit Effects 0.000 description 4
- 238000011161 development Methods 0.000 description 3
- 230000018109 developmental process Effects 0.000 description 3
- 230000007246 mechanism Effects 0.000 description 3
- 230000002093 peripheral effect Effects 0.000 description 3
- 230000005670 electromagnetic radiation Effects 0.000 description 2
- 230000006399 behavior Effects 0.000 description 1
- 239000000872 buffer Substances 0.000 description 1
- 239000000969 carrier Substances 0.000 description 1
- 239000003795 chemical substances by application Substances 0.000 description 1
- 230000001010 compromised effect Effects 0.000 description 1
- 238000011157 data evaluation Methods 0.000 description 1
- 230000001419 dependent effect Effects 0.000 description 1
- 238000001514 detection method Methods 0.000 description 1
- 230000036541 health Effects 0.000 description 1
- 238000001228 spectrum Methods 0.000 description 1
- 239000004575 stone Substances 0.000 description 1
- 238000012546 transfer Methods 0.000 description 1
- 238000012795 verification Methods 0.000 description 1
Classifications
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/70—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer
- G06F21/71—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer to assure secure computing or processing of information
- G06F21/72—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer to assure secure computing or processing of information in cryptographic circuits
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
- H04L9/0819—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s)
- H04L9/0825—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s) using asymmetric-key encryption or public key infrastructure [PKI], e.g. key signature or public key certificates
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/50—Monitoring users, programs or devices to maintain the integrity of platforms, e.g. of processors, firmware or operating systems
- G06F21/57—Certifying or maintaining trusted computer platforms, e.g. secure boots or power-downs, version controls, system software checks, secure updates or assessing vulnerabilities
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/06—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/06—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols the encryption apparatus using shift registers or memories for block-wise or stream coding, e.g. DES systems or RC4; Hash functions; Pseudorandom sequence generators
- H04L9/0643—Hash functions, e.g. MD5, SHA, HMAC or f9 MAC
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0861—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0866—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords involving user or device identifiers, e.g. serial number, physical or biometrical information, DNA, hand-signature or measurable physical characteristics
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0861—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0877—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords using additional device, e.g. trusted platform module [TPM], smartcard, USB or hardware security module [HSM]
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L2463/00—Additional details relating to network architectures or network communication protocols for network security covered by H04L63/00
- H04L2463/081—Additional details relating to network architectures or network communication protocols for network security covered by H04L63/00 applying self-generating credentials, e.g. instead of receiving credentials from an authority or from another peer, the credentials are generated at the entity itself
Definitions
- a trust anchor or trust point forms the basis for protecting devices, e.g. IOT devices or field devices or data processing systems such as embedded systems or control computers.
- a trust anchor can be used to guarantee the uncompromised functioning of the data processing system when the system is started and / or during ongoing operation.
- a trust anchor can include a cryptographic key that is used, for example, for a secure boot process or for authentication of the data processing system or for using a key file of the data processing system or for confirming an operating status of the data processing system or for checking an update file (firmware Update) can be used.
- anchor German: anchor
- anchor comes from the fact that security or trust concepts of the data processing systems use the trust anchor as a basis and it is or must be assumed that the trust anchor itself is secure and uncompromised.
- TPM Trusted Platform Module
- ISO / IEC 11889 specified Trusted Platform Module (TPM) in 2009, which is available in every modern PC and which modern operating systems require for certain cryptographic operations.
- TPM Trusted Platform Module
- the hard disk encryption "BitLocker" of the widely used "Windows" operating system is based on a TPM.
- many other implementations of a trust anchor are conceivable, for example a crypto controller, an authentication structure stone or a security element integrated in a CPU (secure element).
- a key of generation i can be derived iteratively for all l ⁇ i ⁇ n from the key of generation i-1 and stored in a memory section i.
- Cryptographic operations arranged according to classes can thus be carried out, with cryptographic operations of the kth class being carried out with the key stored in the kth memory section, where l ⁇ k ⁇ n.
- KDF key derivation function
- the derivation of keys is based on static properties. For example, a key derivation takes place as a function of a software binary file, fixed labels in a file system, or hard-coded derivation values in firmware. If an attacker gains control of a part of the system, e.g. by exploiting a software vulnerability, the derived keys are not sufficiently protected. In particular, the keys used by other software components can be reconstructed (derived) by an attacker at any time.
- a changeable or variable digital fingerprint is included or taken into account as a key derivation parameter in the derivation, which is formed depending on a measurable current runtime configuration of a runtime environment communicating with the security module.
- the security module is configured during the runtime of the runtime environment operating the security module. This means that the safety module is reconfigured depending on the actual current runtime configuration. This can be done once, but preferably repeatedly during the runtime of the runtime environment.
- the current fingerprint of the runtime environment is preferably determined and the key is derived as a function of this. Measurements to determine the fingerprint are preferably also carried out when the key is derived.
- a measurement can be carried out by the runtime environment itself and made available to the security module.
- a special fingerprint measurement process (or fingerprint measurement process task) is preferably carried out in the runtime environment in addition to other processes.
- the measurement process can be isolated from other processes, for example by a hypervisor.
- the measurement can, however, take place on a separate computing core (core) of a multi-core runtime environment, on a separate measuring device, for example a separate microcontroller, or by the security module itself.
- the security module can be part of a device.
- the key provided can be a master key or initial key or it can be derived from these. In embodiments of the invention, the initial key can be implemented in such a way that any other access is prevented or is physically impossible.
- the runtime environment is formed, for example, by a CPU or computing device, which addresses or controls or communicates with the security module, the security module being configured by the method according to the invention.
- the runtime properties of a regular, operational runtime environment can be recorded and used as input parameters for key derivation.
- the current runtime configuration that can be measured or monitored provides a fingerprint that changes if the system is manipulated. Manipulations are e.g. starting an additional process or the integrity information of operating data.
- the fingerprint is determined dynamically at runtime and is used as a key derivation parameter in a key derivation function or as a key generation parameter in a key generation function. This has the advantage that if the runtime integrity information is changed, cryptographic keys of the non-manipulated state cannot be determined.
- the key can be repeated (iteratively) one or more times.
- At least one cryptographic operation can be carried out with the help of the derived further key.
- Key change events can be, for example, special commands for key updates or the change of the higher-level data processing system to another (operating) state.
- the execution of a cryptographic operation can also serve as a key change event, which means that the implementation of keys for only one-time use for an operation (eg for encrypting Data), whereby these keys can then be available for other operations (e.g. for decryption or verification).
- the measurable runtime configuration can comprise at least one ascertainable state of the runtime environment or at least one state of the runtime environment triggered by a monitorable event occurrence. States of the runtime environment and / or occurrences of events are measurable runtime properties of the runtime environment at a certain point in time.
- This runtime configuration can form a variable fingerprint (Runtime Integrity Fingerprint), which ensures the integrity.
- Measurable at a certain point in time are e.g. Hardware counter, real-time clock, meta-info (on running processes or on the file system, file properties, dedicated files, state-determining security mechanisms, static data, file contents, process name, process number, process priority, watchdog, benchmark functions, state of the peripherals, power consumption profile, profile electromagnetic radiation etc.
- a one-way function for the key derivative is advantageously used.
- a one-way function is a function in which the key on which it is based can only be deduced from the key with a great deal of effort (with regard to computing power and memory).
- the monitorable or measurable runtime properties are both static properties (e.g. the checksum of a read-only file system) and dynamic properties (e.g. the current runtime of the system since a power-on reset - POR).
- static properties e.g. the checksum of a read-only file system
- dynamic properties e.g. the current runtime of the system since a power-on reset - POR.
- Side channel information can also be used as finger print, e.g. the time behavior (e.g. cache timing) or the power consumption profile.
- An attack (changes that occur during runtime, e.g. starting a malicious process after exploiting a software vulnerability) can lead to a change in the runtime properties of the runtime environment. If these are taken into account in a key derivation, such attacks automatically lead to the fact that the same keys can no longer be derived as in an integral state of the device and thus critical data (e.g. encrypted files) are better protected against an attacker.
- critical data e.g. encrypted files
- the present invention also relates to a safety module, a device and a computer program product.
- the claimed security module can be configured with at least one derived key, having:
- a deriving unit for deriving a further key from the key provided or from a key previously derived from the key provided
- a generation unit which is designed to generate a changeable or variable fingerprint with the aid of a measurable current runtime configuration of a runtime environment communicating with the security module, which is included in the derivation as a key derivation parameter.
- the device with a runtime environment has such a security module, characterized by
- a measuring unit for measuring a current runtime configuration with the help of which a variable fingerprint is formed, which is used as a key derivation parameter in a derivation of a further key from the provided or from a key previously derived from the key provided.
- the computer program product comprises computer-executable instructions which, when loaded into a device (e.g. computer), are designed to carry out a method according to the above-mentioned type and embodiments.
- a device e.g. computer
- a computer program comprising program code which can be executed by at least one processor and which causes the at least one processor to execute the (operating) method according to the invention and its embodiments.
- the computer program can run on a device / module or device of the type mentioned above or be stored as a computer program product on a computer-readable medium.
- the devices, devices or devices, modules and computer program (products) can be designed in accordance with the developments / embodiments of the aforementioned method and their developments / embodiments and vice versa.
- the single figure shows a schematic representation of a device D. It should be pointed out that the explanation of the invention in connection with the device is purely by way of example and without limiting the present invention to such a device.
- a device D is shown.
- the basic functionality is implemented by the Runtime Measurement Key Derivation Function (runtime measurement key derivation function) RM-KDF, which is integrated in a safety module SD integrated in device D or coupled to device D. It can also be implemented in a distributed manner, ie a first part of the runtime measurement key derivation function RM-KDF can be integrated on the safety module, and a second part of the runtime measurement key derivation function RM-KDF can be coupled to the safety module.
- RM-KDF Runtime Measurement Key Derivation Function
- the system or runtime states 1 to N differ in the runtime properties of one or more components, e.g. the processes P running at the time of key derivation, file system properties FS and hardware states HW such as the value of a hardware counter.
- the RM-KDF obtains measured values (e.g. one-way or hash values from files) from the runtime environment R. Which parts of the runtime environment are to be measured is specified by a measurement control system MP (Measurement Policy).
- MP Measurement Policy
- the totality of the measured values M which e.g. can be recorded with a continuous hash value, then, together with a master key MK, serves as an input parameter for a key derivation function KDF, e.g.
- the states 1 to N are implicitly defined by the measurement policy (measurement rule) MP and the states of the measured runtime components.
- the measurement policy MP can be different for each state, or the same for several states. Accordingly, several RM-KDFs can be used a device D can be used, which use different measurement policies, derivation functions KDFs and / or master keys MK.
- the measurement policy MP, the measurement functions for the entirety of the measured values M and key derivation functions KDF can in principle be implemented either in software or hardware components.
- the master key MK used for derivation can either be stored in hardware (e.g. hardware-based trust anchor) or implemented in software (e.g. as part of an obfuscated routine).
- Measurement Policy MP Several possibilities for measurable runtime properties are shown below. These can be combined as required to form a Measurement Policy MP.
- Previous running time of device D since a reset e.g. by means of a hardware counter or a real-time clock.
- the previous runtime of the software e.g. a Linux kernel (/ proc / uptime) can be used here.
- Performance runtime data e.g. CPU load, memory usage, usage of input / output interfaces, e.g. network interfaces, DMA transfer, interrupt frequency.
- Meta information on running processes P eg the user under whom a process is running, which process started it (process tree / parent-child relationship of processes / "process chain") / process priority, process number, SELinux domain of a Processes, name spaces and cgroups in which a process is running.
- keys can also be derived depending on the existing, exchangeable peripheral components - such as USB dongles.
- HIDS host-based intrusion detection system
- Another possibility is to include configuration data that restrict logging in to the system (or even prevent it completely) in the measurement: In the event of an attack in which the configuration is changed in such a way that logging in is possible again (in particular, in order to be able to observe the system "from inside” during runtime), only wrong keys are then derived.
- Static data such as a hardware ID or configuration files in the file system can also be measured. If the runtime measurement key derivation function RM-KDF is executed in a different environment (different hardware and thus hardware ID, different configuration), or if the files assumed to be static are manipulated, different keys are derived.
- Meta information of the file system such as the size of certain parts, access or change times, performances, users / owners, targets of symbolic links, etc.
- RM-KDF runtime measurement key derivation function
- This can, for example, include the process chain, starting from the calling component, down to the root of the process tree.
- the names of the processes contained in the process chain can be continued. continuously hashed and used as part of the key derivation parameter. This ensures that the correct key can only be derived in the course of a designated call.
- a watchdog (hardware or software function) can be included that monitors the integrity of the runtime environment.
- Benchmark function can be measured and this - with a certain margin for normal measurement variances - included in the derivation. If the execution of such a function requires, for example, 250ms with a standard deviation (Sigma) of 10ms, the (integer) division by 100ms on a non-manipulated device with 5-Sigma security results in the value 2.
- An attacker on the other hand, can reproduce the derived key in a simulated or emulated environment is made more difficult because the performance of the device now also has to be simulated with sufficient accuracy (in the example: +/- 20%).
- the applications can derive keys at runtime with the aid of the library in order to carry out a cryptographic operation with the aid of the derived key.
- Such operations can protect and access security-critical objects such as encrypted file systems or private keys for a TLS connection.
- the Runtime Measurement Key Derivation Function RM-KDF uses the measurement function and the measurement policy MP to measure or determine parts of the runtime environment or specified events at one or more specific times and as Define the runtime configuration.
- the measurement function uses dedicated kernel interfaces to provide information on currently attached file systems (mounts), the status of certain peripheral components (e.g.
- the FPGA, GPIO, MAC address the runtime of the operating system (uptime), static content from the file system and the names of the processes in the process chain of the caller aggregated in a running hash value.
- the aggregated value is then used as a key derivation parameter for a key derivation function with the master key MK.
- the derived key Kl to KN is different depending on the calling application, since these belong to different process chains.
- a variable fingerprint FP formed from the runtime configuration and taking it into account as key derivation parameters can be viewed as a configuration of the security module.
- the applications can use these derived keys e.g. Use systems to access private file systems. If an attacker tries to derive a key by means of another process, also with the help of the Runtime Measurement Key Derivation Function RM-KDF, it will be different. Both offline and online attacks usually change dynamic properties of a runtime environment (e.g. configuration files, options of mounted file systems). Access to keys from valid states is therefore very difficult.
- the invention has the advantage that access to keys can be linked to the current state of static and, in particular, dynamic properties of the runtime environment. If the runtime environment is interfered with (physical attack, remote attack), the key derivation can be influenced and thus valid keys can no longer be derived in an untrustworthy environment. Furthermore, the state dependency can be used deliberately in order to provide different keys for different runtime phases in software. This has the particular advantage that in the event of a compromised runtime phase, the
- Computer-readable memories are, for example, volatile memories such as caches, buffers or RAM as well as non-volatile memories such as removable data carriers, hard drives, etc.
- the functions or steps described above can be present in the form of at least one set of instructions in / on a computer-readable memory.
- the functions or steps are not tied to a specific set of instructions or to a specific form of instruction set or to a specific storage medium or to a specific processor or to specific execution schemes and can be implemented through software, firmware, microcode, hardware, processors, integrated circuits etc. can be run alone or in any combination.
- a wide variety of processing strategies can be used, for example serial processing by a single processor or multiprocessing or multitasking or parallel processing, etc.
- the instructions can be stored in local memories, but it is also possible to store the instructions on a remote system and access them via the network.
- the device D can have one or more processors.
- processors central signal processing, “control unit” or “data evaluation means” includes processing medium in the broadest sense, for example servers, universal processors, graphics processors, digital signal processors, application-specific integrated circuits (ASICs), programmable logic circuits such as FPGAs, discrete analog or digital circuits and any combination thereof, including all others known to the person skilled in the art or developed in the future Processing agents.
- Processors can consist of one or more devices or devices or units. If a processor consists of several devices, these can be designed or configured for parallel or sequential processing or execution of instructions.
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- Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
- Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
- Signal Processing (AREA)
- Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
- General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Theoretical Computer Science (AREA)
- Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- Software Systems (AREA)
- Power Engineering (AREA)
- General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- Computing Systems (AREA)
- Mathematical Physics (AREA)
- Storage Device Security (AREA)
Abstract
Applications Claiming Priority (2)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
EP19167509.9A EP3720039B1 (fr) | 2019-04-05 | 2019-04-05 | Procédé de configuration d'un module de sécurité au moyen d'au moins une clé dérivée |
PCT/EP2020/057077 WO2020200729A1 (fr) | 2019-04-05 | 2020-03-16 | Procédé pour la configuration d'un module de sécurité avec au moins une clé déduite |
Publications (1)
Publication Number | Publication Date |
---|---|
EP3928463A1 true EP3928463A1 (fr) | 2021-12-29 |
Family
ID=66101904
Family Applications (2)
Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
---|---|---|---|
EP19167509.9A Active EP3720039B1 (fr) | 2019-04-05 | 2019-04-05 | Procédé de configuration d'un module de sécurité au moyen d'au moins une clé dérivée |
EP20714915.4A Pending EP3928463A1 (fr) | 2019-04-05 | 2020-03-16 | Procédé pour la configuration d'un module de sécurité avec au moins une clé déduite |
Family Applications Before (1)
Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
---|---|---|---|
EP19167509.9A Active EP3720039B1 (fr) | 2019-04-05 | 2019-04-05 | Procédé de configuration d'un module de sécurité au moyen d'au moins une clé dérivée |
Country Status (4)
Country | Link |
---|---|
US (1) | US20220150056A1 (fr) |
EP (2) | EP3720039B1 (fr) |
CN (1) | CN113647053A (fr) |
WO (1) | WO2020200729A1 (fr) |
Families Citing this family (3)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
FR3106909B1 (fr) * | 2020-01-31 | 2022-02-18 | St Microelectronics Grenoble 2 | Circuit intégré configuré pour réaliser des opérations de chiffrement symétrique avec protection de clé secrète |
FR3106910B1 (fr) | 2020-01-31 | 2022-02-18 | St Microelectronics Grenoble 2 | Circuit intégré configuré pour réaliser des opérations de chiffrement symétrique sans transmission de clé secrète |
US11995044B2 (en) * | 2021-02-12 | 2024-05-28 | Zettaset, Inc. | Configurable stacking/stackable filesystem (CSF) |
Family Cites Families (20)
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US7814334B2 (en) * | 2007-06-18 | 2010-10-12 | International Business Machines Corporation | Method and apparatus for changing and adding activation keys for functions of digital content without having to change and recompile the digital content |
US8639949B2 (en) * | 2007-07-20 | 2014-01-28 | Nxp B.V. | Device with a secure virtual machine |
EP2528268B3 (fr) * | 2008-06-06 | 2021-12-29 | Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson (publ) | Generation de cle cryptographique |
WO2010035202A1 (fr) * | 2008-09-26 | 2010-04-01 | Koninklijke Philips Electronics N.V. | Authentification d’un dispositif et d’un utilisateur |
GB2492857B (en) * | 2011-11-30 | 2013-07-17 | Avecto Ltd | Method and computer device to control software file downloads |
DE102012209408A1 (de) * | 2012-06-04 | 2013-12-05 | Siemens Aktiengesellschaft | Sichere Übertragung einer Nachricht |
US8843765B2 (en) * | 2012-10-10 | 2014-09-23 | Broadcom Corporation | Key derivation system |
FR2998693B1 (fr) * | 2012-11-29 | 2015-03-13 | Spirtech | Procede de derivation de cles cryptographiques multiples a partir d'une cle maitresse dans un microprocesseur de securite |
US9390291B2 (en) * | 2012-12-29 | 2016-07-12 | Intel Corporation | Secure key derivation and cryptography logic for integrated circuits |
EP3114793A4 (fr) * | 2014-03-03 | 2017-09-27 | Intel Corporation | Procédés et appareil pour la migration de clés |
US9819485B2 (en) * | 2014-05-01 | 2017-11-14 | At&T Intellectual Property I, L.P. | Apparatus and method for secure delivery of data utilizing encryption key management |
US9264410B2 (en) * | 2014-06-05 | 2016-02-16 | Sony Corporation | Dynamic configuration of trusted executed environment resources |
US10185669B2 (en) * | 2014-08-04 | 2019-01-22 | Oracle International Corporation | Secure key derivation functions |
DE102015208899A1 (de) * | 2015-05-13 | 2016-03-24 | Siemens Aktiengesellschaft | Vorrichtung und Verfahren zur flexiblen Erzeugung von kryptographischen privaten Schlüsseln und Gerät mit flexibel erzeugten kryptographischen privaten Schlüsseln |
US10310820B2 (en) * | 2016-05-12 | 2019-06-04 | Basal Nuclei Inc | Programming model and interpreted runtime environment for high performance services with implicit concurrency control |
WO2018231753A1 (fr) * | 2017-06-12 | 2018-12-20 | Daniel Maurice Lerner | Dispositifs utilisant des jetons aléatoires pour diriger un accès aléatoire dynamique |
US10193690B1 (en) * | 2017-09-29 | 2019-01-29 | U.S. Bancorp, National Association | Systems and methods to secure data using computer system attributes |
US10374803B2 (en) * | 2017-10-06 | 2019-08-06 | Stealthpath, Inc. | Methods for internet communication security |
US10009325B1 (en) * | 2017-12-07 | 2018-06-26 | Karamba Security | End-to-end communication security |
US10862680B2 (en) * | 2018-09-26 | 2020-12-08 | Intel Corporation | Encoding process for multiple RSA and ECC keys |
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2019
- 2019-04-05 EP EP19167509.9A patent/EP3720039B1/fr active Active
-
2020
- 2020-03-16 WO PCT/EP2020/057077 patent/WO2020200729A1/fr unknown
- 2020-03-16 EP EP20714915.4A patent/EP3928463A1/fr active Pending
- 2020-03-16 US US17/599,780 patent/US20220150056A1/en active Pending
- 2020-03-16 CN CN202080027078.6A patent/CN113647053A/zh active Pending
Also Published As
Publication number | Publication date |
---|---|
EP3720039B1 (fr) | 2024-09-04 |
CN113647053A (zh) | 2021-11-12 |
US20220150056A1 (en) | 2022-05-12 |
WO2020200729A1 (fr) | 2020-10-08 |
EP3720039A1 (fr) | 2020-10-07 |
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