EP3909214A1 - Procédé permettant de générer des codes d'ouverture d'un réservoir et procédé d'ouverture d'un réservoir - Google Patents

Procédé permettant de générer des codes d'ouverture d'un réservoir et procédé d'ouverture d'un réservoir

Info

Publication number
EP3909214A1
EP3909214A1 EP19850773.3A EP19850773A EP3909214A1 EP 3909214 A1 EP3909214 A1 EP 3909214A1 EP 19850773 A EP19850773 A EP 19850773A EP 3909214 A1 EP3909214 A1 EP 3909214A1
Authority
EP
European Patent Office
Prior art keywords
cap
code
identifier
token
tank
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Pending
Application number
EP19850773.3A
Other languages
German (de)
English (en)
Inventor
Paolo GUARNIERI
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Individual
Original Assignee
Individual
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Priority claimed from IT102019000000280A external-priority patent/IT201900000280A1/it
Priority claimed from IT102019000000283A external-priority patent/IT201900000283A1/it
Application filed by Individual filed Critical Individual
Publication of EP3909214A1 publication Critical patent/EP3909214A1/fr
Pending legal-status Critical Current

Links

Classifications

    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/12—Transmitting and receiving encryption devices synchronised or initially set up in a particular manner
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/30—Authentication, i.e. establishing the identity or authorisation of security principals
    • G06F21/44—Program or device authentication
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
    • G07C9/00—Individual registration on entry or exit
    • G07C9/00174—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys
    • G07C9/00896—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys specially adapted for particular uses
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
    • H04L63/0853—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities using an additional device, e.g. smartcard, SIM or a different communication terminal
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/321—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving a third party or a trusted authority
    • H04L9/3213—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving a third party or a trusted authority using tickets or tokens, e.g. Kerberos
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3297—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving time stamps, e.g. generation of time stamps
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
    • G07C9/00—Individual registration on entry or exit
    • G07C9/00174—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys
    • G07C9/00571—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated by interacting with a central unit
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
    • G07C9/00—Individual registration on entry or exit
    • G07C9/20—Individual registration on entry or exit involving the use of a pass
    • G07C9/215—Individual registration on entry or exit involving the use of a pass the system having a variable access-code, e.g. varied as a function of time
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
    • H04L2209/84—Vehicles

Definitions

  • the present invention relates to a generation process of opening codes of a tank and in particular an opening method of such tank of the type specified in the preamble of the independent claims.
  • the present invention relates to a process and/or a method of providing credentials for opening a tank and thereby for monitoring the closing and opening of valves and loading manifolds of tanker systems, tanks or other storage systems for fluids (preferably liquids, in detail liquefied or non-liquefied gases, petroleum products and petrochemicals in general or other liquids such as oils and liquid foods).
  • fluids preferably liquids, in detail liquefied or non-liquefied gases, petroleum products and petrochemicals in general or other liquids such as oils and liquid foods.
  • a tank has a container for the substances for which it is used and a valve, or filler, that can be closed by a cap easily accessible by a user.
  • the cap is generally a screw or bayonet cap.
  • the screw cap has a threaded support which can be screwed or unscrewed in rotation from the tank. Therefore, the cap preferably has external threads compatible with the filler.
  • the opening of this cap requires the operator to hold the cap and impose a mechanical moment to rotate it with respect to the tank.
  • Many caps also have a lock and therefore require the use of a key to open them.
  • the prior art described has several significant drawbacks.
  • the opening method of a tank required to date is easily bypassed because the opening method is extremely simple and substantially devoid of safety measures able to prevent undesired opening.
  • the codes for opening the tank are at most identifiable in keys that are easy to copy.
  • the above-mentioned caps and consequently the opening methods of the tanks in addition to not guaranteeing a high level of security in terms of accessibility, do not allow the supplier to control the integrity of the closing means used on its tanks.
  • the technical purpose of the present invention is to devise an opening method of a tank able to substantially overcome at least some of the drawbacks mentioned.
  • one important aim of the invention is to provide an opening method of a tank which is difficult to perform by non-authorised personnel.
  • Fig. 1 shows a token generation process and in particular an opening method of a tank
  • Fig. 2a illustrates, in scale, an overview of the opening procedure
  • Fig. 2b presents, in scale, a second view of the assembly in Fig. 2a; and Fig. 3 shows a schematic view of the method for opening a tank according to the invention.
  • processing refers to the action and/or processes of a computer or similar electronic calculation device, which handles and/or processes data represented as physical, such as electronic sizes of logs of a computer system and/or their memories, other data similarly represented as physical quantities inside computer systems, logs or other information storage, transmission or display devices.
  • the generation process according to the invention is part of an opening method of a tank; with reference to the figures the method is denoted by the number 1.
  • the method for opening a tank 1 is suitable to monitor and, in particular, to allow only authorised personnel to open one or more tanks.
  • It comprises at least one tank 2 and at least one cap 3 closing the tank 2 and preferably several tanks 2 and one cap 3 per tank 2.
  • the tank 2 is designed to store a fluid (gas and/or liquid) such as fuel. It can be, for example, a car tank or a tank used to contain large quantities of fuel and may therefore be buried or above ground. Preferably, it is a fuel containment tank.
  • Each tank 2 comprises a container 21 defining a storage volume and an opening 22 for access to said volume.
  • the cap 3 is designed to engage to the tank 2 and in particular to the opening 22, preventing the introduction and/or extraction of product.
  • the means 33 can define a physical connection (e.g. a USB or LAN port) or preferably a wireless connection and in detail radio connection such as Bluetooth or WI-FI.
  • the cap 3 comprises locking means 34 suitable for connecting the cap 3 to the tank 2.
  • the locking means 34 define a locked configuration (Fig. 2b) in which they prevent the removal of the cap 3 from the tank 2 and a free opening configuration (Fig. 2a) in which they allow the removal of the cap 3 from the tank 2.
  • first portion 34a integral with the casing 32; a second portion 34b engaging with the tank 2 and mobile with respect to the first portion; and a connection block 34c defining an active position in which it connects the portions 34a and 34b to each other defining said free opening configuration and an inactive position in which it allows reciprocal movement between said portions defining said locked configuration.
  • the locking means 34 are in said internal volume.
  • the cap 3 comprises a first clock 35 suitable to measure the passage of time.
  • the cap 3 comprises a first token generation unit 36.
  • Said unit 36 is in data connection with the various components of the cap 3 so as to control its operation and receive data from them.
  • the cap 3 comprises a power supply for the cap 3.
  • the power supply comprises a battery suitably housed in the internal volume.
  • the opening method 1 comprises an identifier of at least one out of the tank 2 and/or the cap 3. Preferably it provides a private identifier of the cap 3 and appropriately at least one public identifier of at least one out of the tank 2 and/or cap 3. More preferably the opening method 1 comprises a private identifier and a public identifier of the cap 3 and optionally an additional public tank identifier 2.
  • the term “private” identifies a code that cannot be acquired and therefore cannot be transferred to a second device or acquired/read by an operator.
  • the term “public” identifies a code that can be easily acquired and therefore can be transferred (for example via a data connection) to a second device or acquired/read by an operator.
  • the public identifier may be associated with the cap 3.
  • the casing 32 can be external to the casing 32 and therefore readable/acquired from outside. It can be a code (alphanumeric, barcode, QR etc.) written on the casing 32 or a plate attached thereto. Alternatively, the public identifier is stored in the memory 31 .
  • the public identifier may be associated with the tank 2 and for example printed on a plate.
  • the additional public identifier can be printed on a plate attached to the outer surface of the tank 2.
  • the private identifier can be stored in the memory 31 .
  • the data connection means 33 are suitable to allow a data transfer (e.g. public identifier) between the cap 3 and a control device external to the cap. They do not transmit the private identifier.
  • a data transfer e.g. public identifier
  • the cap 3 may comprise a personal code and appropriately an acquisition unit 37 of at least one personal code of the cap 3 and preferably only one personal code of the cap 3.
  • the personal code is a code specific to the cap 3 additional to the private identifier and, if present, the public identifier.
  • the personal code identifies a code representative of the condition of use of the cap 3, i.e. the site where the cap 3 is placed and/or the operating status of the cap It can therefore be an environmental personal code, i.e. specific to the environment/site where the cap 3 is placed when in use and thus the acquisition unit 37 may comprise at least one environmental personal code acquisition sensor.
  • the personal environmental code can be at least one between a geolocation position (and the acquisition unit 37 can comprise at least one geolocation sensor); temperature (and the acquisition unit 37 can comprise at least one thermal sensor), pressure (and the acquisition unit 37 can comprise at least one pressure sensor), luminance of the external environment (and the acquisition unit 37 can comprise at least one optical luminance measurement sensor).
  • the environmental personal code comprises the geolocation position (latitude, longitude and appropriate altitude) and the acquisition unit 37 may comprise at least one geolocation sensor capable of acquiring the geolocation position of the cap 3.
  • the personal code can be a functional personal code, i.e. identifying a parameter/functional characteristic of the cap 3 (i.e. intrinsic function of the cap 3) such as operating temperature, number of activations, current intensity or supply voltage, i.e. of the power supply unit and, in detail, of the battery.
  • the acquisition unit 37 may comprise at least one functional acquisition sensor of said functional code.
  • the functional personal code is the supply voltage (of the power supply and, in detail, of the battery) and the acquisition unit 37 may comprise at least one acquisition voltmeter of said voltage.
  • the functional personal code is the measured voltage of other components or voltage measured by voltage references.
  • cap 3 may have several environmental and/or functional personal codes.
  • the personal code is preferably alphanumeric.
  • the opening method 1 comprises a control device 4 suitable to control the cap 3 and in particular a change in the configuration of the cap 3.
  • the control device 4 comprises at least one data connector suitable for data exchange between the cap 3 and the control device 4.
  • the data connector may define a physical connection (for example a USB or LAN port). Preferably it identifies a wireless connection such as a radio connection such as Bluetooth.
  • the control device 4 comprises a second clock 41 suitable to measure the passage of time.
  • the control device 4 comprises a caps database associating said at least one identifier with a cap 3.
  • the caps database may associate each cap 3, i.e. the private identifier, with at least one personal code (environmental and/or functional).
  • the control device 4 comprises a second token generation unit 42.
  • the control device 4 comprises acquisition means 43 of said public identifier.
  • the acquisition means 43 may comprise a camera or other equipment suitable to acquire the public identifier on the cap 3 for reading a barcode or other similar code. Alternatively or additionally, they may acquire the public identifier by operator input, e.g. via keyboard, and/or by data connection with the cap 3.
  • the control device 4 a remote server 4a and appropriately a reader 4b of said public identifier.
  • the remote server 4a comprises said caps database.
  • the remote server 4a comprises said second unit 42.
  • the remote server 4a comprises said second clock 41 .
  • the reader 4b comprises said acquisition means 43.
  • the reader 4b may comprise a token database including one or more tokens preferably command tokens each associated with a public identifier.
  • the remote server 4a comprises a first data connector 44 and the reader 4b comprises a second data connector 45 suitable to allow the cap 3 to place itself in data connection with the cap 3 and the remote server 4b.
  • Said connectors 44 and 45 are suitable for making a wireless connection.
  • the connectors 44 and 45 allow a passage of data between the reader 4b and the remote server 4a without prejudice to the private identifier.
  • the acquisition means 43 do not allow the acquisition of the secret identifier.
  • the opening method 1 comprises at least one generation process of opening codes of the tank 2.
  • the generation process is designed to generate a token commanding a change in the configuration of the cap 3 and in particular the change into the free opening configuration of the cap 3.
  • the generation process is suitable to be implemented by the cap 3 and/or by the server 4a.
  • the generation process comprises a first computation step in which at least one unit 36 and 42 determines at least one code base according to the identifier, preferably private, and a time stamp of at least one clock 35 and 41 .
  • said at least one unit 36 and 42 determines a primary code base according to the identifier preferably private (and optionally of the personal code) and a secondary code base according to the time stamp of a clock 35 or 41 .
  • Said transformation functions may be different or the same as each other.
  • said at least one unit 36 and 42 determines a single code base according to the preferably private identifier, the time stamp and in some cases the personal code.
  • the time stamp is identifiable in a day, i.e. a date indicating day, month and year. Alternatively, it can be identified in a time, i.e. a date indicating the time, day, month and year.
  • At least one code base may be alphanumeric.
  • the generation process comprises an encryption step wherein at least one unit 36 and 42 calculates an encrypted code, encrypting said at least one code base.
  • the unit 36 or 42 determines a first encrypted code according to the primary code base and a second encrypted code according to the secondary code base.
  • the encryption functions of the encrypted codes may be the same or different.
  • the unit 36 or 42 determines an encrypted code according to the primary code base and the secondary code base.
  • Said at least one encrypted code may be alphanumeric.
  • the generation process comprises a second calculation step in which at least one unit 36 and 42 determines at least one intermediate code according to the at least one encrypted code.
  • the unit 36 or 42 determines a first intermediate code according to the first encrypted code and a second intermediate code according to the second encrypted code. Alternatively, the unit 36 or 42 determines a single intermediate code according to the first encrypted code and the second encrypted code.
  • At least one unit 36 and 42 defines the token as a portion of the single intermediate code.
  • the token is given by a first portion extracted from the first intermediate code and a second portion extracted from the second intermediate code.
  • the extracted portion may comprise any number of alphanumeric characters such as, for example, 4, 6 and 8.
  • the opening method 1 comprises at least a first generation process 110 in which the control device 4 and, in particular, the remote server 4a and more specifically the second unit 42 generate a command token according to the identifier, suitably deprived of the time stamp and optionally of the personal code; and one or more second generation processes 120 in which the cap 3 and, in particular, the first unit 36 generate a verification token of the identifier of the cap 3, suitably deprived of the time stamp and optionally of the personal code of said cap 3.
  • the first generation process 1 10 comprises a first primary calculation step111 ; a first encryption step112; a first secondary calculation step 113; and a first extraction step114.
  • the first steps 1 1 1 , 1 12, 1 13 and 1 14 are described above with reference to the generation process.
  • the first generation process may comprise an update step 115 of the caps database.
  • control device 4 and, in particular the remote server 4a, updates the caps database associating the command token with the public identifier connected to the private identifier used to calculate said token.
  • the second generation process 120 comprises a second, primary calculation step121 , a second, primary encryption step122, a second, secondary calculation step 123, and a second extraction step124.
  • the opening method 1 comprises a first sending process 130 in which the remote server 4a sends the command token and the public identifier associated with said token in the caps database to the reader 4b.
  • command tokens are sent to the reader 4b and, for each of them, the corresponding public identifier.
  • Said one or more command tokens and, if present, said public identifiers are stored in the token database of the reader 4b.
  • the opening method 1 comprises a reading process 140 in which the control device 4 and, specifically, the reader 4b acquires at least one public identifier of at least one out of the tank 2 and/or cap 3. In detail it acquires the public identifier of the cap 3.
  • the opening method 1 comprises a second sending process 150 in which the control device 4 and, specifically, the reader 4b sends to the cap 3 the command token associated with the public identifier acquired in the reading process 140.
  • the second sending process 150 comprises a search step 151 in which the reader 4b searches the token database for the command token associated with the public identifier acquired in the process 140; and a transmission step 152 in which the reader 4b sends the identified token to the cap 3.
  • the opening method 1 comprises a verification process 160, appropriately subsequent to the second generation process 120, in which if the verification token is compatible with the command token the locking means 34 go into a free opening configuration allowing the removal of the cap 3. Otherwise, if the verification token is not compatible with the command token the locking means 34 do not go into the free opening configuration preventing the opening of the tank 2.
  • the opening method 1 comprises an opening process 170 of the tank 2.
  • the opening method may comprise a pre-reading process 180 prior to the first generation process 1 10.
  • the pre-reading process 180 thanks to the connection between the cap 3 and the control device 4 it acquires at least the public identifier and at least one personal code (environmental and/or functional).
  • the reader 4b acquires at least the public identifier and at least one personal code and transmits them to the remote server 4a allowing the update of the caps database and/or the first generation process 1 10.
  • At least one personal code acquired by the control device is encrypted by the first unit 36.
  • the second unit 42 performs the opposite encryption so as to have (and then optionally store in the cap database) at least one unencrypted personal code to use in the primary calculation step 1 1 1 .
  • the opening method 1 provides for a first generation process 1 10 for each tank 2.
  • the remote server 4a searches the caps database for the private identifier associated with each of the caps 3 or tanks 2 selected.
  • the remote server 4a determines a command token for each private identifier and stores it in the caps database associating it with at least one public identifier.
  • the opening method 1 provides for the first sending process 130 in which the server 4a, placed in data connection with the reader 4b by the data connectors 44 and 45, sends the reader 4b one or more command tokens and the public identifier associated with each of said command tokens.
  • the opening method 1 provides for the reading process 140 in which the reader 4b acquires the public identifier of the cap 3 to be removed: and the second sending process 150 in which the reader 4b, having identified the command token associated with such public identifier, sends such command token to the cap 3 using the data connection between the second connector 45 and connection means 33.
  • the opening method 1 comprises the second generation process 120 in which the cap 3 generates the verification token; and the verification process 160 in which the cap 3 goes into the free opening configuration if and only if the verification token is compatible with the command token, otherwise it remains in the locked configuration.
  • the opening method 1 according to the invention achieves some important advantages.
  • the opening method 1 using the particular token generation described above, allows the opening of the tank only by authorized personnel.
  • Another important advantage is that the reader 4b never acquires the secret identifier making it impossible for a third party to generate tokens.
  • This token generation difficulty is also defined by the particular process of generating opening codes that makes it impossible for a third party to reconstruct the token and/or the steps that led to its generation and thus identify the starting data of the token generation.
  • Another fundamental advantage is the presence of the personal code which adds an important variant to the calculation of the token making a fraudulent calculation of the token and therefore an unwanted opening of the tank 2 extremely complicated.
  • the personal code either functional or environmental, is unique to the cap 3.
  • the process may comprise, before the first generation process 1 10, the reading process 140.
  • the reader 4b acquires the public identifier of the cap 3 and sends it to the remote server 4b which, in accordance with the first generation process 110, determines the command token and, in accordance with the first sending process 130, sends it to the reader 4b.
  • the caps database could, in a technically equivalent manner, associate at least one identifier to the tank 2.

Landscapes

  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Signal Processing (AREA)
  • Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
  • General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Theoretical Computer Science (AREA)
  • Software Systems (AREA)
  • Computing Systems (AREA)
  • Details Of Rigid Or Semi-Rigid Containers (AREA)

Abstract

L'invention concerne un procédé permettant de générer (110, 120) des codes d'ouverture d'un réservoir (2) qui comprend un bouchon (3) fermant le réservoir (2) et comprenant un identifiant, une première horloge (35), une première unité de génération de jeton (36), un dispositif de commande (4) approprié pour effectuer un échange entre le bouchon (3) et le dispositif de commande (4) et comprenant une seconde horloge (41), une base de données de bouchon associant le bouchon (3) à l'identifiant et une seconde unité de génération de jeton (42) ; une première étape de calcul (111, 121) dans laquelle une unité (36, 42) détermine une base de code selon la base de code et un horodatage d'une horloge (35, 41) ; une étape de chiffrement (112, 122) dans laquelle une unité (36, 42) calcule un code chiffré en chiffrant l'identifiant ; une seconde étape de calcul (113, 123) dans laquelle l'unité (36, 42) détermine le code intermédiaire en fonction du code chiffré ; une étape d'extraction (114, 124) dans laquelle une unité (36, 42) définit un jeton en tant que partie du code intermédiaire.
EP19850773.3A 2019-01-09 2019-12-27 Procédé permettant de générer des codes d'ouverture d'un réservoir et procédé d'ouverture d'un réservoir Pending EP3909214A1 (fr)

Applications Claiming Priority (3)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
IT102019000000280A IT201900000280A1 (it) 2019-01-09 2019-01-09 Procedimento di apertura di un serbatoio
IT102019000000283A IT201900000283A1 (it) 2019-01-09 2019-01-09 Processo di generazione di codici di apertura di tale serbatoio
PCT/IB2019/061401 WO2020144531A1 (fr) 2019-01-09 2019-12-27 Procédé permettant de générer des codes d'ouverture d'un réservoir et procédé d'ouverture d'un réservoir

Publications (1)

Publication Number Publication Date
EP3909214A1 true EP3909214A1 (fr) 2021-11-17

Family

ID=69572265

Family Applications (1)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
EP19850773.3A Pending EP3909214A1 (fr) 2019-01-09 2019-12-27 Procédé permettant de générer des codes d'ouverture d'un réservoir et procédé d'ouverture d'un réservoir

Country Status (2)

Country Link
EP (1) EP3909214A1 (fr)
WO (1) WO2020144531A1 (fr)

Family Cites Families (5)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US20060170533A1 (en) * 2005-02-03 2006-08-03 France Telecom Method and system for controlling networked wireless locks
AU2012225535A1 (en) * 2011-03-08 2013-10-24 Security Enhancement Systems, Llc Lock
KR101261156B1 (ko) * 2011-07-21 2013-05-07 에스케이씨앤씨 주식회사 비밀키 생성방법 및 이를 적용한 전자장치
US9130753B1 (en) * 2013-03-14 2015-09-08 Emc Corporation Authentication using security device with electronic interface
IT201700056266A1 (it) * 2017-05-24 2018-11-24 Paolo Guarnieri Dispositivo di controllo accessi

Also Published As

Publication number Publication date
WO2020144531A1 (fr) 2020-07-16

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