EP3899766A1 - Aufbauen einer geschützten datenkommunikationsverbindung zwischen einer steuerung einer personentransportanlage und einem mobilgerät - Google Patents
Aufbauen einer geschützten datenkommunikationsverbindung zwischen einer steuerung einer personentransportanlage und einem mobilgerätInfo
- Publication number
- EP3899766A1 EP3899766A1 EP19818179.4A EP19818179A EP3899766A1 EP 3899766 A1 EP3899766 A1 EP 3899766A1 EP 19818179 A EP19818179 A EP 19818179A EP 3899766 A1 EP3899766 A1 EP 3899766A1
- Authority
- EP
- European Patent Office
- Prior art keywords
- data communication
- mobile device
- communication connection
- controller
- key
- Prior art date
- Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
- Pending
Links
Classifications
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/30—Authentication, i.e. establishing the identity or authorisation of security principals
- G06F21/44—Program or device authentication
- G06F21/445—Program or device authentication by mutual authentication, e.g. between devices or programs
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/04—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
- H04L63/0428—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload
- H04L63/0442—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload wherein the sending and receiving network entities apply asymmetric encryption, i.e. different keys for encryption and decryption
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/60—Protecting data
- G06F21/606—Protecting data by securing the transmission between two devices or processes
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/18—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security using different networks or channels, e.g. using out of band channels
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
- H04L9/0819—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s)
- H04L9/0827—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s) involving distinctive intermediate devices or communication paths
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0861—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0869—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords involving random numbers or seeds
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0861—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0877—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords using additional device, e.g. trusted platform module [TPM], smartcard, USB or hardware security module [HSM]
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/088—Usage controlling of secret information, e.g. techniques for restricting cryptographic keys to pre-authorized uses, different access levels, validity of crypto-period, different key- or password length, or different strong and weak cryptographic algorithms
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/03—Protecting confidentiality, e.g. by encryption
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/04—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA]
- H04W12/043—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA] using a trusted network node as an anchor
- H04W12/0431—Key distribution or pre-distribution; Key agreement
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/50—Secure pairing of devices
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W4/00—Services specially adapted for wireless communication networks; Facilities therefor
- H04W4/80—Services using short range communication, e.g. near-field communication [NFC], radio-frequency identification [RFID] or low energy communication
Definitions
- the present invention relates to a method by means of which a protected data communication connection can be established between a control system for a passenger transport system and a mobile device.
- the invention further relates to devices and computer program products which are configured to execute or control the method, and to computer-readable media with such computer program products stored thereon.
- Passenger transport systems such as elevators, moving walks or escalators are used to transport people inside buildings or structures and are permanently installed for this purpose.
- a passenger transport system has various stationary components and relocatable components, the operation of which is usually controlled and / or coordinated by a controller.
- the control of an elevator controls the manner in which a drive machine must be operated in order to move an elevator car to certain floors in response to call requests.
- a controller can, among other things, control the operation of a drive machine in order, for example, to meet operating requirements that vary over time.
- the control system must meet high safety requirements. For example, it must be ensured that the controller always controls the operation of the passenger transport system in such a way that no passengers and / or the integrity of the passenger transport system are endangered. It must also be ensured that the control itself cannot be manipulated without authorization.
- Control systems for passenger transport systems traditionally have their own human-machine interfaces, such as one display and several
- Entry keys via which data can be entered and read out manually by a technician.
- this can be very complex and / or complex, so that both the time required for this can be considerable and the risk of errors occurring can be high.
- the mobile device can be a portable device such as a smartphone, laptop, tablet or the like, which has its own processor, its own data storage and its own human-machine interfaces.
- the mobile device can control with a line-based or wireless
- Data transmission via the data communication connection takes place securely and no data can be manipulated or intercepted.
- Passenger transport system and a mobile device can be set up relatively easily, safely and / or with little logistical effort. Furthermore, there may be a need for a device arrangement with which a passenger transport system can be serviced, and for a controller for a passenger transport system that are set up to carry out or control such a method. There may also be a need for a corresponding computer program product and a computer-readable medium storing such a computer program product.
- Both the controller and the mobile device are configured to establish an initially unprotected data communication connection with one another and to establish protected data communication connections with a common external computer.
- the method comprises at least the following method steps, preferably, but not necessarily, in the order given:
- a device arrangement for maintaining a passenger transportation system comprises a control of the passenger transport system, a mobile device and a common external computer.
- the device arrangement is configured to execute or control a method according to an embodiment of the first aspect of the invention.
- a control of a passenger transport system is proposed, which is configured to execute or control a method according to an embodiment of the first aspect of the invention in cooperation with a mobile device and a common external computer.
- a computer program product with computer-readable instructions which, when executed on one or more processors in a device arrangement according to an embodiment of the second aspect of the invention, guide the method according to a
- a computer program product with computer-readable instructions which, when executed on one or more processors in a controller according to an embodiment of the third aspect of the invention, instruct in cooperation with a mobile device and a common external computer to execute or control the method according to an embodiment of the first aspect of the invention.
- a computer-readable medium with a computer program product stored thereon according to an embodiment of the fourth or fifth aspect of the invention is proposed.
- a control of a passenger transport system can be entered or read out, for example, as part of maintenance measures or during an initial picking process, by establishing a data communication connection between the control and an external mobile device.
- the mobile device can then serve as an external human-machine interface, for example to have data entered by a technician and then forward it to the controller via the data communication connection or to display data read out from the controller to the technician.
- the mobile device can also obtain data from other sources, for example from an external database, from the Internet or from a data cloud provided for this purpose, and then transmit the data to the controller via the data communication connection.
- data can also be forwarded from the control via the mobile device to other devices, in particular to a database or a data cloud. In this way, for example, targeted configuration and / or updating of stored parameters or data and / or updating of software in the controller can be simplified.
- the data is only from an authorized party, i.e. can be entered and / or read out by a technician authorized for this purpose and / or devices authorized for this purpose. After the technician or the device has previously checked, for example, by entering or transmitting a
- Authenticated authentication codes data can be transmitted between the controller and the mobile device via the data communication link. If no special measures are taken, such measures are taken
- the data communication connection can be protected by data to be transmitted over it before the transmission using, for example, symmetrical cryptographic keys or asymmetrical
- Cryptographic keys are encrypted before they are transmitted to a target device via the data communication connection, and the encrypted data are then decrypted again in the target device.
- a problem with the aforementioned method can be that it does not offer flexible security. For example, as soon as a new password or key is introduced into a new version of the control software, the corresponding passwords and keys must be changed in all mobile devices that are used to maintain this control. This is logistically problematic. It actually requires backward compatibility in key management, which goes against a primary purpose of backup, and possibly duplication of the same key on all installations, which is one
- each application for encrypting data to be transmitted and thus for creating a protected data communication connection should have a different key pair.
- This key pair should preferably be able to be generated without complex logistical efforts and / or be valid for a limited period of time and / or be independent of different software versions.
- a data communication connection between the control of the passenger transport system and an external mobile device should be designed in such a protected manner that data transmitted via it is always transferred in encrypted form, so that attacking third parties can neither manipulate nor listen to it without being recognized.
- This common external computer can be a server or a data cloud (cloud), which is located outside the passenger transportation system and preferably also outside of a building that houses the passenger transportation system.
- the common external computer can be operated by a manufacturer of the passenger transport system or by a service provider.
- the controller as well as that
- Mobile devices can communicate with this external computer in a wired or wireless manner, for example via a network such as the Internet
- Communication content between two communication partners should always be transmitted in encrypted form, for example with end-to-end encryption.
- Suitable secure communication protocols can be used for data communication.
- control of the passenger transport system and the mobile device can establish an unprotected data communication connection with one another. Both components can exchange data via this unprotected data communication connection, but this is transmitted unencrypted.
- controller and the mobile device can communicate with one another via a data cable or a wireless connection.
- the controller and the mobile device first set up the unprotected data communication connection between the two components. Both components can then exchange a so-called token via this unprotected data communication connection.
- the token can be a data content, that is to say a type of code, for example, which is provided by one of the components and can then be transmitted to the other component.
- the mobile device can provide the token and transmit it to the controller, for example after the mobile device has been requested to do so by a technician.
- the controller can also provide a token and transmit it to the mobile device as soon as it is ready to receive this token.
- the token can be generated spontaneously in one of the components or previously stored in it.
- the token should be unique, or at least with a very high degree of probability, that is, each controller or mobile device should provide a unique token, which is provided neither by chance nor intentionally by another controller or another mobile device.
- the token can be generated randomly.
- both the control device and the mobile device each build protected data
- Both the control device and the mobile device can then forward the provided or received token to the external computer via its respective protected data communication connection.
- the external computer can then generate two so-called key pairs, which are designed in such a way that the data to be transmitted are common in one
- Encryption methods can first be encrypted and then decrypted again.
- Each pair of keys includes a public key with which the data can be encrypted and a private key with which the data can then be decrypted again.
- the external computer then transmits back to the controller via the first protected data communication connection.
- the external transmits Computer also the public key of the second key pair to the controller.
- the external computer also transmits the second of these key pairs, or at least the private key of this key pair, back to the mobile device via the second protected data communication connection, and additionally also transmits the public key of the first
- Both the control of the passenger transport system and the mobile device then each have their own private key as well as the public key of the other communication partner.
- the controller and the mobile device can then establish the desired protected data communication connection between them, by encrypting all the data to be transmitted with the public key of the communication partner, transmitting it via the data communication connection and then decrypting it by the communication partner using his private key become.
- Key pairs for example, a symmetric key for one
- the controller and the mobile device can communicate with one another in a protected manner by using the temporary key for the communication process.
- the external shared computer can generate the two key pairs in response to the transmission of the token.
- receiving the token can cause the external common computer to trigger the two key pairs.
- the external computer can only generate the key pairs when it has received the same token from both the control device and the mobile device.
- the generated key pairs can then preferably are immediately transmitted to the controller or to the mobile device via the first or second secure data communication connection.
- key pairs do not need to be continuously generated in the external common computer, which are then transmitted to a communication partner pair, that is to say a controller and a mobile device that want to communicate and announce this by transmitting the token, as required, for which purpose in the external computer a high computing power would be necessary.
- a communication partner pair that is to say a controller and a mobile device that want to communicate and announce this by transmitting the token, as required, for which purpose in the external computer a high computing power would be necessary.
- key pairs need not be generated in advance and then stored in the external shared computer until they are needed, which could increase the risk that such key pairs would be spied out in advance. Instead, a key pair can be generated exactly when it is required by a communication partner pair and requested by transmitting the token.
- the external common computer can generate the two key pairs randomly.
- the external shared computer can be configured to generate it randomly each time a key pair is required, independently of the key pairs generated before or after. Assuming that there is a very high number of possible key pairs, this can virtually ensure that the same key pair is not generated twice.
- the key pairs can have a defined expiry time, after which they are no longer for the protected data communication connection are usable.
- the key pairs can be designed in such a way that they lose their functionality after a predefined expiry time, so that protected data transmission using a key pair whose expiry time has been reached is no longer possible.
- a mobile device typically has to be able to communicate with the control of a passenger transport system for a certain period of time, for example during a maintenance process.
- This time period can be, for example, a few minutes, a few hours or a few days.
- the expiry time of key pairs used for protected data communication with this mobile device can therefore be dimensioned such that after the mobile device no longer has to communicate with the control of the passenger transport system, the key pairs used here automatically lose their validity or functionality. This prevents misuse of key pairs after they are no longer needed for their actual purpose.
- the common external computer can be part of a data cloud that is hosted by a company that manages the passenger transportation system.
- a manufacturer of the passenger transport system or a service provider who looks after the passenger transport system can operate a data cloud.
- This data cloud can comprise one or more computers or servers, among which is the shared external computer mentioned herein.
- the control system of the supervised passenger transport system can, for example, establish a protected data communication connection with this data cloud via a data line.
- the mobile device can set up a protected data communication connection with the data cloud, for example, via a suitable encrypted Internet connection.
- the data cloud can be part of an IT infrastructure of the company in charge of the passenger transport system and thus be under its influence and be protected by the IT protection mechanisms that are implemented there.
- the common external computer can be used, among other things, to specify rules according to which the first and second protected data communication connections are to be established.
- This can be used, for example, to also be able to specify how a mobile device must set up the second protected data communication connection in order to then be able to transmit the token over it.
- it can thus be ensured that certain rules must be observed by this mobile device. For example, it can be specified that the mobile device or a technician using the mobile device must authenticate itself before the second protected data communication connection can be established.
- Passenger transport system and a mobile device can address the following problems or difficulties, among others:
- a key pair can optionally be assigned a defined expiry time, potential damage such as that caused by hacking a
- the security of the overall system depends primarily on the IT security of the company that, among other things, controls the
- Manufactures passenger transport system operates the external common computer and / or provides software for the mobile device and is therefore responsible for establishing the protected first and second data communication connections between the controller or the mobile device on the one hand and the external common computer on the other.
- Such company-wide IT security can be better organized, updated and monitored.
- Subunit of this requires the gap to be patched at only one point.
- the device arrangement according to the second aspect of the invention which can be used to maintain a passenger transport system, is intended to control the
- Passenger transport system a separate mobile device and the common external computer include.
- Each of the communication partners mentioned can be configured to share portions of the method steps of the previously described method Establish the protected data communication connection, so that all communication partners together then execute or control the entire process.
- control of the passenger transport system according to the third aspect of the invention can be configured to be able to execute or control the entire method together with the mobile device and the common external computer.
- the controller can have, inter alia, an interface via which the first data communication connection to the common external computer can be established. Furthermore, the controller can have a further interface via which the initially unprotected data communication connection can be established with the mobile device.
- the interfaces can be line-based or wireless.
- the controller can have one or more processors and suitable data memories in order to be able to temporarily store data to be transmitted and / or to encrypt them before transmission, or to decrypt transmitted data and, if appropriate, to temporarily store them.
- the mobile device can have, inter alia, an interface via which the second data communication connection to the common external computer can be established, and also via a further interface via which the initially unprotected data communication connection to the controller can be established.
- the control system the
- Interfaces can be line-based or wireless, and one or more processors and data memories can be provided for implementing corresponding functions.
- the common external computer can have at least one or two interfaces via which the first and the second protected data communication connection can be established. Furthermore, the external computer can have one or more processors and data memories, with the aid of which it can, among other things, recognize and / or analyze received tokens and can generate key pairs. The computer can also have a random generator so that the key pairs can be generated randomly. Individual or each of the communication partners, ie the controller, the mobile device and / or the common external computer, can be programmable. A
- Computer program product can consist of several parts, each part being able to run on one of the communication partners and there by corresponding ones
- Computer program product with the various communication partners, the method described herein can be implemented.
- the computer program product can be formulated in any computer language.
- the computer program product can be stored on any computer-readable medium.
- a portable computer-readable medium such as a flash memory, a CD, a DVD or the like can be used.
- a stationary computer-readable medium such as a computer, server or a data cloud, can be provided to store the computer program product so that it can be downloaded from it, for example, via a network such as the Internet.
- Embodiments of the invention to arrive.
- FIG. 1 shows a device arrangement with the aid of which a method according to a
- Embodiment of the present invention can be implemented.
- the figure is only schematic and not to scale.
- 1 shows a device arrangement 1 according to an embodiment of the present invention.
- the device arrangement 1 comprises a controller 3 of a passenger transport system, a mobile device 5 and an external common computer 7, which can be part of a data cloud 17.
- the controller 3 has the option of communicating with the external common computer 7 via a first protected data communication connection 9.
- the mobile device 5 can establish a second protected data communication connection 11 with the external computer 7, via which data can then be exchanged.
- the mobile device 5 can communicate with the external computer 7 via a protected Internet connection.
- a wire-bound or wireless data communication connection 13 can be established without problems between the mobile device 5 and the controller 3. However, this is initially unprotected, i.e. Data is unencrypted and therefore transmitted without guaranteeing authentication.
- Communication link 13 can be modified into a protected data communication link 15 between the mobile device 5 and the controller 3.
- a technician wishes to connect his mobile device 5 to be used for maintenance purposes to the controller 3.
- he connects his mobile device 5 via a line or wirelessly to the controller 3 or the local network of the passenger transport system 1, in which this controller 3 is integrated.
- the technician can begin to activate the protected data communication link 15 by: for example, selects a button on his mobile device 5 or makes an entry in some other way.
- the mobile device 5 On the basis of this selection or this command, the mobile device 5 outputs a type of telegram which contains a randomly generated token 19 and which is transmitted to the controller 3. This initial data exchange in the form of a negotiation does not need to be protected yet.
- the controller 5 then confirms receipt of the token 19 to the mobile device 5, for example by means of another special telegram. Furthermore, the controller 5 requests from the external computer 7 to which it is connected via the protected data communication connection 9 information relating to pairing information (“pairing information”), adding the generated token 19 to the request.
- pairing information relating to pairing information
- the mobile device 5 Upon receiving the confirmation from the controller 3, the mobile device 5 also requests a pairing key from the data cloud 17 with the external computer 7 and uses the same generated token 19. The request is transmitted via the protected data communication connection 11.
- the common external computer 7 When the common external computer 7 receives the two requests, it generates two asymmetrical key pairs 29, 31, each containing a public key 25, 27 and a private key 21, 23, for the controller 3 on the one hand and for the mobile device 5 on the other hand.
- the external computer 7 then transmits the private key 21 of a first one
- the controller 3 and the mobile device 5 can use encrypted and preferably digitally signed messages to negotiate a symmetrical key (“session symmetry key”) that is valid for the following transmission process.
- session symmetry key a symmetrical key
- An elevator control system generally consists of a set of
- Control units that communicate with each other in a local network.
- one or more external devices can also communicate with the control system as so-called clients.
- external devices are distribution units, visualization computers, diagnostic units, etc.
- the controls are permanently installed, typically in a machine room.
- Authenticating controllers or other clients must all be from each other be different in order to avoid global consequences if one of these keys or credentials is no longer kept secret (ie is "leaked").
- Each member of the network is clearly identified, for example by a string that is standardized within a product line and is defined in the installation instructions for field use.
- the string of the requesting entity is stored in the volatile memory of the controller that was attempted to reach.
- the list of all requesting units can be output, for example, on an embedded operator-human-machine interface (service MMI) or on an already authenticated local computer-based service tool become.
- service MMI embedded operator-human-machine interface
- already authenticated local computer-based service tool become.
- a technician can go through the list of requesting units
- technicians use appropriately edited field instructions to verify that names are compatible with the documentation.
- all inquiring units can be approved, for example by pressing a "select all" button.
- the requesting unit After approval, the requesting unit is automatically added to the list of trusted members and data communication with this controller can take place in a secure manner.
- the approach described above has the following advantages: a) The creation of the trustworthy network between the members of the network is carried out manually under the supervision of an authorized technician. b) It is carried out locally at the time of picking. Therefore, no additional logistical effort (for example during production) is required. c) It only needs to be carried out once during the installation, as long as no new members are added or used as a replacement for, for example, defective old members. d) There is no manual handling of keys or logistics of
Abstract
Description
Claims
Applications Claiming Priority (2)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
EP18215567 | 2018-12-21 | ||
PCT/EP2019/085864 WO2020127433A1 (de) | 2018-12-21 | 2019-12-18 | Aufbauen einer geschützten datenkommunikationsverbindung zwischen einer steuerung einer personentransportanlage und einem mobilgerät |
Publications (1)
Publication Number | Publication Date |
---|---|
EP3899766A1 true EP3899766A1 (de) | 2021-10-27 |
Family
ID=65023657
Family Applications (1)
Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
---|---|---|---|
EP19818179.4A Pending EP3899766A1 (de) | 2018-12-21 | 2019-12-18 | Aufbauen einer geschützten datenkommunikationsverbindung zwischen einer steuerung einer personentransportanlage und einem mobilgerät |
Country Status (4)
Country | Link |
---|---|
US (1) | US20220086129A1 (de) |
EP (1) | EP3899766A1 (de) |
CN (1) | CN113228014A (de) |
WO (1) | WO2020127433A1 (de) |
Family Cites Families (10)
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US5249230A (en) * | 1991-11-21 | 1993-09-28 | Motorola, Inc. | Authentication system |
US8880881B2 (en) * | 2012-01-18 | 2014-11-04 | Square, Inc. | Secure communications between devices |
EP2884690A4 (de) * | 2012-08-08 | 2016-03-09 | Toshiba Kk | Vorrichtung zur erzeugung eines neuverschlüsselungsschlüssels, neuverschlüsselungsvorrichtung, verschlüsselungsvorrichtung, entschlüsselungsvorrichtung und programm |
GB2516939A (en) * | 2013-08-07 | 2015-02-11 | Eus Associates Ltd | Access authorisation system and secure data communications system |
US10979219B2 (en) * | 2014-03-12 | 2021-04-13 | Nokia Technologies Oy | Pairing of devices |
US9225742B2 (en) * | 2014-03-24 | 2015-12-29 | Airwatch Llc | Managed real-time communications between user devices |
US11228569B2 (en) * | 2016-03-01 | 2022-01-18 | Ford Global Technologies, Llc | Secure tunneling for connected application security |
US10187791B2 (en) * | 2016-04-06 | 2019-01-22 | Hrb Innovations, Inc. | Workstation and client device pairing |
US20180176256A1 (en) * | 2016-12-16 | 2018-06-21 | Futurewei Technologies, Inc. | Temporal Control and Access Control of Emails |
US10594702B2 (en) * | 2016-12-16 | 2020-03-17 | ULedger, Inc. | Electronic interaction authentication and verification, and related systems, devices, and methods |
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2019
- 2019-12-18 EP EP19818179.4A patent/EP3899766A1/de active Pending
- 2019-12-18 CN CN201980085318.5A patent/CN113228014A/zh active Pending
- 2019-12-18 WO PCT/EP2019/085864 patent/WO2020127433A1/de unknown
- 2019-12-18 US US17/309,664 patent/US20220086129A1/en active Pending
Also Published As
Publication number | Publication date |
---|---|
WO2020127433A1 (de) | 2020-06-25 |
CN113228014A (zh) | 2021-08-06 |
US20220086129A1 (en) | 2022-03-17 |
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