EP3928463A1 - Procédé pour la configuration d'un module de sécurité avec au moins une clé déduite - Google Patents

Procédé pour la configuration d'un module de sécurité avec au moins une clé déduite

Info

Publication number
EP3928463A1
EP3928463A1 EP20714915.4A EP20714915A EP3928463A1 EP 3928463 A1 EP3928463 A1 EP 3928463A1 EP 20714915 A EP20714915 A EP 20714915A EP 3928463 A1 EP3928463 A1 EP 3928463A1
Authority
EP
European Patent Office
Prior art keywords
key
derived
runtime
derivation
security module
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Pending
Application number
EP20714915.4A
Other languages
German (de)
English (en)
Inventor
Rainer Falk
Christian Peter Feist
Johannes Zwanzger
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Siemens AG
Original Assignee
Siemens AG
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Siemens AG filed Critical Siemens AG
Publication of EP3928463A1 publication Critical patent/EP3928463A1/fr
Pending legal-status Critical Current

Links

Classifications

    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/70—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer
    • G06F21/71—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer to assure secure computing or processing of information
    • G06F21/72—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer to assure secure computing or processing of information in cryptographic circuits
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
    • H04L9/0819—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s)
    • H04L9/0825—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s) using asymmetric-key encryption or public key infrastructure [PKI], e.g. key signature or public key certificates
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/50—Monitoring users, programs or devices to maintain the integrity of platforms, e.g. of processors, firmware or operating systems
    • G06F21/57—Certifying or maintaining trusted computer platforms, e.g. secure boots or power-downs, version controls, system software checks, secure updates or assessing vulnerabilities
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/06—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/06—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols the encryption apparatus using shift registers or memories for block-wise or stream coding, e.g. DES systems or RC4; Hash functions; Pseudorandom sequence generators
    • H04L9/0643—Hash functions, e.g. MD5, SHA, HMAC or f9 MAC
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0861—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0866—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords involving user or device identifiers, e.g. serial number, physical or biometrical information, DNA, hand-signature or measurable physical characteristics
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0861—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0877—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords using additional device, e.g. trusted platform module [TPM], smartcard, USB or hardware security module [HSM]
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L2463/00—Additional details relating to network architectures or network communication protocols for network security covered by H04L63/00
    • H04L2463/081—Additional details relating to network architectures or network communication protocols for network security covered by H04L63/00 applying self-generating credentials, e.g. instead of receiving credentials from an authority or from another peer, the credentials are generated at the entity itself

Definitions

  • a trust anchor or trust point forms the basis for protecting devices, e.g. IOT devices or field devices or data processing systems such as embedded systems or control computers.
  • a trust anchor can be used to guarantee the uncompromised functioning of the data processing system when the system is started and / or during ongoing operation.
  • a trust anchor can include a cryptographic key that is used, for example, for a secure boot process or for authentication of the data processing system or for using a key file of the data processing system or for confirming an operating status of the data processing system or for checking an update file (firmware Update) can be used.
  • anchor German: anchor
  • anchor comes from the fact that security or trust concepts of the data processing systems use the trust anchor as a basis and it is or must be assumed that the trust anchor itself is secure and uncompromised.
  • TPM Trusted Platform Module
  • ISO / IEC 11889 specified Trusted Platform Module (TPM) in 2009, which is available in every modern PC and which modern operating systems require for certain cryptographic operations.
  • TPM Trusted Platform Module
  • the hard disk encryption "BitLocker" of the widely used "Windows" operating system is based on a TPM.
  • many other implementations of a trust anchor are conceivable, for example a crypto controller, an authentication structure stone or a security element integrated in a CPU (secure element).
  • a key of generation i can be derived iteratively for all l ⁇ i ⁇ n from the key of generation i-1 and stored in a memory section i.
  • Cryptographic operations arranged according to classes can thus be carried out, with cryptographic operations of the kth class being carried out with the key stored in the kth memory section, where l ⁇ k ⁇ n.
  • KDF key derivation function
  • the derivation of keys is based on static properties. For example, a key derivation takes place as a function of a software binary file, fixed labels in a file system, or hard-coded derivation values in firmware. If an attacker gains control of a part of the system, e.g. by exploiting a software vulnerability, the derived keys are not sufficiently protected. In particular, the keys used by other software components can be reconstructed (derived) by an attacker at any time.
  • a changeable or variable digital fingerprint is included or taken into account as a key derivation parameter in the derivation, which is formed depending on a measurable current runtime configuration of a runtime environment communicating with the security module.
  • the security module is configured during the runtime of the runtime environment operating the security module. This means that the safety module is reconfigured depending on the actual current runtime configuration. This can be done once, but preferably repeatedly during the runtime of the runtime environment.
  • the current fingerprint of the runtime environment is preferably determined and the key is derived as a function of this. Measurements to determine the fingerprint are preferably also carried out when the key is derived.
  • a measurement can be carried out by the runtime environment itself and made available to the security module.
  • a special fingerprint measurement process (or fingerprint measurement process task) is preferably carried out in the runtime environment in addition to other processes.
  • the measurement process can be isolated from other processes, for example by a hypervisor.
  • the measurement can, however, take place on a separate computing core (core) of a multi-core runtime environment, on a separate measuring device, for example a separate microcontroller, or by the security module itself.
  • the security module can be part of a device.
  • the key provided can be a master key or initial key or it can be derived from these. In embodiments of the invention, the initial key can be implemented in such a way that any other access is prevented or is physically impossible.
  • the runtime environment is formed, for example, by a CPU or computing device, which addresses or controls or communicates with the security module, the security module being configured by the method according to the invention.
  • the runtime properties of a regular, operational runtime environment can be recorded and used as input parameters for key derivation.
  • the current runtime configuration that can be measured or monitored provides a fingerprint that changes if the system is manipulated. Manipulations are e.g. starting an additional process or the integrity information of operating data.
  • the fingerprint is determined dynamically at runtime and is used as a key derivation parameter in a key derivation function or as a key generation parameter in a key generation function. This has the advantage that if the runtime integrity information is changed, cryptographic keys of the non-manipulated state cannot be determined.
  • the key can be repeated (iteratively) one or more times.
  • At least one cryptographic operation can be carried out with the help of the derived further key.
  • Key change events can be, for example, special commands for key updates or the change of the higher-level data processing system to another (operating) state.
  • the execution of a cryptographic operation can also serve as a key change event, which means that the implementation of keys for only one-time use for an operation (eg for encrypting Data), whereby these keys can then be available for other operations (e.g. for decryption or verification).
  • the measurable runtime configuration can comprise at least one ascertainable state of the runtime environment or at least one state of the runtime environment triggered by a monitorable event occurrence. States of the runtime environment and / or occurrences of events are measurable runtime properties of the runtime environment at a certain point in time.
  • This runtime configuration can form a variable fingerprint (Runtime Integrity Fingerprint), which ensures the integrity.
  • Measurable at a certain point in time are e.g. Hardware counter, real-time clock, meta-info (on running processes or on the file system, file properties, dedicated files, state-determining security mechanisms, static data, file contents, process name, process number, process priority, watchdog, benchmark functions, state of the peripherals, power consumption profile, profile electromagnetic radiation etc.
  • a one-way function for the key derivative is advantageously used.
  • a one-way function is a function in which the key on which it is based can only be deduced from the key with a great deal of effort (with regard to computing power and memory).
  • the monitorable or measurable runtime properties are both static properties (e.g. the checksum of a read-only file system) and dynamic properties (e.g. the current runtime of the system since a power-on reset - POR).
  • static properties e.g. the checksum of a read-only file system
  • dynamic properties e.g. the current runtime of the system since a power-on reset - POR.
  • Side channel information can also be used as finger print, e.g. the time behavior (e.g. cache timing) or the power consumption profile.
  • An attack (changes that occur during runtime, e.g. starting a malicious process after exploiting a software vulnerability) can lead to a change in the runtime properties of the runtime environment. If these are taken into account in a key derivation, such attacks automatically lead to the fact that the same keys can no longer be derived as in an integral state of the device and thus critical data (e.g. encrypted files) are better protected against an attacker.
  • critical data e.g. encrypted files
  • the present invention also relates to a safety module, a device and a computer program product.
  • the claimed security module can be configured with at least one derived key, having:
  • a deriving unit for deriving a further key from the key provided or from a key previously derived from the key provided
  • a generation unit which is designed to generate a changeable or variable fingerprint with the aid of a measurable current runtime configuration of a runtime environment communicating with the security module, which is included in the derivation as a key derivation parameter.
  • the device with a runtime environment has such a security module, characterized by
  • a measuring unit for measuring a current runtime configuration with the help of which a variable fingerprint is formed, which is used as a key derivation parameter in a derivation of a further key from the provided or from a key previously derived from the key provided.
  • the computer program product comprises computer-executable instructions which, when loaded into a device (e.g. computer), are designed to carry out a method according to the above-mentioned type and embodiments.
  • a device e.g. computer
  • a computer program comprising program code which can be executed by at least one processor and which causes the at least one processor to execute the (operating) method according to the invention and its embodiments.
  • the computer program can run on a device / module or device of the type mentioned above or be stored as a computer program product on a computer-readable medium.
  • the devices, devices or devices, modules and computer program (products) can be designed in accordance with the developments / embodiments of the aforementioned method and their developments / embodiments and vice versa.
  • the single figure shows a schematic representation of a device D. It should be pointed out that the explanation of the invention in connection with the device is purely by way of example and without limiting the present invention to such a device.
  • a device D is shown.
  • the basic functionality is implemented by the Runtime Measurement Key Derivation Function (runtime measurement key derivation function) RM-KDF, which is integrated in a safety module SD integrated in device D or coupled to device D. It can also be implemented in a distributed manner, ie a first part of the runtime measurement key derivation function RM-KDF can be integrated on the safety module, and a second part of the runtime measurement key derivation function RM-KDF can be coupled to the safety module.
  • RM-KDF Runtime Measurement Key Derivation Function
  • the system or runtime states 1 to N differ in the runtime properties of one or more components, e.g. the processes P running at the time of key derivation, file system properties FS and hardware states HW such as the value of a hardware counter.
  • the RM-KDF obtains measured values (e.g. one-way or hash values from files) from the runtime environment R. Which parts of the runtime environment are to be measured is specified by a measurement control system MP (Measurement Policy).
  • MP Measurement Policy
  • the totality of the measured values M which e.g. can be recorded with a continuous hash value, then, together with a master key MK, serves as an input parameter for a key derivation function KDF, e.g.
  • the states 1 to N are implicitly defined by the measurement policy (measurement rule) MP and the states of the measured runtime components.
  • the measurement policy MP can be different for each state, or the same for several states. Accordingly, several RM-KDFs can be used a device D can be used, which use different measurement policies, derivation functions KDFs and / or master keys MK.
  • the measurement policy MP, the measurement functions for the entirety of the measured values M and key derivation functions KDF can in principle be implemented either in software or hardware components.
  • the master key MK used for derivation can either be stored in hardware (e.g. hardware-based trust anchor) or implemented in software (e.g. as part of an obfuscated routine).
  • Measurement Policy MP Several possibilities for measurable runtime properties are shown below. These can be combined as required to form a Measurement Policy MP.
  • Previous running time of device D since a reset e.g. by means of a hardware counter or a real-time clock.
  • the previous runtime of the software e.g. a Linux kernel (/ proc / uptime) can be used here.
  • Performance runtime data e.g. CPU load, memory usage, usage of input / output interfaces, e.g. network interfaces, DMA transfer, interrupt frequency.
  • Meta information on running processes P eg the user under whom a process is running, which process started it (process tree / parent-child relationship of processes / "process chain") / process priority, process number, SELinux domain of a Processes, name spaces and cgroups in which a process is running.
  • keys can also be derived depending on the existing, exchangeable peripheral components - such as USB dongles.
  • HIDS host-based intrusion detection system
  • Another possibility is to include configuration data that restrict logging in to the system (or even prevent it completely) in the measurement: In the event of an attack in which the configuration is changed in such a way that logging in is possible again (in particular, in order to be able to observe the system "from inside” during runtime), only wrong keys are then derived.
  • Static data such as a hardware ID or configuration files in the file system can also be measured. If the runtime measurement key derivation function RM-KDF is executed in a different environment (different hardware and thus hardware ID, different configuration), or if the files assumed to be static are manipulated, different keys are derived.
  • Meta information of the file system such as the size of certain parts, access or change times, performances, users / owners, targets of symbolic links, etc.
  • RM-KDF runtime measurement key derivation function
  • This can, for example, include the process chain, starting from the calling component, down to the root of the process tree.
  • the names of the processes contained in the process chain can be continued. continuously hashed and used as part of the key derivation parameter. This ensures that the correct key can only be derived in the course of a designated call.
  • a watchdog (hardware or software function) can be included that monitors the integrity of the runtime environment.
  • Benchmark function can be measured and this - with a certain margin for normal measurement variances - included in the derivation. If the execution of such a function requires, for example, 250ms with a standard deviation (Sigma) of 10ms, the (integer) division by 100ms on a non-manipulated device with 5-Sigma security results in the value 2.
  • An attacker on the other hand, can reproduce the derived key in a simulated or emulated environment is made more difficult because the performance of the device now also has to be simulated with sufficient accuracy (in the example: +/- 20%).
  • the applications can derive keys at runtime with the aid of the library in order to carry out a cryptographic operation with the aid of the derived key.
  • Such operations can protect and access security-critical objects such as encrypted file systems or private keys for a TLS connection.
  • the Runtime Measurement Key Derivation Function RM-KDF uses the measurement function and the measurement policy MP to measure or determine parts of the runtime environment or specified events at one or more specific times and as Define the runtime configuration.
  • the measurement function uses dedicated kernel interfaces to provide information on currently attached file systems (mounts), the status of certain peripheral components (e.g.
  • the FPGA, GPIO, MAC address the runtime of the operating system (uptime), static content from the file system and the names of the processes in the process chain of the caller aggregated in a running hash value.
  • the aggregated value is then used as a key derivation parameter for a key derivation function with the master key MK.
  • the derived key Kl to KN is different depending on the calling application, since these belong to different process chains.
  • a variable fingerprint FP formed from the runtime configuration and taking it into account as key derivation parameters can be viewed as a configuration of the security module.
  • the applications can use these derived keys e.g. Use systems to access private file systems. If an attacker tries to derive a key by means of another process, also with the help of the Runtime Measurement Key Derivation Function RM-KDF, it will be different. Both offline and online attacks usually change dynamic properties of a runtime environment (e.g. configuration files, options of mounted file systems). Access to keys from valid states is therefore very difficult.
  • the invention has the advantage that access to keys can be linked to the current state of static and, in particular, dynamic properties of the runtime environment. If the runtime environment is interfered with (physical attack, remote attack), the key derivation can be influenced and thus valid keys can no longer be derived in an untrustworthy environment. Furthermore, the state dependency can be used deliberately in order to provide different keys for different runtime phases in software. This has the particular advantage that in the event of a compromised runtime phase, the
  • Computer-readable memories are, for example, volatile memories such as caches, buffers or RAM as well as non-volatile memories such as removable data carriers, hard drives, etc.
  • the functions or steps described above can be present in the form of at least one set of instructions in / on a computer-readable memory.
  • the functions or steps are not tied to a specific set of instructions or to a specific form of instruction set or to a specific storage medium or to a specific processor or to specific execution schemes and can be implemented through software, firmware, microcode, hardware, processors, integrated circuits etc. can be run alone or in any combination.
  • a wide variety of processing strategies can be used, for example serial processing by a single processor or multiprocessing or multitasking or parallel processing, etc.
  • the instructions can be stored in local memories, but it is also possible to store the instructions on a remote system and access them via the network.
  • the device D can have one or more processors.
  • processors central signal processing, “control unit” or “data evaluation means” includes processing medium in the broadest sense, for example servers, universal processors, graphics processors, digital signal processors, application-specific integrated circuits (ASICs), programmable logic circuits such as FPGAs, discrete analog or digital circuits and any combination thereof, including all others known to the person skilled in the art or developed in the future Processing agents.
  • Processors can consist of one or more devices or devices or units. If a processor consists of several devices, these can be designed or configured for parallel or sequential processing or execution of instructions.

Landscapes

  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Signal Processing (AREA)
  • Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
  • General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Theoretical Computer Science (AREA)
  • Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Software Systems (AREA)
  • Power Engineering (AREA)
  • General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Mathematical Physics (AREA)
  • Computing Systems (AREA)
  • Storage Device Security (AREA)

Abstract

L'invention concerne un procédé pour la configuration d'un module de sécurité (SD) avec au moins une clé déduite, présentant les étapes suivantes, consistant à : – mettre à disposition une clé (MK); - déduire (KDF) une autre clé (K1 à KN) à partir de la clé mise à disposition ou d'un clé déduite au préalable à partir de la clé mise à disposition, le procédé étant caractérisé en ce qu'une empreinte digitale modifiable (FP) entre en tant que paramètre de déduction de clé dans la déduction, qui est formé en fonction d'une configuration de durée d'exécution actuelle mesurable d'un environnement de durée d'exécution (R) en communication avec le module de sécurité.
EP20714915.4A 2019-04-05 2020-03-16 Procédé pour la configuration d'un module de sécurité avec au moins une clé déduite Pending EP3928463A1 (fr)

Applications Claiming Priority (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
EP19167509.9A EP3720039A1 (fr) 2019-04-05 2019-04-05 Procédé de configuration d'un module de sécurité au moyen d'au moins une clé dérivée
PCT/EP2020/057077 WO2020200729A1 (fr) 2019-04-05 2020-03-16 Procédé pour la configuration d'un module de sécurité avec au moins une clé déduite

Publications (1)

Publication Number Publication Date
EP3928463A1 true EP3928463A1 (fr) 2021-12-29

Family

ID=66101904

Family Applications (2)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
EP19167509.9A Pending EP3720039A1 (fr) 2019-04-05 2019-04-05 Procédé de configuration d'un module de sécurité au moyen d'au moins une clé dérivée
EP20714915.4A Pending EP3928463A1 (fr) 2019-04-05 2020-03-16 Procédé pour la configuration d'un module de sécurité avec au moins une clé déduite

Family Applications Before (1)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
EP19167509.9A Pending EP3720039A1 (fr) 2019-04-05 2019-04-05 Procédé de configuration d'un module de sécurité au moyen d'au moins une clé dérivée

Country Status (4)

Country Link
US (1) US20220150056A1 (fr)
EP (2) EP3720039A1 (fr)
CN (1) CN113647053A (fr)
WO (1) WO2020200729A1 (fr)

Families Citing this family (3)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
FR3106909B1 (fr) * 2020-01-31 2022-02-18 St Microelectronics Grenoble 2 Circuit intégré configuré pour réaliser des opérations de chiffrement symétrique avec protection de clé secrète
FR3106910B1 (fr) 2020-01-31 2022-02-18 St Microelectronics Grenoble 2 Circuit intégré configuré pour réaliser des opérations de chiffrement symétrique sans transmission de clé secrète
US11995044B2 (en) * 2021-02-12 2024-05-28 Zettaset, Inc. Configurable stacking/stackable filesystem (CSF)

Family Cites Families (18)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US7814334B2 (en) * 2007-06-18 2010-10-12 International Business Machines Corporation Method and apparatus for changing and adding activation keys for functions of digital content without having to change and recompile the digital content
EP2183695B1 (fr) * 2007-07-20 2014-11-12 Nxp B.V. Dispositif équipé d'une machine virtuelle sécurisée
CN103746794B (zh) * 2008-06-06 2017-06-23 艾利森电话股份有限公司 加密密钥生成方法及装置
WO2010035202A1 (fr) * 2008-09-26 2010-04-01 Koninklijke Philips Electronics N.V. Authentification d’un dispositif et d’un utilisateur
DE102012209408A1 (de) * 2012-06-04 2013-12-05 Siemens Aktiengesellschaft Sichere Übertragung einer Nachricht
US8843765B2 (en) * 2012-10-10 2014-09-23 Broadcom Corporation Key derivation system
FR2998693B1 (fr) * 2012-11-29 2015-03-13 Spirtech Procede de derivation de cles cryptographiques multiples a partir d'une cle maitresse dans un microprocesseur de securite
US9390291B2 (en) * 2012-12-29 2016-07-12 Intel Corporation Secure key derivation and cryptography logic for integrated circuits
WO2015133990A1 (fr) * 2014-03-03 2015-09-11 Intel Corporation Procédés et appareil pour la migration de clés
US9819485B2 (en) * 2014-05-01 2017-11-14 At&T Intellectual Property I, L.P. Apparatus and method for secure delivery of data utilizing encryption key management
US9264410B2 (en) * 2014-06-05 2016-02-16 Sony Corporation Dynamic configuration of trusted executed environment resources
US10185669B2 (en) * 2014-08-04 2019-01-22 Oracle International Corporation Secure key derivation functions
DE102015208899A1 (de) * 2015-05-13 2016-03-24 Siemens Aktiengesellschaft Vorrichtung und Verfahren zur flexiblen Erzeugung von kryptographischen privaten Schlüsseln und Gerät mit flexibel erzeugten kryptographischen privaten Schlüsseln
WO2018231753A1 (fr) * 2017-06-12 2018-12-20 Daniel Maurice Lerner Dispositifs utilisant des jetons aléatoires pour diriger un accès aléatoire dynamique
US10193690B1 (en) * 2017-09-29 2019-01-29 U.S. Bancorp, National Association Systems and methods to secure data using computer system attributes
US10374803B2 (en) * 2017-10-06 2019-08-06 Stealthpath, Inc. Methods for internet communication security
US10009325B1 (en) * 2017-12-07 2018-06-26 Karamba Security End-to-end communication security
US10862680B2 (en) * 2018-09-26 2020-12-08 Intel Corporation Encoding process for multiple RSA and ECC keys

Also Published As

Publication number Publication date
EP3720039A1 (fr) 2020-10-07
US20220150056A1 (en) 2022-05-12
WO2020200729A1 (fr) 2020-10-08
CN113647053A (zh) 2021-11-12

Similar Documents

Publication Publication Date Title
EP2899714B1 (fr) Préparation sécurisée d'une clé
EP3259698B1 (fr) Système d'amorçage autonome avec un module de sécurité
DE69815599T2 (de) Verfahren und Vorrichtung zum Schutz von Anwendungsdaten in sicheren Speicherbereichen
DE102008011925B4 (de) Sicheres Initialisieren von Computersystemen
EP3928463A1 (fr) Procédé pour la configuration d'un module de sécurité avec au moins une clé déduite
DE102008021567B4 (de) Computersystem mit sicherem Hochlaufmechanismus auf der Grundlage einer Verschlüsselung mit symmetrischem Schlüssel
DE102009013384B4 (de) System und Verfahren zur Bereitstellung einer sicheren Anwendungsfragmentierungsumgebung
DE102020116791A1 (de) Vorrichtung und Verfahren zum computergestützten Verarbeiten von Daten
DE102007057900A1 (de) Authentifikationen von verdächtigen Daten unter Verwendung von Schlüsseltabellen
DE102014208838A1 (de) Verfahren zum Betreiben eines Steuergeräts
EP2911080A1 (fr) Procédé et dispositif d'initialisation sécurisée d'un ordinateur
EP3432185A1 (fr) Procédé et dispositif de réseau destinés à protéger contre les tentatives de manipulation d'au moins un appareil utilisant une première paire de clé produite par authentification et/ou selon le procédé de chiffrement asymétrique destiné à la communication chiffrée
WO2017162424A1 (fr) Procédé et dispositif pour fournir une fonction de sécurité cryptographique pour le fonctionnement d'un appareil
DE102021127629A1 (de) Virtualisierung der sicheren speicherung eines baseboard management controllers auf einem host- computergerät
DE102018217431A1 (de) Sicherer Schlüsseltausch auf einem Gerät, insbesondere einem eingebetteten Gerät
EP3907637A1 (fr) Procédé et dispositif destinés à la mise en service sécurisée d'une instance conteneur
EP3286872B1 (fr) Obtention d'une clé cryptographique spécifique d'un appareil à partir d'une clé intersystème pour un appareil
EP3248136B1 (fr) Procédé de fonctionnement d'une unité d'ordinateur avec un environnement de temps d'exécution sécurisé et unité d'ordinateur
WO2021164911A1 (fr) Procédé assisté par ordinateur pour stocker un état d'intégrité, dispositif d'état d'intégrité et produit programme d'ordinateur
EP3667529B1 (fr) Procédé et dispositif d'authentification d'une configuration du réseau prédiffusé programmable par l'utilisateur fpga
EP3072080B1 (fr) Procédé et dispositif de protection d'un dispositif de calcul contre les manipulations
EP3595256A1 (fr) Dispositif et procédé de fonctionnement d'une unité de traitement configurée au moyen du logiciel pour un appareil
EP3786818A1 (fr) Procédé de protection d'une application logicielle contre une utilisation non autorisée
EP3534282A1 (fr) Procédé et module de sécurité permettant l'exécution assistée par ordinateur d'un code de programme
DE102021110768B3 (de) Forensik-Modul und eingebettetes System

Legal Events

Date Code Title Description
STAA Information on the status of an ep patent application or granted ep patent

Free format text: STATUS: UNKNOWN

STAA Information on the status of an ep patent application or granted ep patent

Free format text: STATUS: THE INTERNATIONAL PUBLICATION HAS BEEN MADE

PUAI Public reference made under article 153(3) epc to a published international application that has entered the european phase

Free format text: ORIGINAL CODE: 0009012

STAA Information on the status of an ep patent application or granted ep patent

Free format text: STATUS: REQUEST FOR EXAMINATION WAS MADE

17P Request for examination filed

Effective date: 20210924

AK Designated contracting states

Kind code of ref document: A1

Designated state(s): AL AT BE BG CH CY CZ DE DK EE ES FI FR GB GR HR HU IE IS IT LI LT LU LV MC MK MT NL NO PL PT RO RS SE SI SK SM TR

DAV Request for validation of the european patent (deleted)
DAX Request for extension of the european patent (deleted)
STAA Information on the status of an ep patent application or granted ep patent

Free format text: STATUS: EXAMINATION IS IN PROGRESS

17Q First examination report despatched

Effective date: 20240207